Return to www.BrainFly.Net

Translated by Reverend Canon Roberts

Book 33. The Second Macedonian War

The above-described events took place in the winter. At the commencement of spring Quinctius, anxious to make the Boeotians, who were uncertain which side to take, into a Roman dependency, summoned Attalus to Elatia, and marching through Phocis fixed his camp at a point five miles from Thebes, the Boeotian capital. The following day, escorted by a single maniple and accompanied by Attalus and the various deputations who had flocked to him from all quarters, he proceeded to the city. The hastati of the legion, numbering 2000 men, were ordered to follow him at a distance of one mile. About half-way he was met by Antiphilus, the captain-general of the Boeotians; the population of the city were on the walls, anxiously watching the approach of the Roman general and the king. They saw few arms and few soldiers with them, the hastati, who were following a mile behind, were hidden by the windings of the road and the undulating nature of the terrain. As he came nearer to the city he slackened his pace, as though he were saluting the crowds who had come out to meet him, but really to allow the hastati to catch him up. The townsfolk pushing along in a mass in front of the lictor did not see the armed column which had hurried up until they reached the general's quarters. Then they were utterly dismayed, as they believed that the city had been betrayed and captured through the treachery of Antiphilus. It was quite clear that the Council of Boeotia which was summoned for the next day would have no chance of unfettered deliberation. They concealed their vexation, since to have exhibited it would have been useless and dangerous.

Attalus was the first to speak in the council. He began by recounting the services which he had rendered to Greece as a whole and in particular to the Boeotians. But he was too old and infirm to stand the strain of public speaking, and suddenly became silent and fell down. Whilst they were removing the king, who had lost the use of one side, the proceedings were suspended. Aristaenus, the chief magistrate of the Achaeans, was the next to speak, and he spoke with all the more weight because he gave the Boeotians the same advice which he had given to the Achaeans. Quinctius himself added a few remarks, in which he dwelt more upon the good faith of the Romans and their sense of honour than upon their arms and resources. Dicaearchus of Plataea next brought forward a motion in favour of alliance with Rome. When its terms had been recited no one ventured to oppose it, consequently it was passed by the unanimous vote of the cities of Boeotia. After the council broke up Quinctius only stayed in Thebes as long as Attalus' sudden attack made it necessary, and as soon as he saw that there was no immediate danger to life but only powerlessness in the limbs, he left him to undergo the necessary treatment and returned to Elatia. The Boeotians, like the Achaeans before them, were thus admitted as allies, and as he was leaving everything behind in peaceful security, he was able to devote all his thoughts to Philip and the means of bringing the war to a close.

After his envoys had returned from their fruitless mission to Rome, Philip decided to raise troops in every town in his kingdom. Owing to the perpetual wars which had for so many generations drained the manhood of Macedonia there was a serious lack of men of military age, and under Philip's own rule vast numbers had perished in the naval battles against the Rhodians and Attalus and in the campaigns against the Romans. Under these circumstances he even enrolled youths of sixteen and recalled to the colours men who had served their time, provided they had any stamina left. After his army was brought up to its proper strength he concentrated the whole of his forces at Dium and formed a standing camp there in which he drilled and exercised his soldiers day by day whilst waiting for the enemy. During this time Quinctius left Elatia and marched by way of Thronium and Scarphea to Thermopylae. The Aetolian Council had been summoned to meet at Heraclea to decide the strength of the contingent which was to follow the Roman general to war, and he waited at Thermopylae for a couple of days to learn the result. When he had been informed of their decision he started, and marching past Xyniae fixed his camp where the frontiers of Acarnania and Thessaly meet. Here he waited for the Aetolian contingent, who came up without any loss of time under the command of Phaeneas. They numbered 600 infantry and 400 cavalry. To remove any doubt as to why he had waited he resumed his march as soon as they arrived. On his advance through Phthiotis he was joined by 500 Cretans from Gortynium and 300 Apollonians, armed like the Cretans, and not long after by Amynander with 1200 Athamanian infantry. As soon as Philip ascertained that the Romans had started from Elatia he realised that a struggle lay before him which would decide the fate of his kingdom, and he thought it well to address words of encouragement to his soldiers. After repeating the familiar phrases about the virtues of their ancestors and the military reputation of the Macedonians, he dwelt more especially on the considerations which tended to depress their courage and then on those from which they ought to derive consolation and hope.

Against the three defeats sustained by the Macedonian phalanx at the Aous he set the repulse of the Romans at Atrax. On the former occasion, when they failed to maintain their hold on the pass leading into Epirus, he pointed out that the fault lay, first, with those who had been careless in their outpost duties and then in the behaviour of the light infantry and the mercenaries in the actual battle. But the Macedonian phalanx stood its ground, and on favourable ground and in a fair field would always remain unbeaten. The phalanx consisted of 16,000 men, the flower of the military strength of his dominions. There were in addition 2000 caetrati, whom they call " peltasts," and contingents of the same strength were furnished by the Thracians and by the Trallians, an Illyrian tribe. Besides these there were about 1500 hired troops drawn from various nationalities. and a body of cavalry numbering 2000 troopers. With this force the king awaited his enemies. The Roman army was almost equal in numbers, in cavalry alone were they superior, owing to the accession of the Aetolians.

Quinctius had been led to hope that Thebes in Phthiotis would be betrayed to him by Timon, the first man in the city, and accordingly he marched thither. He rode up to the walls with a small body of cavalry and light infantry, but his expectations were so far frustrated by a sortie from the city that he would have been in imminent danger had not infantry and cavalry from the camp come to his assistance in time. When he found that his hopes were illusory and that there was no prospect of their being realised he desisted from any further attempt for the time. Definite information having reached him, however, that the king was now in Thessaly, though his exact whereabouts was unknown, he sent his men into the fields round to cut down and prepare stakes for a stockade. Both the Macedonians and the Greeks made use of stockades, but they did not adapt their materials either for convenience in carrying or for defensive strength. The trees they cut down were too large and too branching for the soldiery to carry together with their arms, and when they had put them in position and fenced their camp with them the demolition of their rampart was an easy matter. The large trunks stood up apart from one another and the numerous stout branches afforded a good hold, so that two, or at the most three, men by pulling together would bring a tree down, making at once a gap as wide as a gate, and there was nothing at hand with which to block the opening. On the other hand, the stakes which the Romans cut were light and generally forked with three, or at the most four, branches, so that, with his arms slung at his back, the Roman soldier could carry several of them together comfortably. Then again they fix them so close together in the ground and interlace the branches in such a way that it is impossible to discover to which particular tree any of the outside branches belong, and these are made so sharp and so closely intertwined that there is no room left for inserting the hand, nothing can be got hold of to be dragged away, nor if there were would the enemy succeed in doing so because the branches are hooked together like the links of a chain. If one happens to be pulled out, it leaves only a small opening and it is very easy to put another in its place.

Quinctius resumed his march on the following day, but as the soldiers were carrying the timber for a stockade, so that they might be ready to form an entrenched camp anywhere, the day's march was not a long one. The position he selected was about six miles from Pherae, and after fixing his camp he sent out reconnoitring parties to find out in what part of Thessaly the enemy was, and what were his intentions. Philip was in the neighbourhood of Larisa and had already received information that the Romans had left Thebes for Pherae. He, too, was anxious to bring matters to a decision and determined to make straight for the enemy, and finally fixed his camp some four miles from Pherae. The next day light infantry from both sides moved out to seize some hills which commanded the city, but when they caught sight of one another they halted and sent to their respective camps for instructions as to what they were to do now that they had come unexpectedly upon the enemy. As they awaited their return without moving the day passed without any fighting and these detachments were recalled to camp. The next day there was a cavalry action near those hills, in which Philip's troops were routed and driven back to their camp; a success in which the Aetolians had the greatest share. Both sides were greatly hampered in their movements by the nature of the ground, which was thickly planted with trees, and by the gardens which are usually found in suburban districts, the roads being enclosed between walls and in some cases blocked. Both commanders alike determined to get out of the neighbourhood, and as though by mutual agreement they both made for Scotusa: Philip, in the hope of obtaining a supply of corn there; Quinctius, with the intention of forestalling his adversary and destroying his corn. The armies marched the whole day without once getting sight of each other owing to a continuous range of hills which lay between them. The Romans encamped at Eretria in Phthiotis, Philip fixed his camp by the river Onchestus. The next day Philip encamped at Melambium in the territory of Scotusa and Quinctius at Thetideum in the neighbourhood of Pharsalia, but not even then did either side know for certain where their enemy was. The third day heavy clouds came up, followed by a darkness as black as night which kept the Romans in their camp for fear of a surprise attack.

Eager to press on, Philip was not in the least deterred by the clouds which had descended to the earth after the rain, and he ordered the standard-bearers to march out. But so thick a fog had blotted out the daylight that the standard-bearers could not see their way, nor could the men see their standards. Misled by the confused shouts, the column was thrown into as great disorder as if it had lost its way in a night march. When they had surmounted the range of hills called Cynoscephalae, where they left a strong force of infantry and cavalry in occupation, they formed their camp. The Roman general was still in camp at Thetideum; he sent out, however, ten squadrons of cavalry and a thousand velites to reconnoitre and warned them to be on their guard against an ambuscade, which owing to the darkened daylight might not be detected even in open country. When they reached the heights where the enemy were posted both sides stood stock-still as though paralysed by mutual fear. As soon as their alarm at the unexpected sight subsided they sent messages to their generals in camp and did not hesitate any longer to engage. The action was begun by the advanced patrols, and then as the supports came up the fighting became general. The Romans were by no means a match for their opponents, and they sent message after message to their general to inform him that they were being overpowered. A reinforcement of 500 cavalry and 2000 infantry, mostly Aetolians, under two military tribunes, was hastily despatched and restored the battle, which was going against the Romans. This turn of fortune threw the Macedonians into difficulties and they sent to their king for help. But as owing to the darkness a battle was the last thing he had looked for on that day, and as a large number of men of all ranks had been sent out to forage, he was for a considerable time at a loss what to do. The messages became more and more importunate, and as the fog had now cleared away and revealed the situation of the Macedonians who had been driven to the topmost height and were finding more safety in their position than in their arms, Philip felt that he ought to risk a general and decisive engagement rather than let a part of his force be lost through want of support. Accordingly he sent Athenagoras, the commander of the mercenaries, with the whole of the foreign contingent, except the Thracians, and also the Macedonian and Thessalian cavalry. Their appearance resulted in the Romans being dislodged from the hill and compelled to retreat to lower ground. That they were not driven in disorderly flight was mainly owing to the Aetolian cavalry, which at that time was the best in Greece, though in infantry they were inferior to their neighbours.

This affair was reported to the king as a more important success than the facts warranted. Messenger after messenger ran back from the field shouting that the Romans were in flight, and though the king, reluctant and hesitating, declared that the action had been begun rashly and that neither the time nor the place suited him, he was at last driven into bringing the whole of his forces into the field. The Roman commander did the same, more because no other course was open to him than because he wished to seize the opportunity of a battle. He posted the elephants in front of his right wing, which he kept in reserve; the left, with the whole of the light infantry, he led in person against the enemy. As they advanced he reminded them that they were going to fight with the same Macedonians as those whom in spite of the difficult ground they had driven out of the pass leading into Epirus, protected though they were by the mountains and the river, and had thoroughly defeated; the same as those whom they had vanquished under P. Sulpicius when they tried to stop their march on Eordaea. The kingdom of Macedonia, he declared, stood by its prestige, not by its strength, and even its prestige had at last disappeared. By this time he had come up to his detachments who were standing at the bottom of the valley. They at once renewed the fight and by a fierce attack compelled the enemy to give ground. Philip with his caetrati and the infantry of his right wing, the finest body in his army, which they call "the phalanx," went at the enemy almost at a run; Nicanor, one of his courtiers, was ordered to follow at once with the rest of his force. As soon as he reached the top of the hill and saw a few of the enemy's bodies and weapons lying about, he concluded that there had been a battle there and that the Romans had been repulsed, and when he further saw that fighting was going on near the enemy's camp he was in a state of great exultation. Soon, however, when his men came back in flight and it was his turn to be alarmed, he was for a few moments anxiously debating whether he ought not to recall his troops to camp. Then, as the enemy were approaching, and especially as his own men were being cut down as they fled and could not be saved unless they were defended by fresh troops, and also as retreat was no longer safe, he found himself compelled to take the supreme risk, though half his force had not yet come up. The cavalry and light infantry who had been in action he stationed on his right; the caetrati and the men of the phalanx were ordered to lay aside their spears, the length of which only embarrassed them, and make use of their swords. To prevent his line from being quickly broken he halved the front and gave twice the depth to the files, so that the depth might be greater than the width. He also ordered the ranks to close up so that man might be in touch with man and arms with arms.

After the Roman troops who had been engaged had retired through the intervals between the leading maniples, Quinctius ordered the trumpets to sound the advance. Seldom, it is said, has such a battle-shout been raised at the beginning of an action, for both armies happened to shout at the same moment, not only those actually engaged, but even the Roman reserves and the Macedonians who were just then appearing on the field. On the right the king, aided mainly by the higher ground on which he was fighting, had the advantage. On the left, where that part of the phalanx which formed the rear was only just coming up, all was confusion and disorder. The centre stood and looked on as though it were watching a fight in which it had no concern. The newly-arrived part of the phalanx, in column instead of in line of battle, in marching rather than in fighting formation, had hardly reached the crest of the hill. Though Quinctius saw that his men were giving ground on the left he sent the elephants against these unformed troops and followed up with a charge, rightly judging that the rout of a part would involve the rest. The result was not long in doubt; the Macedonians in front, terrified by the animals, instantly turned tail, and when these were repulsed the rest followed them. One of the military tribunes, seeing the position, suddenly made up his mind what to do, and leaving that part of his line which was undoubtedly winning, wheeled round with twenty maniples and attacked the enemy's right from behind. No army when attacked in the rear can fail to be shaken, but the inevitable confusion was increased by the inability of the Macedonian phalanx, a heavy and immobile formation, to face round on a new front. To make matters worse, they were at a serious disadvantage from the ground, for in following their repulsed enemy down the hill they had left the height for the enemy to make use of in his enveloping movement. Assailed on both sides they lost heavily, and in a short time they flung away their arms and took to flight.

With a small body of horse and foot Philip occupied the highest point on the hills in order to see what fortune his left wing had met with. When he became aware of their disorderly flight and saw the Roman standards and arms flashing on all the hills he too left the field. Quinctius, who was pressing on the retiring foe, saw the Macedonians suddenly holding their spears upright, and as he was doubtful as to what they intended by this unfamiliar maneuver he held up the pursuit for a few minutes. On learning that it was the Macedonian signal of surrender, he made up his mind to spare them. The soldiers, however, unaware that the enemy were no longer resisting and ignorant of their general's intention, commenced an attack upon them, and when those in front had been cut down the rest scattered in flight. Philip himself rode off at a hard gallop in the direction of Tempe and drew rein at Gomphi, where he remained for a day to pick up any survivors from the battle. The Romans broke into the hostile camp in hopes of plunder, but they found that it had to a large extent been cleared out by the Aetolians. 8000 of the enemy perished that day; 5000 were made prisoners. Of the victors about 700 fell. If we are to believe Valerius, who is given to boundless exaggeration, 40,000 of the enemy were killed and-here his invention is not so wild-5700 made prisoners and 249 standards captured. Claudius too writes that 32,000 of the enemy were killed and 4300 made prisoners. We have taken the smaller number, not because it is the smaller, but because we have followed Polybius, who is no untrustworthy authority on Roman history especially when the scene of it is in Greece.

After collecting together the fugitives who had been scattered in the various stages of the battle and had followed him in his flight, Philip despatched men to burn his papers at Larisa, that they might not fall into the enemy's hands, and then retreated into Macedonia. Quinctius sold some of the prisoners and a part of the booty and gave the rest to the soldiers, after which he proceeded to Larisa, not knowing for certain in what direction the king had gone or what movements he was contemplating. Whilst he was there a herald arrived from the king ostensibly to ask for an armistice for the purpose of burying those who had fallen in the battle, but really to ask for permission to open negotiations for peace. Both requests were granted by the Roman general, who also sent a message to the king bidding him not to lose heart. This gave great offence to the Aetolians, who were intensely mortified and said that the commander had been changed by his victory. Before the battle, so they alleged, he used to consult his allies on all matters great and small, but now they were excluded from all his counsels; he was acting solely on his own judgment. He was looking out for an opportunity of ingratiating himself personally with Philip so that after the Aetolians had borne the whole burden of the hardships and sufferings of the war the Roman might secure for himself all the credit and advantages of peace. As a matter of fact Quinctius certainly did show the Aetolians less consideration, but they were quite ignorant of his reason for treating them with neglect. They believed that he was looking for bribes from Philip, though he was a man who never yielded to the temptation of money; but it was not without good reason that he was disgusted with the Aetolians for their insatiable appetite for plunder and their arrogance in claiming for themselves the credit of the victory, a piece of vanity which offended all men's ears. Besides, if Philip were out of the way and the kingdom of Macedonia hopelessly crushed he recognised that the Aetolians must be regarded as the dominant power in Greece. Dictated by these considerations his conduct was deliberately designed to humiliate and belittle them in the eyes of Greece.

The enemy were granted a fifteen days' armistice and arrangements were made for a conference with Philip. Before the date fixed for it Quinctius called his allies into consultation and laid before them the conditions of peace which he thought ought to be imposed. Amynander briefly stated his view, which was that the terms should be such that Greece should be sufficiently strong, even in the absence of the Romans, to protect her liberty and prevent the peace from being broken. The Aetolians spoke in a more vindictive tone. After a brief allusion to the correctness of Quinctius' attitude in calling in those who had been his allies in war to advise with him on the question of peace, they went on to assure him that he was totally mistaken if he supposed that he would leave either peace with Rome or liberty for Greece on a sure basis unless Philip were either put to death or expelled from his kingdom. Either of these alternatives was easy for him if he chose to make full use of his victory. Quinctius replied that in uttering these sentiments the Aetolians were losing sight of the settled policy of Rome and convicting themselves of inconsistency. In all the former councils and conferences when discussing the question of peace they had never advocated the destruction of Macedonia, and the Romans, whose policy from the earliest times had been to show mercy to the conquered, had furnished a conspicuous proof of this in the peace which had been granted to Hannibal and the Carthaginians. Leaving the Carthaginians, however, out of account, how often had he himself had conferences with Philip? But never had the question of his abdication been raised. Had his defeat in battle made the war one of extermination? "An enemy in arms one is bound to meet with ruthless hostility; towards the conquered the greatest minds show the greatest clemency. You think that kings of Macedon are a danger to the liberties of Greece. If that nation and kingdom were swept away, Thracians, Illyrians, Gauls, savage and barbarous tribes, would pour into Macedonia and then into Greece. Do not, by removing the danger closest to you, open the door to greater and more serious ones." Here he was interrupted by Phaeneas, the president of the Aetolian league, who solemnly declared amid great excitement that if Philip escaped then, he would soon prove a still more dangerous enemy. "Cease your uproar," said Quinctius, "when we have to deliberate. Peace will not be settled upon such terms as to make it possible to recommence war."

The council broke up, and on the morrow Philip went to the spot fixed for the conference, which was in the pass leading into Tempe. The day following a meeting of the Romans and all their allies was convened, before which he appeared. He showed great prudence in deliberately abstaining from any allusion to those conditions which were regarded as essential, instead of letting them be forced from him in the discussion. All the concessions which in the former conference the Romans had insisted upon or the allies had demanded he said he would agree to, everything else he would leave to the decision of the senate. This would seem to have precluded any further demands even from those most hostile to him, and yet Phaeneas broke the general silence by asking, "What? Philip! Do you at last restore to us Larisa, Cremaste, Echinus and Phthiotic Thebes?" On Philip replying that he placed no difficulty in the way of their resuming possession of these places, a dispute arose between Quinctius and the Aetolians over Thebes. Quinctius asserted that it belonged to Rome by the right of war, for before the war broke out he marched there and invited the citizens to enter into friendly relations with him, and whilst they were at full liberty to abandon Philip they preferred his allegiance to that of the Romans. Phaeneas retorted that it was only just and equitable, considering the part they had taken in the war, that all which the Aetolians possessed before the war should be restored to them. It was provided by treaty from the very first that the spoils of war, including all movable goods and all livestock and prisoners, should go to the Romans; the conquered cities and territories to the Aetolians. "You yourselves," replied Quinctius, "broke that treaty when you left us and made peace with Philip. If it were still in force, it would only apply to the cities which have been captured; the cities of Thessaly have passed into our power of their own free will." This declaration was approved by all the allies, but created a bitter feeling amongst the Aetolians at the time, and soon led to a war which proved most disastrous to them. It was agreed that Philip should give up his son Demetrius and some of "the friends of the king" as hostages and also pay an indemnity of 200 talents. With regard to the other matters, he was to send an embassy to Rome and a four months' truce was granted him to enable him to do so. In case the senate declined to grant terms of peace the agreement was to be cancelled and the hostages and money returned to Philip. The main reason for Quinctius desiring an early peace is alleged to have been the warlike designs of Antiochus and his threatened invasion of Europe.

At this very time, and according to some accounts on the very day on which the battle of Cynoscephalae was fought, the Achaeans routed Androsthenes, one of Philip's generals, in a pitched battle at Corinth. Philip intended to hold that city as a menace to the States of Greece, and after inviting the leading citizens to a conference on the pretext of settling what force of cavalry the Corinthians could furnish for the war, he had detained them all as hostages. The force in occupation consisted of 500 Macedonians and 800 auxiliaries of various nationalities. In addition to these he had sent 1000 Macedonians and 1200 Illyrians and also Thracian and Cretan contingents (these tribes fought on both sides), amounting to 800 in all. There were in addition 1000 heavy-armed troops, consisting of Boeotians, Thessalians and Acarnanians. A draft from Corinth itself made up the whole force to 6000 men, and Androsthenes felt himself strong enough to give battle. The Achaean captain-general, Nicostratus, was at Sicyon with 2000 infantry and 200 cavalry, but seeing that he was inferior in both the number and the quality of his troops, he did not venture outside the walls. The king's troops overran and ravaged the territories of Pellene, Phlius and Cleonae. At last, to show their contempt for the timidity of their enemy, they invaded the territory of Sicyon and, sailing along the Achaean seaboard, harried and wasted the land. Their confidence, as is usually the case, made them careless, and their raids were conducted with an absence of all precautions. Seeing a possibility of a successful surprise attack, Nicostratus sent secret information to all the cities round as to what force each city should contribute and on what day they should all muster at Apelaurus, a place in Stymphalia. All being in readiness on the appointed day he made a night march through the district of Phlius to Cleonae, no one knowing what his object was. He had with him 5000 infantry, of which . . . were light-armed troops, and also 300 cavalry. With this force he waited for the return of the scouting patrols whom he had sent out to ascertain in what direction the enemy had dispersed themselves.

Androsthenes, in perfect ignorance of all this, marched out from Corinth and encamped by the Nemea, a stream which divides the territory of Corinth from that of Sicyon. Here, leaving half his army in camp, he formed the other half and the whole of the cavalry into three divisions and ordered them to make simultaneous raids in the territories of Pellene, Sicyon and Phlius. The three divisions marched off on their separate errands. As soon as intelligence of this was brought to Nicostratus at Cleonae, he promptly sent a strong detachment of mercenaries to seize the pass leading to Corinth. He followed with his army in two columns, the cavalry forming an advanced guard. In one column marched the mercenaries and light infantry; in the other the hoplites, the main strength of all Greek armies. When they were not far from the hostile camp some of the Thracians began to attack the parties of the enemy scattered in the fields. The camp was filled with sudden alarm and the commander was surprised and bewildered. He had never seen the enemy, unless it were a few here and there on the hills before Sicyon, as they did not venture on the lower ground, and he never supposed that they would leave their position at Cleonae and take the aggressive against him. The dispersed parties were recalled to camp by sound of trumpet, and, ordering the soldiers to seize their arms with all speed, he hurried out, of the camp with a weak force and formed his line on the river bank. The other troops had hardly had time to collect and form, and did not withstand the first charge, but the Macedonians, who formed the bulk of the fighting line, made the victory for a long time doubtful. At length, with their flank exposed by the flight of the rest of the army and subjected to two separate attacks from the light infantry on their flank and the hoplites and heavy armed on their front, they began to give ground, and, as the pressure increased, turned and fled. The greater number flung away their arms and, abandoning all hope of holding their camp, made for Corinth. Against these Nicostratus sent his mercenaries in pursuit, and despatched the cavalry and Thracian auxiliaries to attack the plundering parties round Sicyon. Here too there was great slaughter, almost more, in fact, than in the actual battle. Some who had been ravaging the country round Pellene and Phlius were returning to camp, in no military formation and unaware of all that had happened, when they fell in with the enemy patrols where they had expected to find their own. Others, seeing men running in all directions, suspected what had happened and fled with such precipitation that they lost themselves and even the peasantry were able to cut them off. 1500 men fell on that day and 300 prisoners were secured. The whole of Achaia was delivered from a great fear.

Acarnania was the only Greek State that still adhered to the Macedonian alliance. Before the battle of Cynoscephalae L. Quinctius had invited their chiefs to a conference at Corcyra, where he induced them to take the first step towards a change of policy. The two main reasons for their fidelity were their innate sense of loyalty and their fear and dislike of the Aetolians. A national council was convened at Leucas. It was by no means generally attended, nor did those who were present agree as to the course to be pursued. The leaders, however, including the presiding magistrate, succeeded in getting a party motion carried in favour of an alliance with Rome. The cities which had not sent representatives resented this strongly, and amidst the national excitement two of their leading men, Androcles and Echedemus, emissaries of Philip, had sufficient influence not only to obtain the cancelling of the decree, but even to secure the condemnation of its authors, Archelaus and Bianor, on a charge of treason and the dismissal from office of Zeuxidas, who as president had allowed the motion to be put. The condemned men took a hazardous but, as events turned out, a successful step. Their friends advised them to bow to circumstances and go to the Romans at Corcyra, but they resolved to present themselves before the people and either calm the popular indignation or submit to whatever fortune might have in store for them. When they entered the crowded council chamber there were at first murmurs of astonishment, but soon the respect inspired by the high position they once held and the compassion felt for their present misfortunes evoked silent sympathy. Permission having been given them to speak, they at first adopted a suppliant tone, but when it came to meeting the charges against them they defended themselves with all the confidence of innocent men, and at last they ventured to complain mildly of the treatment they had received and remonstrated against the injustice and cruelty which had been meted out to them. The feelings of their audience were so stirred that all the decrees made against them were rescinded by a large majority. Nevertheless it was decided to go back to the alliance with Philip and renounce friendly relations with Rome.

These decrees were passed at Leucas, the capital of Acarnania and the seat of the national council. When this sudden change of feeling was reported to Flamininus at Corcyra, he at once set sail for Leucas and brought up at a spot called the Heraeum. He then advanced towards the city with every description of artillery and siege engines, thinking that at the first shock of alarm the defenders would lose heart. As soon as he saw that there were no signs of their asking for peace he began to set up the vineae and towers and bring the battering-rams up to the walls. Acarnania as a whole lies between Aetolia and Epirus and looks westward towards the Sicilian Sea. Leucadia, which is now an island separated from Acarnania by a canal of moderate depth, was then a peninsula, connected with the western shore of Acarnania by a narrow isthmus half a mile long, and at no point more than 120 paces broad. The city of Leucas is situated at the head of this isthmus, resting on a hill which faces eastward towards Acarnania; the lowest part of the city lies on the sea front and is level. This makes it open to attack both by land and sea, for the shallow waters are more like a lagoon than like the sea, and the soil of the surrounding plain can easily be thrown up for lines of investment and siege works. Many parts of the wall were in consequence undermined or shaken down by the battering-rams. But the advantage which the situation of the city gave to the assailants was counterbalanced by the indomitable spirit of the defenders. Ever on the alert, night and day they repaired the shattered walls, barricaded the breaches, made constant sorties and defended their walls by arms more than their walls defended them. The siege would have been protracted longer than the Romans anticipated had not some refugees of Italian nationality who were living in Leucas admitted soldiers from the citadel. Once admitted, they ran down with great tumult from the higher ground and found the Leucadians drawn up in battle formation in the forum, who offered a stout resistance. In the meanwhile the walls had in many places been successfully escaladed, and over the heaps of stones and debris a way was made into the city. By this time the general himself had enveloped the combatants with considerable force, and whilst some perished between the two bodies of assailants others threw down their arms and surrendered. A few days later, on hearing of the battle of Cynoscephalae; the whole of Acarnania submitted to the Roman general.

In every direction alike Philip's fortunes were sinking. Just at this time the Rhodians determined to win back from him the district on the mainland known as Peraea, which had been held by their forefathers. An expedition was despatched under the command of Pausistratus, consisting of 1300 Achaean infantry and about 1800 miscellaneous troops drawn from various nations-Gauls and Pisuetae; Nisuetae, Tamians and Trahi from Africa, and Laudicenes from Asia. With this force Pausistratus seized Tendeba, an extremely advantageous position situated in the territory of Stratonice, the king's troops who had held it being unaware of his advance. Here he was joined by a body of 1000 Achaean infantry and 400 cavalry specially raised for this campaign. They were commanded by Theoxenus. Dinocrates, one of the king's lieutenants, marched to Tendeba with a view of recovering the place, and from there to Astragon, another fortified position in the same district. All the scattered garrisons were recalled, and with these and a contingent of Thessalians from Stratonice itself he went on to Abanda where the enemy lay. The Rhodians were quite ready for battle, and as the camps lay near one another they at once took the field. Dinocrates posted his 500 Macedonians on his right and the Agrianians on his left, and formed his centre from the troops of the various garrisons, mostly Carians, whilst the flanks were covered by the Macedonian horse and the Cretan and Thracian irregulars. The Rhodians had the Achaeans on their right and a picked force of mercenaries on their left; the centre was held by a mixed force drawn from several nationalities; their cavalry and such light infantry as they had protected their flanks.

On that day the two armies only stood on the banks of the stream, which was then running low, and after discharging a few missiles at each other returned to camp. The following day they were marshalled in the same order, and the action which followed was a much more keenly contested one than might have been expected from the numbers engaged. There were not more than 3000 infantry and about 100 cavalry on each side, but they were fairly matched not only in numbers and equipment, but also in courage and tenacity. The battle was begun by the Achaeans, who crossed the rivulet and attacked the Agrianians, and they were followed by the whole line, who went over the brook at the double. For a long time the struggle remained doubtful, till the Achaeans, who numbered . . ., compelled the 400 to give ground. With the enemy's left pushed back, they concentrated their attack on his right. As long as the Macedonian ranks were unbroken and the phalanx kept its close formation they could not be moved, but when their left was exposed and they tried to bring their spears round to face the enemy who were making a flank attack, they at once got into confusion and fell foul of one another, then they turned and at last, flinging away their arms, broke into headlong flight. The fugitives made for Bargyliae, and Dinocrates also fled thither. The Rhodians kept up the pursuit for the remainder of the day and then returned to camp. Had they gone on to Stratonice straight from the battle-field the city would in all probability have been taken, but they lost the chance of doing this by wasting their time in recovering the fortified posts and villages in Peraea. During this interval those in command at Stratonice regained their courage, and before long Dinocrates with the survivors from the battle entered the place. The city was subsequently besieged and assaulted, but all to no purpose, nor could it be secured until some years later, when it was made over to the Rhodians by Antiochus. These incidents occurred almost simultaneously in Thessaly, Achaia and Asia.

Emboldened by the successive Macedonian defeats, the Dardanians began to lay waste the northern part of the realm. Although Philip had almost the whole world against him and Fortune was driving him and his people out of every place in turn, he felt that to be expelled from Macedonia itself would be worse than death. No sooner, therefore, did he hear of the Dardanian invasion than he hurriedly levied troops in all the cities of his kingdom and with a force of 6000 infantry and 500 cavalry he came upon the enemy unexpectedly near Stobi in Paeonia. A great many men fell in the battle, a greater number amongst the fields, where they were dispersed in the hope of plunder. Where there was no obstacle to flight they were in no mood to risk the chance of a battle, and so they retired within their own borders. The success of this expedition, so different from the state of things elsewhere, revived the spirits of his men. After this he returned to Thessalonica. The close of the Punic War took place at a favourable moment, for it removed the danger of having a second war on hand at the same time, namely the war against Philip. Still more opportune was the victory over Philip at a time when Antiochus was already taking hostile action from Syria. Not only was it easier to meet each singly than if they had joined forces, but Spain was giving trouble at the same time and a warlike movement on a large scale was taking place in that country. During the previous summer Antiochus had reduced all the cities in Coelo-Syria which had been under Ptolemy's sway, and though he had now withdrawn into winter quarters he displayed as great activity as he had done during the summer. He had called up the whole strength of his kingdom and had amassed enormous forces, both military and naval. At the commencement of spring he had sent his two sons, Ardys and Mithridates, with an army to Sardis with instructions to wait for him there whilst he started by sea with a fleet of a hundred decked ships and two hundred smaller vessels, including swift pinnaces and Cyprian barques. His object was twofold: to attempt the reduction of the cities along the whole coastline of Cilicia, Lycia and Caria which owed allegiance to Ptolemy, and also to assist Philip-the war with him was not over-both by land and sea.

The Rhodians have given many splendid proofs of their courage in maintaining their loyalty to Rome and in defending the liberties of Greece, but never did they afford a finer instance of it than at this time. Undismayed by the vastness of the impending war they sent a message to the king forbidding him to sail beyond the promontory of Chelidonia in Cilicia, a place rendered famous by its being mentioned in an ancient treaty between the Athenians and the kings of Persia. If he did not keep his fleet and his forces within that limit, they informed him that they should oppose him, not because of any personal enmity to him, but because they would not allow him to join forces with Philip and so hinder the Romans in their work of liberating Greece. Antiochus was at the time investing Coracesium. He had so far secured Zephyrium, Soli, Aphrodisias and Corycus, and after rounding Anemurium-another Cilician headland-had captured Selinus. All these towns and other fortified places on this coast had submitted to him either voluntarily or under the stress of fear, but Coracesium unexpectedly shut its gates against him. During this delay the Rhodian envoys obtained an audience of him. The tenor of their instructions was of a nature to rouse the king's wrath, but he curbed his anger and told them that he should send envoys to Rhodes with instructions to renew the old ties which he and his ancestors had formed with that State, and also to reassure them as to the object of his approach, which would bring no injury or loss either to them or to their allies. The embassy which he had sent to Rome had just returned, and as the issue of the war with Philip was still uncertain the senate had wisely given them a favourable reception. Antiochus alleged the gracious reply of the senate and the resolution they passed, so complimentary to him, as a proof that he had no intention of breaking off his friendly relations with Rome. Whilst the king's envoys were urging these considerations in a meeting of the citizens of Rhodes, news came that the war had been brought to a close at Cynoscephalae. On receipt of this intelligence the Rhodians, having nothing more to fear from Philip, abandoned their design of opposing Antiochus with their fleet. They did not, however, abandon the other object, the defence of the liberties of the States in alliance with Ptolemy which Antiochus was now threatening. To some they gave active assistance, others they forewarned of the movements of the enemy; it was thus that Caunos, Myndus, Halicarnassus and Samos owed their liberty to Rhodes. It is not worth while to go in detail into the events which happened in this part of the world, seeing that it is almost beyond my powers to deal with those especially connected with the war with Rome.

It was at this time that Attalus, who owing to his illness had been carried from Thebes to Pergamum, died there in his seventy-second year after a reign of forty-four years. Beyond his wealth Fortune had bestowed nothing on this man which could lead him to hope that he would ever be king. But by making a wise use of his riches and at the same time employing them on a magnificent scale he gradually began to be regarded, first in his own estimation and then in the eyes of his friends, as not unworthy of the crown. In one decisive battle he defeated the Gauls-a nation all the more dreaded because they had migrated into Asia comparatively recently-and after this victory he assumed the royal title and ever after justified it by a corresponding greatness of soul. He governed his subjects with absolute justice and showed exceptional loyalty to his allies; affectionate towards his wife and his children, four of whom survived him, he was considerate and generous to his friends and left his kingdom so settled and secure that the possession of it descended to the third generation of his posterity. This was the state of things in Greece, Asia and Macedonia, when just as the campaign against Philip was brought to a close and before peace had been definitely established a serious war broke out in Further Spain. M. Helvius was administering the province, and he wrote to the senate to inform them that the tribal chiefs Culchas and Luxinius were in arms. Fifteen fortified towns were taking part with Culchas, whilst Luxinius was supported by the strong cities of Carmo and Bardo, the Malacini and Sexetani on the coast and the whole of Baeturia. In addition to these the tribes which had not yet disclosed their intentions were prepared to rise as soon as their neighbours moved. After M. Sergius, the city praetor, had read this despatch in the senate a decree was passed ordering that after the new praetors were elected the one who obtained Spain as his province should as soon as possible ask for the senate's instructions as to the military operations there.
 

The consuls arrived in Rome both at the same time and convened the senate at the temple of Bellona. On their demanding a triumph for their military successes, they were opposed by two of the tribunes of the plebs, who insisted on the proposal being submitted to the House by each consul separately. They would not permit a joint proposal to be made on the ground that in that case equal honours would be conferred when the services were far from equal. Q. Minucius replied that Italy had been assigned to them both and he and his colleague had conducted their operations with one mind and one policy. C. Cornelius added that when the Boii crossed the Po to assist the Insubres and the Cenomanni it was through his colleague's action in laying waste their fields and villages that they were compelled to return and defend their own country. The tribunes admitted that the achievements of C. Cethegus were such that there could be no more hesitation about according him a triumph than about paying honours to the immortal gods. Neither Cethegus, however, nor any other citizen possessed so much influence and power that he could, after obtaining a well-deserved triumph for himself, grant the same honour to a colleague who did not deserve it, and whose request for it was an affront. Q. Minucius, they declared, had fought some insignificant actions, hardly worth talking about, amongst the Ligurians and had lost a large number of men in Gaul. Two military tribunes, T. Juventius and Cneius Ligurius, both attached to the fourth legion, had fallen in an unsuccessful battle in company with many other brave men, both citizens and allies. A few towns and villages had ostensibly surrendered for the time being, without giving any guarantee of good faith. These altercations between the consuls and the tribunes took up two days. At last the pertinacity of the tribunes won the day and the consuls submitted their requests separately.

A triumph was unanimously decreed to C. Cethegus. His popularity was still further enhanced by delegates from Cremona and Placentia, who gratefully described how he had delivered them from the horrors of a siege, and in the case of most of those who had fallen into the enemy's hands from actual slavery. Q. Minucius put his motion merely tentatively, and on finding the whole senate opposed to him gave out that by virtue of his rights as consul, and in accordance with the precedent set by many illustrious men, he should triumph on the Alban Mount. C. Cethegus celebrated his triumph while he was still in office. Many military standards were carried in the procession, many spoils in captured wagons and many noble Gauls were led before his chariot. Some authorities aver that the Carthaginian general Hamilcar was amongst them. But the eyes of all were turned chiefly to a crowd of colonists from Cremona and Placentia who followed the consul's chariot wearing the cap of liberty. The amount of specie carried in the procession was 237,500 ases and 79,000 silver denarii. Each of the soldiers received a bonus of 70 ases and double the amount was given to each centurion and horseman. Q. Minucius celebrated his victories over the Ligurians and the Boii on the Alban Mount. Though this triumph was less of a distinction than the other in respect of the scene and glory of his achievements, and though everybody was aware that its cost was not defrayed from the public treasury, still it about equalled it in the number of standards and wagons and spoils. Even the amount of money almost reached the same figure; there were 254,000 ases and 53,200 silver denarii. He gave to each of his soldiers the same sums as his colleague had given

After the triumph came the elections. The new consuls were L. Furius Purpurio and M. Claudius Marcellus. The praetors elected the day following were Q. Fabius Buteo, Tiberius Sempronius Longus, Q. Minucius Thermus, Manius Acilius Glabrio, L. Apustius Fullo and C. Laelius. About the end of the year despatches arrived from T. Quinctius stating that he had fought a pitched battle with Philip in Thessaly, and that the enemy had been routed and put to flight. These despatches were read by Sergius first in the senate and then, with the sanction of the senate, at a meeting of the citizens. A five days' thanksgiving was appointed for this success. The joint delegation from T. Quinctius and Philip arrived soon afterwards. The Macedonians were conducted to the Government building in the Campus Martius, where they were accommodated as guests of the State. The senate received them in audience in the temple of Bellona; no long speeches were made, for the delegates simply stated that the king was prepared to act in accordance with the wishes of the senate. Following the traditional usage, ten commissioners were appointed to advise with T. Quinctius as to the terms on which peace was to be granted to Philip, and a clause was added to the decree providing that among the members of the commission should be included P. Sulpicius and P. Villius, to whom Macedonia had been assigned as their province when they were consuls. On the same day a petition was presented by the inhabitants of Cosa praying that their numbers might be enlarged, and an order was made for a thousand fresh colonists to be enrolled, no one to be included in the number who had been an enemy alien since the consulship of P. Cornelius and Tiberius Sempronius.

The Roman Games in the Circus Maximus and the scenic plays on the stage were exhibited by the curule aediles, P. Cornelius Scipio and Cneius Manlius Vulso, on a more splendid scale than usual, and amid greater hilarity on the part of the spectators owing to the recent successes in the field. Three times they were repeated in every detail. The Plebeian Games were repeated seven times. The latter were exhibited by Manius Acilius Glabrio and C. Laelius, and out of the proceeds of fines they set up bronze statues of Ceres, Liber and Libera. The first business before the new consuls, L. Furius and M. Claudius Marcellus, after taking office was the allotment of the provinces. The senate was preparing to decree Italy as the province for both, but the consuls tried hard to get Macedonia allotted as well as Italy. Marcellus, who was the more anxious of the two to obtain Macedonia, declared that the peace with Philip was illusory and that if the Roman army were withdrawn he would resume hostilities. This made the senate hesitate in coming to a decision, and the consul would probably have gained his point had not two tribunes of the plebs, Q. Marcius Ralla and C. Atinius Labeo, threatened to interpose their veto unless the plebs were first consulted as to whether it was their will and pleasure that peace should be made with Philip. The question was submitted to the plebs in the Capitol, and the whole of the thirty-five tribes voted in the affirmative. The satisfaction felt at the peaceful settlement with Macedonia was all the more welcome owing to the gloomy news from Spain and the publication of a despatch stating that the proconsul, C. Sempronius Tuditanus, acting in Hither Spain had been defeated and his army routed and put to flight. Many men of high rank had fallen in the battle, and Tuditanus himself was seriously wounded and died soon after being carried off the field. Italy was assigned to both the consuls as their province, together with the legions which the previous consuls had had, and they were to raise four new legions, two to garrison the City and two to be at the disposal of the senate. T. Quinctius Flamininus was to remain in his province with the army which he had, and the previous extension of his command was deemed sufficient.

The praetors next balloted for their provinces. L. Apustius Fullo obtained the City jurisdiction, M. Acilius Glabrio the jurisdiction in causes between citizens and aliens. Q. Fabius Buteo received Further Spain and Q. Minucius Thermus, Hither Spain. C. Laelius was allotted Sicily and Tiberius Sempronius Longus, Sardinia. The consuls were ordered to furnish the two praetors who were to proceed to Spain with one legion each from the four new legions they were raising and also 4000 allied infantry and 300 cavalry. These two praetors were ordered to proceed to their provinces at the earliest possible moment. The Spanish war, which was practically a fresh war, because the natives had resorted to arms on their own account without any Carthaginian army or general to support them, broke out five years after the former war had been brought to a close simultaneously with the Punic War. Before the praetors started for Spain, or the consuls left the City, they were charged with the expiation of the various portents that had been announced. P. Villius, a Roman knight who was on his way to the Sabine country, was killed, together with his horse, by a flash of lightning. The temple of Ferona near Capenae was similarly struck. At the temple of Moneta two spear-heads burst into flame. A wolf entered the City through the Porta Esquilina, the busiest part of the City, and ran down to the Forum; it then ran through the Tuscan and Cermalian wards, and finally escaped through the Porta Capena almost untouched. These portents were expiated by the sacrifice of full-grown victims.

During this interval Cneius Cornelius Blasio, who had administered Hither Spain before Tuditanus, was authorised by the senate to enter the City in ovation. Before him were borne 1515 pounds of gold and 20,000 of silver, and also 34,500 silver denarii. L. Stertinius, who made no effort to obtain a triumph, brought away from Further Spain 50,000 pounds of silver for the public treasury, and with the proceeds from the sale of the spoil he erected two gateways in the Forum Boarium in front of the temples of Fortuna and Mater Matuta, and one in the Circus Maximus. On these three structures he placed gilded statues. The above were the principal events during the winter. T. Quinctius was in winter quarters at Elatia. Amidst the numerous requests which he received from the friendly States was one from the Boeotians begging that, those of their countrymen who had been fighting for Philip might be restored to them. Quinctius readily granted their request, not because he thought that they deserved it, but because he was anxious, in view of Antiochus' suspicious movements, to win the support and sympathy of the Grecian States. After they had been restored it became at once apparent how little gratitude he had evoked among the Boeotians, for they sent delegates to thank Philip for the return of their countrymen, as though it were he who had made the concession and not Quinctius and the Romans. And at the next election they chose a person called Brachylles as the Boeotarch, for no other reason than because he had commanded the Boeotian contingent which had served under Philip, thus passing over men like Zeuxippus and Pisistratus and others who had brought about the alliance with Rome. Annoyed as these men were at the time, they were still more apprehensive as to the future, for if these things could go on while a Roman army was lying almost at their gates, what would happen to them, they asked, when the Romans had left for Italy and Philip was close at hand to help his friends and take his revenge upon his opponents?

As Brachylles was the main supporter of the king they determined to get rid of him while the arms of Rome were in their neighbourhood. The hour chosen was when he was returning from a State banquet in a state of intoxication, escorted by an effeminate crew who had been carousing in the banquet hall. He was set upon by six armed men, three of whom were Italians and three Aetolians, and killed on the spot. His companions fled screaming for help, and the whole city was thrown into uproar, men running in all directions with lanterns and torches. The assassins had meanwhile escaped through the nearest gate. At daybreak the next morning the population gathered in the theatre in such numbers as to give the appearance of a formal assembly convened by edict or by the public crier. Openly all men were saying that he had been murdered by his retinue and the dissolute wretches who accompanied him, but in their hearts they fixed upon Zeuxippus as the instigator of the crime. For the time being, however, it was decided that those who had been with him should be arrested and examined under torture. While search was being made for them Zeuxippus, determined to clear himself of any suspicion of complicity, came calm and undismayed into the gathering and said that people were mistaken who supposed that such an atrocious murder could have been committed by such effeminate creatures. He adduced many strong arguments to support this view, and some who heard him were convinced that if he were an accomplice he would never have appeared before the people or made any allusion to the murder when no one had challenged him to do so. Others were quite certain that by thus unblushingly meeting the charge he was endeavouring to divert suspicion from himself. After a short time those who were really innocent were put to the torture, and though they themselves knew nothing about it they treated the universal opinion as though it amounted to proof and named Zeuxippus and Pisistratus without alleging any evidence as to their actually knowing what had happened. Zeuxippus, however, with a person called Stratonidas escaped by night to Tanagra, fearing his own conscience more than the statements of men who were unconscious of the true state of the case. Pisistratus paid no regard to the informers and remained in Thebes.

Zeuxippus had a slave with him who had acted as messenger and intermediary all through the affair. Pisistratus was afraid that this man might turn informer, and it was through this very fear that the slave was compelled to make the disclosure. He sent a letter to Zeuxippus warning him to do away with the slave as he was privy to all they had done, and he did not believe him to be so capable of concealing the thing as he had been of carrying it out. The bearer was ordered to give the letter to Zeuxippus as soon as possible, and as he had no opportunity of giving it at once he handed it to this very slave, whom he regarded as the most faithful of all to his master, telling him at the same time that it was from Pisistratus about a matter which greatly concerned Zeuxippus. The slave assured the bearer that he would deliver it forthwith, but being conscience stricken he opened it, and after reading it through fled to Thebes and laid the evidence before the magistrates. Warned by the flight of the slave, Zeuxippus withdrew to Anthedon, as he considered that a safer place to live in. Pisistratus and the others were examined under torture and afterwards executed.

This murder roused Thebes and the whole of Boeotia to an intensely bitter hatred against the Romans; they were quite convinced that Zeuxippus, the foremost man amongst them, would not have been a party to such a crime if he had not been countenanced by the Roman general. To go to war was impossible; they had neither forces nor a leader, but they did the next thing to it, they took to brigandage and assassination. They made away with soldiers who were billeted on them, and others on furlough who were going about on various errands in their winter quarters. Some were caught in the high roads by men who lay in wait for them, others were led on false pretences to lonely inns and then seized and murdered. These crimes were committed from greed quite as much as from hatred, because the men carried silver in their belts for making purchases. As more and more men were amongst the missing every day, the whole of Boeotia acquired an evil reputation, and the men were more afraid to go outside their camp than if they had been in an enemy's country. On this, Quinctius sent officers to the different cities to investigate the murders. Most of them were found to have been committed round Lake Copais; here bodies were dug out of the mud and recovered from the shallows with stones or amphorae fastened to them, to sink them deeper by their weight. Many murders also took place at Acraephia and Coronea. Quinctius issued orders for those who were guilty to be given up to him, and he levied a fine of 500 talents upon the Boeotians for the 500 soldiers who had been murdered.

Neither of these orders was complied with. The cities simply excused themselves by saying that their government had not sanctioned any of these deeds. Quinctius thereupon sent a deputation to visit Athens and Achaia and explain to them that it was in a just and holy cause that he was going to punish the Boeotians by arms. Appius Claudius received orders to march to Acraephia with half the force, and he himself with the other half invested Coronea after laving waste the country round. All the country through which the two divisions advanced from Elatia was devastated. The Boeotians, completely cowed by the losses they were sustaining and seeing fear and flight everywhere, sent envoys, but as they were not admitted into the camp, the Athenian and Achaean envoys came to their support. The mediation of the Achaeans was the more effectual of the two, because in case they failed to obtain peace for the Boeotians they were resolved to fight by the side of the Romans. Through their representations, the Boeotians were allowed to approach the Roman general and lay their case before him. Peace was granted them on condition that they surrendered the guilty parties and paid a fine of 30 talents, and the siege was raised.

A few days later the ten commissioners arrived from Rome. On their advice peace was granted to Philip on the following terms: All the Greek communities in Europe and Asia were to be free and independent; Philip was to withdraw his garrisons from those which had been under his rule and after their evacuation hand them over to the Romans before the date fixed for the Isthmian Games. He was also to withdraw his garrisons from the following cities in Asia: Euromus, Pedasae, Bargyliae, Iasos, Myrina, Abydos, Thasos and Perinthus, for it was decided that these too should be free. With regard to the freedom of Cios, Quinctius undertook to communicate the decision of the senate and the commissioners to Prusias, King of Bithynia. The king was also to restore all prisoners and deserters to the Romans, and all his decked ships, save five, were to be surrendered, but he could retain his royal galley, which was all but unmanageable owing to its size and was propelled by sixteen banks of oars. His army was never to exceed 5000 men and he was not allowed to have a single elephant, nor was he permitted to make war beyond his frontiers without the express sanction of the senate. The indemnity which he was required to pay amounted to 1000 talents, half of it to be paid at once and the remainder in ten annual instalments. Valerius Antias asserts that an annual tribute of 4000 lbs. of silver was imposed on the king for ten years. Claudius says that the annual tribute amounted to 4200 lbs. of silver and extended over thirty years, with an immediate payment of 2000 lbs. He also says that an additional clause in the treaty expressly provided that Philip should not make war upon Eumenes, who had succeeded his father Attalus upon the throne. As a guarantee of the observance of these conditions hostages were taken by the Romans, amongst whom was Philip's son, Demetrius. Valerius Antias further states that the island of Aegina and the elephants were given to Attalus, and that Stratonice and the other cities in Caria which Philip had held were given to the Rhodians, and the islands of Lemnos, Imbros, Delos and Scyros to the Athenians.

Almost all the States of Greece welcomed peace on these terms. The Aetolians formed a solitary exception. They did not venture upon open opposition, but they criticised the commissioners' decision bitterly in private. It was, they said, a mere form of words vaguely suggesting the delusive image of pretended liberty. Why, they asked, were some cities to be given to the Romans without being named, and others which were named to retain their freedom, unless it was thought that the cities in Asia might be safely left free because of their remoteness, whilst those in Greece which are not even named might be appropriated, viz. Corinth, Chalcis, Oreus, together with Eretria and Demetrias? Nor was this charge altogether groundless, for there was much hesitation as to three of those cities. In the decree of the senate which the commissioners had brought with them the rest of the cities in Greece and Asia were unequivocally declared free, but in the case of Corinth, Chalcis and Demetrias the commissioners were instructed to do and determine as the interests of the commonwealth and the circumstances of the time and their own sense of duty required. It was Antiochus they had in their minds; they were convinced that as soon as he deemed his strength adequate he would invade Europe, and they did not intend to leave it open to him to occupy cities which would form such favourable bases of operations. Quinctius proceeded with the ten commissioners to Anticyra, and from there sailed across to Corinth. Here the commissioners discussed for days the measures for securing the freedom of Greece. Again and again Quinctius urged that the whole of Greece must be declared free if they wanted to stop the tongues of the Achaeans and inspire all with a true affection for Rome and an appreciation of her greatness-if, in fact, they desired to convince the Greeks that they had crossed the seas with the sole purpose of winning their freedom and not of transferring Philip's dominion over them to themselves. The commissioners took no exception to his insistence on making the cities free, but they argued that it would be safer for the cities themselves to remain for a time under the protection of Roman garrisons rather than have to accept Antiochus as their master in the place of Philip. At last they came to a decision; the city of Corinth was to be restored to the Achaeans, but a garrison was to be placed in Acrocorinthus, and Chalcis and Demetrias were to be retained until the menace of Antiochus was removed.

The date fixed for the Isthmian Games was now close at hand. These Games always drew vast crowds, owing partly to the innate love of the nation for a spectacle in which they watched contests of every kind, competitions of artistic skill, and trials of strength and speed, and partly owing to the fact that its situation between two seas made it the common emporium of Greece and Asia, where supplies were to be obtained of everything necessary or useful to man. But on this occasion it was not the usual attractions alone that drew the people from every part of Greece; they were in a state of keen expectancy, wondering what would be the future position of the country, and what fortune awaited themselves. All sorts of conjectures were formed and openly expressed as to what the Romans would do, but hardly anybody persuaded himself that they would withdraw from Greece altogether.

When the spectators had taken their seats, a herald, accompanied by a trumpeter, stepped forward into the middle of the arena, where the Games are usually opened by the customary formalities, and after a blast from the trumpet had produced silence, made the following announcement: "THE SENATE OF ROME AND T. QUINCTIUS, THEIR GENERAL, HAVING CONQUERED KING PHILIP AND THE MACEDONIANS DO NOW DECREE AND ORDAIN THAT THESE STATES SHALL BE FREE, SHALL BE RELEASED FROM THE PAYMENT OF TRIBUTE, AND SHALL LIVE UNDER THEIR OWN LAWS, NAMELY THE CORINTHIANS; THE PHOCIANS; ALL THE LOCRIANS TOGETHER WITH THE ISLAND OF EUBOEA; THE MAGNESIANS; THE THESSALIANS; THE PERRHAEBIANS, AND THE ACHAEANS OF PHTHIOTIS." This list comprised all those States which had been under the sway of Philip. When the herald had finished his proclamation the feeling of joy was too great for men to take it all in. They hardly ventured to trust their ears, and gazed wonderingly on one another, as though it were an empty dream. Not trusting their ears, they asked those nearest how their own interests were affected, and as everyone was eager not only to hear but also to see the man who had proclaimed their freedom, the herald was recalled and repeated his message. Then they realised that the joyful news was true, and from the applause and cheers which arose it was perfectly evident that none of life's blessings was dearer to the multitude than liberty. The Games were then hurried through; no man's eyes or ears were any longer fixed on them, so completely had the one master joy supplanted all other pleasurable sensations.

At the close of the Games, almost the entire assemblage ran to the spot where the Roman general was seated, and the rush of the crowd who were trying to touch his hand and throw garlands and ribbons became almost dangerous. He was about thirty-three years old at the time, and not only the robustness of his manhood but the delight of reaping such a harvest of glory gave him strength. The universal rejoicing was not simply a temporary excitement; for many days it found expression in thoughts and words of gratitude. "There is," people said, "one nation which at its own cost, through its own exertions, at its own risk has gone to war on behalf of the liberty of others. It renders this service not to those across its frontiers, or to the peoples of neighbouring States or to those who dwell on the same mainland, but it crosses the seas in order that nowhere in the wide world may injustice and tyranny exist, but that right and equity and law may be everywhere supreme. By this single proclamation of the herald all the cities in Greece and Asia recover their liberty. To have formed this design shows a daring spirit; to have brought it to fulfilment is a proof of exceptional courage and extraordinary good fortune."

Immediately after the Isthmian Games Quinctius and the ten commissioners gave audience to the ambassadors from the different monarchs and self-governing communities. The first to be heard were those from Antiochus. They spoke to very much the same effect as they had before spoken in Rome, making insincere and empty professions of friendship, but they did not receive the same ambiguous answer as on the former occasion, when the business with Philip was not yet settled. Antiochus was openly and unequivocally warned to evacuate all the cities in Asia which had belonged to either Philip or Ptolemy, to leave the free States alone, and never to make aggressions on them, as all the cities through the length and breadth of Greece must continue to enjoy peace and liberty. He was especially warned not to lead his forces into Europe or go there himself. On the dismissal of the king's ambassadors a convention of those from the different cities and States was held and the proceedings were expedited by the reading out of the names in the decree of the ten commissioners. The people of Orestis, a district in Macedonia, had their old constitution restored to them as a reward for having been the first to revolt from Philip. The Magnetes, the Perrhaebians and the Dolopians were also declared free. The Thessalians received their freedom and also a grant of the Achaean portion of Phthiotis exclusive of Thebes and Pharsalus. The demand of the Aetolians that Pharsalus and Leucas should be restored to them in accordance with treaty rights was referred to the senate, but the commissioners acting under the authority of their decree united Phocis and Locris thus reverting to the former state of things. Corinth, Triphylia and Heraea-also in the Peloponnesus-were restored to the Achaean league. The commissioners intended to make a grant of Oreus and Eretria to Eumenes, Attalus' son, but as Quinctius raised objections this one point was left to the decision of the senate, and that body declared these places and also Carystus to be free cities. Lychnis and Parthus were given to Pleuratus; both these Illyrian cities had been subject to Philip. Amynander was told to keep the forts which he had taken from Philip during the war.

After the convention had broken up the commissioners divided amongst themselves the work that lay before them and separated, each proceeding to effect the liberty of the cities within his own district. P. Lentulus went to Bargyliae; L. Stertinius to Hephaestia, Thasos and the cities in Thrace; P. Villius and L. Terentius went to interview Antiochus; and Cn. Cornelius visited Philip. After settling minor points in accordance with his instructions, he asked the king whether he would listen patiently to advice that might be not only useful to him but salutary as well. Philip replied that he should be grateful for any suggestion he might make which would be to his interest. Cornelius then strongly urged him, now that he had obtained peace, to send a mission to Rome to establish relations of friendship and alliance. By doing this he would remove, in case of any hostile movement on the part of Antiochus, the possibility of appearing to be waiting for an opportunity of recommencing hostilities. This meeting with Philip took place at Tempe. He assured Cornelius that he would send delegates forthwith, and Cornelius then went on to Thermopylae, where what was called the Pylaic council-a gathering from all parts of Greece-met on stated days. He appeared before the council, and urged the Aetolians especially to continue staunch and loyal friends to Rome. Some of their leaders mildly remonstrated against the change in the feelings of the Romans towards them since their victory; others took a much stronger line and declared that without the aid of the Aetolians Philip could not have been vanquished, nor could the Romans ever have landed in Greece. To prevent matters from coming to an open quarrel, the Roman commander abstained from replying to these charges and simply assured them that if they would send an embassy to Rome they would gain everything that was fair and reasonable. On his authority, therefore, they passed a resolution that a mission should be despatched. Such were the incidents that marked the close of the war with Philip.

Whilst these events were happening in Greece and Macedonia and Asia, Etruria very nearly became the scene of war owing to a conspiracy of the slaves. For the purpose of investigating and crushing this movement, Manius Acilius Glabrio, to whom as praetor the mixed jurisdiction over citizens and aliens had been assigned, was sent into Etruria with one of the two legions stationed in the City. A body of the conspirators was defeated in open battle and many of them were killed or taken prisoners; the ringleaders were scourged and crucified; the others sent back to their masters. The consuls left for their provinces. Marcellus entered the territory of the Boii, and whilst he was entrenching his camp on some rising ground, his men worn out with marching all day long, Corolamus, one of the Boian chiefs, attacked him with a large force and killed as many as 3000. Several men of high rank fell in this tumultuary battle; amongst them Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus and M. Junius Silanus, prefects of the allies, and two military tribunes in the second legion-M. Ogulnius and P. Claudius. The Romans, however, succeeded by great exertions in completing their lines and held the camp against the attacks of the enemy, which his initial success rendered all the more fierce. Marcellus remained in his camp for some time, in order that his wounded might be cured and that his men might have time to recover their spirits after such heavy losses.

The Boians, quite incapable of supporting the weariness of delay, dispersed everywhere to their villages and strongholds. Suddenly Marcellus crossed the Po and invaded the Comum territory, where the Insubres had induced the natives to take up arms and were now encamped. The Boian Gauls, full of confidence after the recent fight, joined battle with him while he was actually on the march, and at first attacked with such violence that they forced the front ranks to give way. Fearing that if they once began to give ground it might end in a complete repulse, Marcellus brought up a cohort of Marsians and launched all the troops of the Latin cavalry against the enemy. After they had by successive charges held up the determined onset of the Gauls the rest of the Roman line recovered its steadiness and resisted all attempts to break it. At last they took the offensive in a furious charge which the Gauls were unable to stand; they turned and fled in disorder. According to Valerius Antias over 40,000 men were killed in that battle, 801 standards captured, together with 732 wagons and a large number of gold chains. Claudius tells us that one of these, a very heavy one, was deposited as an offering in the temple of Jupiter on the Capitol. The Gaulish camp was stormed and plundered on the same day as the battle took place, and a few days later the town of Comum was captured. Subsequently twenty-eight fortified places went over to the consul. It is a question amongst the various historians whether it was against the Boii or the Insubres that the consul marched in the first place, and whether he wiped out his unsuccessful action by a successful one afterwards or whether the victory at Comum was marred by his later disaster amongst the Boii.

Soon after these instances of Fortune's caprice, the other consul, L. Furius Purpurio, invaded the Boian territory from the Sapinian canton in Umbria. He was approaching the fortress of Mutelus, but fearing that he might be cut off by the Boii and Ligurians, he led his army back over the way he had come, and by making a wide detour through open and therefore safe country ultimately joined his colleague. With their united armies they traversed the Boian country as far as the town of Felsina, systematically plundering as they advanced. That place, with all the fortified positions in the country round, surrendered, as did most of the tribe; the younger men remained in arms for the sake of plunder and had retreated into the depths of the forest. Then the two armies advanced against the Ligurians. The Boii, who were still in arms, expected that as they were supposed to be a long way off the Roman army would be more careless in keeping its formation on the march, and they followed it through secret paths in the forest with the intention of making a surprise attack. As they did not catch it up, they suddenly crossed the Po in ships and devastated the lands of the Laevi and Libui. On their way back along the Ligurian frontier they fell in with the Roman armies whilst they were loaded with plunder. The battle began more quickly and more furiously than if the time and place had previously been determined and all preparations made for battle. Here was a striking instance of the way in which passion stimulates courage, for the Romans were so determined to kill rather than simply to win a victory that they left hardly a man alive to carry the news of the battle. When the despatch announcing this success reached Rome a three days' thanksgiving was ordered for the victory. Marcellus arrived in Rome soon afterwards and a triumph was unanimously accorded to him by the senate. He celebrated his triumph over the Insubres and the Comensians while still in office. The anticipation of a triumph over the Boii he resigned to his colleague, because he personally had been unsuccessful against them, only in conjunction with his colleague had he been victorious. A large amount of spoil was carried in the wagons taken from the enemy, including numerous standards. The specie amounted to 320,000 ases and 234,000 silver denarii. Each legionary received a gratuity of 80 ases; the cavalry and centurions each three times as much.

.During this year Antiochus, who had spent the winter in Ephesus, endeavoured to reduce all the cities in Asia to their old condition of dependence. With the exception of Smyrna and Lampsacus, he thought that they would all accept the yoke without difficulty, since they either lay in open level country or were weakly defended by their walls and their soldiery. Smyrna and Lampsacus asserted their right to be free and there was danger, should their claim be allowed, of other cities in Aeolis and Ionia following the example of Smyrna, and those on the Hellespont the example of Lampsacus. Accordingly he despatched a force from Ephesus to invest Smyrna and ordered the troops in Abydos to march to Lampsacus, only a small detachment being left to hold the place. But it was not only the threat of arms that he made use of, he sent envoys to make friendly overtures to the citizens, and whilst gently rebuking their rashness and obstinacy lead them to hope that in a short time they would have what they wanted. It was, however, perfectly clear to them and to all the world that they would enjoy their liberty as the free gift of the king and not because they had seized a favourable opportunity of winning it. They told the envoys in reply that Antiochus must be neither surprised nor angry if they did not patiently resign themselves to the indefinite postponement of their hopes of liberty.

At the beginning of spring he set sail from Ephesus for the Hellespont and ordered his land army to proceed from Abydos to the Chersonese. He united his naval and military powers at Madytos, a city in the Chersonese, and as they had shut their gates against him he completely invested the place, and was on the point of bringing up his siege engines when the city surrendered. The fear which Antiochus thus inspired led the inhabitants of Sestos and the other cities in the Chersonese to make a voluntary surrender. His next objective was Lysimachia. When he arrived here with the whole of his land and sea forces he found the place deserted and little more than a heap of ruins, for some years previously the Thracians had captured and plundered the city and then burnt it. Finding it in this condition, Antiochus was seized by a desire to restore a city of such celebrity and so favourably situated, and he at once set about the various tasks which this involved. The houses and walls were rebuilt, some of the former inhabitants who had been made slaves were ransomed, others who were scattered as refugees throughout the Chersonese and the shores of the Hellespont were discovered and brought together, and new colonists were attracted by the prospect of the advantages they would receive. In fact every method was adopted of repopulating the city. To remove at the same time all apprehensions of trouble from the Thracians he proceeded with one half of his army to devastate the neighbouring districts of Thrace, the other half and all the ships' crews he left to go on with the work of restoration.

Very shortly after this L. Cornelius, who had been sent by the senate to settle the differences between Antiochus and Ptolemy, made a halt at Selymbria, and three of the ten commissioners went to Lysimachia: P. Lentulus from Bargyliae, P. Villius and L. Terentius from Thasos. They were joined there by L. Cornelius from Selymbria, and a few days later by Antiochus, who returned from Thrace. The first meeting with the commissioners and the invitation which Antiochus gave them were kindly and hospitable, but when it came to discussing their instructions and the position of affairs in Asia a good deal of temper was shown on both sides. The Romans told Antiochus plainly that everything he had done since his fleet set sail from Syria met with the disapproval of the senate and they considered it right that all the cities which had been subject to Ptolemy should be restored to him. With regard to those cities which had formed part of Philip's possessions and which while he was preoccupied with the war against Rome Antiochus had seized the opportunity of appropriating himself, it was simply intolerable that after the Romans had sustained such risks and hardships by sea and land for all those years Antiochus should carry off the prizes of war. Granting that it was possible for the Romans to take no notice of his appearance in Asia as being no concern of theirs, what about his entrance into Europe with the whole of his army and navy? What difference was there between that and an open declaration of war against Rome? Even if he had landed in Italy he would say that he did not mean war, but the Romans were not going to wait until he was in a position to do that.

In his reply Antiochus expressed his surprise that the Romans should go so carefully into the question as to what Antiochus ought to do, whilst they never stopped to consider what limits were to be set to their own advance by land and sea. Asia was no concern of the senate, and they had no more right to ask what Antiochus was doing in Asia than he had to ask what the Roman people were doing in Italy. As for Ptolemy and their complaint that he had appropriated his cities, he and Ptolemy were on perfectly friendly terms and arrangements were being made for them to be connected by marriage shortly. He had not sought to take advantage of Philip's misfortunes nor had he come into Europe with any hostile intent against the Romans. After the defeat of Lysimachus all that belonged to him passed by the right of war to Seleucus, and therefore he counted it part of his dominion. Ptolemy, and after him Philip, alienated some of these places at a time when his (Antiochus') ancestors were devoting their care and attention to other matters. Could there be a shadow of doubt that the Chersonese and that part of Thrace which lies round Lysimachia once belonged to Lysimachus? To recover the ancient right over these was the object of his coming and also to rebuild from its foundations the city of Lysimachia, which had been destroyed by the Thracians, in order that his son Seleucus might have it as the seat of empire.

After this discussion had been going on for some days, an unauthenticated rumour reached them that Ptolemy was dead. This prevented any decision from being arrived at; both parties pretended that they had heard nothing about it, and L. Cornelius, whose mission extended to both Antiochus and Ptolemy, asked for a short adjournment to allow of his obtaining an interview with Ptolemy. His object was to land in Egypt before the new occupant of the throne could initiate any change of policy. Antiochus, on the other hand, felt certain that if he took possession of Egypt at once it would be his own, and so, taking his leave of the Roman commissioners and leaving his son to complete the restoration of Lysimachia, he sailed with the whole of his fleet to Ephesus. From there he despatched envoys to Quinctius to lull his suspicion and to assure him that he was not contemplating any new departure. Coasting along the Asiatic shores he reached Patarae in Lycia and there he learnt that Ptolemy was alive. He now abandoned all intention of sailing to Egypt, but continued his voyage as far as Cyprus. When he had rounded the promontory of Chelidoniae he was for some time delayed in Pamphylia near the river Eurymedon by a mutiny amongst the crews. After continuing his voyage as far as the co-called "heads" of the river Saros he was overtaken by a terrible storm which engulfed nearly the whole of his fleet. Many of the ships were wrecked, many ran aground, a large number foundered so suddenly that none could swim to land. There was a very great loss of life; not only nameless crowds of sailors and soldiers, but many distinguished men, friends of the king, were amongst the victims. Antiochus collected the remains of his shattered fleet, but as he was in no condition to make an attempt on Cyprus he returned to Seleucia, much poorer in men and material resources than when he started on his expedition. Here he had the ships beached, for winter was close at hand, after which he went to Antioch for the winter. Such was the position of affairs with regard to the two monarchs.

This year for the first time three epulones were appointed, namely C. Licinius Lucullus, one of the tribunes of the plebs who had got the law passed under which they were appointed, and with him P. Manlius and P. Portius Laeca. They were allowed by law to wear the toga praetexta like the priests. But a serious dispute broke out this year between the whole body of priests and the City quaestors, Q. Fabius Labeo and P. Aurelius. The senate had decided that the last repayment of the money subscribed for the Punic War should be made to those who had contributed and money was needed for the purpose. As the augurs and pontiffs had not made any contribution during the war, the quaestors demanded payment from them. They appealed in vain to the tribunes of the plebs, and were compelled to pay their quota for every year of the war. Two pontiffs died during the year; they were succeeded by the consul, M. Marcellus, in place of C. Sempronius Tuditanus, who had died while acting as praetor in Spain, and L. Valerius Flaccus in place of M. Cornelius Cethegus. The augur Q. Fabius Maximus also died while quite young, before he could hold any magistracy; no successor was appointed during the year.

The consular elections were conducted by M. Marcellus; the new consuls were L. Valerius Flaccus and M. Porcius Cato. The praetors elected were Cn. Manlius Volso, Ap. Claudius Nero P. Porcius Laeca, C. Fabricius Luscinus, C. Atinius Labeo and P. Manlius. The curule aediles, M. Fulvius Nobilior and C. Flaminius, sold during the year a million modii of wheat to the people at two ases the modius. This wheat was sent by the Sicilians out of regard to C. Flaminius and in honour of his father's memory. The Roman Games were celebrated with great splendour and repeated on three different days. The plebeian aediles, Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus and C. Scribonius Curio, brought several farmers of State lands before the popular tribunal; three of these were convicted, and out of the fines imposed they built a temple to Faunus on the Island. The Plebeian Games lasted two days and there was the usual banquet.

On March 15, the day when they entered upon office, the new consuls consulted the senate as to the allocation of provinces. The senate decided that since the war in Spain was spreading to such a serious extent as to require the presence of a consul and a consular army, Hither Spain should be one of the two consular provinces. The consuls were instructed to come to a mutual arrangement or else ballot for that province and Italy. Whichever of them drew Spain was to take with him two legions, 15,000 allied infantry and 800 cavalry and a fleet of 20 ships of war. The other consul was to raise two legions; that was looked upon as sufficient to hold Gaul after the crushing blow dealt to the Insubres and the Boii the previous year. Cato drew Spain, Valerius Italy. The praetors now balloted for their provinces. C. Fabricius Luscinus received the City jurisdiction; C. Atinius Labeo the jurisdiction over aliens; Cn. Manlius Volso, Sicily; Ap. Claudius Nero, Further Spain; P. Porcius Laeca, Pisae, in order to threaten the Ligurians from the rear. P. Manlius was assigned to the consul to assist him in Hither Spain. Owing to the suspicious attitude of Antiochus and of the Aetolians, and also of Nabis and the Lacedaemonians, T. Quinctius was continued in his command with the two legions he had had before. Any reinforcements required to bring them up to full strength were to be raised by the consuls and despatched to Macedonia. In addition to the legion which Q. Fabius had had, Appius Claudius was authorised to raise 2000 infantry and 200 cavalry. The same number of infantry and cavalry were assigned to P. Manlius for employment in Hither Spain as well as the legion which had served under the praetor Q. Minucius. Out of the army in Gaul 10,000 infantry and 500 cavalry were decreed to P. Portius Laeca to operate in Etruria round Pisae. Tiberius Sempronius Longus had his command in Sardinia extended.

Such was the distribution of the provinces. Before the consuls left the City they were required, in accordance with a decree of the pontiffs, to proclaim a Sacred Spring. This was in fulfilment of a vow made by the praetor A. Cornelius Mammula at the desire of the senate and by order of the people twenty-one years previously in the consulship of Cn. Servilius and C. Flaminius. C. Claudius Pulcher, the son of Appius, was at the same time appointed augur in place of Q. Fabius Maximus, who had died the year before. Whilst general surprise was felt that nothing was being done about the war which had broken out in Spain, a despatch arrived from Q. Minucius announcing that he had successfully engaged the Spanish generals Budar and Baesadines, and that the enemy had lost 12,000 men, Budar being made prisoner and the rest routed and put to flight. When the despatch was read less apprehension was felt about the two Spains, where a very serious war had been anticipated. The general anxiety now centered on Antiochus, especially after the return of the ten commissioners. After giving their report on the negotiations with Philip and the terms on which peace had been made with him, they made it evident that a war on at least as great a scale with Antiochus was imminent. He had, so they informed the senate, landed in Europe with an enormous fleet and a splendid army, and if his attention had not been diverted by a groundless hope based upon a still more groundless rumour, to the invasion of Egypt, Greece would very soon have been in the blaze of war. Even the Aetolians, a nation naturally restless and now intensely embittered against the Romans, would no longer remain quiet. And there was another most formidable mischief with its roots in the very vitals of Greece-Nabis, who was for the time being tyrant of Lacedaemon, but who if he were allowed would soon become tyrant of the whole of Greece, a man who in greed and brutality rivalled the most notorious tyrants in history. If, after the Roman armies had been carried back to Italy, he were allowed to hold Argos as a stronghold threatening the whole of the Peloponnese, the deliverance of Greece from Philip would have been effected in vain; in any case instead of a distant monarch as their lord they would have a tyrant at their doors.

After listening to these statements made by men of such weight and judgment, who, moreover, had made their report after personal investigation, the senate were of opinion that though the policy to be pursued towards Antiochus was the more important question before them, still, as the king, whatever his reason might be, had retired into Syria, it seemed better to consider first what to do about the tyrant. After a lengthy discussion as to whether there were sufficient grounds for a formal declaration of war or whether it would be enough to leave it to T. Quinctius to act, as far as Nabis was concerned, in whatever way he thought best in the interests of the State, the matter was finally left in his hands. Whether they took prompt steps or whether they delayed action it did not seem to them to be of vital importance to the commonwealth. A much more pressing question was what Hannibal and Carthage were likely to do in case of war with Antiochus. The members of the party opposed to Hannibal were constantly writing to their friends in Rome. According to their account, messengers and letters were being sent by Hannibal to Antiochus and emissaries from the king were holding secret conferences with him. Just as there were wild beasts which no skill could tame, so this man was untamable and implacable. He complained that his countrymen were becoming enervated through ease and self-indulgence, and slumbering in indolence and sloth, and said that nothing could rouse them but the clash of arms. People were all the more ready to believe these assertions when they remembered that it was this man who was responsible for the beginning quite as much as for the conduct of the late war. His recent action had also called forth strong resentment amongst many of the magnates.

The order of judges exercised supreme power in Carthage at that time, owing mainly to the fact that they held office for life. The property, reputation and life of everyone were in their power. Whoever offended one of the order had an enemy in every member, and when the judges were hostile there was always a prosecutor to be found amongst them. Whilst these men were exercising this unbridled despotism, for they used their power without any regard to the rights of their fellow-citizens, Hannibal, who had been appointed one of the presiding magistrates, ordered the quaestor to be summoned before him. The quaestor paid no attention to the summons; he belonged to the opposite party and, moreover, as the quaestors were generally advanced to the all-powerful order of judges he gave himself the airs of a man who was sure of promotion. Resenting this indignity Hannibal sent an officer to arrest the quaestor, and after he was brought into the assembly Hannibal denounced not only the quaestor but the whole of the judicial order, whose insolence and excessive power utterly subverted the laws and the authority of the magistrates who had to enforce them. When he saw that his words were making a favourable impression and that the insolence and tyranny of that order were recognised as dangerous to the liberty of the meanest citizen, he at once proposed and carried a law enacting that the judges should be elected annually and that none should hold office for two consecutive years. Whatever popularity, however, he gained amongst the masses by his action was counterbalanced by the offence given to a large number of the aristocracy. A further step which he took in the public interest aroused intense hostility to him personally. The public revenues were being frittered away, partly through careless management and partly through being fraudulently appropriated by some of the political leaders and superior magistrates. The result was that there was not money enough to meet the annual payment of the indemnity to Rome, and there seemed every likelihood of a heavy tax being imposed upon the individual citizens.

When Hannibal had informed himself as to the amount of the national income from all sources, the objects for which calls upon it were made, what proportion was absorbed by the regular needs of the State and how much had been embezzled, he stated publicly in the assembly that if the balance were called up the government would be rich enough to meet the demands of Rome without any tax falling on individual citizens. And he was as good as his word. Those who had for years been battening on their pilferings from the national treasury were as furious as if it was the seizure of their personal property and not the forcible recovery of what they had stolen that was contemplated. In their rage they began to urge on the Romans, who were on their own account looking out for an opportunity of visiting their hate upon him. For a long time this policy found an opponent in P. Scipio Africanus. He considered it quite beneath the dignity of the Roman people to support the attacks of Hannibal's accusers or to allow the authority of the government to be mixed up with the party politics of Carthage, or not content with having defeated Hannibal in open war to treat him as though he were a criminal against whom they were to appear as prosecutors. At last, however, his opponents carried their point and delegates were sent to Carthage to point out to the senate there that Hannibal was concerting plans with Antiochus for commencing war. Cn. Servilius, M. Claudius Marcellus and Q. Terentius Culleo formed the delegation. On their arrival in Carthage they were advised by Hannibal's enemies to give out that people who asked the reason of their coming should be told that they had come to adjust the differences between Masinissa and the government of Carthage. This explanation was generally believed. Hannibal alone was not deceived, he knew that he was the object at which the Romans were aiming, and that the underlying motive of the peace with Carthage was that he might be left as the sole victim of their undying hostility. He decided to bow before the storm, and after making every preparation for flight he showed himself during the day in the forum to allay suspicion and as soon as it was dark he went in his official dress to the gate, accompanied by two attendants who were unaware of his design.

When the horses which he had ordered were ready, he rode during the night to Byzacium-the name of a country district-and the next day reached his castle on the coast between Acylla and Thapsus. There a ship was awaiting him, prepared for immediate departure. It was in this way that Hannibal withdrew from Africa, the country for whose misfortunes he had felt much more pity than for his own. That same day he landed in the island of Cercina. Here he found some Phoenician merchant ships lying in the harbour, and on his leaving his vessel there was a general rush to greet him. In reply to inquiries he gave out that he was on a mission to Tyre. Fearing, however, that one or other of these ships might leave in the night for Thapsus or Hadrumetum and report his appearance in Cercina, he ordered preparations for a sacrifice to be prepared and the ships' captains to be invited to the solemnity. He also gave directions for the sails and yards to be collected from the ships that they might serve as awnings to shade them at their feast, as it happened to be the middle of the summer. The entertainment was as sumptuous as time and circumstances permitted, and the conviviality was prolonged far into the night, much wine being consumed. As soon as he had an opportunity of escaping the observation of those in the harbour Hannibal set sail. The rest were all asleep and it was not till late the next day that they rose from their torpor, stupid with the effects of intoxication, and then had to spend several hours in getting the tackle of their vessels back into its place. At Hannibal's house in Carthage the usual crowd had collected in large numbers in the vestibule. When it became generally known that he was not to be found, the crowd surged into the forum demanding the appearance of their foremost citizen. Some, guessing the truth, suggested that he had fled, others-and these were the loudest and most numerous-said that he had been put to death through Roman treachery, and you might note the different expressions in their faces, as would be expected in a city torn by violent political partisanship. Then came the news that he had been seen in Cercina.

The Roman delegates informed the council of Carthage that the senate had definitely ascertained that it was mainly at Hannibal's instigation that Philip had made war on Rome, and now letters and messengers were being despatched to Antiochus and the Aetolians, and plans had been formed for driving Carthage into revolt. It was to Antiochus that he had gone, and nowhere else, and he would never rest until he had stirred up war throughout the whole world. If the Carthaginians wanted to satisfy the Roman people that none of his proceedings was in accordance with their wishes or sanctioned by their government, they must see that he did not go unpunished. The Carthaginians replied that they would do whatever the Romans thought right. After a fair voyage Hannibal reached Tyre, and the founders of Carthage welcomed as from a second fatherland the man who had achieved every possible distinction. After a short stay here he continued his voyage to Antiochia. Here he heard that the king had left for Asia, and he had an interview with his son, who was at the time celebrating the Games at Daphne, and who gave him a most friendly welcome. Anxious to lose no time he at once resumed his voyage and found the king at Ephesus, still unable to make up his mind on the question of war with Rome. Hannibal's arrival was not the least important factor in bringing him to a decision. The Aetolians, too, were now growing averse from their alliance with Rome. They had sent a mission to Rome to demand the restitution of Pharsalus, Leucas and certain other cities under the terms of the former treaty, and the senate referred them to Quinctius.

Book 34. Close of the Macedonian War

While the State was preoccupied by serious wars, some hardly yet over and others threatening, an incident occurred which though unimportant in itself resulted in a violent party conflict. Two of the tribunes of the plebs, M. Fundanius and L. Valerius, had brought in a proposal to repeal the Oppian Law. This law had been made on the motion of M. Oppius, a tribune of the plebs, during the consulship of Q. Fabius and Tiberius Sempronius, when the strain of the Punic War was most severely felt. It forbade any woman to have in her possession more than half an ounce of gold, to wear a dress of various colours or to ride in a two-horsed vehicle within a mile of the City or of any Roman town unless she was going to take part in some religious function. The two Brutuses-M. Junius and T. Junius-both tribunes of the plebs, defended the law and declared that they would not allow it to be repealed; many of the nobility came forward to speak in favour of the repeal or against it; the Capitol was crowded with supporters and opponents of the proposal; the matrons could not be kept indoors either by the authority of the magistrates or the orders of their husbands or their own sense of propriety. They filled all the streets and blocked the approaches to the Forum; they implored the men who were on their way thither to allow the women to resume their former adornments now that the commonwealth was flourishing and private fortunes increasing every day. Their numbers were daily augmented by those who came up from the country towns. At last they ventured to approach the consuls and praetors and other magistrates with their demands. One of the consuls at all events was inexorably opposed to their request-M. Porcius Cato. He spoke as follows in defence of the law:

"If we had, each one of us, made it a rule to uphold the rights and authority of the husband in our own households we should not now have this trouble with the whole body of our women. As things are now our liberty of action, which has been checked and rendered powerless by female despotism at home, is actually crushed and trampled on here in the Forum, and because we were unable to withstand them individually we have now to dread their united strength. I used to think that it was a fabulous story which tells us that in a certain island the whole of the male sex was extirpated by a conspiracy amongst the women; there is no class of women from whom the gravest dangers may not arise, if once you allow intrigues, plots, secret cabals to go on. I can hardly make up my mind which is worse, the affair itself or the disastrous precedent set up. The latter concerns us as consuls and magistrates; the former has to do more with you, Quirites. Whether the measure before you is for the good of the commonwealth or not is for you to determine by your votes; this tumult amongst the women, whether a spontaneous movement or due to your instigation, M. Fundanius and L. Valerius, certainly points to failure on the part of the magistrates, but whether it reflects more on you tribunes or on the consuls I do not know. It brings the greater discredit on you if you have carried your tribunitian agitation so far as to create unrest among the women, but more disgrace upon us if we have to submit to laws being imposed upon us through fear of a secession on their part, as we had to do formerly on occasions of the secession of the plebs. It was not without a feeling of shame that I made my way into the Forum through a regular army of women. Had not my respect for the dignity and modesty of some amongst them, more than any consideration for them as a whole, restrained me from letting them be publicly rebuked by a consul, I should have said, 'What is this habit you have formed of running abroad and blocking the streets and accosting men who are strangers to you? Could you not each of you put the very same question to your husbands at home? Surely you do not make yourselves more attractive in public than in private, to other women's husbands more than to your own? If matrons were kept by their natural modesty within the limits of their rights, it would be most unbecoming for you to trouble yourselves even at home about the laws which may be passed or repealed here.' Our ancestors would have no woman transact even private business except through her guardian, they placed them under the tutelage of parents or brothers or husbands. We suffer them now to dabble in politics and mix themselves up with the business of the Forum and public debates and election contests. What are they doing now in the public roads and at the street corners but recommending to the plebs the proposal of their tribunes and voting for the repeal of the law. Give the reins to a headstrong nature, to a creature that has not been tamed, and then hope that they will themselves set bounds to their licence if you do not do it yourselves. This is the smallest of those restrictions which have been imposed upon women by ancestral custom or by laws, and which they submit to with such impatience. What they really want is unrestricted freedom, or to speak the truth, licence, and if they win on this occasion what is there that they will not attempt?

"Call to mind all the regulations respecting women by which our ancestors curbed their licence and made them obedient to their husbands, and yet in spite of all those restrictions you can scarcely hold them in. If you allow them to pull away these restraints and wrench them out one after another, and finally put themselves on an equality with their husbands, do you imagine that you will be able to tolerate them? From the moment that they become your fellows they will become your masters. But surely, you say, what they object to is having a new restriction imposed upon them, they are not deprecating the assertion of a right but the infliction of a wrong. No, they are demanding the abrogation of a law which you enacted by your suffrages and which the practical experience of all these years has approved and justified. This they would have you repeal; that means that by rescinding this they would have you weaken all. No law is equally agreeable to everybody, the only question is whether it is beneficial on the whole and good for the majority. If everyone who feels himself personally aggrieved by a law is to destroy it and get rid of it, what is gained by the whole body of citizens making laws which those against whom they are enacted can in a short time repeal? I want, however, to learn the reason why these excited matrons have run out into the streets and scarcely keep away from the Forum and the Assembly. Is it that those taken prisoners by Hannibal-their fathers and husbands and children and brothers-may be ransomed? The republic is a long way from this misfortune, and may it ever remain so! Still, when this did happen, you refused to do so in spite of their dutiful entreaties. But, you may say, it is not dutiful affection and solicitude for those they love that has brought them together; they are going to welcome Mater Idaea on her way from Phrygian Pessinus. What pretext in the least degree respectable is put forward for this female insurrection? 'That we may shine,' they say, 'in gold and purple, that we may ride in carriages on festal and ordinary days alike, as though in triumph for having defeated and repealed a law after capturing and forcing from you your votes.'

"You have often heard me complain of the expensive habits of women and often, too, of those of men, not only private citizens but even magistrates, and I have often said that the community suffers from two opposite vices-avarice and luxury-pestilential diseases which have proved the ruin of all great empires. The brighter and better the fortunes of the republic become day by day, and the greater the growth of its dominion-and now we are penetrating into Greece and Asia, regions filled with everything that can tempt appetite or excite desire, and are even laying hands on the treasures of kings-so much the more do I dread the prospect of these things taking us captive rather than we them. It was a bad day for this City, believe me, when the statues were brought from Syracuse. I hear far too many people praising and admiring those which adorn Athens and Corinth and laughing at the clay images of our gods standing in front of their temples. I for my part prefer these gods who are propitious to us, and I trust that they will continue to be so as long as we allow them to remain in their present abodes.

In the days of our forefathers Pyrrhus attempted, through his ambassador Cineas, to tamper with the loyalty of women as well as men by means of bribes. The Law of Oppius in restraint of female extravagance had not then been passed, still not a single woman accepted a bribe. What do you think was the reason? The same reason which our forefathers had for not making any law on the subject; there was no extravagance to be restrained. Diseases must be recognised before remedies are applied, and so the passion for self-indulgence must be in existence before the laws which are to curb it. What called out the Licinian Law which restricted estates to 500 jugera except the keen desire of adding field to field? What led to the passing of the Cincian Law concerning presents and fees except the condition of the plebeians who had become tributaries and taxpayers to the senate? It is not therefore in the least surprising that neither the Oppian nor any other law was in those days required to set limits to the expensive habits of women when they refused to accept the gold and purple that was freely offered to them. If Cineas were to go in these days about the City with his gifts, he would find women standing in the streets quite ready to accept them.

There are some desires of which I cannot penetrate either the motive or the reason. That what is permitted to another should be forbidden to you may naturally create a feeling of shame or indignation, but when all are upon the same level as far as dress is concerned why should any one of you fear that you will not attract notice ? The very last things to be ashamed of are thriftiness and poverty, but this law relieves you of both since you do not possess what it forbids you to possess. The wealthy woman says, 'This levelling down is just what I do not tolerate. Why am I not to be admired and looked at for my gold and purple? Why is the poverty of others disguised under this appearance of law so that they may be thought to have possessed, had the law allowed it, what it was quite out of their power to possess?'

Do you want, Quirites, to plunge your wives into a rivalry of this nature, where the rich desire to have what no one else can afford, and the poor, that they may not be despised for their poverty, stretch their expenses beyond their means? Depend upon it, as soon as a woman begins to be ashamed of what she ought not to be ashamed of she will cease to feel shame at what she ought to be ashamed of. She who is in a position to do so will get what she wants with her own money, she who cannot do this will ask her husband. The husband is in a pitiable plight whether he yields or refuses; in the latter case he will see another giving what he refused to give. Now they are soliciting other women's husbands, and what is worse they are soliciting votes for the repeal of a law, and are getting them from some, against the interest of you and your property and your children. When once the law has ceased to fix a limit to your wife's expenses, you will never fix one. Do not imagine that things will be the same as they were before the law was made. It is safer for an evil-doer not to be prosecuted than for him to be tried and then acquitted, and luxury and extravagance would have been more tolerable had they never been interfered with than they will be now, just like wild beasts which have been irritated by their chains and then released. I give my vote against every attempt to repeal the law, and pray that all the gods may give your action a fortunate result."

After this the tribunes of the plebs who had announced their intention of vetoing the repeal spoke briefly to the same effect. Then L. Valerius made the following speech in defence of his proposal: "If it had been only private citizens who came forward to argue in favour of, or against, the measure we have brought in, I should have awaited your votes in silence as I should have considered that enough had been said on either side. But now, when a man of such weight of character as M. Porcius, our consul, is opposing our bill, not simply by exerting his personal authority which, even had he remained silent, would have had very great influence, but also in a long and carefully thought out speech, it is necessary to make a brief reply. He spent, it is true, more time in castigating the matrons than in arguing against the bill, and he even left it doubtful whether the action of the matrons which he censured was due to their own initiative or to our instigation. I shall defend the measure and not ourselves, for that was thrown out as a suggestion rather than as an actual charge. Because we are now enjoying the blessings of peace and the commonwealth is flourishing and happy, the matrons are making a public request to you that you will repeal a law which was passed against them under the pressure of a time of war. He denounces this action of theirs as a plot, a seditious movement, and he sometimes calls it a female secession. I know how these and other strong expressions are selected to bolster up a case, and we all know that, though naturally of a gentle disposition, Cato is a powerful speaker and sometimes almost menacing. What innovation have the matrons been guilty of by publicly assembling in such numbers for a cause which touches them so closely? Have they never appeared in public before? I will quote your own 'Origines' against you. Hear how often they have done this and always to the benefit of the State.

"At the very beginning, during the reign of Romulus, after the capture of the Capitol by the Sabines, when a pitched battle had begun in the Forum, was not the conflict stopped by the matrons rushing between the lines? And when after the expulsion of the kings the Volscian legions under their leader Caius Marcius had fixed their camp at the fifth milestone from the City, was it not the matrons who warded off that enemy by whom otherwise this City would have been laid in ruins? When it had been captured by the Gauls, how was it ransomed? By the matrons, of course, who by general agreement brought their contributions to the treasury. And without searching for ancient precedents, was it not the case that in the late war when money was needed the treasury was assisted by the money of the widows? Even when new deities were invited to help us in the hour of our distress did not the matrons go in a body down to the shore to receive Mater Idaea? You say that they were actuated by different motives then. It is not my purpose to establish the identity of motives, it is sufficient to clear them from the charge of strange unheard-of conduct. And yet, in matters which concern men and women alike, their action occasioned surprise to no one; why then should we be surprised at their taking the same action in a cause which especially interests them? But what have they done? We must, believe me, have the ears of tyrants if, whilst masters condescend to listen to the prayers of their slaves we deem it an indignity to be asked a favour by honourable women.

"I come now to the matter of debate. Here the consul adopted a twofold line of argument, for he protested against any law being repealed and in particular against the repeal of this law which had been passed to restrain female extravagance. His defence of the laws as a whole seemed to me such as a consul ought to make and his strictures on luxury were quite in keeping with his strict and severe moral code. Unless, therefore, we show the weakness of both lines of argument there is some risk of your being led into error. As to laws which have been made not for a temporary emergency, but for all time as being of permanent utility, I admit that none of them ought to be repealed except where experience has shown it to be hurtful or political changes have rendered it useless. But I see that the laws which have been necessitated by particular crises are, if I may say so, mortal and subject to change with the changing times. Laws made in times of peace war generally repeals, those made during war peace rescinds, just as in the management of a ship some things are useful in fair weather and others in foul. As these two classes of laws are distinct in their nature, to which class would the law which we are repealing appear to belong? Is it an ancient law of the kings, coeval with the City, or, which is the next thing to it, did the decemviri who were appointed to codify the laws inscribe it on the Twelve Tables as an enactment without which our forefathers thought that the honour and dignity of our matrons could not be preserved, and if we repeal it shall we have reason to fear that we shall destroy with it the self-respect and purity of our women? Who does not know that this is quite a recent law passed twenty years ago in the consulship of Q. Fabius and Tiberius Sempronius? If the matrons led exemplary lives without it, what danger can there possibly be of their plunging into luxury if it is repealed? If that law had been passed with the sole motive of limiting female excesses there might be some ground for apprehension that the repeal might encourage them, but the circumstances under which it was passed will reveal its object.

Hannibal was in Italy; he had won the victory of Cannae; he was now master of Tarentum, Arpi and Capua; there was every likelihood that he would bring his army up to Rome. Our allies had fallen away from us, we had no reserves from which to make good our losses, no seamen to render our navy effective, and no money in the treasury. We had to arm the slaves and they were bought from their owners on condition that the purchase money should be paid at the end of the war; the contractors undertook to supply corn and everything else required for the war, to be paid for at the same date. We gave up our slaves to act as rowers in numbers proportionate to our assessment and placed all our gold and silver at the service of the State, the senators setting the example. Widows and minors invested their money in the public funds and a law was passed fixing the maximum of gold and silver coinage which we were to keep in our houses. Was it at such a crisis as this that the matrons were so given to luxury that the Oppian Law was needed to restrain them, when, owing to their being in mourning, the sacrificial rites of Ceres had been intermitted and the senate in consequence ordered the mourning to be terminated in thirty days? Who does not see that the poverty and wretched condition of the citizens, every one of whom had to devote his money to the needs of the commonwealth, were the real enactors of that law which was to remain in force as long as the reason for its enactment remained in force? If every decree made by the senate and every order made by the people to meet the emergency is to remain in force for all time, why are we repaying to private citizens the sums they advanced? Why are we making public contracts on the basis of immediate payment? Why are slaves not being purchased to serve as soldiers, and each of us giving up our slaves to serve as rowers as we did then?

"All orders of society, all men will feel the change for the better in the condition of the republic; are our wives alone to be debarred from the enjoyment of peace and prosperity? We, their husbands, shall wear purple, the toga praetexta will mark those holding magisterial and priestly offices, our children will wear it, with its purple border; the right to wear it belongs to the magistrates in the military colonies and the municipal towns. Nor is it only in their lifetime that they enjoy this distinction; when they die they are cremated in it. You husbands are at liberty to wear a purple wrap over your dress, will you refuse to allow your wives to wear a purple mantle? Are the trappings of your horses to be more gorgeous than the dress of your wives? Purple fabrics, however, become frayed and worn out, and in their case I recognise some reason, though a very unfair one, for his opposition; but what is there to offend with regard to gold, which suffers no waste except on the cost of working it? On the contrary, it rather protects us in the time of need and forms a resource available for either public or private requirements, as you have learnt by experience. Cato said that there was no individual rivalry amongst them since none possessed what might make others jealous. No, but most certainly there is general grief and indignation felt among them when they see the wives of our Latin allies permitted to wear ornaments which they have been deprived of, when they see them resplendent in gold and purple and driving through the City while they have to follow on foot, just as though the seat of empire was in the Latin cities and not in their own. This would be enough to hurt the feelings of men, what then think you must be the feelings of poor little women who are affected by small things? Magistracies, priestly functions, triumphs, military decorations and rewards, spoils of war-none of these fall to their lot. Neatness, elegance, personal adornment, attractive appearance and looks-these are the distinctions they covet, in these they delight and pride themselves; these things our ancestors called the ornament of women. What do they lay aside when they are in mourning except their gold and purple, to resume them when they go out of mourning? How do they prepare themselves for days of public rejoicing and thanksgiving beyond assuming richer personal adornment? I suppose you think that if you repeal the Oppian Law, and should wish to forbid anything which the law forbids now, it will not be in your power to do so, and that some will lose all legal rights over their daughters and wives and sisters. No; women are never freed from subjection as long as their husbands and fathers are alive; they deprecate the freedom which orphanhood and widowhood bring. They would rather leave their personal adornment to your decision than to that of the law. It is your duty to act as their guardians and protectors and not treat them as slaves; you ought to wish to be called fathers and husbands, instead of lords and masters. The consul made use of invidious language when he spoke of female sedition and secession. Do you really think there is any danger of their seizing the Sacred Mount as the exasperated plebs once did, or of their taking possession of the Aventine? Whatever decision you come to, they in their weakness will have to submit to it. The greater your power, so much the more moderate ought you to be in exercising it."

After these speeches in support of and against the law the women poured out into the streets the next day in much greater force and went in a body to the house of the two Brutuses, who were vetoing their colleagues' proposal, and beset all the doors, nor would they desist till the tribunes had abandoned their opposition. There was no doubt now that the tribes would be unanimous in rescinding the law. It was abrogated twenty years after it had been made. After this matter was settled Cato at once left the City and with twenty-five ships of war, five of which belonged to the allies, sailed to the port of Luna, where the army had also received orders to muster. He had published an edict through the whole length of the coast requiring ships of every description to be assembled at Luna, and there he left orders that they should follow him to the Port of the Pyrenees, it being his intention to advance against the enemy with his full naval strength. Sailing past the Ligurian coast and the Gulf of Gaul, they assembled there by the appointed day. Cato sailed on to Rhoda and expelled the Spanish garrison who were holding the fort. From Rhoda a favourable wind brought him to Emporiae. Here he disembarked the whole of his force with the exception of the crews of the vessels.

At that time Emporiae consisted of two towns divided by a wall. One was inhabited by Greeks who had, like the people of Massilia, originally come from Phocaea; the other contained a Spanish population. As the Greek town was almost entirely open to the sea its walls were less than half a mile in circuit; the Spanish town, further back from the sea, had walls with a circuit of three miles. A third element in the population was formed by some Roman colonists who had been settled there by the deified Caesar after the final defeat of Pompey's sons. At the present day all have been fused into one municipal body by the grant of Roman citizenship, in the first instance to the Spaniards and then to the Greeks. Anyone who saw how the Greeks were exposed to attacks on the one side from the open sea and from the Spaniards on the other side might wonder what there was that afforded them protection. Discipline was the guardian of their weakness, a quality which among stronger nations is best maintained by fear. They kept that portion of the wall which faced inland extremely well fortified, only one gate was situated on that side and it was always guarded night and day by one of the magistrates. During the night one-third of the citizens were on duty on the walls, not simply as a matter of routine or regulation, they kept up their watches and patrols as if an enemy were at their gates. No Spaniards were allowed within their city, nor did they themselves venture outside their walls without proper precautions. The exits to the sea were open to all. They never went out through the gate which faced the Spanish town unless a large number went together, and it was generally the body who had mounted guard on the walls the night before. The object of their going outside this gate was as follows: the Spaniards, unfamiliar with the sea, were glad to purchase the goods which the Greeks received from abroad and at the same time to sell the products of their fields to them. Owing to the need of this mutual intercourse the Spanish city was always open to the Greeks. An additional security was found in the friendship of Rome, under whose shelter they lay and to which they were quite as loyal as the Massilians, though their strength and resources were so much less. On this occasion they gave the consul and his army a hearty welcome. Cato made a short stay there, and while he was gaining intelligence as to the strength and position of the enemy he spent the interval in exercising his troops, that they might not waste their time. It happened to be the time of the year when the Spaniards had their corn stored in the barns. Cato forbade the army contractors to supply any corn to the troops, and sent them back to Rome with the remark, "War feeds itself." Then, advancing from Emporiae, he laid the enemy's fields waste with fire and sword, and spread terror and flight in all directions.

During this time M. Helvius, who was on his way from Further Spain with a force of 6000 men sent by the praetor Appius Claudius to escort him, fell in with an immense body of Celtiberians near the town of Iliturgi. Valerius states that they amounted to 20,000 men and that 12,000 were killed, the town of Iliturgi taken and all the adult males put to the sword. After this Helvius reached Cato's camp and as the country was now safe he sent his escort back to Further Spain and on his arrival at Rome celebrated his victory by entering the City in ovation. He brought into the treasury 732 pounds' weight of uncoined silver, 17,023 Spanish denarii, and 11,943 of Oscan silver. The reason why the senate refused him a triumph was that he had fought under another man's auspices and in another man's province. Moreover he did not return till two years after he had given up his command, for after handing over the administration to his successor, Q. Minucius, he was detained in the province by a long and dangerous illness. In consequence of this he entered the City only two months before Q. Minucius celebrated his triumph. The latter brought home 34,800 pounds' weight of silver, 73,000 denarii, and 278,000 of Oscan silver.

The consul in Spain was encamped not far from Emporiae. Here he was approached by three envoys from Bilistages, the chief of the Ilergetes, one of them the chief's son. They reported that their strongholds were being attacked and they were hopeless of making a successful resistance unless the Roman general sent a force: 3000 men would be sufficient; the enemy would not stay to fight if such a large body of troops came into the field. The consul told them that he was greatly concerned for their danger and their fears, but his numbers were by no means sufficient to allow of his reducing his strength by dividing his forces while the enemy were so near and he was daily expecting to have to fight a pitched battle with them. On hearing this the envoys flung themselves in tears at the consul's feet and implored him not to desert them in an hour of such sore distress. Where could they, they cried, go if they were repulsed by the Romans? They had no allies, no hope of succour anywhere else in the world. They could have avoided this danger had they been willing to break faith and make common cause with the rest of their countrymen. No threats, no intimidation had moved them so long as they hoped to find sufficient help and support from the Romans. If there was none to be had, if their request was refused by the consul, they called gods and men to witness that, against their will and through sheer compulsion, they would have to desert the cause of Rome lest they should suffer what the Saguntines had suffered. They would rather perish with the rest of the Spaniards than meet their fate alone.

The envoys were dismissed for the day without receiving any reply. The consul passed an anxious night trying to decide between the two alternatives: he did not want to desert his allies nor did he want to weaken his army, a course which might possibly delay the decisive conflict, or, if it should come on, endanger his success. He finally made up his mind not to part with any of his troops lest the enemy should inflict some humiliation upon him, and he decided to hold out the hope of assistance to his allies instead of actually giving it. He reflected that promises have often been as effective as performance, especially in war; to the man who believes that he has help to fall back upon it is just the same as if he had it, his very belief nerves him to hope and to dare. The next day he gave his reply to the envoys, and assured them that though he was afraid of weakening his force for the benefit of others, he nevertheless made more account of the critical and dangerous position they were in than he did of his own. He then ordered a third of the men in each cohort to cook the food, which they were to take on board in good time, and orders were at the same time issued for the ships to be ready to sail in three days' time. He told two of the envoys to report these measures to Bilistages and the Ilergetes; the third, the chief's son, he succeeded, by his affability and the presents he gave him, in keeping with him. The envoys did not leave until they saw the soldiers actually on board, then, no longer feeling any doubts, they spread far and wide amongst friends and foes the news of the approach of Roman succour.

When the consul had kept up appearances long enough he recalled the soldiers from the ships, and as the season for active operations was now approaching, he fixed his camp at a distance of three miles from Emporiae. From this position he sent his men into the enemy's fields in quest of plunder, first in one quarter and then in another as occasion served, leaving only a small guard in the camp. They generally started at night in order to cover as great a distance from the camp as possible and also to take the enemy by surprise. This kind of thing was a training for the new levies and led to the capture of numerous prisoners, till the enemy no longer ventured outside the defences of their forts. When he had thoroughly tested the temper of his own men and that of the enemy he ordered the military tribunes and prefects of the allies, as well as all the cavalry and centurions, to appear on parade and addressed them as follows: "You have often wished for the time when you might have an opportunity of displaying your courage; that time has now come. So far your operations have resembled those of marauders rather than of warriors, now you shall join issue with the enemy in a regular battle. Henceforth you will be allowed, instead of ravaging fields, to drain cities of their wealth. When the Carthaginian commanders and armies were in Spain, our fathers had not a single soldier here, and yet they insisted upon a clause being added to the treaty fixing the Ebro as the boundary of their dominion. Now, when a consul, two praetors and three Roman armies are occupying Spain, and not a single Carthaginian has been seen in this province for the last ten years, our dominion on this side of the Ebro has been lost to us. It is your duty to win this back by your arms and courage and to compel a nation, which starts a war in a spirit of recklessness rather than of steady determination, to submit once more to the yoke which it has cast off." After these words of encouragement he announced that he should lead them that night against the enemy's camp. They were then dismissed to take food and rest.

After attending to the auspices the consul started at midnight in order that he might take up the position which he intended to secure before the enemy were aware of his movements. He led his troops round to the rear of the enemy's camp and formed them into line at daybreak, after which he sent three cohorts right up to the hostile rampart. Startled by the appearance of the Romans behind their lines, the barbarians flew to arms. Meanwhile the consul briefly addressed his men. "There is no hope," he said, "anywhere but in courage, and indeed I have taken care that there shall not be. Between us and our camp is the enemy, and behind us enemy country. The noblest course is also the safest, and that is to rest all your hopes in your valour." Then he ordered the cohorts to be recalled that their feigned retreat might draw the natives out of their camp. His anticipations were realised. They thought that the Romans had retired through fear, and bursting out of their camp they covered with their numbers the whole of the ground between their camp and the Roman line of battle. Whilst they were hurriedly forming their ranks the consul, whose dispositions were completed, commenced the attack. The cavalry on the two wings were the first to get into action, but those on the right were immediately repulsed and their hasty retirement created alarm amongst the infantry. On seeing this, the consul ordered two picked cohorts to be taken round the enemy's right and to show themselves in his rear before the infantry became engaged. This menace to the enemy made the battle a more even one; still, the right wing, both cavalry and infantry, had become so demoralised that the consul seized some of them with his own hand and turned them towards the foe. As long as the action was confined to the discharge of missiles it was equally contested on both sides, but now the Roman right where the panic and flight began was with difficulty holding its ground; the left, on the other hand, was pressing back the barbarians in front, and the cohorts in the rear were creating a panic amongst them. When they had discharged their iron javelins and fire darts they drew their swords and the fighting became more furious. They were no longer wounded by chance hits from a distance, but foot to foot with the foe they had only their strength and courage to trust to.

Finding that his men were becoming exhausted, the consul rekindled their courage by bringing up the reserves from the second line. The front was re-formed, and these fresh troops attacking the wearied enemy with fresh weapons made a fierce charge in a dense body and broke their lines, and once broken they soon scattered in flight and rushed through the fields in the direction of their camp. When Cato saw the whole battleground filled with fugitives he galloped back to the second legion which was stationed in reserve, ordered the standards to be borne before him and the whole legion to follow him at the double to attack the hostile camp. When a man in his eagerness ran out of his rank the consul rode up and struck him with his sparus and ordered the military tribunes and centurions to chastise him. The attack on the camp had already begun, but the Romans were unable to reach the stockade, as they were held up by stones and stakes and every description of missile. The appearance of the fresh legion put heart into the assailants and made the enemy fight still more desperately in front of their breastwork. The consul surveyed the whole position that he might find out where there was the weakest resistance and therefore the best chance of breaking through. He saw that the defenders were in least force at the left-hand gate of their camp, and to this point he directed the hastati and principes of the second legion. The defenders who were holding the gate could not withstand their charge, and when the others saw the enemy within their lines they abandoned all further attempts to retain their camp and flung away their arms and standards. Many were killed at the gates, jammed together by the crowding in the narrow space, and whilst the soldiers of the second legion were cutting the enemy from behind, the rest plundered the camp. Valerius Antias says that more than 40,000 of the enemy were killed that day. Cato, who certainly does not depreciate his own merits, says that many were killed, but does not give the actual numbers.

(He is considered to have done three things on that day which deserve praise. One was his leading his army round the hostile camp into a position far from his ships and his own camp where his men had nothing to trust to but their courage, and also joining battle with the enemy on both sides of him. The second was his maneuver of throwing the cohorts on the enemy's rear. The third was his order to the second legion to advance in battle formation right up to the gate of the camp while the rest of his troops were scattered in pursuit of the enemy.) After this battle the consul's victorious advance was uninterrupted. When the signal had been given to retire and he had withdrawn his men loaded with spoil into camp, he allowed them a few hours' rest and then led them off to harry the fields. As the enemy had been scattered in flight they extended their depredations over a wider extent of country, and this action contributed no less than the battle to force the inhabitants of Spanish Emporiae and the settlers amongst them to surrender; many from other communities who had taken refuge in Emporiae also surrendered. The consul addressed them all in kind terms and dismissed them to their homes. He at once resumed his advance, and wherever his army marched delegates from the various communities met him to make their surrender. By the time he reached Tarraco the whole of Spain on this side the Ebro had been subjugated and the soldiers belonging to the Roman and allied troops who had through various mishaps been made prisoners in Spain were brought by the natives as a gift to the consul. Then a rumour was spread that the consul intended to take his army into Turdetania, and it was even reported-quite falsely-that he had actually marched against the secluded dwellers in the mountains. On this idle and absolutely groundless rumour seven fortified places belonging to the Bergistani revolted. The consul reduced them to submission without any serious fighting. After he had returned to Tarraco and before he made any further advance these same people again revolted and again they were subdued, but they were not treated so leniently. They were all sold into slavery to prevent any further disturbance of peace.

In the meantime the praetor, P. Manlius, marched into Turdetania with the army which he had taken over from his predecessor Q. Minucius and, in addition, the force which Appius Claudius Nero had commanded in Further Spain. The Turdetani are considered the least warlike of all the Spanish tribes; nevertheless, trusting to their numbers, they ventured to oppose the Roman armies. A cavalry charge threw them at once into disorder; the infantry encounter was hardly a contest, the seasoned troops, familiar with the tactics of the enemy, left no doubt as to the issue of the fight. Still, that battle did not end the war. The Turduli hired a force of 10,000 Celtiberian mercenaries and prepared to carry on hostilities with foreign arms. While this was going on, the consul, seriously perturbed by the rising of the Bergistani, and convinced that all the other tribes would do the same whenever they had the chance, disarmed the whole of the Spanish population on this side of the Ebro. This step aroused such bitter feeling that many of them destroyed themselves, for they were a brave and high-spirited nation, and did not think life worth living without the possession of arms. On this being reported to the consul he summoned the senators in all the cities to meet him. "It is not," he told them, "more in our interest than in yours that you should abstain from hostilities; hitherto your wars have always involved more suffering for the Spaniards than toil and trouble for the Romans. I know of only one way in which this can be prevented, and that is to put it out of your power to commence hostilities. I am anxious to attain that result with as little harshness as possible. You must help me in this matter with your advice. I shall adopt no plan more gladly than the one which you yourselves suggest." As they remained silent, he said he would give them a few days for deliberation. After they had been summoned to a second conference, at which they still remained silent, he levelled the walls of all their cities in a single day, and during his advance against those which were still refractory he received the submission of all the cities in each district into which he came. The sole exception was Segestica, and this important and wealthy city he took by storm.

The subjugation of the enemy was a more difficult task for Cato than it had been for those generals who had entered Spain for the first time. The Spaniards went over to them because they were sick of the domination of Carthage, but Cato had, so to speak, to reclaim them like slaves who had asserted and enjoyed freedom. He found commotion everywhere, some tribes were in arms, others were having their cities besieged to drive them into revolt, and had it not been for his timely succour their powers of resistance must have been exhausted. But the consul was a man of such force and energy that he took up and executed single-handed the greatest and smallest tasks alike; he not only thought out and gave directions as to what was best to be done, but he carried most of his measures through personally. Over no one in the army did he exercise severer discipline than over himself; in his frugal mode of life, in his incessant vigilance and hard work he rivalled the meanest of his soldiers. The only privilege he enjoyed in his army was his rank and authority.

The Turdetani, as I have already stated, were employing Celtiberian mercenaries, and this added to the praetor's difficulties in his campaign against them. He wrote to Cato for assistance and the consul marched his legions thither, and found on arrival that the Celtiberians and the Turdetani were occupying separate camps. With the Turdetanian patrols encounters commenced at once and the Romans always came off victorious, however desultory the fighting. The Celtiberians were treated differently; the consul ordered the military tribunes to go to them and give them the choice of three courses: to go over to the Romans and receive double the pay that they were to get from the Turdetanians, or to depart to their homes under a guarantee from the Roman Government that they should not suffer for having joined their enemies, or, if they were in any case bent on war, to fix a time and place where they could decide the matter by arms. The Celtiberians asked for a day's grace for consultation. A council was held, but owing to the presence of the Turdetani and the confusion and disorder which prevailed, no decision could be arrived at. Whilst the question of war or peace was still in suspense the Romans were bringing provisions from the fields and fortified villages of the enemy, and often entered their entrenchments as many as ten at a time, just as though there was a tacit truce admitting of general intercourse. As the consul could not induce the enemy to fight, he sent some light-armed cohorts on a plundering expedition into a part of the country which had not yet suffered spoliation. He next marched to Segestia with the view of attacking it, as he heard that all the baggage and personal belongings of the Celtiberians had been left there. As, however, nothing would make them move, he returned with an escort of seven cohorts to the Ebro, after discharging the arrears of pay to his own men and to the praetor's army as well. The whole of his army he left in the praetor's camp.

Small as the force was which he had with him, the consul captured several towns; the Sedetani, the Ausetani, and the Suessetani went over to him. The Lacetani, a remote forest tribe, remained in arms, partly through their native love of fighting and partly through the fear of retribution from the tribes friendly to Rome, amongst whom they had made plundering raids whilst the consul was occupied with the war against the Turdetani. It was for this reason that the consul brought up to attack them not only his Roman cohorts but also the troops of the friendly tribes who had their own accounts to settle with them. Their town was considerably greater in length than in breadth. The consul halted his men a little less than half a mile from the place. Leaving some picked cohorts on guard with strict orders not to move from the spot till he returned to them, he led the rest of his force round to the further side of the town. His auxiliaries were mostly Suessetani, and he ordered them to advance up to the walls for the assault. As soon as the Lacetani recognised their arms and standards and remembered how often they had raided their fields with impunity and routed and scattered them in battle they flung open their gates and all in a body rushed upon them. The Suessetani did not wait for their battle-shout, much less their charge. The consul expected this, and on seeing what had happened he galloped close under the enemy's walls back to his cohorts and hurried them up to a part of the town where all was silence and solitude, as the defenders had gone off in pursuit of the Suessetani. The whole place passed into his hands before the Lacetani returned. Finding that they had nothing left them but their arms, they soon surrendered.

The victorious consul at once led his army against Vergium, a fortified place which served mainly as a haunt and shelter for brigands who were in the habit of raiding the peaceable districts of the province. Vergestanus, the chief, came over to the consul and on his own behalf and that of his fellow-townsmen disavowed any complicity with them. He and his friends could take no part in public affairs, when the brigands had been once admitted they made themselves masters of the whole place. The consul directed him to return home and make up some plausible reason for his absence. Then, when he saw the Romans approaching the walls and the brigands fully occupied in defending them, he was not to forget to seize the citadel with his sympathisers. Vergestanus carried out his instructions and the brigands found themselves menaced by a double danger, on the one side by the Romans who were scaling the walls and on the other by the seizure of the citadel. When the consul had gained possession of the town he gave orders for those who had held the citadel to be set at liberty, together with all their relations, and to retain their property; the rest of the townsfolk be made over to the quaestor to be sold as slaves, and the brigands were summarily executed. After the province was pacified Cato organised the working of the iron and silver mines so satisfactorily that they produced a considerable revenue, and the province in consequence became constantly richer. For these successful operations the senators decreed a three days' thanksgiving.

During this summer the other consul, L. Valerius Flaccus, fought a successful action in Gaul with a body of Boii near the forest of Litanae; 8000 Gauls are stated to have been killed; the rest, abandoning all further resistance, dispersed to their homes. During the remainder of the summer the consul kept his army around the Po in the neighbourhood of Placentia and Cremona, and repaired the ravages which had been made in war. Such was the position of affairs in Spain and Italy. In Greece T. Quinctius had made such use of his time through the winter that, with the exception of the Aetolians who had not received the rewards of victory which they expected and were quite incapable of remaining quiet for any length of time, the whole of Greece was supremely happy in the enjoyment of the blessings of peace and liberty, and was filled with admiration at the moderation and justice and self-control which the Roman general displayed in the hour of victory no less than at the courage and ability he had shown in war.

At this juncture there was handed to him the decree of the senate declaring war on Nabis the Lacedaemonian. After reading it he summoned a meeting of delegates from every State in Greece to be held in Corinth. It was attended by representatives from all quarters, even the Aetolians put in an appearance. The consul addressed the gathering in the following terms: "The war against Philip was conducted by the Romans and the Greeks with a common aim and united action, though each had their own grounds of quarrel. He had broken off friendly relations with Rome by first assisting her enemies the Carthaginians and then by attacking her allies in this country. Towards you his conduct has been such that, if we could have forgotten our own wrongs, those inflicted on you would have been a sufficient justification for war. Today's deliberation, however, solely concerns yourselves. The question I am laying before you is whether you are willing that Argos, which as you know has been taken possession of by Nabis, should remain under his rule, or whether you think it right that a city of such antiquity and renown, situated in the heart of Greece, should be restored to liberty and placed in the same condition as all the other cities in the Peloponnese and the mainland of Greece. This question, as you see, is one that you must decide wholly for yourselves; it in no way touches the Romans except so far as the servitude of any one city deprives them of the full and untarnished glory of effecting the liberation of Greece."

After the Roman commander's speech others were asked to express their views. The Athenian delegate began by expressing the utmost gratitude for the services which the Romans had rendered to Greece. He pointed out that they had given assistance against Philip in answer to most pressing appeals, but their offer of help against Nabis was purely spontaneous, and he expressed strong indignation against remarks which some had made who had tried to belittle these great services and thrown out dark hints about the future when they ought rather to have expressed their grateful acknowledgments for the past. It was obvious that this was a hit at the Aetolians, and Alexander, their foremost citizen, replied with a bitter attack upon the Athenians, who, he said, had in old days been the first champions of liberty and were now betraying the common cause and trying to curry favour for themselves. He then protested against the action of the Achaeans in first fighting under Philip's banner and then, when his fortunes declined, turning renegades and after capturing Corinth scheming to get possession of Argos. The Aetolians, he declared, were the first to oppose Philip, they had always been allies of Rome, and though it was laid down in the treaty that after Philip was conquered their cities and territories should be restored, they were fraudulently kept out of Echinus and Pharsalus. He accused the Romans of hypocrisy, for after their ostentatious and empty proclamation of liberty to Greece they were holding Chalcis and Demetrias with their garrisons, although while Philip hesitated to withdraw his garrisons from those cities they were always protesting that as long as Demetrias, Chalcis and Corinth were held by him Greece could never be free. And now they were putting forward Argos and Nabis as an excuse for keeping their armies in Greece. Let them carry their armies back to Italy, the Aetolians would guarantee that Nabis would withdraw his garrison from Argos either voluntarily or for a consideration, otherwise they would forcibly compel him to submit to the will of a united Greece.

This pretentious harangue called up Aristaenus, the captain-general of the Achaean League. "I pray," he began, "that Jupiter Optimus Maximus and Queen Juno, the tutelary deities of Argos, may never allow that city to be a bone of contention between the tyrant of Lacedaemon and the robbers of Aetolia, or suffer more after you have recovered it than it did when he captured it. No intervening sea protects us from these brigands. What, then, will be our fate, T. Quinctius, if they make a stronghold for themselves in the very heart of Greece? They have nothing Greek about them but the language, any more than they have anything human about them but the form and appearance of men; their customs and rites are more horrid than those of any barbarians, nay, even than those of savage beasts. We ask you therefore, Romans, to rescue Argos from Nabis and settle the affairs of Greece in such a way that you may leave this country at peace and security even against the robber practices of the Aetolians." A general outcry against the Aetolians arose, and the Roman commander said that he would have replied to their charges had he not seen that the delegates were all so incensed against them that they needed to be calmed rather than excited further. He should now put the question, "What do you decide as to war with Nabis, if he does not restore Argos to the Achaeans?" There was a unanimous decision in favour of war, and he impressed upon them the duty of each city sending a contingent in proportion to their strength. He also sent an envoy to the Aetolians, not so much in the expectation of compliance with his demands as to make them disclose their real sentiments, and in this he succeeded.

The military tribunes received orders to bring up the army from Elatia. Envoys from Antiochus arrived about the same time to negotiate an alliance; Quinctius told them that he could express no opinion in the absence of the ten commissioners; the envoys would have to go to Rome and consult the senate. On the arrival of the troops from Elatia he proceeded to Argos. Near Cleonae he was met by Aristaenus with 10,000 Achaean infantry and the united armies encamped not far from that place, and the following day marched down into the plain of Argos and selected a site for their camp some four miles distant from the city. The commander of the Lacedaemonian garrison was Pythagoras, son-in-law and also brother-in-law of the tyrant. Just before the arrival of the Romans he had considerably strengthened the defences of the citadels-Argos possessed two-and other points which appeared weak or vulnerable. Whilst carrying out these tasks, however, he was quite unable to disguise the alarm he felt at the appearance of the Romans, and his fears of a foreign foe were aggravated by disturbances at home. There was an Argive named Damocles, a young man of more courage than prudence. He got hold of those who seemed likely to support him, and after binding them by an oath discussed the question of expelling the garrison, and in his efforts to strengthen the conspiracy was somewhat incautious in testing the sincerity of those whom he addressed. While he was conferring with his supporters one of the commandant's officials summoned him to appear before him. Seeing that his designs were betrayed, he appealed to his fellow-conspirators who were present to take arms with him rather than be tortured to death. He went off accordingly with a few followers to the forum, calling upon all who had the safety of their State at heart to follow him as the champion of their liberty. He did not induce a single person to move, for they saw that there was no chance of success at the time nor any hope of sufficient support. While thus appealing loudly to the bystanders he was surrounded by the Lacedaemonians and killed together with his supporters. Others were arrested afterwards, and many of these were put to death; a few were imprisoned. During the following night several were lowered by cords from the walls and fled to the Romans.

These men assured Quinctius that if the Roman army had been at their gates the movement would have succeeded, and if he moved his camp nearer to the city the Argives would rise. He sent forward some light troops, cavalry and infantry, and the Lacedaemonians sallied out to meet them. They met near the Cylarabis, a gymnasium not three hundred paces from the city, and the Lacedaemonians were without much trouble driven back behind their walls. The Roman general then fixed his camp at the spot where the battle had taken place and remained there for a day on the watch in case any fresh movement was started. When he saw that the citizens were paralysed by fear, he summoned a council of war to consider the question of attacking Argos. All with the exception of Aristaenus were agreed that as Argos was the sole cause of the war, so it ought certainly to be the starting-point. This was very far from what Quinctius wanted, and when Aristaenus spoke in opposition to the unanimous sense of the council he listened to him with unmistakable signs of approval. He wound up the discussion by stating that it was on behalf of the Argives that war had been begun, and he could not imagine anything less consistent than to leave the real enemy alone and attack Argos. As far as he was concerned he should direct all his efforts against Lacedaemon and its tyrant, the head and front of the war.

After the council broke up he sent some cohorts of light troops, infantry and cavalry, to collect corn. All that was ripe was cut and carried off; what was still green was trampled down and spoilt to prevent the enemy from using it. Then he commenced his march, and after crossing Mount Parthenius and leaving Tegea on his right he encamped on the third day at Caryae, and here he awaited the allied contingents before entering the enemy's country; 1500 Macedonian troops came in from Philip and 400 Thessalian cavalry. He had now an adequate force, but he was still detained as he was waiting for the corn which had been requisitioned from the cities in the neighbourhood. A large naval force was also concentrating; L. Quinctius had arrived from Leucas with 40 ships; there were 18 decked ships from Rhodes; Eumenes was cruising amongst the Cyclades with 10 decked ships, 30 despatch-boats and various others of smaller build. Even refugees from Lacedaemon itself, driven away by the tyrant's violence and disregard of all law, gathered in large numbers at the Roman camp in the hope of recovering their country. The number of those expelled by the various tyrants who for several generations held Lacedaemon was very considerable. The principal man among the refugees was Agesipolis, and the sovereignty of Lacedaemon belonged by right to his family. He had been expelled when only an infant by Lycurgus, who became tyrant after the death of Cleomenes, the first of the Lacedaemonian tyrants.

Although Nabis was confronted by so serious a war both by land and sea, and a just comparison of his own strength with that of the enemy left him hardly any hope of success, he did not give up the struggle. He called up 1000 picked troops from Crete in addition to the 1000 he had already; there were 10,000 of his own subjects under arms including the garrisons in the country districts, and he also fortified the city of Sparta with rampart and fosse. To prevent any internal disturbance he kept the citizens in check by the fear of ruthless punishment, as he could not expect them to desire a tyrant's safety and success. There were certain citizens whom he suspected, and after marching all his forces on to a level space called the Dromos he then assembled the Lacedaemonians in front of him, ordering them to lay down their arms, and surrounding them with his armed bodyguard. He then explained briefly why he ought to be excused for feeling grave apprehensions and taking strict precautions at such a critical time, and he pointed out that it was in their own interest that any persons whom the present state of affairs brought under suspicion should be prevented from doing mischief rather than punished for having done it. He should therefore keep certain persons in custody until the storm which was threatening had passed over. If he was sufficiently on his guard against domestic treason he would have all the less cause to fear a foreign foe, and when the enemy had been repulsed they would at once be set at liberty. He then directed the names of some eighty of the principal men of military age to be called over, and as each answered to his name he ordered him into custody. During the night they were all put to death. The Helots are a class who from early times have occupied the fortified villages in the country districts and worked on the land. Some of these were now charged with attempted desertion and after being whipped through all the streets were put to death. The terror thus created so completely quelled the population that all attempts at revolution were at an end. Nabis kept his troops within their lines, as he did not feel himself a match for the enemy in the field and he was afraid to leave the city in such a state of suspense and uncertainty.

As his preparations were now completed, Quinctius broke up his camp and on the second day reached Sellasia on the river Oenus, the place where Antigonus, King of Macedon, was said to have fought with Cleomenes, tyrant of the Lacedaemonians. On hearing that the descent into the valley was by a difficult and narrow path, he sent an advance party by a short circuit over the heights to make a road, and thus by a fairly broad and open route he arrived at the Eurotas, which flows almost under the very walls of Sparta. Whilst the Romans were measuring out the site of their camp, and Quinctius had ridden forward with some infantry and cavalry, they were attacked by the tyrant's auxiliary troops. They were not prepared for anything of the kind, as they had met with no opposition on their march; the country through which they passed might have been a friendly territory. For some time there was considerable confusion, the cavalry calling for help from the infantry and the infantry from the cavalry, no man feeling any confidence in himself. At last the standards of the legions appeared in sight, and then those who a moment before had been spreading alarm were now driven in disorder back to the city. The Romans fell back just beyond the range of missiles from the walls and stood for some time in line of battle, but as none of the enemy came out against them they returned to camp. The next day Quinctius led his army along the river past the city to the foot of Mount Menelaus. The legionary cohorts marched in front and the light infantry and the cavalry closed the column. Nabis was keeping his mercenaries, his sole hope, drawn up under their standards inside the city wall, ready to attack the Roman rear.

As soon as the end of the column had gone by they made the same tumultuous dash as on the previous day from different points. Appius was in command of the rear and had told his men beforehand what to expect. He rapidly faced about, and bringing the whole column into line presented an unbroken front to the enemy. So the two armies met one another in battle order, and for some time there was a regular action. At length Nabis' men began to waver and finally took to flight. The rout would not have been so complete had not the Achaeans who were pursuing them been familiar with the country. They inflicted heavy losses upon them and deprived most of the scattered fugitives of their arms. Quinctius fixed his camp near Amyclae. This city lay in a populous and fertile district and he laid the whole of it waste. None of the enemy, however, ventured outside their gates, and he shifted his camp to the bank of the Eurotas and from there he carried devastation throughout the district which stretched from the foot of Taygetus to the sea.

Lucius Quinctius in the meantime was securing the towns on the coast, in some cases by voluntary surrender, in others by threats or force. Gytheum was the great seaport of Lacedaemonia, and when he learnt that the Romans were in camp at no great distance from the sea Lucius determined to attack it with his united strength. In those days it was a strong city with a large mixed population of citizens and aliens and was thoroughly equipped with all the apparatus for war. Lucius was attempting a far from easy task, and very opportunely for him Eumenes and the Rhodian fleet appeared on the scene. The immense number of seamen which had been drawn from the three fleets constructed in a few days all that was required for an attack upon the city, which was fortified on its landward as well as its seaward side. The testudines had been brought up and the wall was being undermined; in other places it was being battered by the rams. One turret had been brought down by repeated blows and the wall adjacent had fallen with it. To draw off the enemy from the breach thus caused, the Romans delivered an assault from the harbour, where the ground was more level, while at the same time they attempted to fight their way over the ruins of the wall. They had almost succeeded in penetrating at this point when the assault was suddenly stopped as a prospect presented itself of the city being surrendered, a prospect, however, which soon vanished. Two men, Dexagoridas and Gorgopas, shared the command of the city between them. Dexagoridas had sent to the Roman general to say that he would deliver up the city. After the time and manner of procedure had been settled he was put to death by Gorgopas as a traitor, and the latter, now in sole command, offered a more determined resistance. The assault would have become much more difficult had not Quinctius appeared with a body of 4000 picked troops. When he had shown himself with his army drawn up on the brow of a hill not far from the city, whilst Lucius on the other side was pressing the assault with his siege works both by land and Sea, Gorgopas was driven to despair and compelled to take the very course which in the case of another he had punished with death. After stipulating for the withdrawal of the soldiers who had formed his garrison he handed the city over to Quinctius. Before the surrender of Gytheum, Pythagoras, who had been left in command at Argos, transferred the custody of the city to Timocrates of Pellene and joined Nabis at Sparta with 1000 mercenary troops and 2000 Argives.

Nabis was thoroughly alarmed at the appearance of the Roman fleet and the loss of the towns on the coast, but as long as Gytheum was held by his men he accepted the situation though with faint hopes of success. When, however, he heard that it too had passed into the hands of the Romans he realised the hopelessness of his position with the enemy all round his frontiers and the sea entirely closed to him. He saw that he must yield to circumstances, and accordingly he sent a herald to the Roman camp to find out whether they would allow him to send envoys to them. His request was granted, and Pythagoras was sent to the general for the sole purpose of asking him to meet the tyrant in conference. The military council was convened and they were unanimously of opinion that a conference should be granted and the time and place were settled. The two principals proceeded to some rising ground midway between their camp accompanied by small escorts. Here the escorts were left well in view of the troops on both sides and Nabis went forward with some of his bodyguard, whilst Quinctius advanced to meet him accompanied by his brother, Eumenes, Sosilaus the Rhodian, Aristaenus, the captain-general of the Achaeans, and the military tribunes.

It was left to the tyrant to decide whether he would speak first or not, and he began the discussion in the following speech: "Titus Quinctius and all who are present: If I could have discovered for myself the reason why you have declared war against me or actually commenced it, I should have awaited in silence the issue of my fortunes. But as things are now I cannot control myself sufficiently to refrain from asking, before I perish, why I am to perish. If you were what the Carthaginians are reported to be, a people for whom the honourable observance of treaties possesses no sanctity, I should not be surprised at your considering it a matter of small moment in what way you treat me. But when I look at you I see that you are Romans who hold treaties to be the most solemn of all religious obligations, and fidelity to allies the most sacred of human duties. When I look at myself I hope I am still the man who in common with the rest of the Lacedaemonians is bound to you by an age-long treaty of alliance and who renewed in the recent war with Philip the personal tie of friendship. But, you say, I have violated and destroyed it by holding the city of the Argives. How shall I justify this? By appealing to facts or to the circumstances of the time? As to the facts I have a double defence, for it was the townsmen themselves who invoked my aid and put the place in my hands; I did not occupy it by force, I accepted it and that too when Philip's partisans were in power, not when it was your ally. The circumstance of time clears me too, because it was when I was actually holding Argos that the alliance between us was formed, and the stipulation was not that I should withdraw my garrison from Argos, but only that I should furnish assistance to you in the war. In this question of Argos I most certainly have the best of the argument both on the ground of equity and justice-for I took a city which belonged not to you but to your enemy, not by force but at the wish of the inhabitants-and also on the strength of your own admission, for under the terms of peace you left Argos to me.

But however that may be, the title of 'tyrant' and the arbitrary acts of a tyrant, such as summoning slaves to freedom and settling the poverty-stricken masses on the land, are alleged against me. As to the title I can make this reply, whatever my character is I am the same man with whom you yourself, T. Quinctius, entered into alliance. Then, I remember, you called me 'king,' now I see that you have dubbed me 'tyrant.' Now, if I had altered the designation of my rule, I should have to defend my inconsistency; as you are altering it, you must justify yours. As to my augmenting the civil population by freeing the slaves and dividing up the land amongst the poor and needy, I can defend myself against this charge also by pleading the time at which I did it. Whatever these measures were I had carried them out when you contracted alliance with me and accepted my assistance in the war with Philip. But even supposing that I had carried them out to-day, I do not ask how I could have injured you or disturbed the amity between us, I content myself with asserting that I have acted in accordance with our ancestral laws and customs. Do not weigh what is done in Lacedaemon by your own institutions. There is no necessity for going into details. You select your cavalry as you do your infantry, according to their assessment; you will have a few preeminent for their wealth and the mass of the population subject to them. Our legislator would not have the government in the hands of a small class such as you designate your senate, nor would he allow any one order to be preponderant in the State; he believed that an equality of rank and fortune was necessary in order that there might be a large number of men to bear arms for their country. I have spoken at greater length, I confess, than is usual with my countrymen. It could have been put very briefly-I have done nothing since I formed a league of amity with you which should make you regret it."

To this the Roman commander replied: "It is not with you that we entered into friendship and alliance, but with Philip, the rightful and legitimate king of Lacedaemon. His right to the crown has been usurped by the tyrants who ruled there while we were preoccupied by, first, the Punic War, then with wars in Gaul and elsewhere, just as you have usurped it during this war with Macedon. What greater inconsistency could there be than for those who waged war against Philip for the liberation of Greece to form a league of unity with a tyrant, and a tyrant, too, who has always treated his subjects with the utmost oppression and cruelty? In fact, even if you had not seized and were not now holding Argos by dishonest practices, it would still have been incumbent on us, whilst liberating the rest of Greece, to restore Lacedaemon also to her old free constitution and to those laws which you spoke about just now as though you put yourself on a par with Lycurgus. Are we to make it our care that your garrisons shall be withdrawn from Iasos and Bargyliae and at the same time leave Argos and Lacedaemon, two of the most famous cities and at one time the lights of Greece, prostrate beneath your feet, and so let their servitude sully our title as the liberators of Greece? You say the sympathies of the Argives were with Philip. Well, we release you from any obligation to be angry with them so far as we are concerned. We have sufficient evidence that the blame for that rests upon some two or at the most three persons, not upon the citizens as a body, just, in fact, as the invitation given to you and your troops and your admission into the citadel was in no way whatever the act of their government. We know that the Thessalians and Phocians and Locrians were unanimous in their support of Philip, and yet we have given them their freedom in common with the rest of Greece; what, pray, do you suppose we shall do in the case of the Argives, who as a State were innocent of any complicity with him?

You said that the enfranchisement of the slaves and the assignment of land to the needy were brought up as charges against you, and they are certainly serious ones, but what are they in comparison with the crimes committed by you and your adherents day by day? Produce an assembly where men are free to speak their minds, at either Argos or Lacedaemon, if you want to hear a true description of your unbridled tyranny. Not to mention earlier instances, what about the massacre which that son-in-law of yours, Pythagoras, perpetrated in Argos almost before my very eyes? What about the murders you yourself committed when I was close to your frontiers? Come now, order those prisoners to be produced whom you arrested in the Assembly after promising in the hearing of all present that they should be kept in custody. Let their unhappy relatives know that those whom they are mourning are still alive. But you say, 'Even if these things are so, what have they got to do with you Romans?' Would you use this language to the liberators of Greece? To those who, to effect this liberation have crossed the sea and carried on war by sea and land? 'At all events,' you say, 'I have not injured you directly or violated your friendship and alliance.' How many instances do you want me to allege of your having done this? I do not want to bring many forward, I will sum them up briefly. What acts, then, constitute a violation of friendship? These two, most of all-to treat my allies as enemies, and to make common cause with my enemies. Both of these things you have done. Though you were our ally you seized by force a city in alliance with us, namely Messene, which had been admitted to our friendship and enjoyed precisely the same privileges as Lacedaemon. And further, you not only concluded an alliance with Philip, our enemy, but you actually established a relationship with him through Philocles, one of his viceroys. In open hostility to us, you infested the sea round Malea with your piratical barques, and have seized and put to death almost more Roman citizens than Philip, so that our transports, which were supplying our armies, found coasting along the Macedonian shores safer than rounding the Cape of Malea. Forbear henceforth, if you please, to talk about your loyal observance of treaties; drop the language of a citizen and speak as a tyrant and an enemy."

Aristaenus followed. He advised and even implored Nabis to take the course which was safest for himself and his fortunes while he had the opportunity. He alluded by name to several who after ruling as tyrants in the surrounding cities had been deposed on the restoration of liberty and had passed a safe and even an honoured old age amongst their fellow-citizens. Further discussion was put an end to by the approach of night. The next day Nabis said that he would evacuate Argos and withdraw his garrison whenever the Romans wished, and would also surrender the prisoners and deserters. Should any further demands be made, he requested that they might be put in writing in order that he might consult his friends about them. Time was allowed him for the purpose, and Quinctius on his side also called the friendly cities into council. The majority were in favour of continuing the war and getting rid of the tyrant; for they felt certain that the freedom of Greece would never be safe otherwise. They declared that it would have been better not to commence war against him than to abandon it after it had begun, for Nabis would be in a much stronger position if he could assume that his usurpation was sanctioned by Rome, and his example would incite many in other cities to plot against the liberties of their fellow-citizens.

The general himself was more inclined to peace. He saw clearly that if the enemy were driven within his walls there was nothing for it but a siege, and a long one too, for it was not Gytheum they would have to attack-that place had, however, been surrendered, not stormed-but Lacedaemon, a city exceptionally strong in men and arms. His one hope had been, so he told the council, that on the approach of his army a revolutionary outbreak might occur, but though the citizens saw the standards carried up to the gates no one stirred. He went on to inform them that Villius had returned from his mission to Antiochus and reported that they could no longer depend upon maintaining peace with him, as he had landed in Europe with a far larger force, both military and naval, than on the former occasion. If he, Quinctius, employed his army in investing Lacedaemon, what other troops, he asked, would he have available for war against so strong and powerful a monarch? This was what he gave out in public; his secret motive was the fear that when the new consuls balloted for their provinces Greece might fall to one of them, and the war which he had begun so victoriously might be brought to a triumphant close by his successor.

As his arguments failed to make any impression on the allies he tried another course, and by apparently falling in with their view he brought them over to his own. "Well and good," he continued, "let us undertake the siege of Lacedaemon, if such is your resolve. Do not close your eyes, however, to the fact that the investment of a city is a slow business and often wearies out the besiegers sooner than the besieged, and you must now face the certainty of having to pass the winter round the walls of Lacedaemon. If these tedious processes only involved toil and danger I should urge you to prepare yourselves in mind and body to sustain them. But a vast outlay will be necessary for the siege works and engines and artillery which will be required for the investment of so great a city, and supplies for you and for us will have to be collected against the winter. So, to prevent your suddenly finding yourselves in difficulties, and abandoning to your shame a task after you have undertaken it, I am of opinion that you ought to write to your respective cities and find out what they really intend doing and what resources they possess. Of auxiliary troops I have enough and more than enough, the greater our number the greater our requirements. The enemy's territory contains nothing now but the bare soil, and besides, winter will be here, making it difficult to bring supplies from a distance." This speech at once reminded them of the evils they had to take account of in their own cities, the indolence, the jealousy, the malicious way in which those remaining at home spoke about those on active service, the unrestrained liberty which hindered united action, the low state of their national exchequers and the niggardliness displayed by individuals in contributing towards public expenses. So they quickly changed their minds and left it to the commander-in-chief to do what he thought best in the interest of Rome and the allies.

After consultation with his staff officers and military tribunes, Quinctius put into writing the conditions on which peace was to be made with the tyrant. There was to be a truce for six months between Nabis and his opponents-the Romans, Eumenes and the Rhodians. T. Quinctius and Nabis were each to send forthwith commissioners to Rome to secure the confirmation of the peace by the senate. The armistice was to commence from the day on which the document containing the conditions was handed to Nabis, and within ten days from that date he was to withdraw all his garrisons from Argos and the other towns in Argive territory and the places were to be handed over, evacuated and free, to the Romans. No slaves were to be removed from those places, whether they had belonged to the king or the public authorities or private individuals, and if any had previously been so removed they were to be duly restored to their owners. Nabis was to return the ships he had taken from the maritime cities, and he himself was not to possess any vessel beyond two light barques with not more than sixteen oars. All the cities allied with Rome were to have their prisoners and deserters restored to them, and all the property which the people of Messene could collect together and identify was to be given back to them. Further, he was to allow the Lacedaemonian refugees to have their wives and children with them, provided that no woman should be forced to join her husband whilst in exile against her will. Such of the tyrant's mercenaries as had gone back to their homes or deserted to the Romans were to have all their property restored to them. He was not to possess a single city in Crete, those which he had held he was to deliver up to the Romans, nor was he to form alliances with or make war against any of the Cretan cities, or anyone else. All the cities which he had to surrender, and all who had voluntarily accepted the suzerainty of Rome, were to be relieved of the presence of his garrisons; neither he nor his subjects were in any way to interfere with them. He was not to build a walled town or fortified post either on his own soil or elsewhere. As a guarantee for the due observance of these conditions he was to give five hostages to be selected by the Roman commander-one being his own son-and he was to pay an indemnity of 100 talents of silver at once and an annual instalment of 50 talents for the next eight years.

After the Roman camp had been moved nearer the city, these conditions were sent to Lacedaemon. None of them, of course, were very agreeable to the tyrant, though he was relieved to find that nothing was said about repatriating the refugees, but what he resented most of all was being deprived of his ships and his seaports. The sea had been a great source of profit to him as long as he could infest the whole Maleatic coastline with his pirate ships, and, moreover, the men drawn from the maritime cities furnished him with by far the finest of his troops. He had discussed the conditions privately with his friends, but as courtiers are untrustworthy in all other matters, so are they especially in keeping secrets, and the consul's demands soon became generally known. They were not objected to so strongly by the great body of the citizens as they were by the different individuals who were immediately affected by them. Those who had married the wives of the political exiles and those who had appropriated any of their property were as indignant as though they were to lose what belonged to themselves, instead of restoring what belonged to others. The slaves who had been freed by the tyrant saw not only their liberty gone but an even worse slavery awaiting them if they had to pass into the power of their enraged masters. The mercenary troops were angry at losing their pay when peace was established, and they saw no chance of returning to their own cities, which were as bitterly opposed to the supporters of tyrants as to the tyrants themselves.

They began by gathering together and discussing their grievances, and at last they flew to arms. The tyrant saw from this outbreak that the populace were sufficiently excited for his purpose, and he called a public assembly. As he went separately through the consul's demands and added some of his own invention which were more burdensome and humiliating, each item called forth angry protests, at one time from the whole assembly, at another from separate groups. When he had finished he asked the people what answer they wished him to give, or what action he was to take. The whole assembly almost with one voice forbade him to return any answer and insisted that the war should go on. As usual with the crowd they encouraged one another by saying that they hoped for the best and that Fortune helped the brave. Encouraged by the general voice, the tyrant gave out that Antiochus and the Aetolians would assist them, and he meanwhile had enough troops to stand a siege. Nobody now still talked of peace, and unable to remain quiet any longer they ran off to attack the enemy's advanced posts. The offensive movements of small bodies of skirmishers and the discharge of their missiles removed any doubt from the minds of the Romans that war was inevitable. For four days slight actions took place without any decisive result, but on the fifth day the fighting almost amounted to a regular battle and the Lacedaemonians were driven back into their town in such a state of demoralisation that some of the Roman soldiers in hot pursuit entered the city at places where at that time there was no wall.

As the fear thus inspired had checked all further offensive on the part of the enemy, Quinctius saw that there was nothing left but to invest the place, and after despatching officers to bring up the whole of the naval contingent from Gytheum, he proceeded with his military tribunes to ride round the city and examine its position. Sparta had formerly been unwalled, but in recent years the various tyrants had protected those parts which were level and exposed by a wall; the higher and less accessible positions were defended by permanent military posts instead of fortifications. When the consul had made a thorough inspection of the place he saw that he would have to employ the whole of his force in the attack. Accordingly he completely invested the city with Roman and allied troops, mounted and unmounted; in fact, his entire military and naval strength, amounting to 50,000 men. Some were carrying scaling ladders, others fire, others the different things with which to attack and still more to appal the enemy. Orders were issued for all to raise the battle-shout and rush straight forward to the assault at the same moment so that the Lacedaemonians, threatened on every side, would not know where first to meet the attack or where assistance would be most required. Quinctius formed his main army into three divisions: the first was to deliver the assault in the neighbourhood of the Phoebeum; the second towards the Dictynneum; the third at the place called the Heptagoniae. All these points were unprotected by walls. Though the city was now encompassed on every side by so menacing a foe the tyrant was most energetic in its defence; wherever shouts arose on some sudden onset, when breathless messengers came asking for help, he either hurried to the threatened spot himself or sent others to assist. When, however, demoralisation and panic had set in everywhere, he completely lost his nerve, and was unable either to give the necessary orders or to listen to the messages that came; he not only lost all power of judgment, but was almost beside himself.

As long as they were in the narrow streets the Lacedaemonians stood their ground against the Romans, and three separate actions were going on at different places, but as the struggle became more intense it became more unequal. The Lacedaemonians were carrying on the fight with missiles, against which the Romans were easily able to protect themselves by their large shields, and whilst some fell harmlessly others came with little force. Owing to the confined space and the crowding together they had no room to run before hurling their missiles to give them greater force, nor could they keep a firm and steady footing while they tried to throw them. None of the darts which the enemy flung penetrated the bodies and very few the shields of the Romans. Some wounds were caused by the enemy who were on higher ground around them, but soon their advance exposed them to an unlooked-for attack from the houses, not only darts but even tiles being hurled upon them. On this they held their shields above their heads and closed up so that with shield joined to shield there might be no room for a chance missile or even for one thrown at close range to penetrate. In this testudo formation they went on.

For a short time the Romans were held up by the narrowness of the streets as they and the enemy were closely packed together, but when they got into a broader thoroughfare they pushed the enemy back and were able to advance, and the violence of their attack made further resistance impossible. When the Lacedaemonians had once turned to flight and were making for the higher parts of the city, Nabis, in a state of distraction as though the city was actually taken, was looking round for some way of escape, but Pythagoras, who in all other respects was showing the spirit and leadership of a general, was now the one man who saved the city from capture. He gave orders for the buildings nearest the walls to be set alight and they instantly burst into flames, the townsmen, who at other times would naturally have helped to extinguish them, fanning the conflagration. The roofs collapsed upon the Romans, broken tiles and pieces of burning wood struck the soldiers, the flames spread far and wide, and the smoke caused them alarm out of all proportion to the danger incurred. Those who were still outside the city making the final assault fell back from the walls; those who were already within, afraid of being cut off by the outbreak of fire in their rear, retired, and Quinctius, seeing the state of matters, sounded the retreat. Recalled from the assault when the city was all but captured, they returned to camp.

Quinctius came to the conclusion that he would gain more from playing on the enemy's fears than by what he had hitherto achieved, and he kept them in a constant state of alarm for three successive days by harassing them with attacks and throwing up barriers at certain points to close the avenues of escape. Driven at last to submission by this perpetual menace, the tyrant sent Pythagoras once more to open negotiations. At first Quinctius refused to see him and ordered him to quit the camp, but when he assumed a suppliant tone and fell on his knees, the consul granted him an audience. He began by leaving everything at the absolute discretion of the Romans, but he gained nothing by taking this line, which was regarded as idle and leading to no result. Finally it was arranged that, conditionally upon the acceptance of the terms which had a few days previously been presented in writing, there should be a suspension of hostilities; the money and the hostages were accepted. While the siege was going on message after message reached Argos announcing the imminent capture of Lacedaemon, and the spirits of the population were raised higher by the departure of Pythagoras with the main strength of his garrison. Feeling contempt for the few still remaining, they expelled them from the citadel under the direction of a man called Archippus. Timocrates of Pellene was allowed to leave under a safe-conduct owing to the clemency and moderation he had shown as commandant. After granting peace to the tyrant, and dismissing Eumenes and the Rhodians and sending his brother Lucius back to the fleet, Quinctius went to Argos, where he found everybody very happy.

The famous Nemean Games, the most popular of all their festivals, had been suspended by he Argives owing to the sufferings of the war, but on the arrival of the Roman commander with his army they manifested their delight by ordering the Games to be celebrated and making the general himself the president. There were many circumstances which enhanced their joy-those of their fellow-citizens whom Pythagoras had lately removed and those whom Nabis had previously carried off had now been brought back from Lacedaemon; those who had succeeded in escaping after the discovery of the plot by Pythagoras and the consequent bloodshed had returned home; once more after a long interval they had their liberty restored, and they saw with their own eyes the Romans who were the authors of its restoration and who for their sake had undertaken the war with the tyrant. Moreover, on the very day the Nemean Games were exhibited the voice of the herald confirmed by public proclamation "the liberty of the Argives." The satisfaction which the Achaeans felt at the restoration of Argos to their league was considerably impaired by the fact that Lacedaemon was left in servitude to the tyrant, who remained as a thorn in their side. As for the Aetolians, they were perpetually harping upon the subject at every meeting of their council. They declared that the war was not at an end till Philip had evacuated every city in Greece; Lacedaemon was left to the tyrant, but her rightful king, who was in the Roman camp, and the noblest of her citizens would have to live in exile; Rome had made herself the minister to his tyranny. Quinctius led his forces back to Elatia, which had been his starting-point for the Spartan War. Some authorities state that the tyrant did not conduct operations by making sorties from the town, but after fixing his camp face to face with that of the Romans and waiting for a considerable time in expectation of assistance from the Aetolians, he was in the end compelled to give battle owing to the Romans attacking his foragers. In that battle they state that he was defeated and lost his camp and so was driven to ask for peace, after losing 14,000 in killed and wounded and more than 4000 who were made prisoners.

The despatch from T. Quinctius reporting his operations at Lacedaemon and one from M. Porcius, the consul in Spain, reached Rome almost simultaneously. A three days' thanksgiving was ordered by the senate on behalf of each of them. The consul, L. Valerius, who after routing the Boii near the Litanean forest had no further trouble in his province, returned to Rome for the elections. The new consuls were P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus and Tiberius Sempronius Longus. Their fathers had both been consuls in the first year of the Second Punic War. The election of praetors followed. Those elected were P. Cornelius Scipio, the two Cornelii-Merenda and Blasio-Cneius Domitius Ahenobarbus, Sextus Digitius, and T. Juventius Thalna. After the elections were over the consul went back to his province. During the year the people of Ferentinum tried to claim the right of those Latins who had been enrolled in Roman colonies to be deemed Roman citizens. Those who had given in their names had been assigned to the colonies of Puteoli, Salernum and Buxentum, and on the strength of this assumed the status of Roman citizens. The senate decided that they were not Roman citizens.

At the beginning of the year of office of the new consuls the envoys from Nabis arrived in Rome. An audience of the senate was granted them outside the City in the temple of Apollo. They asked that the treaty of peace which had been arranged with T. Quinctius might be confirmed, and their request was granted. When the allocation of provinces came under discussion there was a large attendance of senators, and the general opinion was that as the wars in Spain and Macedonia had come to an end Italy should be assigned to both consuls as their province. Scipio was of opinion that one consul was enough for Italy, the other ought to have Macedonia assigned to him. He pointed out that a serious war was impending with Antiochus, who had deliberately landed in Europe. What, Scipio asked, did they suppose he would do when he was invited to commence hostilities by the Aetolians on the one side, who were undoubtedly hostile, and on the other side urged on by Hannibal, the commander so renowned for the defeats he had inflicted on the Romans? While the consular provinces were being discussed the praetors balloted for their provinces. Cneius Domitius received the urban jurisdiction and T. Juventius that over aliens. To P. Cornelius was allotted Further Spain, and Hither Spain to Sextus Digitius. Of the two Cornelii, Blasio was appointed to Sicily and Merenda to Sardinia. It was decided not to send a fresh army to Macedonia, the one which was there was to be brought back by Quinctius and disbanded, as was also the army with M. Porcius Cato in Spain. Italy was decreed as the province of both consuls, and they were empowered to raise two legions in the City in order that after the disbandment of the two armies which the senate had decreed there might be in all eight Roman legions.

In the previous year a Sacred Spring had been observed, and the Pontifex Maximus P. Licinius reported to the pontifical college that its observance had not been properly carried out. The college authorised him to bring the matter to the notice of the senate, and they decided that there should be an entirely fresh observance under the direction of the pontiffs. The Great Games, which had been vowed at the same time, were also ordered to be celebrated, and the usual outlay incurred upon them. The victims to be offered included all the cattle born between 1st March and 1st May during the consulship of P. Cornelius and Tiberius Sempronius. Then came the election of the censors. The new censors, Sextus Aelius Paetus and C. Cornelius Cethegus, selected, as their predecessors had done, P. Scipio as leader of the senate. Only three senators in all were removed from the roll, none of whom had enjoyed curule honours. Another thing which added immensely to their popularity with the patricians was the order they issued to the curule aediles, requiring them to reserve special places for the senators at the Roman Games; previously they sat amongst the crowd. Very few of the equestrian order were deprived of their horses, nor did the censors treat any order in the State harshly. The Hall of Liberty and the Villa Publica were also restored and enlarged by these censors. The Sacred Spring and the Games, vowed by Servius Sulpicius Galba, were duly carried out. Q. Pleminius, who for his many crimes against gods and men at Locri had been thrown into prison, seized the opportunity whilst all were preoccupied with the spectacle of the Games to get together a number of men who were to set the City on fire at various points during the night so that he might break out of gaol during the confusion created. The plot was disclosed by some of his accomplices and the information laid before the senate. Pleminius was thrown into the lowest dungeon and put to death.

During the year a number of Roman citizens were settled as colonists in Puteoli, Volturnum and Liternum; three hundred were assigned to each place. Similar settlements were made in Salernum and Buxentum. The commissioners who supervised the emigration were Tiberius Sempronius Longus who was consul at the time, M. Servilius and Q. Minucius Thermus. The land distributed amongst them had formed part of the domain of Capua. A colony of Roman citizens was also established at Sipontum on land which had belonged to Arpi. The commissioners in this case were D. Junius Brutus, M Baebius Tamphilus and M. Helvius. Roman citizens were also sent as colonists to Tempsa and Croto; the territory of the former had been taken from the Brutii, who had expelled the Greeks from it; Croto was still held by the Greeks. The commissioners for the colonisation at Croto were Cneius Octavius, L. Aemilius Paulus and C. Laetorius; those for Tempsa were L. Cornelius Merula and C. Salonius. Some portents appeared in Rome this year and others were announced from various places. In the Forum, the Comitium and the Capitol drops of blood were seen; there were several showers of mud, and the head of the statue of Vulcan appeared to be on fire. It was reported that the river Nar had flowed with milk, that boys of respectable parents at Ariminum had been born without eyes or nose, and one in the district of Picenum without hands or feet. These portents were expiated as directed by the pontiffs. Sacrifices were also offered for nine days in consequence of a report from the people of Hadria that a shower of stones had fallen on their soil.

L. Valerius, who was still in command in Gaul, fought a hotly contested action with the Insubrians and the Boii; the latter had crossed the Po in order to rouse the Insubrians to arms. His colleague M. Porcius Cato celebrated his triumph over the Spaniards during this period. In the procession there were carried 25,000 pounds of unwrought silver, 12,300 silver denarii, 540 of Oscan coinage, and 1200 pounds' weighs of gold. To each of the infantry soldiers he distributed 270 ases and treble the amount to the cavalry. On arriving in his province Tiberius Sempronius marched his troops first of all into the country of the Boii. Boiorix was their chief at the time, and after he and his two brothers had induced the whole nation to resume hostilities he fixed his camp in an exposed position in the open country to show that they were prepared to fight if they were invaded. When the consul became aware of the numbers and confidence of the enemy he sent to his colleague asking him, if he thought he could do so, to hasten to his assistance, and he would by one means or another delay an action till he came. The same reason which led the consul to delay made the Gauls seek an early decision, for their confidence was increased by their enemy's hesitation and they determined to engage him before the two consuls united their forces. For two days, however, they merely stood ready for battle in case there was any advance from the Roman camp; on the third day they went up to the rampart and attacked the camp simultaneously on all sides.

The consul ordered his men instantly to seize their weapons, and for a few minutes kept them standing under arms, partly to encourage the unthinking confidence of the enemy and also to allow of his distributing the troops at the different gates from which each body was to make the sortie. The two legions were ordered to advance through the principal gates, but the Gauls blocked the exits in such dense masses that they could not emerge. The struggle went on for a long time in the confined space; it was not so much fighting with their right hands and swords as pushing with their shields and bodies, the Romans trying to force a way for their standards, the Gauls endeavouring to get into the camp, or at all events to keep the Romans from getting out. Neither the one side nor the other could make any advance until Q. Victorius, a centurion of the first rank, and C. Atilius, a military tribune, the former belonging to the second legion, the latter to the fourth, did what had often been tried in desperate struggles, and snatching the standards from the bearers flung them amongst the enemy. In their effort to recover the standards the men of the second legion were the first to force their way out of the camp.

They were now fighting outside the rampart while the fourth legion were still held up in their gate. Suddenly a new alarm arose on the opposite side of the camp. The Gauls had broken through the quaestorian gate, and after meeting with the most obstinate resistance had killed the quaestor, L. Postumius Tympanus, M. Atinius and P. Sempronius, praefects of allies, and nearly 200 men. This side of the camp was in the enemy's hands until one of the "special cohorts" which had been sent by the consul to defend the quaestorian gate drove them out of the camp after killing many of them, and stopped those who were breaking in. Almost at the same moment the fourth legion, with two of the special cohorts, forced their way out of another gate. So there were three separate actions going on simultaneously on different sides of the camp, and the confused shouts which arose called off the attention of the combatants from their own struggle to the doubtful position of their comrades. Up to noonday the battle was fought with equal strength on both sides, and almost equal hopes of victory. But the heat and the exertion told upon the Gauls with their soft and perspiring bodies, utterly incapable as they were of enduring thirst, and compelled them to beat a retreat. The few who still stood their ground were charged by the Romans and driven in rout to their camp. Then the consul gave the signal to retire; most of the men obeyed it, but some in their eagerness for battle and in the hope of securing the hostile camp pushed on to the rampart. The Gauls, deriding this weak force, rushed in a body out of their camp. Now it was the Romans who were routed, and those who refused to return to camp at the consul's order were driven thither by their fears. So first on one side and then on the other victory and flight alternated. The Gauls, however, lost as many as 11,000 men, the Romans 5000.

They retired into the most distant part of their country; the consul led his legions to Placentia. Some writers assert that Scipio formed a junction with his colleague and marched through the fields of the Boii and the Ligurians, plundering as he went, until the forests and marshes forbade further progress; others, on the contrary, state that he returned to Rome to conduct the elections without doing anything worth recording. T. Quinctius had returned to his former quarters at Elatia, and he spent the whole winter in administering justice and reforming the judicial procedure. He also made changes in the political arrangements which had been imposed on the cities by the lawless tyranny of Nabis and his lieutenants, and which by augmenting the power of his own party crushed the rights and liberties of the others. At the beginning of spring he went to Corinth, where he had summoned a general meeting of the allies. Representatives from all the States were present, so that it was practically a Pan-Hellenic council. He began his address by reminding them of the friendly relations which had from the first existed between the Romans and the Greeks as a nation and the work which had been done by himself and the commanders who had been in Macedonia before him. His speech was listened to with universal approbation except where he alluded to the treatment of Nabis. It was felt by those present to be quite inconsistent with the part of a Liberator of Greece to leave the tyrant as a scourge to his own country and a terror to all the surrounding States.

Quinctius was quite aware of their feelings on this question, and he frankly admitted that he would not have listened to any overtures of peace if this course would not have involved the destruction of Lacedaemon. As matters were, since Nabis could not be crushed without ruining a city of the first importance it seemed better to leave him weakened and almost entirely deprived of any power to injure others rather than allow this city to succumb from the effect of remedies too strong for it and perish in the very process of recovering its liberty. After this review of the past he went on to announce his intention of leaving for Italy, taking the whole of his army with him. He told them that in less than ten days they would hear that the troops in occupation of Demetrias and Chalcis had been withdrawn, and they would see with their own eyes Acrocorinthus evacuated and handed over to the Achaeans immediately. This would show the whole world whether it was the Romans who were in the habit of telling lies or the Aetolians, who in their public speeches had spread abroad the notion that it was a mistake to entrust their liberties to Rome and that they had only changed their Macedonian for Roman masters. But that people never cared in the least what they said or what they did. He advised the other States to measure their friends by their deeds and not by their words, and so learn whom to trust and whom to beware of. They must use their liberty in moderation; under proper restraints liberty was a blessing to individuals and communities alike; in excess it was a danger to others and led to recklessness and violence on the part of those who possessed it. The nobility, together with the various classes of society in the different cities, must study to preserve internal harmony, and the States as a whole must endeavour after mutual concord. As long as they were of one mind neither king nor tyrant would ever be strong enough to hurt them, but discord and sedition gave every advantage to those who were seeking to destroy their liberty, since the party which was worsted in a domestic struggle would rather join hands with a foreigner than submit to a fellow-citizen. It must be their care to defend and maintain the freedom which had been won for them by foreign arms and restored to them on the faith of a foreign power. Then the Roman people would know that the gift of liberty had been made to those who were worthy of it and that their boon had been well bestowed.

These sentiments, such as a father might have uttered called forth tears of joy from all who heard them, and for some time the voice of the speaker was drowned amidst the expressions of approval and the exhortations which the audience addressed to each other to let these words sink into their hearts and minds as though they were the words of an oracle. At last, when silence was restored, he asked them to find out any Roman citizens who were living as slaves amongst them and send them within two months' time to him in Thessaly. They would not, he felt sure, think it right or honourable for their liberators to be in the position of slaves in the land which they had liberated. They all exclaimed that among the other things for which they were grateful they thanked him especially for reminding them of so sacred and imperative a duty. There was an immense number who had been made prisoners in the Punic War, and as they were not ransomed by their countrymen Hannibal sold them as slaves. That they were very numerous is evident from what Polybius says. He asserts that this undertaking cost the Achaeans 100 talents, as they fixed the price to be paid to the owners at 500 denarii a head. On this reckoning Achaia must have held 1200 of them; you can estimate proportionally what was the probable number throughout Greece. The assembly was still sitting when, on looking round, they saw the troops coming from Acrocorinthus; they marched straight through to the gate and left the city. The general followed them amidst universal applause and shouts of "Saviour and Liberator." Then taking his final leave of them he returned to Elatia by the same route by which he had come. From there he despatched Appius Claudius with the whole of his forces, they were to march through Thessaly and Epirus to Oricum and wait for him there, as he intended to sail from there with his army to Italy. His brother Lucius, who was in command of the fleet, received written instructions to collect ships from every part of the Greek coast.

He then proceeded to Chalcis and withdrew the forces in occupation not only from that city, but from Oreus and Eretria as well. Here he summoned a convention of all the cities in Euboea, and after reminding them of the condition in which he found them and the condition in which he was leaving them, sent them back to their homes. Going on to Demetrias, he withdrew his troops from that place amidst the same enthusiasm on the part of the citizens as at Corinth and Chalcis. He then resumed his progress into Thessaly, where the cities had not only to be liberated but also brought back from confusion and chaos into some tolerable form of government. This state of confusion arose from the disorders of the time and the violence and lawlessness introduced by Philip, but it was due quite as much to the quarrelsome character of the people, who never conducted public proceedings of any kind, whether elections or conventions or councils, without tumult and riot. Quinctius selected the senate and the judges mostly from the propertied classes and placed power in the hands of those whose interest it was to keep everything in peace and security.

After thus traversing Thessaly he went on through Epirus to Oricum, his starting place for Italy. From this point the whole of his army was carried across to Brundisium, and from Brundisium they marched through the whole length of Italy to the City in what was almost a triumphal procession, of which the captured spoils formed as large a part as the troops themselves. On his reaching Rome the senate met outside the City to receive his report and they gladly decreed the triumph he had so well earned. Its celebration lasted three days. On the first day he had carried through the City the arms and armour and the bronze and marble statues; those taken from Philip were more numerous than those which he had secured in the various cities. On the second day all the gold and silver, coined and uncoined, were borne in the procession. There were 18,000 pounds of uncoined and unwrought silver and 270 of silver plate, including vessels of every description, most of them embossed and some exquisitely artistic. There were also some made of bronze. In addition to these there were ten silver shields. Of the silver coinage 84,000 were Attic pieces, known as tetrachma, each nearly equal in weight to four denarii. The gold weighed 3714 pounds, including one shield made entirely of gold, and there were 14,514 coins from Philip's mint. In the third day's procession were carried 114 golden coronets, the gifts of various cities, and before the victor's chariot went the sacrificial victims and many noble prisoners and hostages, amongst the latter Philip's son Demetrius and Armenes the son of the Lacedaemonian tyrant. Then came Quinctius himself in his chariot followed by a long train of soldiers, as the whole of his army had been brought back from the province. Each infantryman received a largess of 250 ases, each centurion twice as much, and each cavalryman treble the amount. A striking feature in the procession was furnished by those who had been rescued from slavery, and who with shaven heads followed their deliverer.

At the close of the year Q. Aelius Tubero, a tribune of the plebs, acting on a resolution of the senate, brought a proposal before the plebs, which was adopted, for the settlement of two Latin colonies, one in Bruttium and the other in the territory of Thurium. The commissioners who were to supervise the settlement were appointed for three years. Those who were to make the arrangements in Bruttium were Q. Naevius, M. Minucius Rufus and M. Furius Crassipes; those put in charge of the Thurium settlement were A. Manlius, Q. Aelius and L. Apustius. The elections in which they were chosen were held by the City praetor, Cn. Domitius, in the Capitol. A number of temples were dedicated this year. One was the temple of Juno Matuta in the Forum Olitorium. This had been vowed four years previously and its building contracted for by C. Cornelius during his consulship, and he dedicated it when he was censor. Another was the temple of Faunus; the aediles C. Scribonius and Cn. Domitius had contracted for its building two years before out of the money raised by fines, and Cn. Domitius dedicated it when he was City praetor. Q. Marcius Rulla dedicated a temple to Fortuna Primigenia on the Quirinal, having been made duumvir for the purpose. P. Sempronius Sophus had vowed it in the Punic War ten years previously, when he was consul, and he had made the contract for it during his censorship. C. Servilius also dedicated a temple to Jupiter on the Island, which had been vowed six years before in a war with the Gauls by the praetor L. Furius Purpurio, who when consul signed the contract for its construction.

P. Scipio returned from his province of Gaul to conduct the elections. The new consuls were L. Cornelius Merula and Q. Minucius Thermus. The praetors were elected on the following day; they were L. Cornelius Scipio, M. Fulvius Nobilior, C. Scribonius, M. Valerius Messala, L. Porcius Licinus and C. Flaminius. Atilius Serranus and L. Scribonius Libo were the first aediles who made the Megalesia scenic Games. It was when these same aediles exhibited the Roman Games that the senate for the first time sat apart from the people. This, like all innovations, excited much comment. Some regarded it as a tribute which had long been due to the highest order in the State; others considered that whatever enhanced the greatness of the patricians detracted from the dignity of the people, and that all such distinctions as mark off the different orders in the State impair the concord and liberty which all ought equally to enjoy. For 557 years the spectators had sat promiscuously, what, people asked, had happened all of a sudden that the patricians refused to have the plebeians amongst them? Why should a rich man object to a poor man sitting by his side? It was a piece of unheard-of arrogance neither adopted nor wished for by any other senate in the world. Even Africanus himself, who when consul was responsible for the change, was said to have regretted it. So distasteful is any departure from ancient usage; so much do men prefer to stand in the old ways except where they are clearly condemned by experience.

At the beginning of the year of office of the new consuls there were such frequent reports of the occurrence of earthquakes that men grew tired not only of the subject itself, but also of the suspension of business which was ordered on account of it. No meeting of the senate could be held nor any public proceedings conducted, as the consuls were entirely occupied with sacrifices and expiations. At last the decemvirs received instructions to consult the Sacred Books, and in accordance with their injunctions a three days' intercession was proclaimed. Prayers were offered at all the shrines, the suppliants wearing laurel wreaths, and a notice was issued requiring all the members of a family to offer up their prayers together. The senate authorised the consuls to publish an edict forbidding anyone to report an earthquake on any day on which business had been suspended on account of one already reported. After this the consuls balloted for their provinces. Gaul fell to Cornelius and Liguria to Minucius. The praetors' ballot resulted in C. Scribonius receiving the City jurisdiction, M. Valerius that over aliens, L. Cornelius Sicily, L. Porcius Sardinia, C. Flaminius Hither Spain and M. Fulvius Further Spain.

The consuls were not looking forward to any war during their year of office, when a despatch arrived from M. Cincius, the commandant of Pisae, announcing a rising in Liguria. Warlike resolutions had been passed in all the councils of the nation, and 20,000 Ligurians were now in arms. They had ravaged the country round Luna, and after crossing the frontiers of Pisae had traversed the whole length of the coast. Minucius, to whom the province of Liguria had been allotted, acting on the instructions of the senate, mounted the Rostra and issued an edict for the two City legions which had been enrolled the year before to muster in ten days' time at Arretium, their place would be taken by two legions which he was going to raise. He also notified the magistrates and officers of those Latin and allied communities which were bound to furnish troops that they should attend upon him in the Capitol. Here he arranged with them what contingent each city should supply in proportion to the number of men they had of military age, the total being fixed at 15,000 infantry and 500 cavalry. They were then instructed to start for home at once and raise their troops without a moment's delay. Fulvius and Flaminius were each reinforced with Roman troops to the number of 3000 infantry and 100 cavalry and also 5000 infantry and 200 cavalry furnished by the Latins and allies, and the praetors were ordered to disband the old soldiers as soon as they arrived in their provinces. Large numbers of the soldiers in the City legions urged the tribunes of the plebs to investigate the cases of the men who pleaded either length of service or ill-health as reasons why they should not be called up. This matter was quite thrown aside by a despatch from Tiberius Sempronius, in which he stated that a body of 10,000 Ligurians had appeared in the neighbourhood of Placentia and had wasted the country with fire and sword up to the very walls of the colony and the banks of the Po, and the Boii also were contemplating a revival of hostilities.

In view of this announcement the senate decreed that a state of emergency had arisen, and that they disapproved of the tribunes investigating the soldiers' grievance and so preventing them from assembling in obedience to the edict. They further ordered that the men of the allied contingents who had served under P. Cornelius and Tiberius Sempronius and had been disbanded by them should reassemble on the day which L. Cornelius named and in whatever place in Etruria he notified to them. Whilst on his way to his province the consul was to enlist and arm and take with him whatever men he thought fit in the towns and country districts through which he passed, and he was empowered to disband any of them whenever he wanted to do so.

After the consuls had raised the necessary troops and left for their provinces, T. Quinctius requested the senate to listen to his report of the arrangements which he had made in concert with the ten commissioners, and if they thought good to ratify and confirm them. They would, he said, be in a better position to do this if they heard the statements of the envoys who had come from every State in Greece as well as those who had come from the three kings. These deputations were introduced to the senate by the City praetor, Caius Scribonius, and they all met with a favourable reception. As the negotiations with Antiochus were somewhat protracted they were entrusted to the ten commissioners, some of whom had been with the king either in Asia or in Lysimachia. T. Quinctius was authorised to hear the envoys in the presence of the commissioners and make such a reply as was consistent with the interests and the honour of the Roman people. Menippus and Hegesianax were the leaders of the embassy, and the former was the spokesman. He professed himself at a loss to understand what difficulty or complications his mission could create as he had simply come to ask that friendly relations might be established and an alliance formed. There were three kinds of treaties by means of which States and monarchs came to terms with one another. In one case the conditions were dictated to those who had been vanquished in war, for when everything had been surrendered to the one who was the stronger in arms he had the absolute right to say what they might retain and of what they were to be deprived. In the second case powers who have been equally matched in war form a league of peace and amity on equal terms, for then they arrive at a mutual understanding in respect of claims for indemnity, and where proprietorship has been disturbed by the war, matters are adjusted either in accordance with the former legal status or as is most convenient to the contracting parties. The third class of treaties comprises those made by States which have never been enemies and who unite in forming a league of friendship; no conditions are either imposed or accepted, for these only exist between victors and vanquished. It was this latter kind of league that Antiochus was seeking, and he (the speaker) was surprised that the Romans should think it just and fair to impose conditions upon the king as to which of the cities in Asia they decided should be free and autonomous and which should pay tribute, and in the case of some forbidding the king to garrison them. These were terms on which to make peace with Philip their enemy, not a treaty of alliance with Antiochus, who was their friend.

The following was Quinctius' reply: "Since it pleases you to draw these distinctions and to enumerate the various ways in which friendly relations can be established, I too will lay down the two conditions apart from which, you may tell your king, no friendship with Rome can be established. One is this-if he does not wish us to concern ourselves with the cities of Asia, he must himself keep his hands off every part of Europe. The other is this-if instead of confining himself within the frontiers of Asia he crosses over into Europe, the Romans will be perfectly justified in protecting their friendship with those cities where it exists and in winning new ones." Hegesianax replied: "Surely it is an unworthy suggestion to say that Antiochus is excluded from the cities of Thrace and the Chersonese which his great-grandfather Seleucus won most gloriously after defeating Lysimachus, who fell in the battle, and some of which Antiochus himself recovered by force of arms from the Thracians who had taken possession of them, whilst others which had been deserted, like Lysimachia, he repeopled with tillers of the soil, and where they had been burnt or laid in ruin he rebuilt them at a vast expense. What resemblance could there be between the renunciation by Antiochus of his right to cities which had been acquired or recovered in this way and the non-interference of the Romans in Asia, which had never belonged to them? Antiochus was asking for the friendship of Rome, but it was such a friendship as would bring him honour, not shame." On this Quinctius observed: "As it is a question of honour-a question which ought to be the sole, or at all events the primary, one for the foremost nation in the world and for a monarch so great as yours, which course appears to you the more honourable, to desire the freedom of all the Greek cities wherever they are or to keep them tributary and in bondage? If Antiochus thinks that he is acting honourably in claiming the lordship of cities which his great-grandfather held by the right of war, a right which his father and grandfather never asserted, the Roman people also consider that their sense of honour and consistency forbid them to abandon their championship of the liberties of Greece. As they liberated Greece from Philip, so it is their intention to liberate the Greek cities in Asia from Antiochus. Colonies were not founded in Aeolis and Ionia to be in bondage to monarchs, but that their stock might multiply and a nation of ancient lineage be propagated throughout the world."

As Hegesianax hesitated and could not deny that the cause of liberty carried a more honourable title than that of slavery, P. Sulpicius, the senior of the ten commissioners, said: "Let us have no more beating about the bush; choose one of the two conditions which Quinctius has just put forward so clearly; choose or drop this idle plea of friendship." "It is not our wish," said Menippus, "nor is it in our power to enter into any compact by which the sovereign rule of Antiochus will be impaired." The next day Quinctius introduced to the senate all the deputations from Greece and Asia, in order that they might learn the attitude of the Romans and that of Antiochus towards the cities of Greece. He laid his own demands before them and then those of the king, and told them to report to their governments that the Romans would show the same courage and fidelity in vindicating their liberties against Antiochus, if he did not quit Europe, which they had shown in liberating them from Philip. On this Menippus earnestly begged Quinctius and the senate not to precipitate a decision which might, when once taken, throw the world into confusion. He asked them to take time for reflection and allow the king to do the same. When the conditions were reported to him, he would take them into consideration and would obtain some modification of them or make some concessions for the sake of peace. So the whole matter was postponed and it was decided that the same commissioners should be sent to the king who had been with him at Lysimachia, namely P. Sulpicius, P. Villius and P. Aelius.

Scarcely had they started on their mission when envoys came from Carthage with the intelligence that Antiochus was undoubtedly preparing for war with the advice and assistance of Hannibal, and apprehensions were felt as to the outbreak of a war with Carthage at the same time. As was stated above, Hannibal, a fugitive from his native country, had reached the court of Antiochus, where he was treated with great distinction, the only motive for this being that the king had long been meditating a war with Rome, and no one could be more qualified to discuss the subject with him than the Carthaginian commander. He had never wavered in his opinion that the war should be conducted on Italian soil; Italy would furnish both supplies and men to a foreign foe. But, he argued, if that country remained undisturbed and Rome were free to employ the strength and resources of Italy beyond its frontiers, no monarch, no nation could meet her on equal terms. He wanted 100 decked ships and a force of 10,000 infantry and 1000 cavalry; he would take the fleet to Africa first as he felt confident of being able to persuade the Carthaginians to enter upon another war, and if they hung back he would raise up war against Rome in some part of Italy. The king should cross over into Europe with the rest of his army and keep his troops somewhere in Greece, not actually sailing for Italy, but prepared to do so; this would give a sufficient impression of the magnitude of the war.

When he had brought the king over to his view, he thought he ought to prepare his countrymen, but he would not run the risk of sending a written communication lest it should be intercepted and his plans discovered. During his visit to Ephesus he had picked up a Tyrian servant named Aristo and, as he had experience of the intelligent way in which he executed less important commissions, Hannibal decided to make use of him. By means of bribes and lavish promises, which the king himself endorsed, he was induced to go to Carthage with instructions. Hannibal supplied him with a list of those whom it was necessary to interview, and he also provided him with secret signs by which they might know that he had really been commissioned by Hannibal. As the man was constantly going about Carthage, Hannibal's enemies found out the reason for his visit quite as soon as his friends, and the matter became the subject of conversation at social gatherings and in the clubs. At last it gave rise to discussion in the senate, where various speakers asserted that nothing was gained by Hannibal's banishment if he was able to form treasonable designs, and by carrying on an agitation amongst the citizens threaten the peace and security of the State. They declared that one Aristo, a Tyrian stranger, had come furnished with instructions from Hannibal and Antiochus, that men who were well known were holding furtive colloquies with him every day, and that a mischief was being secretly hatched which would soon break out and bring about universal ruin. There was a general outcry and all present demanded that Aristo should be summoned and questioned as to the object of his visit, and unless he explained it, sent with a deputation to Rome. "We have suffered enough," they said, "for one man's recklessness; if private citizens offend it will be at their own risk, the State must be preserved from the taint and even from the suspicion of guilt."

When Aristo appeared he endeavoured to clear himself by relying mainly on the fact that he had brought nothing in the shape of a letter to anyone. Still he did not give a satisfactory explanation of the object of his visit, and what caused him most embarrassment was the allegation that his interviews were confined to the members of the Barcine party. On this a heated discussion arose, one side demanding his arrest and detention as a spy, the other asserting that there was no ground for such irregular action, and it would form a bad precedent if visitors from abroad were to be apprehended for no reason whatever. The same thing would happen to the Carthaginians at Tyre and the other commercial cities which they so largely frequented. The debate was adjourned. Aristo, having to do with Carthaginians, adopted a Carthaginian stratagem. Early in the evening he hung up a placard in the busiest part of the city over the tribunal where the magistrates sat day by day. In the third watch of the night he boarded a vessel and fled away. When the suffetes took their seats the next morning to administer justice they saw the placard, took it down and read it. It stated that Aristo's instructions were not intended for private citizens; they were public and addressed to the "elders"-for so they designated their senate. As this involved the whole government there was less eagerness to investigate the few cases where suspicion fell. It was, however, decided that a deputation should be sent to Rome to report the affair to the consuls and the senate and at the same time lay a complaint against Masinissa.

When Masinissa saw that the Carthaginians were falling into bad odour with Rome and at variance amongst themselves-the leaders of the Barcine party suspected by the senate owing to their interviews with Aristo, and the senate suspected by the people in consequence of the notice which Aristo had put up-he thought it a good opportunity for attacking them. The coastal district which skirts the Lower Syrtis is called Emporia. It is a very fertile country and there is one city in it-Leptis-which alone paid Carthage tribute to the extent of a talent a day. This district Masinissa overran and ravaged from end to end and occupied parts of it, so that it appeared doubtful whether it belonged to him or to the Carthaginians. On learning that they had sent envoys to Rome to meet the charges which had been made against them, and also to complain of his conduct, he too sent a deputation to strengthen the suspicions against Carthage and also to question the right of that government to exact tribute from the district which he had invaded. The Carthaginians were received in audience first, and their account of the Tyrian stranger made the senate feel anxious lest they should be involved in war with both Antiochus and Carthage at the same time. What strengthened their suspicions most of all was the fact that after deciding to arrest Aristo and send him to Rome they had neglected to keep either him or his ship under guard. Then came the argument with Masinissa's representatives as to the territory in dispute. The Carthaginians rested their case on the adjudication of Scipio, as the district lay within the frontiers of what, after his victory, he declared to be Carthaginian territory, and they also relied on Masinissa's own admission. When Aphthires was a fugitive from his kingdom and was roaming with a body of Numidians in the neighbourhood of Cyrenae, Masinissa who was pursuing him asked permission to traverse that district, showing thereby that he had no doubt as to its belonging to Carthage.

The Numidians contended that false statements had been made as to Scipio's delimitation. If the origin of any rights they claimed was inquired into, what ground in all Africa really belonged to the Carthaginians? When they landed on its shores and sought a settlement they were granted as much land on which to build their city as they could enclose within an ox-hide cut into strips. Whatever ground they had gained outside Bursa they had gained by violence and robbery. As to the territory in question, it was impossible for them to prove that it had been in their possession from the beginning or even for any considerable length of time. The Carthaginians and the kings of Numidia laid alternate claims to it as opportunity offered; it always became the possession of those who for the time being were the strongest in arms. They begged the senate to let matters remain in the same state in which they were before Carthage became the enemy or Masinissa the friend and ally of Rome, and not to prevent him who was able to hold it from doing so. The reply given to both parties was to the effect that the senate would send a commission to Africa to settle the dispute on the spot. The commissioners were P. Scipio Africanus, C. Cornelius Cethegus and M. Minucius Rufus. After surveying the locality and hearing both sides they decided for neither of them and left the whole question in abeyance. Whether they did this of their own motion or whether they had received instructions to do so is uncertain. What is certain is that under the circumstances it was a matter of expediency that the question should remain unsettled. Had it not been so Scipio, either through his knowledge of the facts or his personal influence with both the contending parties, could have settled it by a nod.

Book 35. Antiochus in Greece

In the opening months of the year in which the above events occurred several unimportant engagements took place in Spain between Sextus Digitius, the praetor, and the numerous cantons which after the departure of M. Cato had recommenced hostilities. These were on the whole so costly to the Romans that the force which the praetor handed over to his successor was hardly half what he had received. There would undoubtedly have been a general rising throughout Spain had not the other praetor, P. Cornelius Scipio, fought several successful actions beyond the Ebro and so cowed the natives that no less than fifty towns went over to him. This was whilst he was praetor. As pro-praetor he inflicted a severe defeat on the Lusitanians. They had devastated Further Spain and were on their way home with an immense quantity of plunder when he attacked them on the march and fought from the third hour of the day to the eighth without arriving at any decision. He was inferior in numbers, but in everything else he had the advantage, for he was with close and serried ranks attacking a long column hampered by many herds of cattle, and his soldiers were fresh while the enemy were wearied with their long march. They had started in the third hour of the night on a march which was prolonged through three hours of daylight and they were forced to accept battle without taking any rest. So it was only in the first stage of the battle that they showed any spirit or energy. At first they threw the Romans into some disorder, but soon the fighting became even. In the crisis of the struggle the praetor vowed that he would celebrate Games to Jupiter if he should rout and destroy the enemy. At length the Roman attack became more insistent and the Lusitanians began to give ground. Finally they broke and fled, and in the hot pursuit which followed as many as 12,000 of the enemy were killed, 540 prisoners taken, nearly all mounted troops, and 134 standards captured. The losses in the Roman army amounted to 73. The scene of the action was not far from the city of Ilipa, and P. Cornelius led his victorious army, enriched with spoil, to that place. The whole of the booty was laid out in front of the city and the owners were allowed to claim their property. The rest was made over to the quaestor to be sold and the proceeds distributed to the soldiers.

C. Flaminius had not left Rome when these things happened in Spain. Naturally he and his friends talked much more about the defeats than about the successes, and as a widespread war had broken out in his province and he was going to take over from Sex. Digitius a miserable remnant of an army, and that utterly demoralised, he had tried to induce the senate to assign to him one of the City legions. From this and from the force which the senate had empowered him to raise he could select 6200 infantry and 300 cavalry, and with that legion-for there was not much to be expected from Digitius' army-he said he could manage very well. The senior members of the House said that their decisions must not depend upon rumours started by private individuals in the interest of particular magistrates, and that no importance should be attached to anything but the despatches of the praetors from their provinces or the reports which their officers brought home. If there was a sudden rising in Spain they considered that emergency troops ought to be promptly raised by the praetor outside Italy. What they had in their minds was that these troops should be raised in Spain. Valerius Antias asserts that C. Flaminius went to Sicily to enlist men, and that whilst on his way from there to Spain he was carried by a storm to Africa, where he administered the military oath to soldiers who had belonged to the army of P. Africanus.

In Italy, too, the Ligurian war was growing more serious. Pisae was now surrounded by 40,000 men, and their numbers were being swelled daily by crowds who were attracted by the love of fighting and the hope of plunder. Minucius arrived in Arretium on the day which he had appointed for the assembling of his soldiers. From there he marched in close order to Pisae, and though the enemy had moved their camp across the river to a position not more than a mile distant from the place, he succeeded in entering the city, which his arrival undoubtedly saved. The day following he, too, crossed the river and fixed his camp about half a mile distant from that of the enemy. From this position he sent out skirmishers, and so protected the land of the friendly tribes from depredation. As his troops were new levies, drawn from various classes and not yet sufficiently acquainted with each other to feel mutual confidence, he did not venture to challenge a regular engagement. The Ligurians, relying on their numbers, marched out and offered battle, prepared for a decisive conflict, and even detached bodies to go in all directions beyond their frontiers to secure plunder. When they had collected a vast quantity of cattle and other booty an armed escort was ready to take it to their forts and villages.

As the Ligurian operations were confined to Pisae the other consul led his army through the furthest limits of Liguria into the country of the Boii. Here totally different tactics were pursued; it was the consul who offered battle and the enemy who declined it. As they met with no opposition the Romans dispersed on plundering forays, the Boii preferring to let their property be carried off with impunity rather than risk a battle in its defence. After the whole country had been laid waste with fire and sword the consul left the enemy's territory and marched in the direction of Mutina, taking as little precaution against attack as though he were in a friendly country. When the Boii found that their enemy had withdrawn from their frontiers, they followed noiselessly, looking out for a suitable place for a surprise attack. Passing by the Roman camp in the night, they seized a pass through which the Romans would have to go. This movement did not escape observation, and the consul, who had been in the habit of marching in the dead of the night, decided to wait for daylight so that the dangers incident to a tumultuary battle might not be augmented by darkness. Though it was quite light when he started, he sent on a squadron of cavalry to reconnoitre. On receiving their report as to the strength and position of the enemy he ordered the whole of the baggage to be collected together, and the triarii were told off to surround it with a breastwork. With the rest of his army in battle formation he advanced against the enemy. The Gauls did the same when they found that their stratagem was exposed and that they would have to fight an open and regular battle.

The action began about eight o'clock. The left wing of the allied cavalry and the "special" corps were fighting in the front line, and two generals of consular rank-M. Marcellus and Tiberius Sempronius; the latter had been consul the previous year-were in command of them. The consul Merula was at one moment at the front and at another holding back the legions who were in reserve, lest in their eagerness they should go forward before the signal was given. Two military tribunes, Q. Minucius and P. Minucius, received orders to take the cavalry of these two legions outside the line and when the signal was given to deliver an attack from the open. Whilst the consul was making these dispositions a message came from Ti. Sempronius Longus informing him that the special corps were not able to withstand the onslaught of the Gauls, a great many had been killed, and the survivors, wearied out and dispirited, had lost all heart for fighting. He asked the consul, therefore, if he approved, to send up one of the legions before they were humiliated by defeat. The second legion was sent up and the special corps was withdrawn. The battle was now restored, as the legion came up with its men fresh and its maniples complete. As the left division was withdrawn from the fighting the right came up into the front line. The hot sun was blazing down on the Gauls, who were incapable of standing the heat; nevertheless they sustained the attacks of the Roman army in mass formation, leaning against each other or on their shields. On perceiving this the consul ordered C. Livius Salinator, the allied cavalry leader, to send his men at a hard gallop against them, and the cavalry of the legions to act as supports. This hurricane of cavalry confused, disordered, and finally broke up the Gaulish lines, but they did not turn to flee. Their officers began to stop any attempt at flight by striking the waverers with their spears and forcing them back into their ranks, but the cavalry, riding in amongst them, did not allow them to do this. The consul urged his men on; only a little more effort was needed, he said; victory was within their grasp, they saw how disordered and demoralised the enemy were, and they must press the attack. If they allowed them to re-form their ranks, the battle would begin all over again with doubtful result. He ordered the standard-bearers to advance, and with one united effort they at last forced the enemy to give way. When once the Gauls were scattered in flight the cavalry of the legions was sent in pursuit. Fourteen thousand of the Boii were killed in that day's fighting, 1902 taken prisoners, as well as 721 of their cavalry, including three officers; 212 standards were also captured and 63 military wagons. Nor was the victory a bloodless one for the Romans; they and the allied contingents together lost over 5000 men, including 23 centurions, four praefects of allies and three military tribunes in the second legion-M. Genucius, Q. Marcius and M. Marcius.

Despatches from the two consuls arrived in Rome almost on the same day. The one from L. Cornelius contained his report of the battle at Mutina; that from Q. Minucius, at Pisae, stated that the conduct of the elections had fallen to his lot, but the whole position in Liguria was so uncertain that it was impossible for him to leave without bringing ruin on the friendly tribes and injury to the interests of the republic. He suggested that if the senate thought proper they should send word to his colleague, who had practically brought the war in Gaul to a close, requesting him to return to Rome for the elections. If Cornelius objected on the ground that it was not part of his allotted duties, he was ready to do whatever the senate decided upon. But he begged them to give long and careful consideration to the question whether it would be more in the interest of the State that an interrex should be appointed than that he should leave his province in such a condition. The senate instructed C. Scribonius to send two commissioners of senatorial rank to L. Cornelius to show him the despatch which his colleague had sent to the senate, and to inform him that unless he came to Rome for the election of the new magistrates the senate would consent to the appointment of an interrex rather than call away Q. Minucius from a war which had hardly begun. The commissioners brought back word that L. Cornelius would come to Rome for the election of the new magistrates. The despatch which he had sent after his engagement with the Boii gave rise to a debate in the senate. M. Claudius had written unofficially to the majority of the senators stating that it was the good fortune of Rome and the valour of the soldiers that they had to thank for any success that had been gained. All the consul had done was to lose a large number of his men and let the enemy slip out of his hands when he had the chance of annihilating them. His losses were mainly due to the delay in bringing up the reserves to relieve the first line, who were being overpowered. The enemy were able to escape because he was too late in giving the order to the legionary cavalry, and so prevented them from following up the fugitives.

The senate agreed that no hasty decision should be come to on this matter and the debate was adjourned for a fuller meeting of the House. There was another pressing question to be dealt with. The citizens were suffering from money-lenders, and though numerous laws had been made in restraint of avarice they were evaded through the fraudulent transferring of the bills to subjects of the allied States who were not bound by these laws. In this way debtors were being overwhelmed by unlimited interest. After a discussion as to the best method of checking this practice it was decided to fix a date, and all members of the allied States who had after that date lent money to Roman citizens were required to make a return of the amounts so lent, and the debtor was to be at liberty to choose under which laws the creditor might exercise his rights. The appointed day was that of the Feralia, which had just been celebrated. From the returns sent in it was found that the debts contracted under this fraudulent system amounted to a considerable sum, and M. Sempronius, one of the tribunes of the plebs, was authorised by the senate to propose a measure, which the plebs adopted, providing that debts contracted with members of the Latin and allied communities should come under the same laws as those contracted with Roman citizens. These were the main military and political events in Italy. In Spain the war was by no means so serious as rumour represented. C. Flaminius in Hither Spain took the fortified town of Inlucia in the country of the Oretani. He then with drew his troops into winter quarters, and during the winter several unimportant actions were fought to repel raiding parties, who resembled banditti rather than hostile troops. He was not always successful, however, and sustained losses. More important operations were carried on by M. Fulvius. He fought a pitched battle near Toletum with a combined force of Vaccaci, Vettones and Celtiberians, defeated and routed them and took Hilernus their king prisoner.

Meanwhile the date of the elections was approaching, and L. Cornelius, after handing over his command to M. Claudius, went to Rome. After expatiating in the senate upon his services and the state in which he had left the province, he took the senators to task for not having paid due honour to the immortal gods, now that such a serious war had been terminated by a single victorious battle. He then asked the House to decree a public thanksgiving, and at the same time a triumph for him. Before the question was put, however, Q. Metellus, who had filled the offices of consul and dictator, said that the despatch which L. Cornelius had sent to the senate and the letter which M. Marcellus had sent to most of the senators were in conflict with one another, and the discussion of this question had been adjourned in order that it might take place when the writers of these letters were present. He had been expecting, therefore, that the consul, who knew that his lieutenant had made statements reflecting on him, would bring him with him when he had to come to Rome, especially as the army ought really to have been handed over to Tiberius Sempronius, who had the imperium, and not to a staff officer. It seemed now as if the man had been purposely kept out of the way who could have repeated his written statements face to face with his opponent and established them if possible, while any groundless charge he made could have been disproved until at last the truth had been clearly ascertained. He gave it as his opinion, therefore, that none of the decrees which the consul asked for should, for the present at all events, be made. As the consul still persisted in asking the senate to decree a public thanksgiving and authorise him to ride in triumph through the City, two of the tribunes of the plebs, M. Titinius and C. Titinius, said that they would exercise their right of veto if a resolution of the senate were passed to that effect.

The censors who had been elected during the previous year were Sextus Aelius Paetus and C. Cornelius Cethegus. Cornelius closed the lustrum. The assessment returns gave the number of citizens as 243,704. There was an enormous rainfall that year and the low-lying parts of the City were inundated by the Tiber. Near the Porta Flumentana some buildings collapsed and fell in ruins. The Porta Coelimontana was struck by lightning and the wall adjacent was struck in several places. At Aricia and Lanuvium and on the Aventine there were showers of stones. It was reported from Capua that a huge swarm of wasps flew into the forum and settled in the temple of Mars, and that they were carefully collected and burnt. In consequence of these portents the Keepers of the Sacred Books were ordered to consult them. Sacrifices were offered for nine days, public intercessions were appointed and the City underwent lustration. During this time M. Porcius Cato dedicated the chapel of Victoria Virgo near the temple of Victory, which he had vowed two years previously. During the year a Latin colony was settled at the Castrum Frentinum in the territory of Thurium. The commissioners who superintended the colonisation were A. Manlius Volso, L. Apustius Fullo and Q. Aelius Tubero, the latter of whom had brought in the bill for its settlement. The colonists comprised 3000 infantry and 300 cavalry, a small number in proportion to the amount of land available. Thirty jugera might have been allotted to each infantryman and 60 to each of the cavalry, but on the advice of Apustius a third of the land was reserved, which could, were it desired, be assigned to fresh colonists. The infantry received 20 jugera and the cavalry 40 each.

The year was now drawing to a close and the canvassing for the consular elections was keener than had ever been known before. There were many strong candidates, both patrician and plebeian, in the field. The patrician candidates were P. Cornelius, the son of Cneius Scipio, who had lately returned from his province in Spain with a brilliant record; L. Quinctius Flamininus, who had commanded the fleet off Greece, and Cn. Manlius Volso. The plebeian candidates were C. Laelius, Cn. Domitius, C. Livius Salinator and Manius Acilius. But all men's eyes were turned to Quinctius and Cornelius, for as they were both patricians they were competing for the same place and they each possessed strong recommendations, for each had covered himself with military glory. But it was the brothers of the two candidates who most of all made the contest such an exciting one, for they were the two most brilliant commanders of their day. Scipio had the more splendid reputation, but its very splendour exposed him all the more to jealousy; Quinctius' reputation was of more recent growth, as his triumph had been celebrated during the year. Moreover, the former had been continually before the public eye for nearly ten years, a circumstance which tends to diminish the reverence felt for great men as people become surfeited with their praises. He had been made consul for the second time after his final defeat of Hannibal, and also censor. In the case of Quinctius, all his claims to popular favour were founded upon his recent successes; since his triumph he had not sought for nor received anything from the people. He said that he was canvassing for his own brother, not for a step-brother; for one who had as lieutenant shared with him the management of the war; whilst he commanded on land his brother commanded at sea. By these arguments he succeeded in beating his competitor, though his competitor was supported by his brother Africanus, by the house of the Cornelii-it was a Cornelius who was conducting the election-and by the splendid testimonial which the senate gave when they pronounced Africanus to be the best man among all the citizens and most worthy to receive the Mater Idaea on her arrival from Pessinus. L. Quinctius and Cneius Domitius Ahenobarbus were the two elected, so that even in the case of the plebeian candidate C. Laelius, Scipio, who had been working for him, was unable to secure his return. The next day the praetors were elected. The successful candidates were L. Scribonius Libo, M. Fulvius Centumalus, A. Atilius Serranus, M. Baebius Tamphilus, L. Valerius Tappo and Q. Salonius Sarra. M. Aemilius Lepidus and L. Aemilius Paulus distinguished themselves as aediles this year. They inflicted fines on a large number of graziers, and out of the proceeds they had gold-plated shields made, which they placed on the pediment of the temple of Jupiter. They also built an arcade outside the Porta Trigemina, and in connection with it a wharf on the Tiber, and a second arcade leading from the Porta Fontinalis to the altar of Mars in the Campus Martius.

For a considerable time nothing worth recording had happened in Liguria, but at the close of the year affairs assumed a very serious aspect. The consul's camp was attacked and the attack was repulsed with great difficulty, and when, not long after, the Roman army was marching through a pass a Ligurian army seized the mouth of the pass. As the exit was blocked the consul decided to go back and countermarched his men. But the entrance behind them had been also occupied by a portion of the enemy forces, and the disaster of Candium not only occurred to the minds of the soldiers but almost presented itself before their eyes. Amongst his auxiliary troops the consul had about 800 Numidian horse. Their commander assured the consul that he would break through on whichever side he chose if only he could tell him in which direction lay the most numerous villages, as he would attack them and instantly fire the houses so that the alarm thus created might compel the Ligurians to leave their position in the pass and help their countrymen. The consul highly approved of his plan and promised to reward him richly. The Numidians mounted their horses and began to ride towards the enemy's outposts without showing any aggressiveness. Nothing could at first sight look more contemptible than the appearance they presented; horses and men were alike thin and diminutive; the riders were without body armour and, except for the javelins they carried, unarmed; the horses had no bridles and their pacing was most ungainly, trotting as they did with head and neck stuck straight out. The contempt which they aroused they did their best to increase; they fell from their horses and presented a ridiculous spectacle. Consequently the men at the outposts who had at first been on the alert, prepared to meet an attack, now laid their arms aside and sat down to watch the show. The Numidians rode forward and then galloped back, but always got a little nearer to the mouth of the pass, as though they were carried forward by their horses which they were incapable of managing. At last, digging in their spurs, they made a dash through the enemy's outposts, and emerging into open country set fire to all the dwellings near the road and then to the first village they came to, laying it all waste with fire and sword. The sight of the smoke, the cries of the terrified villagers and the hasty flight of the old men and the children produced great excitement in the Ligurian camp, and without waiting for orders or concerted action every man ran off to protect his property and in a moment the camp was deserted. The consul, extricated from the blockade, reached his destination.

Neither the Boii nor the Spaniards, however, with whom Rome had been warring that year, were such bitter enemies as the Aetolians. After the Roman armies had evacuated Greece they expected that Antiochus would take possession of that part of Europe vacated, and that neither Philip nor Nabis would remain inactive. When they saw no movement anywhere they decided that to prevent their designs from being thwarted by delay they must do something to produce agitation and confusion, and accordingly a council was convened at Naupactus. Here Thoas, their chief magistrate, complained of their unjust treatment by the Romans and the position in which the Aetolians were placed, for after a victory which was won through them, they, of all the States and cities in Greece, had been shown the least consideration. He advised that envoys should be sent to each of the three kings to find out their intentions and to urge such arguments on each as would goad them into a war with Rome. Democritus was sent to Nabis, Nicander to Philip, and Dicaearchus, the brother of Thoas, to Antiochus. Democritus pointed out to the tyrant that by the loss of his maritime cities the very sinews of his power were cut; it was from them that he drew his soldiers, his ships and his crews. Little more than a prisoner within his own walls, he saw the Achaeans fording it over the Peloponnese; he would never have another opportunity of winning back his dominion if he let this one go by; there was no Roman army in Greece, and they would never think it worth their while to send their legions back again for the sake of Gytheum and the other Laconian cities on the coast. Such were the arguments used to influence the tyrant, so that when Antiochus landed in Greece the consciousness of having broken his amity with Rome through his ill-treatment of her allies might force him to join arms with the Syrian monarch.

Nicander took much the same line in his interview with Philip. He spoke with all the greater force because the king had been brought down from a loftier position than the tyrant and had lost more of his power. He reminded the king of the former prestige of Macedonia and the world-wide victories of his nation. Nicander assured him that the policy recommended was a safe one both in its initiation and its execution. On the one hand he was not asking Philip to take any action before Antiochus was in Greece with his army, on the other there was every prospect of final success. With what possible force could the Romans hold their own against him when leagued with Antiochus and the Aetolians after he had, without the help of Antiochus, maintained such a protracted struggle against the Romans and against the Aetolians, who were at the time a more formidable enemy than the Romans? He also spoke about Hannibal as a foe to Rome from his birth, who had slain more of her generals and soldiers than still survived. Such were the arguments employed with Philip. Those advanced by Dicaearchus in his interview with Antiochus were different. The spoils of war, he said, won from Philip belonged to the Romans, but the victory over him to the Aetolians; they and they alone had granted the Romans an entrance into Greece and provided them with the strength which secured victory. He went on to enumerate the amount of infantry and cavalry which they were prepared to furnish to Antiochus, the localities which would be available for his land army and the harbours which could receive his fleet. Then, as Philip and Nabis were not present to check him, he falsely represented them as prepared for immediate hostilities and ready to seize the very first opportunity of recovering what they had lost in war. In this way the Aetolians tried to stir up war against Rome throughout the world.

The kings, however, took no action, or at all events their action was too late. Nabis promptly sent emissaries to all the coast towns to foment a rising; some of their leading citizens he won over by bribes, others who remained steadfast to the cause of Rome he put to death. T. Quinctius had entrusted the Achaeans with the defence of the coast towns and they lost no time in sending envoys to the tyrant to remind him of his treaty with Rome and to warn him against disturbing the peace which he had so ardently sought for. They also sent succours to Gytheum, which the tyrant was already attacking, and sent a report to Rome of what was happening. During the winter Antiochus went to Raphia in Phenicia to be present at the marriage of his daughter to Ptolemy, the king of Egypt, and at the close of the winter returned through Cilicia to Ephesus. After sending his son Antiochus into Syria to watch the more distant frontiers of his kingdom in case any disturbance should take place in his rear, he left Ephesus and marched with the whole of his land army against the Pisidians in the neighbourhood of Sida. Whilst he was thus engaged the Roman commissioners, P. Sulpicius and P. Villius, who, as I have already stated, had been sent to interview him, received instructions to visit Eumenes first, and after landing at Elea they went up to Pergamum, where the king's palace was situated. Eumenes welcomed the prospect of a war with Antiochus, for he felt certain that if a monarch so much more powerful than himself were left in peace he would prove a troublesome neighbour, and if there was war Antiochus would be no more a match for the Romans than Philip had been, and would either be altogether got rid of or so completely defeated as to submit to terms of peace. In this case much taken from Antiochus would be added to his dominions, and then he would easily be able to defend himself without any assistance from Rome. Even at the worst, Eumenes thought it better to meet any misfortune with the Romans as his allies than, standing alone, have to accept the supremacy of Antiochus, or if he refused, be compelled to do so by force. For these reasons he did his utmost by personal influence and by argument to urge the Romans to war.

Owing to illness Sulpicius stopped at Pergamum, whilst Villius went on to Ephesus, as he heard that the king had commenced hostilities in Pisidia. He made a short stay there, and as Hannibal happened to be there at the time he made a point of paying frequent visits to him in order to ascertain his future plans and if possible remove any apprehension from his mind as to danger threatening him from Rome. Nothing else was discussed in these interviews, but they had one result, which though really undesigned might have been deliberately aimed at, for they lowered Hannibal's authority with the king and cast suspicion upon all that he said or did. Claudius, following Acilius who wrote in Greek, says that Publius Scipio Africanus was one of the commissioners, and that he had conversations with Hannibal. One of these he reports. Africanus asked Hannibal whom he considered to be the greatest commander, and the reply was, "Alexander of Macedon, for with a small force he routed innumerable armies and traversed the most distant shores of the world which no man ever hoped to visit." Africanus then asked him whom he would put second, and Hannibal replied, "Pyrrhus; he was the first who taught how to lay out a camp, and moreover no one ever showed more cleverness in the choice of positions and the disposition of troops. He possessed, too, the art of winning popularity to such an extent that the nations of Italy preferred the rule of a foreign king to that of the Roman people who had so long held the foremost place in that country." On Scipio's again asking him whom he regarded as the third, Hannibal, without any hesitation, replied, "Myself." Scipio smiled and asked, "What would you say if you had vanquished me?" "In that case," replied Hannibal, "I should say that I surpassed Alexander and Pyrrhus, and all other commanders in the world." Scipio was delighted with the turn which the speaker had with true Carthaginian adroitness given to his answer, and the unexpected flattery it conveyed, because Hannibal had set him apart from the ordinary run of military captains as an incomparable commander.

From Ephesus Villius went on to Apamea. On being informed of the Roman commissioner's arrival, Antiochus proceeded thither also. The conversations between them were almost on the same lines as those which Quinctius had held with the king's envoys in Rome The conference was broken off in consequence of intelligence received of the death of the king's son, who, as already stated, had been sent to Syria. There was great mourning in the court, and the young man's loss was deeply regretted. He had already given proof of such qualities that it was certain, if his life had been spared, he would have shown himself a great and just monarch. The more universally he had made himself beloved, the stronger the suspicions which were felt about his death. The king, it was said, looked upon the heir-apparent as a menace to his old age, and so had him taken off by poison through the agency of certain eunuchs, a class of men whose services kings are glad to employ in crimes of this kind. Another motive which was attributed to the king strengthened this suspicion, for as he had given Lysimachia to his son Seleucus he had no similar residence to which he could remove Antiochus under presence of conferring an honour upon him. The court, however, presented all the outward signs of mourning for several days, and the Roman commissioner, not wishing to be in the way at such an unseasonable time, withdrew to Pergamum. The king abandoned the war which he had begun and returned to Ephesus. There, with his palace closed on account of the mourning, he held secret counsels with his favourite courtier, a man called Minnio. Minnio, utterly ignorant of the outside world and measuring the king's power by his campaigns in Syria and Asia, was fully convinced that Antiochus would prove no less superior to the Romans in war than he was in the justice of his cause, as the demands of the Romans were unjustifiable. As the king avoided all further discussion with the commissioners, either because he found that nothing was to be gained from them or owing to the depression due to his recent bereavement, Minnio said that he would act as spokesman on the king's behalf, and induced Antiochus to invite the commissioners up from Pergamum. Sulpicius had now recovered, so they both proceeded to Ephesus.

.Minnio apologised for the non-appearance of the king and the negotiations proceeded in his absence. Minnio opened the discussion in a carefully prepared speech, in which he said: "I see that you Romans claim the fair-sounding epithet of 'Liberators of the cities of Greece.' But your acts do not correspond to your words; you lay down one law for Antiochus, and another for yourselves. For how are the inhabitants of Smyrna and Lampsacus more Greek than those of Neapolis and Regium and Tarentum, from whom you demand tribute and ships by virtue of your treaty with them? Why do you send year by year a quaestor with full powers of life and death to Syracuse and the other Greek cities of Sicily? The only reason that you could give would, of course, be that you imposed these terms upon them after subjugating them by force. Then accept the same reason from Antiochus in the case of Smyrna and Lampsacus and the cities of Ionia and Aeolis. They were conquered by his ancestors and made to pay tribute and taxes, and he claims the rights which have come down to him from ancient times. I should be glad, therefore, if you would answer him on these points, if, that is, you are prepared to discuss them fairly, and are not simply seeking a pretext for war."

Sulpicius replied: "If these are the only arguments that can be advanced in support of his case, Antiochus has shown a discreet modesty in letting them be brought forward by anybody rather than by himself. For what possible resemblance can there be between the circumstances of the two groups of cities which you have mentioned? From the day when Regium, Tarentum, and Neapolis passed into our hands we have demanded the fulfilment of their treaty obligations by an unbroken tenor of right which has always been asserted and never intermitted. Those communities have never, either of themselves or through anyone else, made any change in those obligations; would you venture to assert that the same holds good of the cities of Asia, and that after once becoming subject to the ancestors of Antiochus they have remained in the uninterrupted possession of your monarchy? Can you deny that some of them have been subject to Philip, others to Ptolemy, others again have for many years enjoyed an independence which no one has ever challenged? Granting that they at some time or other under the pressure of misfortune lost their freedom, does that give you the right after so many ages to claim them as your vassals? If so, we accomplished nothing when we delivered Greece from Philip; his successors can reassert their right to Corinth, Chalcis, and the whole of Thessaly. But why do I defend the cause of States which they themselves should more properly defend in the hearing of the king and themselves?"

He then ordered the representatives of the States to be called in. Eumenes, who quite expected that whatever strength Antiochus lost would prove an accession to his own dominions, had prepared the representatives beforehand and told them what to say. Several were brought in, and as they each stated their grievances and put forward their demands quite regardless as to whether these were fair or not, they changed the discussion into a heated altercation. Unable either to make or to obtain any concessions, the commissioners resumed to Rome leaving everything as unsettled as when they came. On their departure the king held a council of war. Here each speaker tried to outdo the rest in violence of language, for the more bitter he showed himself against the Romans the better his chance of winning the king's favour. One of them denounced the Roman demands as arrogant: "They tried to impose on Antiochus, the greatest monarch in Asia, as though he were the defeated Nabis, and yet even Nabis they allowed to remain as sovereign over his own country and to retain Lacedaemon, whilst they consider it an offence if Smyrna and Lampsacus are under the sway of Antiochus." Others argued that those cities were for so great a monarch slight and insignificant grounds of war, but unjust demands always began with small matters, unless indeed they were to suppose that when the Persians demanded earth and water from the Lacedaemonians they were actually in need of a clod of earth and a draught of water. A similar attempt was now being made by the Romans in respect of these two cities, and as soon as others saw that these had shaken off the yoke they too would go over to the people who posed as liberators. Even if liberty were not in itself preferable to servitude, everyone, whatever his present condition may be, finds the prospect of change more attractive.

There was amongst those present an Acarnanian named Alexander. He had formerly been one of Philip's friends, but had latterly attached himself to the wealthier and more magnificent court of Antiochus. As he was thoroughly familiar with the state of affairs in Greece and possessed some knowledge of the Roman character he had come to be on such intimate terms with Antiochus that he even took part in his private councils. As though the question under discussion was not whether war should be declared or not, but simply where and how it should be conducted, he said that he looked forward to certain victory if the king would cross over into Europe and fix the seat of war in some part of Greece. He would first of all find the Aetolians, who live in the centre of Greece, in arms, ready to take their places in the front and face all the dangers and hardships of war. Then, in what might be called the right and left wing of Greece, Nabis was ready in the Peloponnesus to do his utmost to recover Argos and the maritime cities from which the Romans had expelled him and shut him up within his own walls. In Macedonia Philip would take up arms the moment he heard the war-trumpet sound; he knew his spirit, he knew his temper, he knew that he had been revolving in his mind vast schemes of revenge, chafing like wild beasts that are fastened up by bars or chains. He remembered, too, how often during the war Philip had besought all the gods to give him the help of Antiochus; if this prayer were now granted he would not lose an hour in recommencing war. Only there must be no delay, no holding back, for victory depended upon their being the first to secure allies and to seize the most advantageous positions. Hannibal, too, ought to be sent to Africa at once to create a diversion and divide the Roman forces.

Hannibal had not been invited to the council. He had aroused the king's suspicions by his interviews with Villius, and no respect or regard was now shown to him. For some time he bore this affront in silence; then, thinking it better to inquire the reason for this sudden estrangement and at the same time to clear himself from any suspicion, he chose a fitting moment and put a direct question to the king as to the reason for his disfavour. When he heard what the reason was, he said, "When I was a small boy, Antiochus, my father Hamilcar took me up to the altar whilst he was offering sacrifice and made me solemnly swear that I would never be a friend to Rome. Under this oath I have fought for six-and-thirty years; when peace was settled this oath drove me from my native country and brought me a homeless wanderer to your court. If you cheat my hopes, this oath will lead me wherever I can find support, wherever I learn that there are arms, and I shall find some enemies of Rome, though I have to seek them through the wide world. If, therefore, it pleases your courtiers to advance in your favour by aspersing me, let them seek some other ground for advancing themselves at my expense. I hate the Romans and the Romans hate me. My father Hamilcar and all the gods are witness that I am speaking the truth. When, then, you are making plans for a war against Rome, count Hannibal amongst the first of your friends; if circumstances constrain you to remain at peace, seek someone else to share your counsels." This speech had a great effect upon the king and it brought about a reconciliation with Hannibal. The king left the council, resolved on war.

In Rome people spoke of Antiochus as the enemy, but beyond this attitude of mind they were making no preparations for war. Both the consuls had Italy assigned to them as their province on the understanding that they were either to come to a mutual agreement or leave it to the ballot as to which of them should preside at the elections. The one to whom this duty did not fall was to be prepared to take the legions wherever they were needed beyond the shores of Italy. He was empowered to raise two fresh legions as well as 20,000 infantry and 800 cavalry from the Latins and allied States. The two legions which L. Cornelius had as consul the year before were assigned to the other consul, together with 15,000 allied infantry and 500 cavalry drawn from the same army. Q. Minucius retained his command and the army which he had in Liguria. and was ordered to bring it up to full strength by raising 4000 Roman infantry and 150 cavalry, whilst the allies were to furnish him with 5000 infantry and 250 cavalry. The duty of taking the legions wherever the senate thought fit outside Italy fell to Cn. Domitius; L. Quinctius obtained Gaul as his province and also the conduct of the elections. The result of the balloting amongst the praetors was as follows: M. Fulvius Centumanus received the civic and L. Scribonius Libo the alien jurisdiction; L. Valerius Tappo drew Sicily; Q. Salonius Sarra, Sardinia; M. Baebius Tamphilus, Hither Spain; A. Atilius Serranus, Further Spain. The two latter, however, had their commands transferred first by a resolution of the senate and then by a confirmatory resolution of the plebs; A. Atilius had the fleet and Macedonia assigned to him, and Baebius was appointed to the command in Bruttium. Flaminius and Fulvius were left in command in the two Spains. Baebius received for his operations in Bruttium the two legions which had previously been quartered in the City and also 15,000 infantry and 500 cavalry to be supplied by the allies. Atilius was ordered to construct 30 quinqueremes, to take from the dockyards any old ships that might be serviceable and to impress crews. The consuls were required to supply him with 1000 Roman and 2000 allied infantry. It was stated that these two praetors with their land and sea armies were to act against Nabis who was now openly attacking the allies of Rome. The arrival of the commissioners who had been sent to Antiochus was, however, expected, and the senate forbade Cn. Domitius to leave the City till they returned.

The praetors Fulvius and Scribonius, whose department was the administration of justice, were charged with the task of fitting out 100 quinqueremes in addition to the fleet which Atilius was to command. Before the consul and the praetors left to take up their appointments solemn intercessions were made on account of various portents. A report came from Picenum that a she-goat had produced six kids at one birth; at Arretium a boy had been born with only one hand; at Amiternum there was a shower of earth; at Formiae the wall and one of the gates were struck with lightning. But the most appalling report was that an ox belonging to Cn. Domitius had uttered the words "Roma, cave tibi" ("Rome, be on thy guard!"). With respect to the other portents public supplications were offered up, but in the case of the ox the haruspices ordered it to be carefully kept and fed. The flooded Tiber made a more serious attack upon the City than in the previous year and destroyed two bridges and numerous buildings, most of them in the neighbourhood of the Porta Flumentana. A huge mass of rock, undermined either by the heavy rains or by an earthquake not felt at the time, fell from the Capitol into the Vicus Jugarius and crushed a number of people. In the country districts cattle and sheep were carried off by the floods in all directions and many farmhouses were laid in ruins. Before the consul L. Quinctius reached his province Q. Minucius fought a pitched battle with the Ligurians near Pisae. He killed 9000 of the enemy and drove the rest in flight to their camp, which was attacked and defended with furious fighting until nightfall. During the night the Ligurians stole away in silence, and at daybreak the Romans entered the deserted camp. They found less plunder than might have been expected, as the Ligurians made a practice of sending what they seized in the fields to their homes. After this Minucius gave them no respite; advancing from Pisae he laid waste their fortified villages and homesteads, and the Roman soldiers loaded themselves with the plunder which the Ligurians had carried off from Etruria and sent to their homes.

Just about this time the commissioners returned from their visit to the kings. The intelligence they brought back disclosed no grounds for immediate hostilities except in the case of the tyrant of Lacedaemon, who, as the Achaean delegates also stated, was attacking the coastal district of Lacedaemon in defiance of the treaty. Atilius was sent with the fleet to Greece to protect the allies. As there was no pressing danger from Antiochus, it was decided that both the consuls should start for their provinces. Domitius marched against the Boii from Ariminium, the nearest point, Quinctius made his advance through Liguria. The two armies on their respective routes devastated the country far and wide. A few of the Boian cavalry with their officers went over to the Romans, they were followed by all the older men, and at last every man of rank or wealth, up to the number of 500, deserted to the consul. The Romans were successful in both the Spanish provinces this year. C. Flaminius laid siege to and captured Licabrum, a wealthy and strongly fortified place, and took as prisoner Conribilo, a chieftain of high rank. The proconsul, M. Fulvius, fought two successful actions and stormed many fortified places, together with two towns, Vescelia and Helo; others surrendered voluntarily. Then he marched against the Oretani, and after becoming master of two towns, Noliba and Cusibis, he advanced as far as the Tagus. Here there was a small but strongly fortified city, Toletum, and whilst he was attacking it the Vettones sent a large army to relieve it. Fulvius defeated them in a pitched battle, and after putting them to rout invested and captured the place.

These actual wars, however, preoccupied the thoughts of the senate far less than the threatening prospect of war with Antiochus. Although they received from time to time full information through their commissioners, there were vague and unauthorised rumours afloat in which truth was largely blended with falsehood. Amongst other things it was reported that as soon as Antiochus reached Aetolia he would send his fleet on to Sicily. Atilius had already been sent with his fleet to Greece, but as the senate, if it was to retain its hold upon the friendly States, was bound to assert its authority as well as send troops, T. Quinctius, Cn. Octavius, Cn. Servilius and P. Villius were despatched on a special mission to Greece, and a decree was made ordering M. Baebius to transfer his legions from Bruttium to Tarentum and Brundisium, and if circumstances made it necessary transport them to Macedonia. M. Fulvius was ordered to send a fleet of twenty ships to protect Sicily, its commander to possess full powers. The command was vested in L. Oppius Salinator; he had been plebeian aedile the previous year. Fulvius was also to send to his colleague L. Valerius and inform him that fears were entertained of Antiochus sending his fleet to Sicily, and the senate had therefore decided that he should strengthen his army by raising an emergency force of 12,000 foot and 400 horse for the defence of that part of the Sicilian coast which faced Greece. The praetor took the men for the force from the adjacent islands as well as from Sicily itself, and placed garrisons in all the towns on the eastern coast. These rumours were strengthened by the arrival of Attalus, the brother of Eumenes, who brought word that Antiochus had crossed the Hellespont with his army, and that the Aetolians, who were thoroughly prepared, were in arms immediately on his arrival. Thanks were formally accorded to Eumenes as well as to Attalus. The latter was treated as the guest of the State and suitably lodged; he was also presented with two horses, two sets of equestrian armour, silver vases up to a hundred and gold vases up to twenty pounds' weight.

As messenger after messenger brought word that war was imminent, it was felt to be a matter of importance that the consular elections should take place at as early a date as possible. The senate therefore resolved that M. Fulvius should at once write to the consul informing him that the senate wished him to hand over his command to his staff and return to Rome. On his way he was to send on his edict giving notice of the consular elections. The consul carried out these instructions and returned to Rome. There was a keen contest this year, as three patricians were competing for the one vacancy, namely P. Cornelius Scipio, the son of Cn. Scipio, who had been defeated the previous year; L. Cornelius Scipio, and Cn. Manlius Volso. As a proof that the honour had only been deferred and not refused to a man of his eminence, the consulship was bestowed on P. Scipio and the plebeian who was assigned to him as colleague was Manius Acilius Glabrio. Those who were elected as praetors the next day were L. Aemilius Paullus, M. Aemilius Lepidus, M. Junius Brutus, A. Cornelius Mammula, C. Livius and L. Oppius, the two latter both having the cognomen Salinator. Oppius was in command of the fleet of twenty sail which had gone to Sicily. Whilst the new magistrates were balloting for their respective provinces Baebius received instructions to sail with the whole of his force from Brundisium to Epirus and to remain near Apollonia; M. Fulvius was commissioned to construct fifty new quinqueremes.

Whilst the Roman Government were thus preparing to check any attempt on the part of Antiochus, Nabis was already pushing on hostilities and devoting his whole strength to the investment of Gytheum. The Achaeans had sent succour to the besieged city, and in revenge he devastated their territory. They did not venture upon open hostilities till their delegates had returned from Rome and they had learnt the decision of the senate. On their return they summoned a council to meet at Sicyon and sent to ask T. Quinctius to advise them as to what they ought to do. The members of the council were unanimously in favour of immediate action, but when a letter was read from T. Quinctius in which he advised them to wait for the Roman praetor and the fleet there was some hesitation felt. Some of the leaders adhered to their opinion, others thought that after consulting T. Quinctius they ought to act on his advice. The great majority, however, waited to hear what line Philopoemen would take. He was at the time their chief magistrate, and surpassed all his contemporaries in sound common sense and force of character. He began by commending the wisdom of the regulation which the Achaeans had adopted forbidding their chief magistrate to express his own view when the discussion turned on war. He then urged them to come to a speedy decision as to what they wanted; their chief magistrate would carry out their decision faithfully and carefully, and as far as human wisdom could avail would do his utmost to prevent their regretting it whether it were in favour of peace or war. This speech did more to incite them to war than if he had betrayed his desire for it by open advocacy. The council passed a unanimous vote in favour of hostilities, but left the date and conduct of operations absolutely to the chief magistrate. Philopoemen himself was of the opinion which Quinctius had already expressed, that they ought to wait for the Roman fleet which could protect Gytheum by sea, but he was afraid that the position did not admit of delay and that not only Gytheum but also the force sent to defend it might be lost. Accordingly, he ordered the Achaean vessels to put to sea.

The tyrant had, as one of the conditions of peace, surrendered his old fleet to the Romans, but he had collected a small naval force, consisting of three decked ships with some barques and despatch-boats, to prevent any assistance reaching the besieged city by sea. In order to test the hardiness of these new vessels and make everything fit for battle, he made them put out to sea every day, and the sailors and soldiers were exercised in sham fights, for he regarded the prospect of a successful siege as dependent upon his intercepting all relief attempted by sea. Though the chief magistrate of the Achaeans could vie with the most famous commanders in military skill and experience he was totally inexperienced in naval matters. He was a native of Arcadia, an inland country, and knew nothing of the outside world with the exception of Crete where he had commanded a force of auxiliary troops. There was an old quadrireme which had been captured eighty years ago when it was conveying Nicaea, the wife of Craterus, from Naupactus to Corinth. Attracted by what he had heard of this ship-for it had been in its day a famous unit of the royal fleet-he ordered it to be brought from Aegium, though it was now very rotten and its timbers were parting through age. Whilst this vessel, with Tisus of Patrae, the fleet commander, on board, was leading the armament it was met by the Lacedaemonian ships which were coming from Gytheum. At the very first shock against a new and firm ship the old vessel, which was leaking at every joint, completely broke up and all on board were made prisoners. The rest of the fleet, after seeing the commander's vessel lost, fled away as fast as their oars could carry them. Philopoemen himself escaped in a light scouting boat and did not end his flight till he had reached Patrae. This incident did not in the least depress the spirits of a man who was a thorough soldier and had had a very chequered experience; on the contrary, he declared that if he had made an unfortunate mistake in naval matters of which he knew nothing he had all the more reason to hope for success in things with which experience had made him thoroughly familiar, and he promised that he would make the tyrant's rejoicing over his victory a short-lived one.

Greatly elated by his victory, Nabis felt no further apprehension of danger from the sea, and he now decided to close all access on the land side by an effective disposition of his troops. He withdrew a third of the army which was investing Gytheum and encamped at Pleiae in a position which commanded both Leucae and Acriae, as the enemy would probably advance in that direction. Only a few of the troops in this camp had tents, the mass of the soldiers constructed wattled huts with reeds and leafy branches to shelter them from the sun. Before he came within sight of the enemy Philopoemen decided to make a novel kind of attack and take him unawares. Collecting some small craft in a secluded creek on the Argive coast he manned them with light infantry, mostly caetrati, who were armed with slings and darts and other light equipment. Sailing close inshore he reached a headland near the enemy's camp, where he disembarked his men and made a night march to Patrae along paths with which he was familiar. The enemy's sentinels, fearing no immediate danger, were asleep and Philopoemen's men flung burning brands on the huts from every side of the camp. Many perished in the fire before they were aware of the enemy's presence, and those who had become aware of it were unable to render any assistance. Between fire and sword the destruction was complete, very few escaped death from the one or the other, and those who did escape fled to the camp before Gytheum. Immediately after dealing this blow to the enemy Philopoemen led his force to Tripolis in Laconia, close to the Megalopolitan territory, and before the tyrant could send troops from Gytheum to protect the fields, he succeeded in carrying off a vast quantity of booty both in men and cattle.

He then assembled the army of the league at Tegea and also convened a special meeting of the Achaeans and their allies at which the leading men from Epirus and Acarnania were present. As his troops were now sufficiently recovered from the humiliation of their naval defeat and the enemy were correspondingly depressed he decided to march on Lacedaemon, as that seemed the only means of drawing off the enemy from the siege of Gytheum. His first halt on enemy territory was at Caryae, and on the very day he encamped here Gytheum was taken. Unaware of what had happened he continued his advance as far as Barnosthenes, a mountain ten miles distant from Lacedaemon. After taking Gytheum Nabis returned with his army equipped for rapid marching, and hurrying past Lacedaemon he seized a position known as Pyrrhus' Camp, which he felt quite certain that the Achaeans were making for. From there he advanced to meet them. Owing to the narrowness of the road they extended in a column nearly five miles long. The cavalry and the greater part of the auxiliary troops were in the hinder part of the column, as Philopoemen thought that the tyrant would probably attack his rear with the mercenaries, on whom he mainly depended. Two unexpected circumstances occurred which gave Philopoemen cause for anxiety; the position he had hoped to secure was already occupied and he saw that the enemy were intending to attack the head of the column. He did not see how it was possible for his hoplites to advance in battle order over such broken ground without the support of the light troops.

Philopoemen possessed exceptional skill in the conduct of a march and the selection of positions; he had made these the objects of special attention in peace as well as in war. It was his habit, when he was travelling and had come to a mountain pass difficult to traverse, to study the ground in all directions. If he was alone he would think the matter over, if he were accompanied he would ask those with him what they would do if an enemy showed himself there, what tactics they would employ according as the attack was made upon their front, or on either flank or on their rear; the enemy in battle order might possibly come upon them whilst they were deployed for action or possibly whilst they were in column of march, unprepared for attack. He used to think out for himself and question others as to some position which he intended to secure, what numbers and what weapons-for these differed considerably-he ought to employ; where he ought to deposit the baggage and the soldiers' kits; where the non-combatants ought to be placed; what ought to be the strength and nature of the baggage guard; and whether it would be better to go forward or for the army to retrace its steps. He used also to consider very carefully the sites he ought to select for his camp, the amount of ground to be enclosed, the supply of water, fodder and wood, the safest route to take on the morrow and the best formation in which to march. He had exercised his mind on these problems from earliest manhood to such an extent that there was no device for meeting them with which he was not familiar. On the present occasion he first of all halted the column, and then sent up to the front the Cretan auxiliaries and the so-called Tarentine horse, and the rest of the cavalry were ordered to follow them. He then took possession of a rock which overhung a mountain torrent, so that he might have a water supply. Here he collected the camp-followers and the whole of the baggage and surrounded them with a guard. His entrenchments were such as the nature of the position allowed, and the setting up of the tents on such rough and uneven ground presented considerable difficulty. The enemy were half a mile distant, both sides watered at the same stream under the protection of the light infantry, and as usually happens when the camps are near one another, night intervened before the forces engaged. It was quite certain, however, that there would be a battle between the detachments who were guarding the water-carriers, and in view of this Philopoemen during the night posted in a valley out of the enemy's view as large a force of his caetrati as the ground would conceal.

At daybreak the Cretan light infantry and the Tarentines commenced an action on the river bank; Telemnastus of Crete commanding his countrymen, and Lycortas of Megalopolis the cavalry. The enemy, too, had Cretan auxiliaries and Tarentine horse covering their watering-parties, and as the same class of troops were fighting with the same weapons on either side the issue was for some time doubtful. As the action proceeded the tyrant's troops proved superior owing to their numbers, and moreover Philopoemen had instructed his officers to offer only a slight resistance and then pretend to flee and so draw the enemy on to the spot where his ambush was set. As the enemy became disordered in the pursuit, a great many were killed and wounded before they caught sight of their hidden foe. The caetrati were crouching in the best formation that the narrow space admitted of, and the intervals between their companies allowed their own fugitives to pass through. Then they sprang up fresh and vigorous, in perfect order, to attack an enemy who, scattered in disorderly pursuit, were also exhausted by the strain of fighting and the wounds which many of them had received. The result was decisive, the soldiers of the tyrant turned and fled at a much greater speed than when they were the pursuers, and were driven into their camp. Many were killed or made prisoners in the flight, and the camp itself would have been in great danger had not Philopoemen sounded the "retire." He feared the broken ground, so dangerous to any who advanced without caution, more than he feared the enemy. From his knowledge of the tyrant's character Philopoemen guessed what a state of alarm he would be in after this battle and sent one of his men to him in the guise of a deserter. This man told him that he had found out that the Achaeans intended to advance the following day to the Eurotas-this river almost washes the walls of Lacedaemon-in order to intercept him and prevent him from withdrawing into the city and also stop supplies from being conveyed from the city to the camp. They also, he told him, were going to try and create a rising against him amongst the citizens. Though the deserter's story was not fully accepted it afforded the tyrant, now thoroughly frightened, a plausible excuse for quitting his present position. He gave Pythagoras instructions to remain the next day on guard before the camp with the cavalry and auxiliaries whilst he himself, with the main strength of his army, marched out as though for action and gave the standard-bearers orders to quicken their pace and make for the city.

When Philopoemen saw them moving hurriedly along a steep and narrow road he sent his Cretan auxiliaries and the whole of his cavalry against the force which was guarding the camp. Seeing the enemy approaching, and finding that the main army had left them to themselves, they tried to retire into their camp, but as the entire Achaean army was advancing in battle order they dreaded lest they should be captured with their camp, and accordingly started after their main body which was some distance ahead. The Achaean caetrati at once attacked and plundered the camp, whilst the rest of the army went off in pursuit of the enemy. The route they had taken was such that even if there had been no enemy to be feared, their column could only have got through with great difficulty, but now, when the rearmost ranks were being assailed and cries of terror penetrated to the head of the column, it was every man for himself; they flung away their arms and fled into the forest which skirted the road on both sides. In an instant the road was blocked with heaps of weapons, mostly spears, which, falling with their heads towards the enemy, formed a kind of stockade across the road. Philopoemen ordered the auxiliaries to press the pursuit as much as possible, since flight would be a difficult matter, for cavalry at all events. The heavy infantry he led in person by a more open road to the Eurotas. Here he encamped just before sunset and waited for the light troops whom he had left in pursuit of the enemy. They came in at the first watch with the news that the tyrant had entered the city with a small body of troops; the rest of his army were without arms, scattered in the forest. He told them to take food and rest. The rest of the army, having come earlier into camp, had already done so and were now refreshed after a short sleep. Selecting some of their number and telling them to take nothing but their swords, he posted them on two of the roads which led from the city, one to Pharae and the other to Barnosthenes, as he expected that the fugitives would return by these roads. His expectation was justified, for the Lacedaemonians as long as daylight remained went along the sequestered tracks in the heart of the forest, but when it grew dusk and they caught sight of the lights in the enemy's camp they kept out of sight on hidden paths. After they had got past it, and thought all was safe, they came out into the open road. Here they were caught by the enemy who were waiting for them, and so numerous were the prisoners and the slain in all directions that hardly a quarter of their whole army escaped. Now that Philopoemen had shut the tyrant up in his city he spent nearly a month in devastating the Lacedaemonian fields, and after thus weakening and almost shattering the tyrant's power he returned home. The Achaeans in view of his brilliant success put him on a par with the Roman general, and considered him as his superior so far as the Laconian war was concerned.

.While this war between the Achaeans and the tyrant was going on the Roman envoys were visiting the cities of their allies, for they felt some apprehension lest the Aetolians might have induced some of them to go over to Antiochus. They did not trouble themselves much about the Achaeans; as they were in declared hostility to Nabis it was thought that they might be depended upon throughout. Athens was the first place they visited, from there they proceeded to Chalcis, and thence to Thessaly, where they addressed a largely attended council of the Thessalians. They then went on to Demetrias, where a council of the Magnetes was assembled. Here they had to be careful as to what they said, for some of the leading men were in opposition to Rome and gave wholehearted support to Antiochus and the Aetolians. Their attitude was due to the fact that when it was learnt that Philip's son, who had been detained as a hostage, was released and the tribute imposed upon him remitted, it was stated, amongst other false rumours, that the Romans intended to restore Demetrias to him also. Rather than let that happen Eurylochus, the president of the Magnetes, and some of his party were anxious that the arrival of Antiochus and the Aetolians should bring about a complete change of policy. In meeting this hostile spirit the Roman envoys had to be on their guard lest while removing this groundless suspicion they should so far destroy Philip's hopes as to make an enemy of a man who was for every reason of more importance to them than the Magnetes were. The envoys confined themselves to pointing out that the whole of Greece was under obligations to Rome for the boon of liberty, Magnesia so especially. Not only had a Macedonian garrison been stationed there, but Philip had built a palace there so that they were forced to have their lord and master always before their eyes. But all that Rome had done for them would be useless if the Aetolians brought Antiochus into that palace and they had to have a new unknown king in place of one whom they had known and had experience of.

Their supreme magistrate was called "Magnetarch," and Eurylochus was holding that office at the time. Feeling secure in the power which his office gave him, he said that he and the Magnetes could not be silent about the report which was widely current that Demetrias was to be given back to Philip. To prevent this the Magnetes were prepared to make every effort and face every danger. Carried away by excitement he threw out the ill-advised remark that even then Demetrias was only free in appearance, in reality everything was at the nod and beck of Rome. These words were received with murmurs and protests; some in the assembly approved, but others were filled with indignation at his having dared to speak in that way. As for Quinctius, he was so angry that he lifted up his hands towards heaven and called upon the gods to witness the ingratitude and perfidy of the Magnetes. This exclamation created universal alarm and Zeno, one of their leading men, who had gained great influence amongst them, partly by the refinement which characterised his private life and partly because he had always been a staunch friend to Rome, implored Quinctius and other envoys not to make the whole city responsible for one man's madness; it was at his own risk that anyone behaved like a madman. The Magnetes were indebted to Titus Quinctius and the Roman people for more than their liberty-for everything, in fact, which men hold dear and sacred; there was nothing which a man could ask the gods to give him that they had not received from them. They would sooner lay frenzied hands upon themselves than violate their friendship with Rome.

.His speech was followed by urgent entreaties from the whole assembly. Eurylochus left hurriedly, and making his way secretly to the city gate fled to Aetolia, for the Aetolians were now throwing off the mask more and more every day from their hostile intentions. Thoas, the foremost man amongst them, happened to return from his mission to Antiochus just at this time, bringing with him an envoy from the king in the person of Menippus. Before the meeting of the national council these two men had filled all ears with descriptions of the land and sea forces which Antiochus had collected. They declared that a great host of infantry and cavalry were on their way, elephants had been brought from India and-what they thought would most of all impress the popular mind-he was bringing gold enough to buy up the Romans themselves. It was obvious what effect this sort of talk would have on the council, for their arrival and all their proceedings were duly reported to the Roman envoy. Although events had almost taken a decisive turn, Quinctius thought it might not be altogether useless if some representatives of the friendly cities attended the council who would have the courage to speak frankly in reply to the king's envoy and remind the Aetolians of their treaty engagements with Rome. The Athenians seemed best fitted for the task on account of the prestige which their city enjoyed and also because of their old alliance with the Aetolians. Quinctius therefore requested them to send delegates to the Pan-Aetolian Council.

Thoas opened the proceedings by giving a report of his negotiations. He was followed by Menippus, who asserted that the best thing for all the peoples of Greece and Asia would have been for Antiochus to have intervened whilst Philip's power was still unimpaired, everyone would then have kept what belonged to him, and everything would not have been completely at the mercy of Rome. "Even now," he continued, "if only you resolutely carry out the designs you have formed, he will be able with the help of the gods and the assistance of the Aetolians to restore the fortunes of Greece, drooping though they are, to their old place in the world. That, however, must rest on liberty, and a liberty which stands in its own strength and is not dependent on the will of another." The Athenians, who had received permission to speak their minds after the king's delegate, made no allusion to the king, but simply reminded the Aetolians of their alliance with Rome and the services which T. Quinctius had rendered to the whole of Greece. They warned them against wrecking that friendship by hasty and precipitate action; bold and hot-headed counsels were attractive at first sight, difficult to put into practice, disastrous in their results. The Roman envoys and Quinctius himself were not far away, it would be better to discuss the question at issue in friendly debate than to throw Europe and Asia into a deadly struggle of arms.

The great mass of the assembly, eager for a change of policy, were wholly on the side of Antiochus and were even opposed to admitting the Romans into the council. Mainly, however, through the influence of the elders amongst their leading men, it was decided that a meeting of the council should be summoned to hear them. When the Athenians returned and reported this decision Quinctius felt that he ought to go to Aetolia, as he might do something to change their purpose, if not the whole world would see that the responsibility for the war rested solely on the Aetolians and that Rome was taking up arms in a just and necessary cause. Quinctius began his address to the council by tracing the history of the league between the Aetolians and Rome and pointing out how frequently they had infringed its provisions. He then dealt briefly with the rights of the cities which were the subject of controversy and showed how much better it would be, if they thought they had a fair case, to send a deputation to Rome to argue their cause or bring it before the senate, whichever they preferred, instead of a war between Rome and Antiochus at the instigation of the Aetolians, a war which would create a world-wide disturbance and utterly ruin Greece. None would feel the fatal result of such a war sooner than those who set it in motion. The Roman was a true prophet, but he spoke in vain. Without allowing time for deliberation by adjourning the council or even waiting for the Romans to retire, Thoas and the rest of his supporters got a decree passed amidst the cheers of the assembly for inviting Antiochus to give liberty to Greece and arbitrate between the Romans and the Aetolians. The insolence of this decree was aggravated by the personal effrontery of Damocritus their chief magistrate. When Quinctius asked him for a copy of the decree, Damocritus, without the slightest regard for his official position, told him that a more pressing matter demanded his immediate attention, he would shortly give him his reply and the decree from his camps in Italy on the banks of the Tiber. Such was the madness which at that time possessed the Aetolians and their magistrates.

Quinctius and the other legates returned to Corinth. The Aetolians, who were continually receiving intelligence about Antiochus' movements, wished to make it appear that they were doing nothing themselves and simply waiting for his arrival; consequently they did not hold a council of the whole league after the Romans had left. Through their "Apokleti," however-the designation they give to their inner council-they were discussing the best means of effecting a revolution in Greece. It was everywhere understood that the leading men and the aristocracy in the various States were partisans of Rome and perfectly contented with things as they were, whilst the mass of the populations and all whose circumstances were not what they wished them to be were eager for change. On the day of their meeting the Aetolians decided upon a project alike audacious and impudent, namely the occupation of Demetrias, Chalcis and Lacedaemon. One of their leaders was sent to each of these cities: Thoas went to Chalcis, Alexamenus to Lacedaemon, Diocles to Demetrias. Eurylochus, whose flight and the reason for it have been already described, came to the assistance of Diocles, as in no other way did he see any prospect of returning home. He wrote to his friends and relatives and the members of his party, and they brought his wife and children dressed in mourning and carrying suppliant emblems into the assembly, which was crowded. They appealed to those present individually and implored the assembly as a whole not to allow a man innocent and uncondemned to waste his life in exile. The simple and unsuspecting were moved by pity, the evil-minded and seditious by the prospect of profiting by the confusion which the Aetolian agitation would cause. Everyone voted for his recall. This preparatory step having been taken, Diocles, who was at that time in command of the cavalry, started with the whole of his force, ostensibly to escort the exile home. He covered an immense distance, marching through the day and the night, and when he was six miles from the city he went on in advance at daybreak with three picked troops, the rest being under orders to follow. As they approached the gate he bade his men dismount and lead their horses as though they were accompanying their commander on his journey instead of acting as a military force. Leaving one troop at the gate to prevent the cavalry who were coming up from being shut out, he took Eurylochus, holding him by the hand, through the heart of the city and the forum to his house amidst the congratulations of many who came to meet them. In a short time the city was filled with cavalry-and the commanding positions were seized. Then parties were told off to go to the houses of the leaders of the opposition and put them to death. In this way Demetrias was gained by the Aetolians.

Against the city of Lacedaemon no force was to be employed. The tyrant was to be caught by treachery. After being despoiled of his maritime towns by the Romans and now actually shut up within his walls by the Achaeans, it was taken for granted that whoever was the first to kill him would win the gratitude of the Lacedaemonians. The Aetolians had a good excuse for sending to him, for he had been insistently demanding that help should be sent to him by those at whose instigation he had recommenced war. Alexamenus was supplied with 1000 infantry and 30 men selected from the cavalry. These latter had been solemnly warned by Damocritus in the Inner Council, which is described above, not to suppose that they were sent to fight against the Achaeans or for any purpose which they might fix upon in their own minds. Whatever plan circumstances might compel Alexamenus suddenly to adopt, that plan, however unexpected, hazardous or daring it might be, they must be prepared to execute with unquestioning obedience, and they must so regard it as though it were the only object which they had been sent from home to accomplish. With these men thus primed Alexamenus went to the tyrant, and his visit at once filled him with hope. He told him that Antiochus had already landed in Europe and would soon be in Greece, he would cover sea and land with arms and men; the Romans would find out that it was not with Philip that they had to deal; the numbers of his infantry and cavalry and ships could not be counted; the mere sight of the line of elephants would bring the war to a close. He assured him that the Aetolians were prepared to go to Lacedaemon with the whole of their army when circumstances demanded, but they wanted Antiochus to see a considerable body of their troops on his arrival. He also advised Nabis to be careful not to let the troops which he still had become enervated through idleness and an indoor life; he should take them out and by exercising them under arms make them keener and hardier; the toil and exertion would become lighter by practice, and their commander could make it far from distasteful by his geniality and kindness.

From that time they were frequently marched out to the plain stretching from the city to the Eurotas. The tyrant's bodyguard were usually in the centre of the line; he himself with three horsemen at the most, of whom Alexamenus was generally one, rode along the front of the standards to inspect the wings. On the right were the Aetolians, including the auxiliaries and the thousand who had come with Alexamenus. Alexamenus had made a practice of accompanying the tyrant during his inspection through a few of the ranks, making such suggestions as seemed called for, and then riding up to the Aetolians on the right and giving them the necessary instructions, after which he returned to the side of the tyrant. But on the day which he had fixed for carrying out his deadly project he only accompanied the tyrant for a short time, and then withdrawing to his own men addressed the thirty picked troopers in these terms: "Young men, you have to dare and do the deed which you are under orders to carry out at my bidding. Be ready with heart and hand, and let no one falter at what he sees me doing; whoever hesitates and crosses my purpose with his own may be sure that there is no return home for him." Horror seized them all; they remembered the instructions with which they had come. The tyrant was riding up from his left wing, Alexamenus ordered them to level their lances and watch him; even he himself had to collect his thoughts, bewildered as he was at the contemplation of such a desperate deed. When the tyrant came near he made an attack upon him and speared his horse. The tyrant was flung off, and whilst he lay on the ground the troopers thrust at him with their lances. Many of their thrusts were warded off by his cuirass, but at last they reached his body, and he expired before he could be rescued by his bodyguard.

Alexamenus went off with all the Aetolians at the double to take possession of the palace. Whilst the assassination was going on before their eyes they were too frightened to move; when they saw the Aetolian contingent hurrying away they ran to the abandoned body of the tyrant, but instead of bodyguards and avengers of his death, they were merely a crowd of spectators. In fact, not a single man would have offered any resistance had Alexamenus, laying aside his arms, called the whole army to attention and made an address such as the situation required, keeping a considerable body of Aetolians under arms and injuring no one. But what ought to happen in every act begun by treachery happened here; the affair was so managed as to hasten the destruction of all the actors in it. The general, shutting himself up in the palace, spent a whole day and night in examining the royal treasures, the Aetolians took to looting as though they had captured the city of which they wished to appear as the liberators. The indignation this aroused and a feeling of contempt for the scanty number of Aetolians gave the Lacedaemonians courage to unite together. Some advised that the Aetolians should be driven out and the liberty snatched from them just when it seemed to be restored, asserted and made secure. Others thought that one of the royal blood should be chosen as the ostensible head of the movement. There was a scion of the old royal house called Laconicus who had been brought up with the tyrant's children; they put him on horseback, and seizing their arms slew the Aetolians who were strolling about the city. Then they forced their way into the palace and killed Alexamenus, who with a few of his men offered an ineffectual resistance. Some of the Aetolians had collected together at the Chalcioecon-a bronze temple of Minerva-and were all killed. A few flung away their arms and fled to Tegea and Megalopolis. Here they were arrested by the magistrates and sold as slaves.

On hearing of the tyrant's death Philopoemen went to Lacedaemon, where he found universal panic and confusion. He invited the principal men to meet him, and after addressing them as Alexamenus ought to have done, incorporated the city in the Achaean league. This was rendered all the easier by the fact that just at that time A. Atilius arrived at Gytheum with four-and-twenty quinqueremes. Thoas was far from meeting with the same success at Chalcis as was achieved at Demetrias through the agency of Eurylochus. He had enlisted the services of two men-Euthymidas, one of the leading men in Chalcis who had been expelled through the influence of the Roman party, strengthened by the visit of T. Quinctius and the fleet, and Herodorus, a trader from Chios whose wealth gave him considerable weight in the city. Through their instrumentality Thoas had arranged with the adherents of Euthymidas to betray the city into his hands. Euthymidas had taken up his residence at Athens, from there he went to Thebes, and then on to Salganeus. Herodorus went to Thronium. Not far from this place Thoas had a force of 2000 infantry and 200 cavalry, as well as thirty light transports in the Maliac Gulf. Herodorus was to take these vessels with a complement of 600 infantry to the island of Atalanta with the object of sailing across to Chalcis as soon as he learnt that the land force was nearing Aulis and the Euripus. Thoas himself marched with this force as rapidly as possible, mostly by night, to Chalcis.

After the expulsion of Euthymidas the chief command was vested in Micythio and Xenoclides. Either suspecting what was going on or having received information about it, they were at first in a state of panic and thought that their only safety lay in flight, but when their fears subsided and they saw that they would be deserting not only their city but their alliance with Rome, they thought out the following plan of operations. It so happened that the annual festival of Diana of Amarynthis was being held at the time in Eretria, and this festival was attended not only by the natives but also by the people of Carystus. A deputation was sent from Chalcis to beg the Eretrians and the Carystians to take compassion on those who were born in the same island as themselves, to remember their alliance with Rome, and not to allow Chalcis to pass into the hands of the Aetolians. If they held Chalcis they would hold Euboea; the Macedonians had been harsh masters, the Aetolians would be much more insupportable. The two cities were influenced mainly by their respect for the Romans, whose courage in the late war as well as their justice and considerateness they had had practical experience of. Each city accordingly armed and despatched all their fighting men. The Chalcidians left the defence of their walls to them, and crossing the Euripus with their entire force fixed their camp at Salganeus. From there they sent first a herald and then delegates to the Aetolians to inquire what they had done or said that their allies and friends should come to attack them. Thoas, who was in command, replied that they were come not to attack them but to deliver them from the Romans. "You are fettered," he said, "with more glittering but also with heavier chains than when you had a Macedonian garrison in your citadel." The Chalcidians declared that they were not in bondage to any man, nor did they need any man's protection. They then left the conference and returned to their camp. Thoas and the Aetolians had placed all their hopes on taking the enemy by surprise, and as they were unequal to a sustained conflict and the siege of a city powerfully protected both by land and sea they returned home. When Euthymidas heard that his countrymen were encamped at Salganeus and that the Aetolians had gone away he returned to Athens. Herodorus after anxiously awaiting the signal from Atalanta sent a despatch-boat to find out the cause of the delay, and when he learnt that his associates had abandoned their enterprise he went back to Thronium.

On hearing what had happened Quinctius on his way from Corinth met Eumenes on the Euripus off Chalcis, and it was arranged that Eumenes should leave 500 troops to protect Chalcis and go on to Athens. Quinctius went on as he had started in the direction of Demetrias, and judging that the liberation of Chalcis would do much towards inducing the Magnetes to resume friendly relations with Rome, he wrote to Eunomus, the chief magistrate of the Thessalians, asking him to put his fighting men on a war footing as a support to the party of his adherents. At the same time he sent Villius to sound the feeling of the populace, but not to attempt anything more unless there were a large number who were inclined to restore the old friendly relations. He went in a quinquereme, and had reached the harbour mouth when he found that the whole population had poured out to see him. Villius asked them whether they preferred that he should come to them as friends or as enemies. Eurylochus, their chief magistrate, told him that he had come to friends, but he must keep away from the harbour and allow the Magnetes to live in harmony and liberty and not seduce the populace under cover of a political discussion. This started a hot dispute, not a conference, as the Roman envoy bitterly reproached the Magnetes for their ingratitude and predicted the disasters which would quickly overtake them, whilst the townsmen shouted out in reply angry aspersions on the conduct of the senate and Quinctius. Foiled in his attempt Villius returned to Quinctius, who sent off a message to the praetor to disband his forces and then returned to Corinth.

The affairs of Greece, involved as they were with those of Rome, have carried me, so to speak, out of my course, not because they were worth narrating in themselves, but because they brought about the war with Antiochus. After the consular elections-for that was the point at which I digressed-the new consuls, L. Quinctius and Cn. Domitius, left for their provinces, Quinctius for Liguria and Domitius for the country of the Boii. The Boii remained quiet, and even their senate with their children and the cavalry commanders with their men, 1500 in all, made a formal surrender to the consul. The other consul devastated the Ligurian country far and wide, captured several of their fortified posts and took from them not only prisoners and booty, but also many of his fellow-citizens and members of the friendly States who had been in the hands of the enemy. During the year the senate and people authorised the formation of a military colony at Vibo; 3700 infantry and 300 cavalry were sent there. The supervisors of the settlement were Q. Naevius, M. Minucius and M. Furius Crassipes. Fifteen jugera were allotted to each infantryman and double the number to the cavalry. The land had previously belonged to the Bruttii, who had taken it from the Greeks. During this time two alarming incidents occurred in Rome, one lasted longer than the other, but was less destructive. There were earth tremors which went on for thirty-eight days, and during the whole of the time business was suspended amidst general anxiety and alarm. Intercessions were offered up for three successive days to avert the peril. The other was no groundless alarm, it was a widespread disaster. A fire broke out in the Forum Boarium; for a day and a night the buildings fronting the Tiber were blazing and all the shops with their valuable stocks were burnt out.

The year was now almost at an end and the rumours of hostile preparations on the part of Antiochus and the anxiety these caused to the senate became graver day by day. The discussion as to the assignment of provinces to the new magistrates resulted in the senate decreeing that one of the consular provinces should be Italy and the other wherever the senate should decide, for it was already generally understood that there would be war with Antiochus. The one to whom this latter field of operations would be allotted was to be furnished with 4000 Roman and 6000 allied infantry, together with 300 Roman and 400 allied cavalry. L. Quinctius was instructed to raise this force so that there might be no delay in the new consul proceeding at once wherever the senate should think it necessary. A similar decree was made in the case of the praetors-elect. The first balloting was for the two departments of civic and alien jurisdiction; the second for Bruttium; the third for the command of the fleet, which was to be sent wherever the senate should determine; the fourth for Sicily; the fifth for Sardinia, and the sixth for Further Spain. L. Quinctius was also commanded to raise two new Roman legions and an allied contingent of 20,000 infantry and 800 cavalry. That army was decreed to the praetor who should draw Bruttium as his province. Two temples were dedicated this year to Jupiter. One had been vowed by L. Furius Purpureo, when praetor, in the war against the Gauls; the other by the consul. The dedication was performed by one of the decemviri, Q. Marcius Ralla. Many severe sentences were passed this year on moneylenders, the curule aediles M. Tuccius and P. Junius Brutus acting as prosecutors. From the proceeds of the fines inflicted on them gilded four-horse chariots were placed in the temple on the Capitol and twelve gilded shields on the pediment of the chapel of Jupiter. The same aediles constructed a colonnade outside the Porta Trigemina in the Carpenters' Quarter.

Whilst the Romans were devoting attention to preparations for a fresh war, Antiochus for his part was by no means idle. He was, however, detained in Asia by three cities, Smyrna, Alexandria Troas and Lampsacus, none of which he had been able to become master of either by force or by persuasion, and he did not wish to leave them in his rear during his invasion of Europe. A further cause of delay was his uncertainty about Hannibal. The undecked ships with which he had intended to send Hannibal to Africa were not ready, and then the question was raised, mainly by Thoas, whether he ought to be sent at all. Thoas asserted that the whole of Greece was in a state of unrest and that Demetrias had passed into his hands. The lies about the king and the wild exaggerations as to the forces which Antiochus possessed with which he had excited many minds in Greece he now employed to feed the king's hopes. He told him that all were praying for him to come; there would be a universal rush to the shore from which they had caught the first glimpse of the royal fleet. He actually ventured to disturb the judgment which the king had now without a shadow of doubt formed of Hannibal and gave it as his opinion that no ships ought to be detached from the king's fleet, or if any were sent Hannibal was the very last person who ought to be in command of them. He was a banished man and a Carthaginian to whom his fortunes or his imagination suggested a thousand fresh prospects every day. Then, again, the military reputation which led to Hannibal's being sought after like a woman with a rich dowry was too great for any who was only officer in the king's service; the king ought to be the central figure, the sole leader the sole commander. If Hannibal were to lose a fleet or an army the loss would be just as great as if they were lost under any other leader, but if any success were gained the glory of it would go to Hannibal and not to Antiochus. Supposing that they were fortunate enough to inflict a decisive defeat on the Romans and win the war, how could they hope that Hannibal would live quietly under a monarch, under one man's rule, after he had been unable to bear the restraints imposed by the laws of his own country? His youthful aspirations and his hopes of winning world-wide dominion had not fitted him to endure a master in his old age. There was no necessity for the king to give Hannibal a command, he might find him employment as a member of his suite and an adviser on matters concerning the war. A moderate demand upon such abilities as his would be neither dangerous nor useless; but if the highest services he could render were called for, they would prove too burdensome both for him who rendered them and him who accepted them. Such were the arguments which Thoas used.

No characters are so prone to jealousy as those whose birth and fortune are not on a level with their intelligence, for they hate virtue and goodness in others. The plan of sending Hannibal to Africa, the one useful plan which had been thought out at the beginning of the war, was promptly set aside. Encouraged by the defection of Demetrias, Antiochus determined to postpone no longer his advance into Greece. Before setting sail he went up to Ilium to offer sacrifices to Minerva. He then rejoined his fleet and started on his expedition with 40 decked ships and 60 undecked ones, and these were followed by 200 transports laden with supplies and military stores of every description. He first touched at the island of Imbros and from there crossed the Aegean to Sciathus. After the ships which had lost their course during the voyage had rejoined him, he sailed on to Pteleum, the first point on the mainland. Here he was met by Eurylochus and the Magnetan leaders from Demetrias, and the sight of so many supporters put him in excellent spirits. The following day he entered the harbour of Demetrias and disembarked his force at a spot not far from the city. His total strength consisted of 10,000 infantry, 500 cavalry and six elephants, a force hardly sufficient for the occupation of Greece, even if there were no troops there, to say nothing of maintaining a war against Rome. When the Aetolians received intelligence that Antiochus was at Demetrias they at once convened a council and passed a resolution inviting him to attend. As the king knew that this resolution would be passed he had already left Demetrias and advanced to Phalara on the Maliac Gulf. After being supplied with a copy of the resolution he went on to Lamia, where he received an enthusiastic welcome from the populace, who showed their delight by loud cheers and other manifestations by which the common crowd express their extravagant joy.

When he entered the council it was with difficulty that the president, Phaeneas, and the other leaders obtained silence in order that the king might speak. He began by apologising for having come with forces so much smaller than everyone had hoped and expected. This ought to be taken, he said, as the greatest proof of his friendship and devotion towards them, for though he was quite unprepared and the season was unsuitable for a sea-passage he had unhesitatingly complied with the request of their delegates, convinced as he was that when the Aetolians saw him amongst them they would realise that, even had he come alone, it was in him that their safety and protection lay. At the same time, he was going to fulfil to the utmost the hopes of those whose expectations seemed for the moment to be disappointed. As soon as ever the season of the year made navigation safe he should fill the whole of Greece with arms and men and horses and encircle its coasts with his fleets; he would shrink from no toil or danger till he had delivered Greece from the yoke of Roman dominion and made Aetolia her foremost State. Supplies of every description would accompany his armies from Asia; for the time being it must be the care of the Aetolians to furnish his troops with an abundant supply of corn and other provisions at a reasonable price.

After this speech, which met with unanimous approval, the king left the council. An animated discussion then arose between the two Aetolian leaders, Phaeneas and Thoas. Phaeneas argued that as their leader in war Antiochus would not be so useful to them as he would be were he to act as peace-maker and as an umpire to whom their differences with Rome might be referred for decision. His presence amongst them and his regal dignity would do more to win the respect of the Romans than his arms. Many men, to avoid the necessity of war, will make concessions which could not be extorted from them by war and armed force. Thoas, on the other hand, asserted that Phaeneas was not really anxious for peace; he only wanted to hinder their preparations for war so that the king, tired of delays, might relax his efforts and the Romans gain time for completing their own preparations. Notwithstanding all the deputations which had been despatched to Rome and all the personal discussions with Quinctius, they had learnt by experience that no equitable terms could be procured from Rome, nor would they have sought help from Antiochus had not all their hopes been dashed to the ground. Now that he had presented himself sooner than anyone expected they must not slacken their purpose, rather must they beg the king, as he had come as the champion of Greece, which was the main thing, to summon all his military and naval forces. A king in arms would gain something, a king without arms would not have the slightest weight with Romans, either as acting on behalf of the Aetolians or even defending his own interests. These arguments carried the day and they decided to appoint the king as their commander-in-chief with absolute powers, and thirty of their leading men were selected to act as an advisory council on any matter on which he might wish to consult them.

On the break-up of the council the members dispersed to their respective cities. The next day the king consulted the council as to where operations should commence. It was thought best to begin with Chalcis, where the Aetolians had recently made their futile attempt, and where they considered success would depend on quick action more than on serious preparations or sustained effort. The king accordingly, with a force of 1000 infantry which had come up from Demetrias, marched through Phocis, and the Aetolian leaders, who had called out a few of their fighting men, taking a different route, assembled at Chaeronea and followed him in ten ships of war. Fixing his camp at Salganeus he crossed the Euripus with the Aetolians, and when he was within a short distance from the harbour the magistrates and leading men of Chalcis came forward in front of their gate. A small party from each side met to confer. The Aetolians did their utmost to persuade the Chalcidians to receive the king as an ally and friend without disturbing their friendly relations with Rome. They said that he had sailed across to Europe not to levy war but to liberate Greece, not with empty professions as the Romans had done, but to make her really free. Nothing could be more advantageous for the States of Greece than to enter into friendly relations with both parties, for then they would be secure against ill-treatment from either side through the protection which the other would be pledged to afford. If they refused to receive the king, let them consider what they would at once have to go through, with the Romans too far away to help and Antiochus, whom they were powerless to resist, before their gates as an enemy. Micythio, one of the Achaean leaders, said in reply that he was wondering who the people were that Antiochus had left his kingdom and come across to Europe to liberate. He knew of no city in Greece which held a Roman garrison or paid tribute to Rome or had to submit against its will to conditions imposed by a one-sided treaty. The Chalcidians needed no one to vindicate their liberty, for they were a free State; nor did they require protection, for it was owing to this same Roman people that they were in the enjoyment of peace and liberty. They did not reject the proffered friendship of the king nor even of the Aetolians, but the first proof of friendship would be their departure from the island, for as far as they themselves were concerned it was quite certain that they would not admit them within their walls or even enter into any alliance with them without the authority of the Roman Government.

The king had remained on board, and when this was reported to him he decided for the present to return to Demetrias as he had not brought sufficient troops to effect anything by force. As his first attempt had proved a complete failure he consulted the Aetolians as to what the next step should be. They decided to try what could be done with the Boeotians, the Achaeans and the Athamanian king, Amynander. They were under the impression that the Boeotians had been estranged from Rome ever since the death of Brachylles and the results which flowed from it, and they also believed that Philopoemen, the chief magistrate of the Achaeans, was an object of dislike and jealousy on the part of Quinctius owing to the reputation he had gained in the Laconian war. Amynander had married Apama, the daughter of a certain Alexander of Megalopolis, who represented himself as being descended from Alexander the Great and had given his three children the names of Philip, Alexander and Apama. Her marriage with the king had made Apama much talked about and her elder brother Philip had followed her to Athamania. He was a weak and conceited young man, and Antiochus and the Aetolians had persuaded him that if he brought Amynander and the Athamanians over to the side of Antiochus he might hope to succeed to the throne of Macedon, as he really belonged to the royal stock. These empty promises carried weight not only with Philip but even with Amynander.

The Aetolian agents who had been sent to Achaia were received in audience at a council held at Aegium. Antiochus' envoy spoke first. Like most men who are fed by royal bounty, he talked in a grandiloquent strain and filled sea and land with the empty sound of his words. According to him, an innumerable mass of cavalry was crossing the Hellespont into Europe; some were clad in coats of mail, they were called "cataphracti"; others were bowmen, and against them nothing was safe, their aim was surest when they were galloping away from the enemy. Although this cavalry force alone could overwhelm the massed armies of Europe, he went on to talk about bodies of infantry many times as numerous and startled his hearers with names they had hardly ever heard of-Dahae, Medes, Elymaeans and Cadusii. The naval forces were such as no harbours in Greece could hold; the right division was formed by the Sidonians and Tyrians; the left by the Aradii and Sidetae from Pamphylia, nations which were unequalled in the whole world as skilful and intrepid seamen. It was unnecessary, he continued, to refer to the money and other provision for war, his hearers themselves knew how the realms of Asia had always overflowed with gold. So the Romans would not have to do with a Philip or a Hannibal, the one only the foremost man in a single city, the other confined to the limits of his Macedonian kingdom, but with the Great King who ruled over the whole of Asia and a part of Europe. And yet, coming as he did from the remotest borders of the East to liberate Greece, he asked for nothing from the Achaeans which could impair their loyalty to Rome, their old friend and ally. He did not ask them to take up arms with him against them, all he wanted was that they should stand aloof from both sides. "Let your one wish and desire," he concluded, "as becomes common friends, be that each may enjoy peace; if there is to be war do not become involved in it." Archidamus, who represented the Aetolians, spoke to the same effect and urged them to maintain a passive attitude as the easiest and safest course, and, whilst watching the war as mere onlookers, wait for its final result upon the fortunes of others without in any way hazarding their own. Then his tongue ran away with him and he broke out into unrestrained abuse of the Romans in general and in particular of Quinctius, reproaching them with ingratitude and asserting that it was through the valour of the Aetolians that they secured not only the victory over Pyrrhus, but even their own safety, for it was the Aetolians who saved Quinctius and his army from destruction. "What duty," he exclaimed, "incumbent on a commander has that man ever discharged? I saw him, while the battle was going on, busy with auspices, offerings and vows like some miserable priest, while I was exposing myself to the enemy's weapons in his defence."

Quinctius replied: "Archidamus had in his mind those in whose presence rather than those to whose ears he was addressing his remarks, for you Achaeans know perfectly well that all the warlike spirit of the Aetolians lies in words not in deeds, and shows itself in haranguing councils more than on the battlefield. So they are indifferent to the opinion which the Achaeans have of them, because they are aware that they are thoroughly known to them. It is for the king's representatives, and through them for the king himself, that he has uttered this bombast. If anyone did not know before what it was that led Antiochus to make common cause with the Aetolians, it came out clearly in their delegate's speech. By lying to one another and boasting of forces which neither of them possess they have filled each other with vain hopes. These say that it was through them that Philip was defeated and by their courage that the Romans were protected, and as you heard just now, they talk as though you and all other cities and nations were going to follow their lead. The king, on the other hand, vaunts of his clouds of infantry and cavalry and covers all the seas with his fleets. It is very like something that happened when we were at supper with my host in Chalcis, a worthy man and one who knows how to feed his guests. It was at the height of summer; we were being sumptuously entertained, and were wondering how he managed to get such an abundance and variety of game at that season of the year. The man, not a boaster like these people, smiled and said, 'That variety of what looks like wild game is due to the condiments and dressing, it has all been made out of a home-bred pig.' This might be fitly said of the king's forces which were just now so extolled. All that variety of equipment and the crowd of names no one ever heard of-Dahae, Medes, Cadusians and Elymaeans-are nothing but Syrians, whose servile, cringing temper makes them much more like a breed of slaves than a nation of soldiers. I wish I could bring before your eyes, Achaeans, the flying visits which the 'Great King' paid to the national council of the Aetolians at Lamia and afterwards to Chalcis. You would see what looked like two badly depleted legions in the king's camp; you would see the king almost on his knees begging corn from the Aetolians and trying to raise a loan from which to pay his men, and then standing at the gates of Chalcis, and on finding himself shut out from there returning to Aetolia having gained nothing but a glimpse of Aulis and the Euripus. The king's confidence in the Aetolians is misplaced, so is theirs in his empty professions. You must not, therefore, let yourselves be deceived; trust rather in the good faith of Rome, of which you have had actual experience. As to their saying that the best course for you is to have nothing to do with the war, nothing on the contrary could be further from your interests, for then, winning neither gratitude nor respect, you would fall as a prize to the victor."

It was felt that his reply to both parties was to the point, and his speech easily won the approbation of the council. There was no debate and no hesitation in coming to a unanimous decision that the Achaeans would count as their friends or foes those whom the Romans considered such, and would also declare war on Antiochus and the Aetolians. On the instruction of Quirinus they at once despatched a contingent of 500 men to Chalcis and an equal number to the Piraeus. At Athens matters were fast approaching a state of civil war through the action of certain individuals who by holding out the prospect of bribes were drawing the mob, who can always be bought by gold, over to Antiochus. The supporters of Rome sent to Quirinus asking him to go to Athens, and Apollodorus, the ringleader of the movement, was tried at the instance of a man called Leontes, found guilty and sent into banishment. The delegates returned to the king with an unfavourable reply from the Achaeans; the Boeotians gave no definite answer. They simply promised that when Antiochus appeared in Boeotia they would deliberate as to what action they should take. When Antiochus heard that the Aetolians and Eumenes had each sent reinforcements to Chalcis he saw that he must act promptly and be the first to enter the place and if possible intercept the enemy on their advance. He sent Menippus with about 3000 men and Polyxenidas with the whole of the fleet, and a few days later marched thither in person with 6000 of his own men and a smaller body of Aetolians, taken from such force as could be hastily concentrated at Lamia. The 500 Achaeans and the small contingent supplied by Eumenes under Xenoclides of Chalcis crossed the Euripus, as the route was still open, and reached Chalcis. The Roman troops, who were about 500 strong, came after Menippus had encamped before Sanganeus at the Hermaeum, the point of departure from Boeotia to the island of Euboea. They were accompanied by Micythio, who had been sent from Chalcis to Quirinus to ask for this very contingent. When, however, he found that the passes were blocked, he abandoned the one leading to Aulis and took the one to Delium, intending to sail across from there.

Delium is a temple of Apollo overlooking the sea, five miles distant from Tanagra and four miles from the nearest point of Euboea by sea. Here in the fane and in the grove, sacred and therefore inviolable, with its rights of sanctuary which it possessed in common with those temples which the Greeks call "asyla," the soldiers were walking about perfectly at their ease, not having yet heard that a state of war existed or that swords had been drawn and blood shed. Some were exploring the temple and the grove, others strolling along the beach without any weapons, while a large number had gone off to procure wood and fodder. Whilst thus dispersed they were suddenly attacked by Menippus. Many were killed, as many as fifty were made prisoners; very few made their escape. Amongst these was Micythio, who was taken on board a small transport. The losses incurred greatly disquieted Quinctius and the Romans, but at the same time it was regarded as an additional justification for the war. Antiochus had moved his army up to Aulis and from there he despatched a second mission to Chalcis, consisting of some of his own people and some Aetolians. They employed the same arguments as before, but in much more threatening tone, and in spite of the efforts of Micythio and Xenoclides he had little difficulty in inducing the townsmen to open the gates to him. The adherents of Rome left the city just before the king's entry. The Achaean troops and those of Eumenes were holding Salganeus, and a small body of Romans were fortifying a post on the Euripus to defend the position. Menippus commenced the attack on Salganeus and Antiochus prepared to capture the fortified post. The Achaeans and the soldiers of Eumenes were the first to abandon the defence on condition of being allowed to depart in safety. The Romans offered a much stouter resistance, but when they found that they were blockaded by land and sea and that siege artillery was being brought up they were unable to hold out any longer. As the king was now in possession of the capital of Euboea, the other cities on the island did not dispute his dominion. He flattered himself that he had made a most successful commencement of the war, considering how large an island and how many serviceable cities had fallen into his hands.

Book 36. War Against Antiochus-First Stage

On entering upon their office the new consuls, P. Cornelius Scipio and Manius Acilius Glabrio, were instructed by the senate to make it their first business before balloting for their provinces to sacrifice adult victims in all the temples in which for the greater part of the year there was a lectisternium and to offer up special prayers that the intention of the senate to undertake a fresh war might bring prosperity and happiness to the senate and people of Rome. All these sacrifices were performed without anything untoward occurring, and in the victims which were first offered the omens were entirely favourable. The haruspices accordingly assured the consuls that the boundaries of Rome would be extended by this war and that everything pointed to victory and triumph. When this report was laid before the senate their minds were at rest so far as the sanctions of religion were concerned and they ordered the question to be submitted to the people, "Whether it was their will and intention that war should be undertaken against Antiochus and those who were of his party?" If this proposal were carried, the consuls, if they thought fit, were to bring the matter afresh before the senate. P. Cornelius put the question to the people, and it was carried; the senate then decreed that the consuls should ballot for the provinces of Greece and Italy. The one to whom Greece was allotted was to take over the army which by order of the senate L. Quinctius had raised from Roman citizens and allies for service in that province, and in addition the army which M. Baebius had with the authority of the senate taken to Macedonia. He was also commissioned to take up reinforcements of not more than 5000 men from the allies outside Italy. It was further decided that L. Quinctius should be appointed second in command for this war. The other consul to whom Italy was allotted was instructed to conduct operations against the Boii with whichever army he preferred of the two which the late consuls had, and to send the other to Rome to form the City legions and be ready to go wherever the senate thought fit.

Such were the decrees made by the senate up to the actual allocation of the provinces. Then at last the consuls balloted, and Greece fell to Acilius, Italy to Cornelius. When this was settled a senatus consultum was passed in the following terms: "Whereas the Roman people have at this time ordered that there be war with Antiochus and with all who are under his rule, the consuls shall on this behalf issue orders for a public intercession and M. Acilius shall vow Great Games to Jupiter and gifts and offerings to all the shrines.'' This vow was made by the consul in the following formula, as dictated by P. Licinius the Pontifex Maximus: "If the war which the people has ordered to be taken in hand against King Antiochus be brought to such a close as the senate and people of Rome desire, then all the Roman people shall celebrate in thy honour, Jupiter, Great Games for the space of ten days, and oblations of money shall be made to all thy shrines in such wise as the senate shall decree. Whatsoever magistrate shall hold these Games, whensoever and wheresoever he shall celebrate them, may they be deemed to be duly and rightly celebrated and the oblations duly and rightly offered!" Then the consul proclaimed special intercessions to be offered for two days. After the balloting for the consular provinces the praetors drew for theirs. M. Junius Brutus obtained the two civil jurisdictions; Bruttium fell to A. Cornelius Mammula; Sicily to M. Aemilius Lepidus; Sardinia to L. Oppius Salinator; the command of the fleet to C. Livius Salinator; and Further Spain to L. Aemilius Paullus.

The distribution of the armies amongst them was as follows: The new levies which had been raised by L. Quinctius the preceding year were assigned to A. Cornelius, and his duty was to protect the whole of the coast round Tarentum and Brundisium. It was decreed that L. Aemilius Paullus should take over the army which M. Fulvius had commanded as proconsul the year before and also raise 3000 fresh infantry and 300 cavalry for service in Further Spain, two-thirds to consist of allied troops, the remainder being Romans. A reinforcement of the same strength was sent to C. Flaminius, who was continued in his command in Hither Spain. M. Aemilius Lepidus was ordered to take over the province and army of Sicily from L. Valerius, whom he was to succeed, and if it seemed advisable he was to retain him as propraetor and divide the province with him; one section was to extend from Agrigentum to Pachynum, the other from Pachynum to Tyndareum. L. Valerius was also to guard the latter coast with twenty ships of war. Lepidus was further commissioned to requisition two-tenths of all the corn in the island and have it conveyed to Greece. L. Oppius was ordered to make the same requisition in Sardinia, the corn, however, was not to be sent to Greece but to Rome. C. Livius, the praetor who was to command the fleet, received instructions to sail to Greece with twenty vessels which had completed their armament and take over the ships which Atilius had commanded. The repairing and fitting out of the ships in the dockyards was placed in the hands of M. Junius, and he was to select the crews of these vessels from freedmen.

Six commissioners were sent to Africa to procure corn for Greece, the cost to be borne by Rome; three went to Carthage and three to Numidia. So determined were the citizens to be in perfect readiness for the war that the consul published an edict forbidding anyone who was a senator or had the right of speaking in the senate, or held office as an inferior magistrate, from leaving Rome for any place from which he could not return in a day. It was also forbidden for five senators to be absent from the City at any one time. Whilst C. Livius was doing his utmost to make the fleet ready for sea he was for some time delayed by a dispute with the citizens of the maritime colonies. When they were impressed for the fleet they appealed to the tribunes of the plebs, who referred them to the senate. The senate unanimously decreed that there was no exemption from service for the colonists. The colonies concerned were Ostia, Fregenae, Castrum Novum, Pyrgi, Antium, Tarracina, Minturnae and Sinuessa. The consul Acilius, in compliance with a resolution of the senate, submitted two questions to the College of Fetials. One was whether the declaration of war had to be made to Antiochus personally, or whether it would be sufficient to announce it at one of his frontier garrisons. The other was whether a separate declaration of war must be made to the Aetolians and whether in that case the league of amity and alliance must first be denounced. The Fetials replied that they had already on a previous occasion, when they were consulted in the case of Philip, decided that it was a matter of indifference whether the declaration were made personally or in one of his garrison towns. As to the league of amity, they held that it was obviously denounced, seeing that after the frequent demands put forward by our ambassadors the king had neither surrendered the towns nor given any satisfaction. In the case of the Aetolians, they had actually declared war on Rome by taking forcible possession of Demetrias, a city belonging to the allies of Rome, by going to attack Chalcis by land and sea, and by bringing Antiochus into Europe to levy war on Rome. When all the preparations were at last completed, Acilius issued an edict for a general muster at Brundisium by the 15th of May of the Roman soldiers whom L. Quinctius had called up and those who had been supplied to him by the Latins and allies, who were under orders to go with him to his province as well as the military tribunes of the first and third legions. He himself left the City wearing his paludamentum on the 3rd of that month. The praetors left at the same time for their respective provinces.

Just before this a mission from the two sovereigns, Philip and Ptolemy, arrived in Rome. Philip offered to furnish troops, money and corn for the war; Ptolemy sent 1000 pounds of gold and 20,000 pounds of silver. The senate declined to accept any of it and passed a vote of thanks to both the kings. On their each offering to enter Aetolia with all their forces and take their part in the war, Ptolemy was excused, but Philip's envoys were informed that the senate and people of Rome would be grateful to him if he gave his support to Acilius. Similar missions were despatched by the Carthaginians and by Masinissa. The Carthaginians offered 100,000 modii of wheat and 50,000 of barley for the use of the army; half the amount they would transport to Rome, and they pressed the Romans to accept it as a free gift. They were further prepared to fit out a fleet at their own expense and pay in one lump sum the tribute of which many annual instalments had still to run. Masinissa's envoys stated that he was prepared to supply 50,000 modii of wheat and 300,000 of barley for the army in Greece, and 300,000 modii of wheat and 250,000 of barley for consumption in Rome. He would also furnish Acilius with 500 cavalry and 20 elephants. In the matter of corn both parties were informed that the Roman people would make use of it on condition that they paid for it; the Carthaginian offer of a fleet was declined, beyond the vessels which they were bound to supply under the terms of the treaty, and in reply to the offer of money the Romans refused to accept any before the dates at which the instalments became due.

During these proceedings in Rome Antiochus, who was at Chalcis, was not idle during the winter. Some of the Greek communities he endeavoured to win over by despatching embassies to them, others sent embassies spontaneously to him, as for instance the Epirots, in accordance with the general determination of their people, and also the Eleans from the Peloponnese. The Eleans sought his assistance against the Achaeans, who having declared war on Antiochus against their wish would, they expected, attack them first of all. A detachment of infantry 1000 strong was sent to them under the command of Euphanes, a Cretan. The deputation from Epirus showed a by no means honest and straightforward spirit to either side; they wanted to ingratiate themselves with Antiochus, but at the same time to give no offence to the Romans. They asked the king not to involve them in the war hastily, for from their position on the front of Greece facing Italy they would have to meet the first onslaught of the Romans. But if he could protect Epirus with his fleet and army all the Epirots would eagerly welcome him in their cities and harbours; if he was unable to do so, they begged him not to expose them unprotected and defenceless to the hostility of Rome. Their object was perfectly clear. If, as they were inclined to believe, he kept clear of Epirus, all would be safe so far as the Roman armies were concerned, whilst they would have secured the king's good graces by expressing their readiness to receive him, had he gone to them. If on the other hand he entered Epirus, they hoped that the Romans would pardon them for yielding to the superior strength of one who was on the spot, without waiting for succour from a distance. As Antiochus was at a loss what reply to make to this ambiguous plea, he said he would send envoys to them to discuss the matters which concerned him and them alike.

He next proceeded to Boeotia. The reasons which the Boeotians gave for their animosity towards Rome I have already stated-the assassination of Brachyllus and Quinctius' attack on Coronea in consequence of the massacre of Roman soldiers. But as a matter of fact, that nation once so famous for its discipline had been for many generations deteriorating both in its public and private life, and many were in a condition which could not possibly long continue without a revolutionary change. The leading Boeotians from all parts of the country assembled at Thebes, and thither Antiochus went to meet them. In spite of the fact that by his attack on the Roman detachments at Delium and Chalcis he had committed hostile acts which were neither trifling nor such as could be explained away, he took the same line in addressing the Boeotian council that he had taken at his first conference at Chalcis and had instructed his envoys to take in the council of the Achaeans. He simply asked that friendly relations might be established with him, not that war should be declared against Rome. No one was deceived as to what he really meant; however, a resolution veiled in inoffensive terms was passed in support of the king and in opposition to Rome. Having thus secured the nation he returned to Chalcis. Letters had been previously sent to the Aetolian leaders requesting them to meet him at Demetrias that he might discuss with them the general conduct of the war, and he arrived there by sea on the day fixed for the meeting. Amynander, who had been invited from Athamania to take part in the discussion, and Hannibal, who had not been consulted for some time, were both present. A discussion arose regarding the people of Thessaly; all present thought they ought to be won over, the only divergence of opinion was as to when and how this ought to be done. Some were of opinion that they ought to set about it at once; others were for postponing action till the spring, it being now midwinter; some again thought that it would be enough to send a deputation, others were in favour of going there with the whole of their forces and frightening them into compliance if they hesitated.

Whilst the debate was revolving entirely round these details Hannibal was asked for his opinion, and in what he said he turned the thoughts of the king and of all present to the consideration of the war as a whole. He spoke as follows: "If I had been taken into your counsels after we landed in Greece and you were deliberating about Euboea and the Achaeans and Boeotia, I should have expressed the same view which I am expressing now with regard to the Thessalians. I consider that it is of the first importance that we should use every possible means to bring Philip and the Macedonians into an armed alliance with us. As to Euboea and the Boeotians and the Thessalians, who can doubt that these people who have no strength of their own and always cringe before a power which is present to their eyes will display the same craven spirit which marks the proceedings of their councils in suing for pardon, and as soon as they see a Roman army in Greece will turn to their accustomed obedience? Nor will they be blamed for refusing to try conclusions with your strength when you and your army are amongst them and the Romans are far away. How much sooner ought we-how much better would it be-to secure the adhesion of Philip than of these people! For if he once takes up the cause he will have everything at stake, and he will contribute an amount of strength which will not only be an accession to us in a war with Rome, but was not long ago sufficient of itself to withstand the Romans. I trust I shall not give offence in saying that with him as our ally I cannot feel doubtful as to the issue, for I see that those through whose assistance the Romans prevailed against Philip will now be the men by whom the Romans themselves are opposed. The Aetolians, who as is universally admitted defeated Philip, will now be fighting in company with him against the Romans. Amynander and the Athamanians, who next to the Aetolians rendered the greatest service in the war, will be on our side. While you, Antiochus, had not yet moved, Philip sustained the whole weight of the war; now you and he, the mightiest monarchs in Asia and Europe, will direct your united strength against a single people who-to say nothing of my own fortunes, good or bad-were at all events in the days of our fathers no match for even one king of Epirus, and how can he possibly be compared with you?

"What considerations then give me ground for believing that Philip can be made our ally? One is the identity of interests, which is the surest bond of alliance. The other is your own assurance, Aetolians. For amongst the reasons which your envoy Thoas gave for inducing Antiochus to come to Greece, the strongest was his constant asseveration that Philip was complaining and chafing under the servile conditions imposed upon him in the guise of peace. He used to compare the king's rage to that of some animal chained or shut up and longing to burst his prison bars. If that is his state of mind, let us loose his chains and burst the bars that hold him in so that he can vent his long-restrained rage on our common foe. But if our delegates are unable to influence him, let us at all events see to it that if we cannot get him on our side the enemy does not get him on his side. Your son Seleucus is at Lysimachia; if with the army he has with him he traverses Thrace and begins to lay waste the adjacent parts of Macedonia, he will easily turn Philip aside from actively assisting the Romans to the defence of his own dominions.

"You are in possession of my opinions about Philip. As regards the general strategy of the war, you have known from the outset what my views are. Had I been listened to then, it would not have been the capture of Chalcis or the storming of a fort on the Euripus that the Romans would have heard about; they would have learnt that Etruria and Liguria and the coastal districts of Cisalpine Gaul were wrapped in the flames of war and, what would have alarmed them most of all, that Hannibal was in Italy. I am of opinion that even now you ought to bring up the whole of your military and naval forces and let a fleet of transports accompany them laden with supplies. We here are too few for the requirements of war and too many for our scanty commissariat. When you have concentrated your entire strength, Antiochus, you might divide your fleet and keep one division cruising off Corcyra, that there may be no safe and easy passage for the Romans, the other you would send across to the coast of Italy opposite Sardinia and Africa. You yourself would advance with all your land forces into the country round Byllis; from there you would protect Greece and give the Romans the impression that you are going to sail to Italy, and should circumstances render it necessary you will be in readiness to do so. This is what I advise you to do, and though I may not be profoundly versed in every phase of war, how to war with the Romans at all events I have learnt through success and failure alike. In the measures which I have advised you to take I promise to co-operate most loyally and energetically. I trust that whatever course, Antiochus, seems best to you may receive the approval of the gods."

Such was the substance of Hannibal's speech, which was applauded at the time but led to no practical results. Not one of the measures he advocated was carried out beyond the despatch of Polyxenidas to bring up the fleet and the troops from Asia. Delegates were sent to the council of the Thessalians which was sitting at Larisa, and the Aetolians and Amynander fixed a day for the muster of their armies at Pherae, whither the king proceeded with his troops at once. Whilst waiting there for Amynander and the Aetolians he sent Philip the Megalopolitan with 2000 men to collect the bones of the Macedonians who had fallen in the final battle with Philip at Cynoscephalae. Either Philip himself suggested this to Antiochus as a means of making himself popular with the Macedonians and stirring up ill-will against their king for having left his soldiers unburied, or else Antiochus, with the vanity natural to kings, formed this in his own mind, a project apparently of importance but really trivial. The bones which were scattered in all directions were collected into a heap and buried under a tumulus, but the proceeding awoke no gratitude in the Macedonians and aroused strong resentment in Philip. He had so far been waiting on events, but now in consequence of this he at once sent to the propraetor M. Baebius to tell him that Antiochus had invaded Thessaly, and asking him, if he thought proper, to move out of his winter quarters; he himself would go to meet him so that they might consult as to what steps ought to be taken.

Antiochus was now encamped at Pherae, where the Aetolians and Amynander had joined him, when a deputation came from Larisa to ask him what the Thessalians had said or done to justify his making war on them. They begged him to withdraw his army so that any question which he thought necessary might be discussed with them through his envoys. At the same time they sent a detachment of 500 men under Hippolochus to protect Pherae. Finding all the routes closed by the king's troops they fell back on Scotusa. The king gave the deputation a gracious answer and explained that he had not entered Thessaly for the purpose of aggression, but solely to establish and protect the freedom of the Thessalians. A commissioner was despatched to Pherae to make a similar statement, but without giving him any reply the Pheraeans sent their chief magistrate to Antiochus. He spoke in pretty much the same strain as the Chalcidians at the conference under similar circumstances on the Euripus, though some things he said showed greater courage and resolution. The king advised them to consider their position most carefully lest they should adopt a policy which, whilst they were cautiously providing against future contingencies, might give them immediate cause for regret, and with this advice he dismissed their envoy. When the result of this mission was reported at Pherae, the people did not hesitate for a moment; they were determined to suffer everything which the chances of war might bring in defence of their loyalty to Rome, and made every possible preparation for the defence of their city. The king commenced a simultaneous attack on all sides; he quite saw, what indeed was indisputable, that it depended upon the fate of the first city which he attacked whether he would be held in contempt or in dread throughout the whole of Thessaly, so he did his utmost to spread terror everywhere. At first the beleaguered garrison offered a stout resistance to his furious assaults, but when they saw many of the defenders killed or wounded their courage began to sink and it was only by the reproaches of their officers that they were recalled to the necessity of holding to their purpose. Their numbers became so diminished that they abandoned the outer circuit of their walls and retreated to the interior of the city, which was surrounded by a shorter line of fortifications. At last their position became hopeless and fearing, if the place were taken by storm, that they would meet with no mercy, they surrendered. The king lost no time in taking advantage of the alarm which this capture created and sent 4000 men to Scotusa. Here the townsmen promptly surrendered in view of the recent example of the Pheraeans, seeing that they had been compelled by stress of circumstances to do what at first they were determined not to do. Hippolochus and his garrison from Larisa were included in the capitulation. These were all sent away unhurt as the king thought that this act would go far to gain the sympathies of the Lariseans.

These successes he accomplished within ten days of his appearance before Pherae. Continuing his march with the whole of his army he reached Crannon, which he took immediately on his arrival. He next secured Cierium and Metropolis and the various forts in their neighbourhood, and by this time every part of that district with the exception of Atrax and Gyrto was in his power. His next objective was Larisa, where he expected that either the dread of meeting the fate of the other towns taken by storm or gratitude for his free dismissal of their garrison or the example of so many cities voluntarily surrendering would dissuade them from an obstinate resistance. In order to intimidate the defenders he had his elephants driven in front of the line, the army following in order of battle up to the city. The sight made a great many of the Lariseans waver between fear of the enemy at their gates and fear of being false to their distant allies. During this time Amynander and his Athamanians seized Pellinaeum, and Menippus advancing into Perrhaebia with an Aetolian force of 3000 infantry and 200 cavalry took Malloea and Cyretiae by storm and ravaged the territory of Tripolis. After these rapid successes they returned to the king at Larisa and found him holding a council of war to decide what should be done about the city. There was considerable diversity of opinion. Some were in favour of an immediate assault as the city was situated in a plain open on all sides to an approach over level ground, and they urged that there should be no delay in constructing siege works and bringing up artillery to attack the walls on all sides simultaneously. Others reminded the council that there was no comparison between the strength of this city and that of Pherae; besides, it was now winter, a season quite unsuitable for warlike operations, most of all so for investing and assaulting a city. While the king was uncertain as to whether there was most to be hoped or feared from the attempt, delegates from Pharsalus arrived to tender the submission of their city and this raised his spirits. M. Baebius had in the meanwhile met Philip at Dassaretiae and they both agreed that Ap. Claudius should be sent to protect Larisa. Claudius traversed Macedonia by forced marches and gained the summit of the ridge which looks down on Gonni, a place twenty miles distant from Larisa at the head of the Vale of Tempe. Here he marked out a camp of greater extent than the force with him required, and kindled more numerous fires than were needed in order to give the enemy the impression that the entire Roman army was there together with Philip. Antiochus withdrew from Larisa the very next day and returned to Demetrias, alleging the approach of winter as the reason for his retreat. The Aetolians and the Athamanians also retired within their own frontiers. Although Appius saw that the purpose of his march, the raising of the siege, was effected he nevertheless went on to Larisa to reassure his allies as to the future. They were doubly delighted, first at the withdrawal of the enemy from their soil and then at the sight of Roman troops within their walls.

The king left Demetrias for Chalcis. Here he fell in love with a daughter of Cleoptolemus, a Chalcidian magnate, and after numerous communications to her father followed by personal interviews (for he was reluctant to be entangled in an alliance so far above his own rank) Antiochus married the girl. The wedding was celebrated as though it were a time of peace, and forgetting the two vast enterprises in which he had embarked-war with Rome and the liberation of Greece-he dismissed all his cares and spent the rest of the winter in banquets and the pleasures attendant on wine, sleeping off his debauches, wearied rather than satisfied. All the king's officers who were in command of the different winter stations, especially those in Boeotia, fell into the same dissolute mode of life; even the common soldiers were completely sunk in it, not a man amongst them ever put on his armour or went on duty as guard or sentry, or discharged any military duty whatever. When, therefore, at the commencement of spring Antiochus passed through Phocis on his way to Chaeronea, where he had given orders for the whole of his army to muster, it was easy for him to see that the men had passed the winter under no stricter discipline than their leader. From Chaeronea he ordered Alexander the Acarnanian and the Macedonian Menippus to take the troops to Stratus in Aetolia. He himself, after sacrificing to Apollo at Delphi, went to Naupactus. Here he had an interview with the Aetolian leaders, and then taking the road which runs past Calydon and Lysimachia he arrived at Stratum, where he met his army who were coming by the Maliac Gulf. Mnasilochus, one of the leading men in Acarnania, who had received many presents from Antiochus, was trying to persuade his people to take the king's side. He had succeeded in bringing Clytus, in whom the supreme power was vested at the time, over to his views, but he saw that there would be difficulty in inducing Leucas, the capital, to revolt from Rome, owing to their fear of the Roman fleet under Atilius, a portion of which was cruising off Cephalania. He therefore decided to adopt a ruse. At a meeting of the council he told them that the ports of Acarnania ought to be protected and that all who could bear arms ought to go to Medione and Tyrrheum to prevent their being seized by Antiochus and the Aetolians. Some of those present protested against this indiscriminate calling out of their fighting strength as quite unnecessary and said that a force of 500 men would be adequate for this purpose. When he had got this force he placed 300 men in Medione and 200 in Tyrrheum, his intention being that they should fall into the king's hands and be practically hostages.

Meanwhile the king's agents arrived in Medione. They were received in audience by the council and in the subsequent discussion on the reply that they were to receive some speakers thought they ought to stand by the alliance with Rome, others urged that they ought not to reject the proffered friendship of the king; Clytus urged a middle course which the council decided to adopt, viz., to send to the king and ask him to allow them to consult the National Council of Acarnania on such an important matter. Mnasilochus and his supporters managed to get themselves put on this commission, and they despatched a secret message to Antiochus urging him to bring up his army while they wasted time by delay. The consequence was that the commission had hardly started when Antiochus appeared within their frontiers and in a short time at their gates. Whilst those who were not privy to the plot were hurrying in confusion through the streets and calling their fighting men to arms, Antiochus was introduced into the city by Mnasilochus and Clytus. Many came round him of their own accord and even his opponents were constrained by their fears to meet him. He quieted their apprehensions by a gracious speech, and when his clemency became generally known several of the communities in Acarnania went over to him. From Medione he marched to Tyrrheum, having sent Mnasilochus and his agents on in advance. The Tyrrheans, however' saw through the treachery at Medione, and instead of intimidating them it only put them more on their guard. They returned a perfectly unambiguous answer to his summons and told him that they would not enter into any fresh alliance unless the Roman commanders authorised them to do so, at the same time they closed their gates and manned their walls. Cn. Octavius had been supplied with a body of troops and a few ships by A. Postumius, whom Atilius had placed in command at Cephalania, and his timely arrival in Leucas gave the Acarnanians fresh heart, as he reported that the consul Manius Acilius had crossed the sea with his legions and the Romans were encamped in Thessaly. His report was the more readily believed because the season of the year was favourable for navigation, and the king, after placing garrisons in Medione and in one or two other towns in Acarnania, withdrew from Tyrrheum and passing through the cities of Aetolia and Phocis returned to Chalcis.

M. Baebius and Philip, after their meeting at Dassaretiae, when they sent Ap. Claudius to relieve Larisa had returned to their respective winter quarters as it was too early in the year for active operations. At the beginning of spring they went down with their united forces into Thessaly; Antiochus was in Acarnania at the time. Philip laid siege to Malloea in Perrhaebia and Baebius attacked Phacium. He took the place at the first assault and captured Phaestum with equal rapidity. Marching back to Atrax he advanced from there against Cyretiae and Eritium both of which places he gained possession of, and after placing garrisons in the captured towns he rejoined Philip, who was still besieging Malloea. On the arrival of the Roman army the garrison, either cowed by the strength of the besieging force or hoping to obtain more favourable terms, made their surrender. The two commanders then went on with their combined forces to recover those towns which the Athamanians were holding, namely Aeginium, Ericinium, Gomphi, Silana, Tricca, Meliboea and Phaloria. They next invested Pellinaeum, where Philip of Megalopolis was stationed with 500 infantry and 40 cavalry, and before they delivered the assault they sent to Philip to warn him against forcing them to take extreme measures. He sent back a defiant answer and said that he would have trusted himself in the hands of Romans or Thessalians, but he would not place himself at the mercy of Philip. As it was evident that force must be employed, and that while the siege was going on Limnaea could be attacked, it was decided that the king should go there whilst Baebius remained to conduct the siege of Pellinaeum.

Meantime the consul Manius Atilius had landed with 10,000 infantry, 2000 cavalry and 15 elephants. He ordered the military tribunes to take the infantry to Larisa, whilst he went with the cavalry to join Philip at Limnaea. On the consul's arrival the place at once surrendered and the garrison of Antiochus, together with the Athamanians, were delivered up. From Limnaea the consul went on to Pellinaeum. Here the Athamanians were the first to surrender, they were followed by the Megalopolitan Philip. As he was leaving the fort, Philip of Macedon happened to meet him, and ordered his men to salute him in mockery as king, and, in a spirit of scorn quite unworthy of his own rank, addressed him as "brother." When he was brought before the consul, he was ordered to be kept a close prisoner, and not long afterwards was sent in chains to Rome. All the Athamanian garrisons, as well as those of Antiochus, which had been surrendered were handed over to Philip. They amounted to 4000 men. The consul went on to Larisa to hold a council of war to decide as to future operations, and on his route he was met by delegates from Cierium and Metropolis, who offered the surrender of their cities. Philip was in hopes of gaining possession of Athamania, and he treated his Athamanian prisoners with special indulgence, with the design of winning their countrymen through them. After sending them home he led his army into the country. The account which the returned prisoners brought of the king's clemency and generosity towards them produced a great effect upon their countrymen. Had Amynander remained in his kingdom he might have kept some of his subjects loyal by his personal authority, but the fear of being betrayed to his old enemy Philip made him flee, together with his wife and children, to Ambracia. The whole of Athamania in consequence submitted to Philip.

The consul remained a few days at Larisa, mainly in order to recruit the horses and draught cattle, which owing to the voyage and the subsequent marching had got out of condition. When his army was, so to speak, renewed by the short rest, he marched to Crannon, and on his way he received the surrender of Pharsalus, Scotusa and Pherae, together with the garrisons which Antiochus had placed in them. These troops were asked whether they would be willing to remain with him. A thousand volunteered, and these he handed over to Philip; the rest he disarmed and sent back to Demetrias. He next captured Proerna and the fortified posts in the neighbourhood, and continued his march towards the Maliac Gulf. As he approached the pass above which Thaumaci is situated, all the men who could bear arms armed themselves, left the city and occupied the woods and roads, and from their higher ground made attacks upon the Roman column of march. The consul sent parties to approach them within speaking distance and warn them against such madness, but when he saw that they persisted he ordered a military tribune to work round them with two maniples and cut off their retreat to the city, which in the absence of its defenders the consul occupied. When they heard the shouts from the captured city behind them, they fled back from all sides and were cut to pieces. The next day the consul reached the Spercheus, and from there ravaged the fields of the Hypataeans.

Antiochus was all this time at Chalcis, having at last discovered that he had gained nothing from Greece beyond a pleasant winter at Chalcis and a disreputable marriage. He now accused the Aetolians of having made empty promises and admired Hannibal, not only as a man of prudence and foresight, but also as little short of a prophet, seeing how he had foretold everything which was happening. In order that his reckless adventure might not be ruined through his own inactivity, he sent a message to the Aetolians requesting them to concentrate all their fighting strength at Lamia, where he himself joined them with about 10,000 infantry, made up largely of troops which had come from Asia, and 500 cavalry. The Aetolians mustered in considerably smaller numbers than on any previous occasion, only the leading men with a few of their dependents were present. They said that they had done their utmost to call up as many as possible from their respective cities, but their personal influence, their appeals, their official authority, were alike powerless against those who declined to serve. Finding himself deserted on all sides by his own troops, who were hanging back in Asia, and by his allies, who were not doing what they undertook to do when they invited him, he withdrew into the pass of Thermopylae. This mountain range cuts Greece in two, just as Italy is intersected by the Apennines. To the north of the pass are situated Epirus, Perrhaebia, Magnesia, Thessaly, the Achaeans of Phthiotis, and the Maliac Gulf. South of it lie the greater part of Aetolia, Acarnania, Locris, Phocis, Boeotia, the adjoining island of Euboea, and Attica, which projects into the sea like a promontory; beyond these is the Peloponnese. This range extends from Leucas on the western sea through Aetolia to the eastern sea, and is so rugged and precipitous that even light infantry-let alone an army-would have great difficulty in finding any paths by which to cross it. The eastern end of the range is called Oeta, and its highest peak bears the name of Callidromus. The road running through the lower ground between its base and the Maliac Gulf is not more than sixty paces broad and is the only military road which can be traversed by an army, and then only if it meets with no opposition. For this reason the place is called Pylae, and also Thermopylae, from the hot springs there, and is famous for the battle against the Persians, but still more so for the glorious death of the Lacedaemonians who fought there.

In a state of mind very unlike theirs Antiochus pitched his camp inside the narrowest part of the pass and barricaded it with defensive works, protecting every part of it with a double line of fosse and rampart and where it seemed necessary with a wall built up from the stones which were lying about everywhere. He felt pretty confident that the Roman army would never force a passage there, and so he sent two detachments out of the 4000 Aetolians who had joined him, one to hold Heraclea, a place just in front of the pass, the other to Hypata. He quite expected that the consul would attack Heraclea; and from Hypata numerous messages had come stating that the whole of the surrounding country was being laid waste. The consul ravaged the territory of Hypata first and then that of Heraclea; in neither place did the Aetolians prove of the slightest use, and finally encamped opposite the king in the mouth of the pass at the hot springs. Both the Aetolian detachments shut themselves up in Heraclea. Before the actual appearance of his enemy Antiochus thought that the whole of the pass was fortified and blocked by his troops, but now he felt anxious lest the Romans might find some paths on the surrounding heights by which they could turn his defences, for the Lacedaemonians were stated to have been similarly taken in the rear by the Persians, and Philip quite recently by the Romans. Accordingly he sent a message to the Aetolians at Heraclea asking them to do him this service at least in the war, namely, to seize and hold the crests of the surrounding mountains and prevent the Romans from crossing them anywhere. On the receipt of this message there was a sharp difference of opinion among the Aetolians. Some thought that they ought to comply with the king's request and go; others were in favour of remaining in their quarters at Heraclea, prepared for either eventuality. If the king were defeated they would then have their forces intact and be able to assist in the defence of the cities round them, if on the other hand he were victorious they would then be in a position to take up the pursuit of the fugitive Romans. Each party held to its opinion, and not only held to it but acted upon it; 2000 remained in Heraclea, and the others, formed into three divisions, occupied the three heights of Callidromus, Rhoduntia and Tichius.

When the consul saw that the heights were occupied by the Aetolians he sent M. Porcius Cato and L. Valerius Flaccus, men of consular rank commanding under him, to attack their fortified positions, Flaccus against Rhoduntia and Tichius, and Cato against Callidromus. They each took a picked force of 2000 infantry. Before making his general advance against the enemy, the consul called his men on parade and addressed a few words to them. "Soldiers," he said, "I see that there are very many amongst you, men of all ranks, who have campaigned in this very province under the leadership and auspices of T. Quinctius. In the Macedonian war the pass at the Aous was more difficult to force than this one, for here we have gates and this passage as though provided by nature is the only one available, every other route between the two seas being closed to us. On that occasion, too, the enemy defences were stronger and constructed on more advantageous ground; the hostile army was more numerous and made up of far better soldiery; there were in that army Macedonians, Thracians and Illyrians, all very warlike tribes; here there are Syrians and Asiatic Greeks, the meanest of mankind, and born only for slavery. The monarch who was opposed to us then was a true soldier, trained from his youth in wars with the Thracians and the Illyrians and all the nations round him; this man-to say nothing of his previous life-has done nothing during the whole of the winter months more memorable than marrying a girl for love out of a private family and, even when compared with their fellow-townsmen, of obscure origin, and now the newly-wedded bridegroom, fattened up as it were with marriage feasts, has come out to fight. His main hope was in the Aetolians, they were his chief strength, and you have already learnt by experience as Antiochus is learning now what an untrustworthy and ungrateful race they are. They have not come in any considerable number, it was impossible to keep them in camp, they are at loggerheads among themselves, and after insisting that Hypata and Heraclea must be defended they refused to defend either place and took refuge on the mountain heights, some shutting themselves up in Heraclea. The king himself has shown clearly that he durst not venture to meet us on fair ground, he is not even fixing his camp in open country; he has abandoned the whole of the district in front of him which he boasts of having taken from us and from Philip, and has hidden himself amongst the rocks. His camp is not even placed at the entrance to the path, as we are told the Lacedaemonians placed theirs, but is withdrawn far within it. What difference is there, as a visible proof of fear, between his shutting himself up here or behind the walls of a besieged city? The pass, however, will not protect Antiochus, nor will the heights which the Aetolians have seized protect them. Sufficient caution and foresight have been exercised to prevent your having anything to fight against but the actual enemy. You must bear in mind that you are not fighting only for the freedom of Greece, though it will be a splendid record to deliver out of the hands of the Aetolians and Antiochus the country which you formerly rescued from Philip. Nor will it be only the spoil in the enemy's camp that will fall to you as a prize; all the stores and material which he is daily looking for from Ephesus will be your booty; you will open up Asia and Syria and all the wealthiest realms to the furthest East to the supremacy of Rome. What will then prevent us from extending our dominion from Gades to the Red Sea with no limit but the Ocean which enfolds the world, and making the whole human race look up to Rome with a reverence only second to that which they pay to the gods? Show yourselves worthy in heart and mind of such vast rewards so that we may take the field tomorrow assured that the gods will help us."

After this address the soldiers were dismissed and got their armour and weapons ready before they took food and rest. As soon as it began to grow light the consul hung out the signal for battle and formed his line on a narrow front to suit the confined limits of the ground. When the king saw the standards of the enemy he also led out his men. Part of his light infantry he stationed in front of their rampart to form the first line. Behind them in support he posted the Macedonians, the main strength of his arm, known as the "sarisophori"; they extended across the whole length of the rampart. To the left of them were posted a body of javelin men, bowmen and slingers immediately under the foot of the mountains, so that they might from their higher ground harass the unprotected flank of the enemy. On the right of the Macedonians, towards the end of his lines, where the ground beyond down to the sea is impassable owing to bogs and quicksands, he posted the elephants with their usual guard, and behind them the cavalry, and a short distance behind them again the rest of his troops. The Macedonians in front of the rampart had no difficulty at first in resisting the Romans, who were trying at all points to break through, and they received considerable assistance from those on the higher ground, who discharged bullets from their slings, arrows and javelins all at once, a perfect cloud of missiles. But as the enemy's pressure increased and the attack was made in greater force they gradually fell back to their rampart, and standing upon it made practically a second rampart with their levelled spears. The rampart, owing to its moderate height, not only offered a higher position from which to fight, but also enabled them to reach the enemy below with their long spears. Many in their reckless attempts to mount the rampart were run through, and they would have had either to retire baffled or sustain serious losses had not M. Porcius appeared on a hill which commanded the camp. He had dislodged the Aetolians from the crest of Callidromus and killed the greater part of them, attacking them when they were off their guard and most of them asleep.

Flaccus was not so fortunate, his attempt to reach the fortified posts on Tichius and Rhoduntia was a failure. The Macedonians and the other troops in the king's camp could at first only make out a moving mass of men in the distance, and were under the impression that the Aetolians had seen the fighting from afar and were coming to their assistance. When, however, they recognised the approaching standards and arms and discovered their mistake, they were so panic-struck that they flung away their weapons and fled. The pursuit was impeded by the entrenchments of the camp and the confined space through which the pursuers had to pass, but the elephants were the greatest hindrance, for it was difficult for the infantry to get past them, and impossible for the cavalry; the frightened horses created more confusion than in the actual battle. The plunder of the camp still further delayed the pursuit. However, they followed up the enemy as far as Scarphea, after which they returned to camp. Large numbers of men and horses had been either killed or captured on the way, and even the elephants, which they were unable to secure, had been killed. While the battle was going on the Aetolians who had been holding Heraclea made an attempt on the Roman camp, but they gained nothing from their enterprise, which was certainly not lacking in audacity. At the third watch of the following night the consul sent the cavalry to continue the pursuit, and at daybreak he put the legions in motion. The king had gained a considerable start, as he did not stop in his headlong ride till he reached Elatia. Here he collected what was left of his army out of the battle and the flight and retreated with a very small body of half-armed soldiers to Chalcis. The Roman cavalry did not succeed in overtaking the king himself at Elatia, but they cut off a large part of his army, who were unable to go any further through sheer fatigue, or else had lost their way in an unknown country, with none to guide them. Out of the whole army not a single man escaped beyond the 500 who formed the king's bodyguard, an insignificant number even if we accept Polybius' statement which I have mentioned above that the force the king brought with him out of Asia did not exceed 10,000 men. What proportion would it be if we are to believe Valerius Antias, that there were 60,000 men in the king's army, of whom 40,000 fell and over 5000 made prisoners, and 230 standards captured? In the battle itself the Roman losses amounted to 150, and in the defence of the camp against the Aetolians not more than 50 were killed.

Whilst the consul was taking his army through Phocis and Boeotia the citizens of the revolted towns, conscious of their guilt and fearing lest they should be treated as enemies, stood outside their gates in suppliant garb. The army, however, marched past all their cities one after the other, without doing any damage, just as though they were in friendly territory, till they came to Coronea. Here great indignation was aroused by the sight of a statue of Antiochus set up in the temple of Minerva Itonia, and the soldiers were allowed to plunder the temple domain. It occurred, however, to the consul that as the statue had been placed there by a decree of the national council of Boeotia it was unfair to take vengeance on the territory of Coronea alone. He at once recalled the soldiers and stopped the pillaging, and contented himself with sternly rebuking the Boeotians for their ingratitude to Rome after the many benefits she had so lately conferred upon them. At the time of the battle ten of the king's ships, with Isidorus in command, were standing off Thronium in the Maliac Gulf. Alexander the Acarnanian, who had been severely wounded, fled thither with tidings of the defeat, and the ships sailed hurriedly away to Cenaeus in Euboea. Here Alexander died and was buried. Three vessels, which had come from Asia and were making for the same port, on hearing of the disaster which had overtaken the army, returned to Ephesus. Isidorus left Cenaeus for Demetrias, in case the king's flight should have carried him there. During this time A. Atilius, who was in command of the Roman fleet, intercepted a large convoy of supplies for the king which had passed through the strait between Andros and Euboea. Some of the vessels he sank, others he captured; those in the rearmost line turned their course towards Asia. Atilius sailed back with his train of captured ships and distributed the large stock of corn on board to the Athenians and the other friendly cities in that quarter.

Just before the consul's arrival Antiochus left Chalcis and directed his course first to Tenos and from there to Ephesus. As the consul drew near to Chalcis the king's commandant, Aristoteles, left the city and the gates were thrown open to the consul. All the other cities in Euboea were delivered up without any fighting, and in a few days peace was established everywhere in the island and the army returned to Thermopylae without injuring a single city. This moderation displayed after the victory was much more deserving of praise than even the victory itself. In order that the senate and people might receive an authoritative report of the operations the consul sent M. Cato to Rome. He set sail from Creusa, the emporium of Thespia, situated in the innermost part of the Gulf of Corinth, and made for Patrae in Achaia; from Patrae he went on to Corcyra, skirting the shores of Aetolia and Acarnania, and so made his passage to Hydruntum in Italy. From there he journeyed by land, and by rapid travelling reached Rome in five days. Entering the City before it was light he went straight to the praetor, M. Junius, who summoned a meeting of the senate at daybreak. L. Cornelius Scipio had been sent on by the consul some days previously, and on his arrival found that Cato had outstripped him. He went into the senate house while Cato was making his report and the two generals were conducted by order of the senate to the Assembly, where they gave the same details of the Aetolian campaign as had been given to the senate. A decree was made that there should be thanksgivings for three days, and the praetor was to sacrifice forty full-grown victims to such of the gods as he thought fit. M. Fulvius Nobilior, who had gone to Spain as praetor two years previously, entered the City about this time in ovation. He had carried before him 130,000 silver denarii and 12,000 pounds of other silver, as well as 127 pounds of gold.

While Acilius was at Thermopylae he sent a message to the Aetolians, advising them, now that they had found out how empty the king's promises were, to return to a right mind and think about delivering up Heraclea and begging pardon of the senate for their madness and delusion. Other cities in Greece, he reminded them, had been faithless to their best friends, the Romans, in that war, but after the flight of the king, whose assurances had seduced them from their duty, they did not aggravate their fault by willful obstinacy, and had once more been received as allies. Even in the case of the Aetolians, though they had not followed the king, but had actually invited him, and were not his associates but his leaders in the war-even for them there was still the possibility, if they showed true repentance, of remaining unharmed. To this message they returned a defiant answer; the question would evidently have to be decided by arms, and though the king was overcome, the war with the Aetolians was clearly only just beginning. The consul accordingly moved his army from Thermopylae to Heraclea, and on the very same day he rode round the entire circuit of the walls to ascertain the situation of the city. Heraclea lies at the foot of Mount Oeta; the city itself is situated in a plain, and it has a citadel which commands it from a position of considerable elevation and precipitous on all sides. After carefully considering all there was to be learnt he decided to deliver a simultaneous attack from four different points. In the direction of the Asopus, where the Gymnasium stood, he placed L. Valerius in charge of the operations. Towards the citadel outside the walls, where the houses were almost closer together than in the city itself, he gave the direction of the assault to Tiberius Sempronius Longus. On the side facing the Maliac Gulf, where the approach presented considerable difficulty, M. Baebius was in command. Towards the stream which they call the Melana, opposite the temple of Diana, he posted Appius Claudius. Through the strenuous exertions of these commanders, each trying to outdo the other, the towers and battering rams and all the other preparations for an assault were completed in a few days. The land round Heraclea is marshy and covered with tall trees, which furnished a liberal supply of timber for siege works of every kind, and as the Aetolians living in the suburb had taken refuge in the city the deserted houses afforded useful materials for various purposes, including not only beams and planks, but also bricks and building stones of all shapes and sizes.

The Romans made more use of machines than of arms in their attack on the city, the Aetolians on the other hand trusted more to their arms for their defence. When the walls were battered by the rams they did not, as is usual, turn aside the blows by using looped ropes, but they made sorties in considerable strength and some carried firebrands to throw on the siege works. There were also arched sally-ports in the walls, and when they built up the wall where it had been destroyed they left more of these openings to allow of more numerous sorties. In the early days of the siege while their strength was unimpaired these sallies were frequent and powerful, but as time went on they became fewer and feebler. Amidst the many difficulties they had to contend with nothing wore them down so much as want of sleep. The Romans owing to their numbers were able to arrange regular reliefs for their men, but the Aetolians were comparatively few, and the same men having to be on duty night and day they were completely exhausted by the incessant strain. For four-and-twenty days, without a moment's respite day or night, they had to sustain the attack of the enemy, who were delivering their assaults from four different quarters at once. Considering the time during which the attack had been going on, and in view of the information brought by deserters, the consul felt pretty sure that the Aetolians were at last worn out, and he formed the following plan. When it was midnight he gave the signal to retire and called off all the soldiers from the assault. He kept them quiet in the camp till the third hour of the following day, when he recommenced the attack and carried it on until midnight, when it was again suspended till the third hour of the following day. The Aetolians supposed that the cause of the assault not being kept up was the same as that which was acting upon them, namely excessive fatigue, and when the signal for retiring was given to the Romans, they too, as though it recalled them also, quitted their posts and did not resume duty on the walls till the third hour of the following day.

After suspending the operations at midnight the consul recommenced the assault at the fourth watch with extreme violence on three sides. On the fourth side he ordered Tiberius Sempronius to keep his soldiers on the alert and ready for the signal, as he felt no doubt that the Aetolians would in the nocturnal confusion rush to the places from which the battle-shout arose. Some of the Aetolians were asleep, worn out by toil and want of rest, and only roused themselves with great difficulty; those who were still awake, hearing the noise of battle, ran towards it through the darkness. The assailants were trying to climb over the fallen parts of the wall into the city, others were endeavouring to mount the walls by scaling ladders, and the Aetolians were hurrying up from all parts to meet the attack. The one quarter where the suburban buildings stood was so far neither attacked nor guarded, but those who were to attack it were eagerly awaiting the signal and none were there to defend it. It was already dawn when the consul gave the signal and they penetrated into the city without any opposition, some over the ruined walls, others, where the walls were intact, by means of scaling ladders. As soon as the shouting was heard which announced that the city was captured the Aetolians left their posts and fled to the citadel.

The consul gave his victorious troops leave to sack the city, not as an act of vengeance, but in order that the soldiery who had been forbidden this in so many captured cities might in one place at least taste the fruits of victory. About midday he recalled his men and formed them into two divisions. One he ordered to march round the foot of the mountain to a peak which was the same height as that on which the citadel stood and separated from it by a ravine as though torn away from it. The twin peaks were so near one another that missiles could be thrown from the rock on to the citadel. With the other division the consul intended to mount up to the citadel, and he waited in the city for the signal from those who were to surmount the peak. Their cheers on occupying the height and the attack of the other division from the city were too much for the Aetolians, utterly broken as their courage was and with no preparation for standing a siege in the citadel, which could hardly contain, much less protect, the women and children and the other non-combatants who had crowded there. So at the first assault they laid down their arms and surrendered. Amongst them was Damocritus, the first magistrate of Aetolia. At the beginning of the war he had told T. Quinctius, on his request for a copy of the decree inviting Antiochus, that be would give it him in Italy when the Aetolians were encamped there. This piece of arrogance made his surrender all the more pleasing to the victors.

Whilst the Romans were laying siege to Heraclea, Philip, as arranged with the consul, was attacking Lamia. He had gone to Thermopylae to offer the consul and the people of Rome his congratulations on the victory and at the same time to excuse himself on the ground of illness for not having taken part in the operations against Antiochus. Then the two commanders separated to carry on the siege of the two places simultaneously. These are about seven miles distant from each other, and as Lamia stands on rising ground and looks towards Mount Oeta the distance between them seems very short and all that goes on in the one place can be seen from the other. The Romans and the Macedonians were strenuously engaged as though in mutual rivalry in siege operations or in actual fighting night and day. But the Macedonians had the more difficult task owing to the fact that the Roman galleries and vineae and all their siege engines were above ground while the Macedonians conducted the attack by means of subterranean mines, and in difficult places they often came to rock upon which iron tools could make no impression. Finding that he was making little progress, the king held conferences with the leading men of the place in the hope that the townsmen might be induced to surrender. He felt quite certain that if Heraclea were taken first they would surrender to the Romans sooner than to him and that the consul would win their gratitude for having raised the siege. His surmise proved correct, for no sooner was Heraclea taken than a message reached him requesting him to abandon the siege, for as it was the Romans who had fought the engagement with the Aetolians it was but fair that they should have the prize of victory. So Lamia was relieved and through the fall of a neighbouring city escaped a similar fate.

Shortly before the fall of Heraclea the Aetolians, assembled in council at Hypata, sent a deputation to Antiochus including Thoas, who had been sent before. They were instructed to ask the king to call up his land and sea forces once more and cross over into Greece; if anything prevented him from doing this, then they were to ask him to send money and troops and to point out to him that it concerned his regal dignity and his personal honour not to betray his allies, and if he allowed the Romans after destroying the Aetolians to have a perfectly free hand and land in Asia with all their forces the very safety of his kingdom would be imperilled. What they said was true and therefore made all the deeper impression on the king. He gave them money for their immediate requirements and pledged himself to send military and naval assistance. Thoas he kept with him, and the man was very glad to remain behind, as being on the spot he might make the king fulfil his promises.

The fall of Heraclea, however, broke the spirit of the Aetolians. Within a few days of their asking Antiochus to resume hostilities and return to Greece they laid aside all thoughts of war and sent envoys to the consul to sue for peace. When they began to speak, the consul cut them short by saying that there were other matters which had to be attended to first. He then granted them a ten days' armistice and directed them to return to Hypata accompanied by L. Valerius Flaccus, to whom they were to refer the questions they had intended to discuss with him, and any other matters which they wished to discuss. On his arrival at Hypata, Flaccus found the Aetolian leaders assembled in council and deliberating as to what line they should take in negotiating with the consul. They were preparing to begin by alleging the old-standing treaty-rights and their service to Rome, when Flaccus bade them desist from appealing to treaties which they had themselves violated and broken. They would gain much more, he told them, by confessing their misdoings and simply asking for mercy. Their only hope of safety lay not in the strength of their case but in the clemency of the Roman people, and if they adopted a suppliant attitude he would stand by them before the consul and in the senate at Rome, for they would have to send their delegates there also. All those present saw that only one path led to safety, namely their formal submission to Rome. They believed that their appearance as suppliants would give them an inviolable character in Roman eyes, and they would still preserve their independence should Fortune hold out any better prospect.

When they appeared before the consul, Phaeneas, the head of the deputation, made a long speech, adapted in various ways to mitigate the victor's wrath, and concluded by saying that the Aetolians committed themselves and all that they had to the honour and good faith of the people of Rome. When the consul heard that he said, "Be quite sure that these are the terms on which you surrender." Phaeneas showed him the decree in which they were expressly stated. "Since then," he replied, "you do make this complete surrender, I require you to give up at once Dicaearchus, your fellow-citizen, and Menestus the Epirote"-he was the man who introduced a body of troops into Naupactus and drove the citizens into revolt-"and Amynander and the Athamanian leaders who persuaded you to revolt from us." Phaeneas hardly allowed the Roman to finish his sentence before he replied: "We have not surrendered ourselves into slavery, but to your protection and good faith, and I am quite sure that it is because you do not know us that you lay upon us commands which are opposed to the usage of the Greeks." To this the consul retorted: "No, I do not trouble myself much as to what the Aetolians consider the usage of the Greeks as long as I follow the usage of the Romans and impose my commands on those who, after being vanquished by force of arms, have just surrendered by their own formal decree. If, then, my command is not promptly obeyed, I shall at once order you to be thrown into irons." He then ordered fetters to be brought and the lictors to close round Phaeneas. Phaeneas and the other Aetolians were now thoroughly cowed, they at last realised their position, and he said that he and the Aetolians with him quite saw that they must carry out the consul's commands, but it was necessary that a decree to that effect should be made at a meeting of the national council. In order that this might be done he asked for a ten days' armistice. Flaccus supported the request, which was granted, and they returned to Hypata. Here Phaeneas reported to the inner council-known as the Apokleti-the commands laid upon them and the fate which had all but overtaken him and his colleagues. The magnates deplored the situation to which they were reduced, but they decided that their conqueror must be obeyed and that the Aetolians from every town should be summoned to a general council.

The whole population of Aetolia was thus assembled, and when they heard the report they were so exasperated by what they considered as the harshness and insulting tone of the order that even had they been at peace the angry outburst would have driven them into war. Besides the anger thus aroused, there were difficulties in the way of carrying out the command. How, they asked, could they possibly surrender Amynander? Their hopes, too, had been raised by the presence of Nicander, who had just returned from his mission to Antiochus and had filled the minds of the populace with the illusory prospect of huge forces being massed both by land and sea. After a voyage of twelve days from Ephesus he landed at Phalara on the Maliac Gulf, on his way to Aetolia. From there he went to Lamia, where he left the money which the king had given them, and then started early in the evening for Hypata, with an escort of light troops, through by-paths with which he was familiar. Whilst traversing the country between the Roman and Macedonian camps, he came upon a Macedonian outpost and was taken to the king. Philip had not finished dinner, and when he was informed of the arrest he treated him, not as an enemy but as a guest, and bade him sit down and partake of the banquet. Then after the other guests had left he detained him, telling him at the same time that he had nothing to fear. He proceeded to blame the Aetolians severely for their crooked policy, which had always recoiled on their own heads, for it was they who first brought the Romans and afterwards Antiochus into Greece. He went on to say that he should forget the past, which it was easier to censure than to amend, and he would not do anything to insult the Aetolians amidst their misfortunes; they in return ought to put an end to their ill-will towards him, and Nicander in particular ought never to forget that day in which he had saved his life. He then assigned him an escort to conduct him to a place of safety, and Nicander arrived at Hypata whilst the Aetolians were debating the question of making peace with Rome.

The booty secured round Heraclea was either sold by Manius Acilius or given to the soldiers. On learning that the decision come to at Heraclea did not make for peace and that the Aetolians had concentrated at Naupactus, where they intended to meet the whole brunt of the war, the consul sent Appius Claudius with 4000 men to occupy the heights which commanded the difficult mountain passes while he himself ascended Mount Oeta. Here he offered sacrifice to Hercules at a place called Pyra, because it was there that the mortal body of the god was cremated. From there he continued his march with the whole of his army and made fairly satisfactory progress till he came to Corax. This is the highest peak between Callipolis and Naupactus, and whilst crossing it many of the draught animals fell with their packs down the precipices, and there were casualties among the troops. It was easy to see with what an inactive enemy he had to deal, for no attempt had been made to post troops so as to close the pass, which was so difficult and dangerous. As it was, the army had sustained casualties before the consul got down to Naupactus. Opposite the citadel he established a fortified post, the other quarters of the city he invested, the troops being distributed according to the situation of the walls. This siege involved quite as much labour and effort as that of Heraclea.

Messene, in the Peloponnese, had refused to join the Achaean league, and the Achaeans now laid siege to it. Neither of the two cities, Messene and Elis, were members of the league; their sympathies were with the Aetolians. The Eleans, however, after Antiochus' flight from Greece, returned a more conciliatory reply to the Achaean envoy and said that when the king's garrison was withdrawn they would consider what they ought to do. The Messenians, on the other hand, dismissed the envoys without vouchsafing any reply whatever and commenced hostilities. But the devastation of their land in all directions by fire and sword and the sight of the Achaean camp near their city made them tremble for their safety, and they sent a message to T. Quinctius at Chalcis to the effect that as he was the author of their liberty the men of Messene were prepared to open their gates to the Romans and surrender their city to them, but not to the Achaeans. On receipt of this message Quinctius at once left Chalcis and sent word to Diophanes, the captain-general of the Achaeans, to withdraw his army at once from Messene and go to him. Diophanes obeyed and raised the siege, and then hurrying on in advance of his army met Quinctius near Andania, a town lying between Megalopolis and Messene. When he began to explain his reasons for attacking the place Quinctius gently rebuked him for taking such an important step without his sanction and ordered him to disband his army and not to disturb the peace which had been established for the good of all. He commanded the Messenians to recall their banished citizens and join the Achaean league; if there were any conditions they objected to, or any safeguards for the future which they wanted, they were to go to him at Corinth. At the same time he ordered Diophanes to convene a meeting of the Achaean league forthwith, at which he would be present. In his address to the council he pointed out how the island of Zacynthus had been treacherously seized, and he now demanded its restoration to the Romans. The island, he explained, had at one time formed part of Philip's dominions and he had given it to Amynander as the price of being allowed to march through Athamania into the north of Aetolia, the result of his expedition being that the Aetolians abandoned all further resistance and sued for peace. Amynander made Philip of Megalopolis governor of the island. Subsequently when Amynander joined Antiochus in war against Rome he recalled Philip to take up active service and sent Hierocles of Agrigentum to succeed him.

After Antiochus' flight from Thermopylae and the expulsion of Amynander from Athamania at the hands of Philip, Hierocles entered into negotiations with Diophanes and sold the island to the Achaeans. The Romans considered it their lawful prize of war; it was not for the benefit of Diophanes and the Achaeans that the legions of Rome fought at Thermopylae. In his reply Diophanes sought to exculpate himself and his nation and brought forward arguments to justify their action. Some of those present protested that they had from the beginning discountenanced that action, and they now remonstrated against the pertinacious attitude of their chief magistrate. They succeeded in getting a decree made referring the whole question to Quinctius for him to deal with. To those who opposed him Quinctius was stern and uncompromising, but if you gave way he was just as placable. Laying aside every trace of anger in look and voice, he said: "If I thought that the possession of that island would be an advantage to the Achaeans I should advise the senate and people of Rome to allow you to keep it. When, however, I look at a tortoise which has completely shrunk into its shell I see that it is safe against every blow, but when it puts forth any portion of its body, the part put forth is exposed and defenceless. Just so with you, Achaeans. As long as you are shut in on all sides by the sea, you have no difficulty in incorporating in your league and protecting all the States within the frontiers of the Peloponnese, but if through a passion for aggrandisement you go beyond those frontiers all that you possess outside is defenceless and lies at the mercy of every assailant." With the unanimous assent of the council-not even Diophanes venturing to raise any opposition-Zacynthus was ceded to the Romans.

As the consul was starting for Naupactus, Philip asked him if he wished him to recover the cities which had renounced their alliance with Rome. On receiving the consul's consent he marched his army to Demetrias, as he was fully aware of the confusion which prevailed there. The citizens were in despair, they saw themselves deserted by Antiochus, with no prospect of help from the Aetolians, and were daily expecting the arrival of their enemy Philip, or of a more relentless enemy still, the Romans, who had more reason to be angry with them. There was in the city a disorganised body of Antiochus' soldiers, the small force which had been left to hold the city, joined afterwards by the fugitives from the battle, who came in, most of them, without arms. They had neither the strength nor the resolution to stand a siege, and when emissaries from Philip held out to them hopes of obtaining pardon they sent to him to say that the gates were open to the king. Some of the principal men left the city as he entered it; Eurylochus committed suicide. In accordance with the stipulation, the soldiers of Antiochus were sent through Macedonia and Thrace to Lysimachia under the protection of a Macedonian escort. There were also at Demetrias a few ships under the command of Isodorus, they too were allowed to depart with their commander. Philip then went on to reduce Dolopia, Aperantia, and some cities in Perrhaebia.

While Philip was thus engaged T. Quinctius, after taking over Zacynthus from the Achaean council, sailed to Naupactus, which had been standing a siege for two months, but was now nearing its fall. Its forcible capture would probably have brought ruin on the Aetolians as a nation. Quinctius had every reason for being embittered against them; he had not forgotten that they were the only people that had spoken slightingly of him when he was winning the glory of liberating Greece and had refused to be guided by him when he sought to dissuade them from their mad project by forewarning them as to what would happen to them, a forewarning which events had just now proved to be true. As, however, he looked upon himself as especially bound to see that no State in the Greece which he had freed was utterly destroyed, he decided to walk up to the walls so that the Aetolians could easily see who he was. He was at once recognised by the advanced posts, and the news rapidly spread throughout the city and troops that Quinctius was there. There was a general rush to the walls; the people all held out their hands in supplication, and with one voice appealed to him by name and implored him to come to their succour and save them. He was deeply moved by this appeal, but at the same time he made signs to them that it was not in his power to help them. When he saw the consul he said to him, "M. Acilius, do you fail to see what is going on, or if you are quite aware of it do you consider that it in no way touches the supreme interest of the Republic?" The consul's attention was aroused and he replied, "Why are you not explicit? What do you mean?" Quinctius continued, "Do you not see, now that Antiochus is crushed, how you are wasting time in laying siege to a couple of cities when your year of office has almost expired, while Philip, who has never seen the standards or the battle-line of the enemy, has been annexing not cities only, but all those States, Athamania, Perrhaebia, Aperantia, Dolopia? And yet it is not so important to us that the strength and resources of the Aetolians should be weakened as it is that Philip should not be allowed to extend his dominions indefinitely and hold all those States as the prize of victory while you and your soldiers cannot pride yourselves on the conquest of two cities."

The consul quite agreed, but he felt it somewhat humiliating to abandon the siege without accomplishing anything. Finally the matter was left for Quinctius to settle. He went back to that section of the walls from which the Aetolians had been calling out to him. They were still there and began to implore him still more earnestly to take pity on the nation of the Aetolians. On this he told some of them to come out to him; Phaeneas and others of their leaders at once went out. As they prostrated themselves at his feet, he said, "Your unhappy plight makes me check the expression of my angry feelings. What I told you beforehand would come to pass has actually happened, and you have not even the comfort left you of believing that you do not deserve your fate. Since, however, I have been somehow destined to be the nursing father of Greece, I shall not desist from showing kindness even to those who have shown themselves ungrateful. Send a deputation to the consul and ask him for an armistice to allow you time to send envoys to Rome with instructions to place yourselves entirely at the mercy of the senate. I will support you before the consul as your advocate and intercessor." They followed his advice and the consul was not deaf to their appeal; an armistice was granted until the result of the mission to Rome was known; the siege was raised and the army sent into Phocis. The consul accompanied by T. Quinctius went to Aegium to attend a meeting of the Achaean council. The subjects of discussion were the entrance of the Eleans into the league and the restoration of the Lacedaemonian exiles. Neither question was settled; the Achaeans preferred that the latter should be left to them to carry out as an act of grace, and the Eleans wished their incorporation into the league to be spontaneous on their part rather than that it should be effected through the Romans.

A deputation from the Epirots visited the consul. It was pretty generally understood that their professions of friendship were insincere, for though they had not furnished Antiochus with troops it was alleged that they had given him pecuniary assistance and they made no attempt to deny that they had opened negotiations with him. Their request to be allowed to continue on the old friendly footing was met by the consul with the remark that he did not know whether he was to regard them as friends or as foes. The senate would decide that; he referred their whole cause to Rome, and for that purpose he granted them an armistice for ninety days. When they appeared before the senate they were more concerned to mention acts of hostility which they had not committed than to clear themselves from the actual charges made against them. The reply they received was such as to make them understand that they had obtained pardon rather than proved their innocence. Just before this a deputation from Philip was introduced into the senate to present his congratulations upon the recent victory and to request to be allowed to offer sacrifices in the Capitol and place an offering of gold in the temple of Jupiter Optimus Maximus. On receiving the senate's permission they deposited a golden crown weighing 100 pounds. Not only was this gracious reception accorded to them, but Philip's son Demetrius, who was living in Rome as a hostage, was placed in their hands to be taken back to his father. Such was the close of the campaign which Manius Acilius the consul conducted against Antiochus in Greece.

The other consul, Publius Cornelius Scipio, had in the ballot drawn Gaul as his province. Before leaving for the coming war with the Boii he asked the senate to vote a sum of money for the Games which he had vowed in the crisis of battle during his praetorship in Spain. They looked upon his request as unprecedented and unjustifiable and passed a resolution to the effect that as he had vowed Games on his own initiative without consulting the senate he should meet the cost of them from the proceeds of the spoils taken from the enemy, if he had any money reserved for the purpose, otherwise he must bear the expense himself. He celebrated the Games for ten days. The temple of Mater Magna Idaea was dedicated about this time. It was during the consulship of P. C. Scipio-afterwards called Africanus-and P. Licinius that the goddess was brought from Asia; the above-named P. Cornelius conducted her from the harbour to the Palatine. The censors, M. Livius and C. Claudius, had signed the contract for the building in accordance with instructions from the senate during the consulship of M. Cornelius and P. Sempronius. After the lapse of thirteen years M. Junius Brutus dedicated it, and the Games which were exhibited on the occasion of its dedication were, according to Valerius Antias, the first scenic Games ever given and were called the Megalesia. Another dedication was that of the temple of Juventas in the Circus Maximus, which was carried out by C. Licinius Lucullus. M. Livius had vowed it on the day when he destroyed Hasdrubal and his army, and when he was censor he signed the contract for its construction in the consulship of M. Cornelius and P. Sempronius. Games were celebrated in connection with this dedication also and everything was done with greater solemnity in view of the fresh war which was impending with Antiochus.

At the beginning of the year in which the above events took place, before M. Acilius had left for the war and whilst P. Cornelius was still in Rome, various portents were announced. There is a tradition that two tame oxen in the Carinae climbed up the stairs on to the flat roof of a building. The haruspices ordered them to be burnt alive and the ashes thrown into the Tiber. At Terracina and Amiternum several showers of stones were said to have fallen. At Menturnae the temple of Jupiter and the booths round the forum were reported to have been struck by lightning, and at Volturnus two ships in the mouth of the river which had been similarly struck were burnt out. In consequence of these portents the senate gave directions for the decemviri to consult the Sibylline Books, and they ordained that a fast day must be instituted in honour of Ceres to be observed every five years; that the sacrifices should be offered for nine days and solemn intercessions for one day, the suppliants to wear wreaths of laurel leaves, and that the consul should offer sacrifice to such deities and with such victims as the decemvirs should name. After the gods had been appeased and the portents duly expiated the consul left for his province. On his arrival he ordered the proconsul Cneius Domitius to disband his army and depart for Rome; he himself led his army into the country of the Boii.

Shortly before this the Ligurians had assembled an army under the "Lex Sacrata" and made a sudden attack upon the camp where the proconsul Q. Minucius was in command. He kept his men drawn up within the rampart until daybreak to prevent the enemy from getting over his lines at any point. As soon as it was light he made a sortie from two of the camp gates simultaneously. But the Ligurians were not, as he had expected, repulsed at the first attempt; for more than two hours they maintained the struggle without either side gaining any advantage. At length, as detachment after detachment issued from the camp, and fresh troops relieved those who were exhausted with fighting, the Ligurians, worn out and suffering especially from want of sleep, turned and fled. Over 4000 of the enemy were killed, the Romans and allied troops lost less than 300. About two months later, P. Cornelius fought a most successful action with the army of the Boii. Valerius Antias states that 28,000 of the enemy were slain and 3400 made prisoners, and that the spoils included 124 standards, 1230 horses and 247 wagons, whilst in the victorious army 1484 men fell. Though we can place little confidence in this writer so far as numbers are concerned, for no one is more reckless in exaggerating them, it was evidently a great victory, for the camp of the Boii was captured and they made their surrender immediately after the battle. Moreover, special thanksgivings were ordered by the senate for the victory and full-grown victims sacrificed.

It was about this time that M. Fulvius Nobilior entered the City in ovation after his return from Further Spain. He brought over 10,000 pounds of silver, 13,000 silver denarii and 127 pounds of gold. After receiving the hostages from the Boii, P. C. Scipio by way of punishment mulcted them of nearly half their territory in order that the Roman people might if they chose settle colonists on it. When on the point of departure to celebrate, as he confidently expected, his triumph, he disbanded his army with orders to be in Rome by the day of triumph. The day following his arrival the senate met in the temple of Bellona and after he had given a full account of his campaign he requested to be allowed to make a triumphal entry into the City. One of the tribunes of the plebs, P. Sempronius Blaesus, was of opinion that though the honour of a triumph ought not to be refused altogether it ought to be delayed. The wars with the Ligurians, he said, were always closely connected with those against the Gauls, for these nations being neighbours rendered each other mutual help. If after his decisive defeat of the Boii Scipio had either crossed the Ligurian frontiers with his army or sent a part of his force to the assistance of Q. Minucius, who had now been detained there three years by an indecisive war, the Ligurian resistance might have been completely broken. In order to swell his triumph he had now brought back soldiers who could have rendered invaluable service to the commonwealth and could do so still if the senate would agree to make good what he in his haste to enjoy a triumph had left undone by delaying that triumph. He should be ordered to return with his legions to his province and see that the Ligurians were thoroughly subdued; unless they were brought under the dominion of Rome the Boii would be in a constant state of unrest; whether it be peace or war it must be with both of them together. When he has reduced the Boii to submission P. Cornelius will enjoy his triumph a few months hence like many before him who did not celebrate their triumph during their year of office.

The consul in his reply reminded the tribune that he did not receive Liguria as his province nor was it with the Ligurians that he had been at war, nor was it over the Ligurians that he asked for a triumph. Q. Minucius would, he felt quite sure, soon subjugate them, and then he would ask for a triumph and it would be granted him because it would be well deserved. He (the speaker) was asking for a triumph over the Boii after defeating them in battle, depriving them of their camp, receiving the submission of the entire nation two days after the battle, and bringing away a number of hostages as a guarantee of peace for the future. But a much stronger reason for his request being granted was the fact that the number of Gauls killed amounted to more than all the thousands of Boii, to say the least, with which any Roman general before his time had ever fought. Out of 50,000 men more than half had fallen, many thousands had been made prisoners, only old men and boys were left among the Boii. Could then anyone wonder why the victorious army after leaving not a single active enemy in the province had come to Rome to grace the consul's triumph? "If," he continued, "the senate wishes to employ these soldiers in another field, in what way do you think they will be made more ready to face fresh toils and dangers? By recompensing them in full for the perils and labours they have already undergone, or by sending them off with expectations instead of rewards after they have been cheated of the hopes already formed? As for myself, I had glory enough to last my lifetime on the day when the senate judged me to be the best and worthiest in the commonwealth and sent me to receive Mater Idaea. The bust of P. Scipio Nasica will be sufficiently honoured by bearing that record inscribed upon it though neither consulship nor triumph were added."

Not only were the senate unanimous in decreeing a triumph, but the tribune bowed to their authority and withdrew his opposition. So the consul P. Cornelius triumphed over the Boii. In the triumphal procession armour, weapons, standards and booty of all descriptions, including bronze vases, were carried in Gaulish wagons. There were also borne in the procession 1471 golden torques, 247 pounds of gold, 2340 pounds of silver, partly in bars, partly wrought, not inartistically, into native vessels, and 23,400 silver denarii. To each of the soldiers who marched behind his chariot he gave as largesse 125 ases, twice as much to each centurion, and three times as much to each of the horsemen. The next day the Assembly met, and in his speech he gave an account of his campaign and dwelt on the injustice of their tribune in trying to involve him in a war which was outside his province, and so rob him of the fruits of the victory which he had won. At the close of his speech he released his men from their military oath and discharged them.

All this time Antiochus was stopping in Ephesus quite unconcerned about the war with Rome as though the Romans had no intention of landing in Asia. This apathy was due either to the blindness or the flattery of most of his councillors. Hannibal, who at that time had great influence with the king, was the only one who told him the truth. He said that so far from feeling any doubt about the Romans going, his only wonder was that they were not there already. The voyage, he pointed out, from Greece to Asia was shorter than from Italy to Greece, and Antiochus was a more dangerous foe than the Aetolians, nor were the arms of Rome less potent on sea than on land. Their fleet had been for some time cruising off Malea, and he understood that fresh ships and a fresh commander had come from Italy to take part in the war. He begged Antiochus therefore to give up all hopes of being left in peace. Asia would be the scene of conflict, for Asia itself he would have to fight by sea and by land, and either he must wrest the supreme power from those who were aiming at world-wide dominion or else he must lose his own throne. The king realised that Hannibal was the only one who saw what was coming and told him the honest truth. Following his advice, he took all the ships that were ready for war to the Chersonese in order to strengthen the places there with garrisons in case the Romans came by land. Polyxenidas received instructions to fit out the rest of the fleet and put to sea, and a number of scouting vessels were sent to patrol the waters round the islands.

C. Livius was in command of the Roman fleet. He proceeded with fifty decked ships to Neapolis, where the open vessels which the cities on that coast were bound by treaty to furnish had received orders to assemble. From there he steered for Sicily and sailed through the strait past Messana. When he had picked up the six vessels which had been sent by Carthage and the ships which Regium and Locris and the other cities under the same treaty obligation had contributed he performed the lustration of the fleet and put out to sea. On reaching Corcyra, which was the first Greek city he came to, he made inquiries as to the state of the war-for peace did not prevail throughout Greece-and the whereabouts of the Roman fleet. When he learnt that the consul and the king were encamped near the Pass of Thermopylae, and that the Roman fleet was lying in the Piraeus, he felt that for every reason he ought to lose no time and at once set sail for the Peloponnese. As Same and Zacynthus had taken the side of the Aetolians he devastated those islands and then shaped his course to Malea, and as the weather was favourable he reached the Piraeus in a few days and here he found the fleet. Whilst off Scyllaeum he was joined by Eumenes with three ships. Eumenes had remained for some time at Aegina, unable to make up his mind what to do, whether to return home and defend his kingdom, as he was constantly being told that Antiochus was concentrating naval and military forces at Ephesus. or whether to remain in close touch with the Romans, on whom he knew that his fate depended. A. Atilius handed over to his successor the twenty-four decked ships in the Piraeus, and then left for Rome. Livius sailed to Delos with eighty-one decked vessels and many smaller, some undecked and beaked, others without beaks, to be used as scouts.

The consul was laying siege to Naupactus at the time. Livius was detained at Delos by contrary winds for several days; the seas round the Cyclades are liable to violent storms, owing to the numerous channels, some narrower, some wider, which separate the islands. Polyxenidas received intelligence through the scouting vessels which were patrolling those waters that the Roman fleet was lying at Delos, and he sent on the information to the king. Antiochus abandoned his designs in the Hellespont and returned to Ephesus with all possible speed, taking his warships with him. He at once called a council of war to decide whether he ought to risk an engagement. Polyxenidas was opposed to any delay, and said that they certainly ought to engage before Eumenes and the Rhodians joined the Roman fleet. In that case they would not be so very unequally matched in point of numbers and in everything else they would have the advantage, in the speed of their vessels and in various other respects, for the Roman ships were awkwardly built and slow, and as they were going to a hostile country they would be heavily laden with stores, whilst the king's ships, having none but friends all round them, would carry nothing but soldiers and their equipment. They would be greatly assisted, too, by their familiarity with the sea and the coasts and their knowledge of the winds; the enemy on the other hand, who was ignorant of all this, would be thrown into confusion by them. The council unanimously approved of his proposal, since the man who made it was also the one who was to carry it out.

Two days were spent in preparations, on the third day they set sail for Phocaea with a fleet of a hundred ships, seventy decked, the rest open ships, but all smaller than the corresponding vessels of the enemy fleet. On hearing that the Roman fleet was approaching, the king, who had no intention of taking part in a naval battle, withdrew to Magnesia ad Sipylum to assemble his land forces, the fleet sailing on to Cissus, the port of Erythrae, as that appeared a more suitable place in which to await the enemy. The Romans had been detained at Delos for some days by northerly winds; when these subsided they put out from Delos and steered for the harbour of Phanae, at the southern end of Chios, facing the Aegean. They then brought their ships up to the city, and after taking in supplies sailed to Phocaea. Eumenes, who had gone to his fleet at Elea, returned in a few days with twenty-four decked ships and a larger number of open ones, and sailed on to Phocaea, where he found the Romans getting their ships ready and making every preparation for the coming naval contest. From Phocaea they put to sea with one hundred and five decked ships and about fifty open ones. At first they were driven towards the land by the northerly winds which blew across their course and were forced to sail in almost a single line; when the wind became less violent they endeavoured to make the harbour of Corycus, which lies beyond Cissus.

When news was brought to Polyxenidas of the approach of the Roman fleet he was delighted at the prospect of a fight. Extending his left towards the open sea he ordered the captains of the right division to align their ships towards the land, and in this way he advanced to battle with a straight front. On seeing this the Roman commander took in sail, lowered his masts, and stowing away the tackle waited for the ships in the rear to come up. His front line now consisted of thirty ships, and in order to make it extend as far as the enemy's left he directed these vessels to set up their foresails and steer for the open sea; those behind, as they came up, were ordered to direct their course landward against the enemy's right. Eumenes was bringing up the rear, but as soon as he saw the hurried removal of the masts and rigging he urged his ships on with all possible speed. Full in view of both fleets were two Carthaginian vessels which outstripped the Roman fleet and three of the king's ships went to meet them. The inequality of numbers enabled two of these to close on one of the Carthaginian vessels, and after shearing off both banks of oars they boarded it and flinging overboard or killing the defenders captured the ship. The other Carthaginian ship which had only one opponent, seeing its sister-ship captured, fled back to the Roman fleet before the three could make a simultaneous attack upon it. Livius was furious and made straight in his flagship for the enemy, and as the two vessels which had overpowered the single Carthaginian ship bore down upon him, expecting the same success, he ordered the rowers to back water on both sides so that the way of the ship might be stopped. Then he ordered them to hook their grappling irons on to the enemy ships and when they had made a soldiers' battle of it to remember that they were Romans and not to look upon the slaves of Antiochus as men. This one ship now defeated and captured the two much more easily than the two had captured the single one previously. By this time the fleets were engaged along the whole line and as the fighting went on the ships became everywhere intermixed. Eumenes, who had come up after the battle had commenced seeing that Livius had thrown the enemy's left into confusion, attacked the right division where the struggle was still an equal one.

It was not long before the enemy's left division took to flight, for when Polyxenidas saw that he was clearly worsted as far as the courage of his soldiers was concerned he lowered his foresails and fled away in disorder, and those who had been engaged with Eumenes near the land very soon did the same. As long as the rowers could hold out and there was any chance of harassing the hindmost ships Eumenes and the Romans kept up a vigorous pursuit. But when they found that owing to the speed of the enemy's ships, which were light as compared with theirs, loaded as they were with supplies, their attempt to overtake them was baffled, they desisted from the pursuit, after capturing thirteen vessels with their troops and crews and sinking ten. The only vessel lost in the Roman fleet was the Carthaginian vessel, overpowered by the two assailants at the beginning of the battle. Polyxenidas did not stop his flight till he was in the harbour of Ephesus. The Romans remained for that day at Cissus, from which place the king's fleet had gone out to battle; the next day they continued to follow up the enemy. Midway on their course they were met by twenty-five decked ships from Rhodes under the command of Pausistratus. With their united fleets they still followed up the enemy and appeared in line of battle before the entrance of the harbour. After they had thus forced the enemy to admit his defeat, the Rhodians and Eumenes were sent home and the Romans started for Chios. They sailed past Phocaea, one of the Erythraean ports, and then anchored for the night. The next day they sailed up to the city itself. Here they stayed for a few days mainly to recruit the crews and then they proceeded to Phocaea. Here four quinqueremes were left to guard the city and the fleet went on to Canae, where as the winter was approaching the ships were drawn up on land and protected by a ring of entrenchments. At the close of the year the elections were held. The new consuls were L. Cornelius Scipio and C. Laelius, and all were looking upon Africanus to end the war with Antiochus. The praetors elected on the following day were M. Tuccius, L. Aurunculeius, Cn. Fulvius, L. Aemilius, P. Junius and C. Atinius Labeo.

Book 37. Final Defeat of Antiochus

After the new consuls had taken office and the obligations of religion had been discharged the position of the Aetolians took precedence of all other subjects of discussion in the senate. Their envoys pressed for an audience as the period of the armistice was drawing to a close, and they were backed up by T. Quinctius, who had by that time returned to Rome. Knowing that they had more to hope from the clemency of the senate than from the strength of their case, they adopted a suppliant attitude and brought up their former good services as a counterpoise to their recent misdoings. However, while in the House, they were subjected to a fire of questions from all sides, the senators endeavouring to force from them a confession of guilt rather than definite replies, and after they were ordered to withdraw they gave rise to a very lively debate. The feeling of resentment against them was stronger than that of compassion, for the senate were embittered against them not only as enemies, but as a wild race whose hand was against every man. The debate went on for several days, and it was finally decided that peace should neither be granted to them nor refused. They were offered two alternatives: either to place themselves unreservedly in the hands of the senate or to pay a fine of 1000 talents and have the same friends and enemies as Rome. When they endeavoured to get some idea of the matters in regard to which they were to be at the senate's disposal they got no definite reply. The same day they were sent away from the City without having obtained peace and were ordered to leave Italy within the fortnight.

Then the question of the consular provinces came up. Both the consuls wanted Greece. Laelius possessed great influence in the senate, and when it was decided that the consul should either ballot or come to a mutual agreement about their provinces he observed that he and his colleague would act more gracefully if they left the matter to the judgment of the senate rather than to the chances of the ballot. Scipio said in reply that he should consider what he ought to do, and after a private conversation with his brother, who insisted upon his leaving the matter in the hands of the senate, he told his colleague that he would do what he advised. This method of procedure as being either unprecedented or resting on precedents of which no record survived was expected to lead to a debate, but P. Scipio Africanus declared that if the senate decreed Greece to his brother Lucius he would serve under him. This declaration met with universal approval and put an end to any further discussion. The senate were glad of the opportunity of finding out which would receive most help-Antiochus from the vanquished Hannibal or the consul and legions of Rome from his vanquisher Scipio, and they almost unanimously decreed Greece to Scipio and Italy to Laelius.

The praetors then balloted for their provinces. L. Aurunculeius received the urban and Cneius Fulvius the alien jurisdiction; L. Aemilius Regillus the command of the fleet; P. Junius Brutus the administration of Etruria; M. Tuccius, Apulia and Bruttium; and C. Atinius, Sicily. The consul to whom Greece had been decreed, in addition to the army of two legions which he was to take over from Manius Acilius, was further reinforced by 3000 Roman infantry and 100 cavalry and allied troops to the number of 5000 infantry and 200 cavalry. It was further decided that after he had arrived in his province he should, if he thought it expedient, take his army into Asia. The other consul was supplied with an entirely fresh army, two Roman legions and 15,000 infantry and 600 cavalry from the allies. Q. Minucius had written to say that his province was pacified and the whole of the Ligurians had made their surrender; he was now ordered to take his army into the country of the Boii and hand it over to P. Cornelius, who was acting as proconsul. The city legions which had been raised the previous year were to be withdrawn from the territory of which the Boii had been mulcted after their defeat and given to the praetor M. Tuccius. These, reinforced by 15,000 allied infantry and 600 cavalry, were to occupy Apulia and Bruttium. A. Cornelius, who had commanded in Bruttium as praetor during the past year, received instructions to transfer his legions to Aetolia if the consul approved and hand them over to Manius Acilius in case he wished to remain there, but if Acilius preferred to return to Rome, Cornelius was to keep that army in Aetolia. It was further arranged that C. Atinius Labeo should take over the province of Sicily and the army of occupation from M. Aemilius and raise reinforcements if he wished to do so in the island itself to the number of 2000 infantry and 100 cavalry. P. Junius Brutus was to raise a new army for service in Etruria consisting of one Roman legion and 10,000 infantry and 400 cavalry of allied troops. L. Aemilius, to whom the naval command had fallen, was to receive from his predecessor, M. Junius, twenty ships of war with their crews and to enlist in addition 1000 seamen and 2000 infantry soldiers to serve as marines. With his fleet thus manned he was to proceed to Asia and take over the fleet which C. Livius had commanded. The praetors commanding in the two Spains were continued in office and retained their armies. Sicily and Sardinia were each required to supply two-tenths of their corn harvest for the year; the whole of the corn from Sicily was to be transported to Aetolia for the use of the army, that from Sardinia was to go partly to Rome and partly to Aetolia, like the corn from Sicily.

Before the consuls left for their provinces it was resolved that various portents should be expiated according to the directions of the pontiffs. The temple of Juno-Lucina in Rome was struck so seriously by lightning that the pediment and great doors were much damaged. At Puteoli, one of the gates and numerous portions of the wall were similarly struck and two men killed. At Nursea it was definitely reported that a thunderstorm suddenly burst out of a cloudless sky; there also two men were killed, both freemen. The people of Tusculum announced that a shower of earth had fallen in their district, and at Reate a mule was said to have had a foal. These portents were duly expiated and the Latin Festival was celebrated a second time owing to the Laurentians not having received their due portion of the sacrifice. To allay the religious fears which these various incidents aroused, a solemn intercession was offered, as directed by the Keepers of the Sacred Books, to those deities which, after consulting the rolls, they named. Ten free-born boys and ten maidens, all of whose fathers and mothers were alive, were employed about that sacrifice, and the Keepers of the Sacred Books offered up sacrifices of sucklings in the night. Before his departure, P. Cornelius Scipio erected an arch on the Capitol facing the road up to the temple, with seven gilded human statues and two equestrian ones. He also set up in front of the arch two marble basins. During this time forty-three of the Aetolian leading men, including Damocritus and his brother, were brought to Rome by two cohorts sent by Manius Acilius. On their arrival they were thrown into the Lautumiae, and the cohorts were ordered to the army. A deputation came from Ptolemy and Cleopatra to offer their congratulations on the expulsion of Antiochus from Greece by the consul Acilius, and to urge the senate to send an army into Asia, as not only in Asia but even throughout Syria there was a universal feeling of alarm. The two sovereigns declared their readiness to carry out the behests of the senate, and a vote of thanks to them was passed. Each member of the deputation received a present of 4000 ases.

When the business which he had to transact in Rome was finished, L. Cornelius gave notice in the Assembly that the men whom he had enlisted and those who were with A. Cornelius in Bruttium were all to assemble at Brundisium by 15th July. He also appointed three officers, Sextus Digitius, L. Apustius and C. Fabricius Luscinus, to collect the ships from all parts of the coast at the same place, and all his preparations being now completed, he set out from the city, wearing his paludamentum. As many as 5000 volunteers, Roman and allied troops who had served their time under P. Africanus, were waiting for the consul on his departure and gave in their names for active service. At the time of the consul's departure, whilst the Games of Apollo were being celebrated, the daylight was obscured, though the sky was clear, by the moon passing under the orb of the sun. L. Aemilius Regillus set out at the same time to take command of the fleet. L. Aurunculeius was commissioned by the senate to undertake the construction of thirty quinqueremes and twenty triremes. This step was due to a report that since the naval battle Antiochus was fitting out a considerably larger fleet than he had on that occasion. When the Aetolian envoys brought back word that there was no hope of peace, their government realised that the danger threatening them from Rome was more serious than the losses inflicted on them by the Achaeans who were harrying the whole of their sea-board which faced the Peloponnese. They had made up their minds that the Romans would return in the spring and lay siege to Naupactus, and in order to block their route they occupied Mount Corax. Acilius knew that this was what they were expecting, and he thought the better course would be to undertake something which they were not expecting; so he commenced an attack on Lamia. This place had almost been destroyed by Philip, and as the inhabitants were not apprehending any similar attempt, Acilius thought he might successfully surprise it. After leaving Elatia his first encampment on the enemy soil was by the Spercheus; from there he made a night march, and by dawn had completely invested the place.

As was natural in a surprise attack, there was considerable confusion and alarm, but a stouter resistance was offered than any one would have believed possible in such sudden danger. The men fought from the walls, the women carried up to them stones and missiles of every description, and though the scaling-ladders were placed at very many points against the walls, the defence was maintained for that day. Towards noon Acilius gave the signal for retiring, and took his troops back into camp, where they took food and rest. Before he dismissed his staff, he warned his men to be armed and ready before daybreak, and told them that till they had carried the city he should not take them back to camp. As on the previous day, he delivered several simultaneous assaults, and as the strength, the weapons, above all the courage, of the defenders began to fail, he took the city in a few hours. The booty found there was partly sold and partly divided amongst the soldiers. After the capture a council of war was held to decide what was to be done next. No one was in favour of going on to Naupactus as long as the Aetolians held Mount Corax. However, to avoid wasting the summer in inaction, and to prevent the Aetolians, after they had failed to obtain peace from the senate, from enjoying it through his own lack of enterprise, Acilius determined to attack Amphissa. He marched the army over Mount Oeta. and when he reached the city he did not, as at Lamia, attempt a combined assault upon the entire circuit of the walls, but he commenced a regular siege. The rams were brought up at several points, and though the walls were being battered, the townsmen made no attempt to prepare or invent anything to meet this kind of engine. All their hopes lay in their arms and their courage; they made frequent sorties and harassed the detached posts and even the men who were working the rams.

The walls had, however, been shaken down in many places when news reached Acilius that his successor had landed in Apollonia, and was advancing through Epirus and Thessaly. The consul was coming with 13,000 infantry and 500 cavalry; he had already reached the Maliac Gulf, and had sent a detachment to Hypata to demand the surrender of that city. The reply was that the inhabitants refused to do so without the sanction of the national council of Aetolia. Not wishing to lose time in the siege of Hypata while Amphissa was still holding out, he sent his brother Africanus on in advance and marched on Amphissa. Just before their arrival the citizens had abandoned their city, which was now to a large extent denuded of its walls, and had retreated, combatants and non-combatants alike, into the citadel which they held to be impregnable. The consul encamped about six miles distant from the place. A deputation from Athens arrived there to intercede for the Aetolians, and went first to Publius Scipio, who had, as stated above, gone on in advance, and then to the consul. They received a conciliatory reply from Africanus, who was keeping Asia and Antiochus in view and trying to find some honourable pretext for abandoning the Aetolian war. He told them that they must endeavour to persuade the Aetolians as well as the Romans to prefer peace to war. In consequence of the representations of the Athenians, a large deputation of Aetolians very soon came from Hypata and had an interview with Africanus. Their hopes of peace were considerably raised by what he said to them, as he pointed out how many tribes and nations in Spain and subsequently in Africa had thrown themselves on his protection, and how he had left everywhere nobler memorials of his clemency and kindness than of his military successes. They had to all appearance gained their end, when the consul, on being approached, gave them the very same answer as that with which they had been turned out of the senate. This unexpected treatment was a great blow to the Aetolians, for they saw that they had gained nothing either through the intervention of the Athenians or the considerate reply of Africanus.

They returned to Hypata without seeing any way out of their difficulties. They had no fund from which they could pay 1000 talents, and if they made an unconditional surrender they were afraid they might have to suffer in person. So they instructed the same deputation to go back to the consul and Africanus, and implore them, if they were willing really to grant them peace and not simply dangle it before their eyes and cheat the hopes of their unhappy nation, either to reduce the sum fixed for them to pay, or make the conditions of surrender such that they would not affect the personal safety of the citizens. They could not induce the consul to make any change in the conditions, and the deputation was again sent away with nothing gained. The Athenian deputation followed them to Hypata. The Aetolians had completely lost heart after so many rebuffs and were deploring in unavailing lamentation the hard fortune of their nation, when Echedemus, the leader of the Athenian deputation, recalled them to a more hopeful frame of mind by suggesting that they should ask for a six months' truce so that they might send envoys to Rome. The delay, he pointed out, would in no way aggravate their present distress which had reached the extreme point, and many things might happen in the interval to lighten it. Acting on his advice the same delegates were sent again. They first obtained an interview with P. Scipio and through his instrumentality they obtained from the consul a truce for the time they asked for.

Manius Acilius raised the siege of Amphissa and after handing over his army to the consul left Greece. The consul returned from Amphissa into Thessaly with the intention of marching through Macedonia and Thrace into Asia. On this Africanus observed to his brother: "The route which you are selecting I too quite approve of, but everything depends upon Philip's attitude. If he is faithful to us he will give us free passage, and furnish us with supplies and everything necessary for an army during a long march. If he proves untrustworthy you will find no part of Thrace safe. I think, therefore, that the king's intentions ought to be ascertained. That will be best done if your emissary pays him a surprise visit before he has taken any preparatory steps." Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, by far the ablest and most energetic young man of his time, was selected for the task, and by using relays of horses he travelled with incredible speed and reached Pella three days after leaving Amphissa. He found the king at a banquet; he had drunk deeply, and the mere fact of his giving way to this self-indulgence removed any suspicion that he was contemplating any change in his policy. His guest received a courteous welcome and on the following day he saw provisions in lavish abundance ready for the army, bridges thrown over the rivers, and roads made where there were difficulties of transport. Returning as quickly as he had come, he met the consul at Thaumaci and reported what he had seen. The army felt more confident and hopeful and marched away in high spirits, to find everything prepared for them in Macedonia. On their arrival the king received them in royal state and accompanied them on their march. He displayed great tact and refinement, qualities which recommended him to Africanus, who, singularly distinguished as he was in other respects, did not object to politeness and courtesy if they were not accompanied by effeminacy. Philip accompanied them through Macedonia and through Thrace as well; he had everything that they required ready for them, and in this way they reached the Hellespont.

After the sea-fight off Corycus Antiochus had the whole winter free for fresh preparations both on sea and land, but he devoted himself mainly to fitting out his fleet in order that he might not be deprived of all command of the sea. He reflected that his defeat occurred during the absence of the Rhodian fleet, and if they took part in the next battle-and he was sure they would not commit the fault of being too late again-he would need a large number of ships so as to be equal to the enemy in ships and men. He accordingly sent Hannibal to Syria to bring the Phoenician vessels, and he gave Polyxenidas orders to refit what ships there were and to construct fresh ones. The less his success in the past, the greater must be his energy in preparing for the future. Antiochus spent the winter in Phrygia and, summoning assistance from all sides, had even sent to Gallograecia. The population there were more warlike at that time than in later years; they still retained the Gaulish temperament as the original stock had not yet died out. Antiochus had left his son with an army in Aeolis to hold the cities on the coast which Eumenes on the one side from Pergamum and the Romans on the other from Phocaea and Erythrae were trying to win over. The Roman fleet, as already stated, was wintering at Canae, and Eumenes went there about mid-winter with 2000 infantry and 500 cavalry. He represented to Livius what an amount of plunder might be carried off from the enemy's country and he persuaded him to send him on an expedition with 5000 men, and in a few days they brought away an enormous amount.

Meantime a revolutionary movement was started in Phocaea by certain individuals who tried to enlist the sympathies of the populace on the side of Antiochus. They had various grievances; the presence of the ships in their winter quarters was a grievance; the tribute of 500 togas and 50 tunics was a grievance; the scarcity of corn was an additional and a serious grievance. Owing to this scarcity the Roman force in occupation left the place, and now the party which were haranguing the plebs in favour of Antiochus were freed from all apprehensions. The senate and aristocracy were for maintaining the alliance with Rome, but the revolutionaries had more influence with the masses. The Rhodians made up for their slackness the previous summer by sending Pausistratus at the vernal equinox with six-and-thirty ships. Livius left Canae with thirty vessels and in addition the seven quinqueremes which Eumenes had brought with him, and set sail for the Hellespont in order to make preparations for the transport of the army which he was expecting to come overland. He first put into the harbour called "The Haven of the Achaeans." Here he went up to Ilium and offered sacrifice to Minerva, after which he gave a gracious audience to deputations from the neighbouring towns of Elaeus, Dardanus and Rhoeteum, who came to place their respective localities under the protection of Rome. From there he sailed to the mouth of the Hellespont, and stationing ten ships opposite Abydos he sailed with the rest to the European shore to attack Sestus. His men were already approaching the walls when they were met by a body of hierophants known as "Galli" in their priestly robes who announced that they were the ministers of Mater Dea, the mother of the gods, and it was at her command that they had come to pray the Romans to spare the city and its walls. No violence was offered to any of them, and presently their senate and magistrates came forward to make a formal surrender of the city. From there the fleet sailed to Abydos. Here interviews took place with the citizens with the object of winning them over, but as no friendly response was given, the Romans made preparations for a siege.

During these operations in the Hellespont, Polyxenidas, the king's lieutenant and a Rhodian refugee, received tidings of the departure from home of his country's fleet and also of the insolent and contemptuous way in which the commandant, Pausistratus, had spoken of him in public. This made the contest between them a personal one, and Polyxenidas thought of nothing else night or day but how to give the lie to the man's bombast by his deeds. He sent a man who was well known to Pausistratus to tell him that if Polyxenidas were allowed to do so he might be of great service to Pausistratus and to his country. Pausistratus was much surprised and inquired in what way this could be brought about. When he had given his word at the other's request that he would either co-operate in the scheme or conceal it in silence, the intermediary informed him that Polyxenidas would betray to him the whole of the king's fleet or at all events the greater part of it, and that the only reward he claimed for so great a service was the restoration to his native land. The offer was too important a one for Pausistratus either to place full confidence in or absolutely to decline. He sailed to Panhormus, a harbour in Samos, and stayed there to examine the proposal more closely. Messages passed to and fro between them, but Pausistratus was not quite reassured until Polyxenidas had, in the presence of the messenger, written down with his own hand the terms of the promise he made, and affixed his seal to the document. Pausistratus thought that by a definite pledge like that the traitor would be at his mercy, for as Polyxenidas was living under an autocrat he would never dare to give what he had signed with his own hand as evidence against him. Then the plan of the pretended treachery was arranged. Polyxenidas said that he would not make any further preparations whatever, he would not keep any large number of rowers with the fleet, some of the vessels he should haul up on land, ostensibly for repairs, others he should disperse in neighbouring ports, a few he should keep at sea outside the port of Ephesus, so that if circumstances compelled him to go out he could expose them to battle. When Pausistratus heard that Polyxenidas was going to disperse his fleet in this way, he followed suit. One division of his fleet he sent to Halicarnassus for supplies, another he despatched to Samos . . . so that he might be ready to attack on receiving the signal from the traitor. Polyxenidas still further misled him by hauling up a certain number of ships and repairing the dockyards as though intending to haul up others. When the rowers were called up from their winter quarters, they were not sent to Ephesus but assembled secretly at Magnesia.

A soldier out of Antiochus' army happened to come to Samos on private business. He was arrested as a spy and brought before the commandant at Panhormus. When questioned as to what was going on at Ephesus, either through fear or acting as traitor to his countrymen he disclosed everything, and asserted that the fleet was lying in the harbour completely equipped and ready for action, that all the rowers had been sent to Magnesia, that very few ships had been hauled up, that the dockyards were closed and that the naval service had never been more carefully looked after. Pausistratus was so completely obsessed by the deception practiced upon him and the vain hopes it had aroused that he would not believe what he heard. When all his preparations were made, Polyxenidas brought up the rowers from Magnesia by night and hastily launched the ships which had been beached. He remained there through the day not to complete his dispositions so much as to prevent the fleet from being seen when it left the harbour. Starting after sunset with seventy decked ships, he put into the port of Pygela before daybreak as the wind was against him. Remaining there for the day for the same reason-to escape observation-he set sail at night for the nearest point on Samian territory. From there he ordered a man named Nicander, a pirate chieftain, to sail with five ships to Palinurus and take the troops from there by the shortest route across country to Panhormus in the rear of the enemy, whilst he himself proceeded thither with his fleet divided into two squadrons, so that he could hold the entrance to the harbour on either side.

Pausistratus was at first somewhat perturbed by this unexpected turn of events, but the old soldier soon pulled himself together and thinking that the enemy could be more easily checked on land than on the sea he sent two divisions of his troops to occupy the headlands which curving inward from the sea like two horns, form the harbour. He expected to repulse the enemy easily by attacking him from both sides, but the sight of Nicander on the land above upset his plan, and suddenly changing his tactics he ordered all to go on board. There was terrible confusion amongst the soldiers and seamen, and something like a flight to the ships took place when they found themselves surrounded landwards and seawards at the same time. Pausistratus saw that his only chance of safety lay in his being able to force a passage through the harbour into the open sea, and as soon as he saw all his men on board he ordered the fleet to follow him while he led the way with his vessel rowed at full speed towards the mouth of the harbour. Just as he was clearing it Polyxenidas closed round him with three ships, and his vessel, struck by their beaks, was sunk, the defenders were overwhelmed by a hail of missiles and Pausistratus, who fought most gallantly, was killed. Of the remaining ships some were taken outside the harbour, others within, and some were captured by Nicander while they were trying to put off from the shore. Only five Rhodian vessels and two from Cos escaped. They had kindled fires in braziers which they hung from poles projecting over the bows, and the terrifying sight of these flames enabled them to clear a way through the crowded ships. The Erythraean triremes which were coming to reinforce the Rhodian fleet met the fugitive vessels not far from Samos, and thereupon changed their course to the Hellespont to join the Romans. Just before this Seleucus captured through an act of treachery the city of Phocaea; one of its gates was opened to him by a soldier on guard. The alarm this created led Cyme and other cities on that coast to go over to him.

Whilst these events were occurring in Aeolis, Abydos had for several days been standing a siege, and the king's garrison had been defending the walls. At last, when all were weary of the struggle, the commandant, Philotas, entrusted the magistrates with the task of opening negotiations with Livius with a view to surrender. Matters were delayed by their being unable to agree as to whether the garrison should be allowed to depart with their arms or without them. Whilst they were discussing this point news arrived of the Rhodian defeat. This took the question out of their hands, for Livius, fearing lest Polyxenidas after such an important success should surprise the fleet at Canae, instantly abandoned the siege of Abydos and the protection of the Hellespont and put to sea the vessels which had been drawn up on the land there. Eumenes went to Elea and Livius sailed for Phocaea with the whole of his fleet and two ships which had joined him from Mitylene. On being informed that the place was held by a strong garrison for the king and that Seleucus was encamped not very far away, he raided the coast and hastily conveyed the spoil, mostly prisoners, on board his ships. He only waited till Eumenes came up with his fleet and then started for Samos. At Rhodes the tidings of the disaster caused widespread grief and alarm, for in addition to the loss in ships and men they had lost the flower and strength of their youth, for many of their nobles had amongst other motives been attracted by the character of Pausistratus which stood deservedly very high amongst his compatriots. But their grief gave place to anger at the thought of their having been the victims of treachery and, worst of all, at the hands of their own fellow-countrymen. They at once despatched ten ships and a few days later ten more, all under the command of Eudamus, a man by no means the equal of Pausistratus in other military qualities, but one who, they believed, would prove a more cautious leader, as possessing a less adventurous spirit. The Romans and Eumenes brought up the fleet first at Erythrae, where they stayed one night. The day following they kept their course to the headland of Corycus. From there they intended to cross over to the nearest point of Samos, but as they did not wait for the sunrise, from which the pilots could note the state of the sky, they sailed into uncertain weather. When they were half-way the north-east wind backed into the north and they began to toss on the waves of an angry sea.

Polyxenidas suspected that the enemy would make for Samos in order to form a junction with the Rhodian fleet. Putting out from Ephesus he first stood off Myonnesus, and from there sailed on to an island called Macris for the purpose of catching any stragglers from the fleet as it sailed past, or attacking, at advantage the hindmost ships. When he saw that the fleet was scattered by the storm he thought that his chance of attacking them had come, but in a short time the gale increased in violence and raised a heavy sea, making it impossible for him to approach them. He now steered for the island of Aethalia, intending to attack them the next day while they were putting into Samos. Towards evening a few Roman ships gained a deserted harbourage in the island, and the rest of the fleet, after tossing on the deep the whole night through, reached the same haven. Here they learnt from the peasants that the enemy's fleet was lying at Aethalia, and a council of war was held to decide whether they should seek a decision at once or wait for the Rhodian contingent. It was decided to put off the encounter and they returned to their base at Corycus. Polyxenidas also, after waiting in vain, returned to Ephesus. Now that the sea was clear of the hostile ships the Romans sailed to Samos. The Rhodian fleet arrived a few days later, and to show that the Romans had only been waiting for them, they left at once for Ephesus to bring about a decisive battle, or if the enemy declined battle, to force an admission that he was afraid to fight, which would very materially influence the attitude of the various cities. They lay off the entrance to the harbour with the ships all abreast in a long line. As no enemy appeared, one division of the fleet anchored at the harbour mouth, the other disembarked its marines who proceeded to devastate the country far and wide. While they were bringing back an enormous amount of plunder and passing near the walls, Andronicus, a Macedonian, who commanded the garrison of Ephesus, made a sortie, took a large part of the plunder from them and drove them back to the ships. The next day the Romans planted an ambuscade about half-way between the city and the coast and advanced in line of march towards the city in order to draw the Macedonian outside the walls. Suspecting what had happened no one came out, and they marched back to their ships. As the enemy shunned an encounter either on land or sea, the fleet returned to Samos. From this port the praetor despatched two vessels belonging to the Italian allies and two Rhodian ships under the command of Epicrates to the Strait of Cephallania. This sea was infested by pirates under the leadership of Hybristas a Lacedaemonian, and supplies from Italy were cut off.

Lucius Aemilius Regillus, who succeeded to the command of the fleet, was met at the Piraeus by Epicrates. On hearing of the defeat of the Rhodians, as he himself had only two quinqueremes, he took Epicrates and his four ships with him to Asia, and some ships from Athens accompanied him. He crossed the Aegean to Chios. Timasicrates the Rhodian arrived there in the dead of night with two quinqueremes from Samos, and on being conducted to Aemilius, explained that he had been sent as an escort because the king's ships made those waters dangerous for transports by their constant excursions from the Hellespont and from Abydos. Whilst Aemilius was crossing from Chios to Samos he was met by two Rhodian quadriremes sent to him by Livius, and Eumenes also met him with two quinqueremes. On his arrival at Samos, Aemilius took over the fleet from Livius, and after the customary sacrifices had been duly offered he called a council of war. Livius was first asked for his opinion. He said that no one could give more sincere advice than the man who advised another to do what he would himself do, were he in his place. He had had it in his mind to sail to Ephesus with the whole of his fleet, including a number of transports loaded with ballast, and sinking these at the entrance of the harbour. This barrage would not involve much trouble because the mouth of the harbour was like that of a river, long, narrow and full of shoals. In this way he would have prevented the enemy from operating by sea and made his fleet useless.

This suggestion found no supporters. Eumenes asked: "What do you mean? When you have barred access to the sea with the sunken ships whilst your own fleet is free, are you going to sail away to assist your friends and spread alarm amongst your enemies, or are you going to continue your blockade of the harbour just the same? If you leave the place, who can have the slightest doubt that the enemy will raise the sunken obstacles and open the harbour with less trouble than it will take us to close it? And if you have to remain here, what good will the closing of the harbour do? Nay, on the other hand, they will spend the summer in the peaceful enjoyment of a harbour perfectly safe and a city filled with wealth, with all the resources of Asia at their command, whilst the Romans, exposed to waves and storms on the open sea and deprived of all supplies, will have to maintain a constant watch and will be themselves more tied up and debarred from doing what ought to be done than the enemy, in spite of their barriers." Eudamus, the commandant of the Rhodian fleet, expressed his disapproval of the plan without saying what he thought ought to be done. Epicrates gave it as his opinion that for the time being they ought to leave Ephesus out of account and send a portion of the fleet to Lycia to gain Patara, the capital of the country, as an ally. That course would possess two great advantages: the Rhodians with a friendly country opposite their island would be able to devote their undivided strength to the war with Antiochus, and his fleet which was being assembled in Cilicia would be prevented from joining Polyxenidas. This proposal weighed most with the council; it was, however, decided that Regillus should take the whole fleet to the port of Ephesus to overawe the enemy.

C. Livius was sent to Lycia with two Roman quinqueremes, four Rhodian quadriremes and two undecked ships from Smyrna. His instructions were to visit Rhodes on his way and communicate his plans to the government. The cities which he passed on his voyage-Miletus, Myndus, Halicarnassus, Cnidus and Cos-fully met all his requirements. When he arrived in Rhodes he explained the object of his expedition, and asked their opinion on it. It was universally approved and three additional quadriremes were supplied for his fleet. He then set sail for Patara. A favourable wind carried them right up to the city, and they hoped that the suddenness of their appearance might frighten the citizens into deserting Antiochus. Afterwards the wind veered round and a heavy cross-sea arose. They succeeded by dint of hard rowing in holding the land, but there was no safe anchorage near the city and they could not lie off the harbour mouth in such a rough sea and with night coming on. Sailing past the city walls they made for the port of Phoenicus rather less than two miles away. This harbour afforded a safe shelter from the violence of the waves, but it was surrounded by high cliffs which the townsmen together with the king's troops who formed the garrison promptly occupied. Though the shore was rocky and landing difficult, Livius sent the contingent from Issa and the Smyrnean light infantry to dislodge them. As long as these light troops had only few to deal with they kept up the contest with missiles and desultory skirmishing more than with hand-to-hand fighting, but as more and more came out of the city in a constant stream and at last the whole of the able-bodied population were pouring out, Livius began to feel apprehensive lest his light troops should be cut off and the ships assailed from the shore. So he sent into the fight the whole of his troops, the seamen and even the rowers, armed with whatever weapons they could get hold of. Even then the battle hung in suspense and not only were a good many soldiers killed, but L. Apustius was amongst those who fell in this promiscuous fighting. The Lycians, however, were routed and driven back to their city and the Romans returned, victorious, but with considerable losses, to their ships. All idea of making any further attempt on Patara was abandoned; the Rhodians were sent home and Livius, sailing along the coast of Asia, crossed over to Greece to meet the Scipios who were in Thessaly at the time. Then he returned to Italy.

Stress of weather had compelled Aemilius to abandon his station at Ephesus and he returned, without having effected anything, to Samos. Here he learnt that Livius had abandoned the Lycian campaign and left for Italy. He looked upon the failure at Patara as a humiliation and decided to sail thither with his whole fleet and attack the city with his full strength. Sailing past Miletus and the other friendly cities on the coast, he landed at Jasus in the bay of Bargyliae. The city was held by the king's troops; the Romans treated the country round as hostile and ravaged it. Then they tried to open negotiations with the magistrates and leading citizens with the view of inducing them to surrender, but after they assured him that they had no power whatever he prepared to storm the place. There were with the Romans some refugees from Jasus. These men went in a body to the Rhodians and implored them not to allow a city which was a neighbour and of the same nationality as they were to perish through no fault of its own. They pleaded that they had been expelled from their native town solely because of their fidelity to Rome, and those who still remained there were forcibly held down by the king's troops lust as they had been forcibly expelled. The one desire in the breast of everyone in Jasus was to escape from their slavery to Antiochus. Moved by their entreaties and supported by Eumenes, the Rhodians urged upon the consul their ties of common nationality with the besieged and the wretched plight of the city, beleaguered by the king's garrison. They succeeded in persuading him to desist from attacking it. Sailing away from there, as all the other cities were friendly, the fleet skirted the Asiatic shore and reached Loryma, a harbour opposite Rhodes. Here remarks were made by the military tribunes, in their private conversations, which at last reached the ears of Aemilius, to the effect that the fleet was withdrawn from Ephesus, its proper theatre of war, so that the enemy, left with full liberty of action, was able to make attempts on all the cities in his neighbourhood which were allied with Rome. Aemilius was so far influenced by what he heard that he summoned the Rhodians and inquired of them whether the whole of the fleet could find room in the harbour of Patara. On their assuring him that it could not, he made this a ground for abandoning his project, and took his ships back to Samos.

During this time Seleucus, who had kept his army in Aeolis all the winter, engaged partly in rendering assistance to his allies and partly in ravaging the territories of those cities which he failed to win over, decided now to cross the frontiers of Eumenes whilst he was at a distance from home, engaged in attacking the maritime cities of Lycia in conjunction with the Romans and Rhodians. He began by threatening an attack on Elea, then abandoning the siege he ravaged the surrounding district, and then went on to attack Pergamum, the capital and stronghold of the kingdom. Attalus posted troops in front of the city and sent forward skirmishers of cavalry and light infantry to harass the enemy without meeting him in a regular engagement. When he found in these encounters that he was in no way a match for his foe, he retired within his walls and the investment of the city commenced. Antiochus left Apamea just about this time and encamped first at Sardis and then at the head of the Caicus, not far from Seleucus' camp, with a vast army drawn from various nations, the most formidable of whom were the Gaulish mercenaries, about 4000 strong. These, with a small admixture of other troops, were sent to devastate every part of the territory of Pergamum. As soon as news of this reached Samos, Eumenes, summoned home by this war within his borders, sailed direct to Elea, where a body of cavalry and light infantry were in readiness. Feeling himself safe with these, he hurried on to Pergamum before the enemy were aware or had made any movement to oppose him. Here again the fighting was confined to skirmishes, as Eumenes firmly declined to risk a decisive action. A few days later the Roman and Rhodian fleets moved from Samos to Elea to support the king. When Antiochus received intelligence that troops were landed at Elea and that such a large naval force was concentrated in a single harbour, and at the same time learnt that the consul and his army were already in Macedonia, and that all preparations were being made for crossing the Hellespont, he thought that the time had come for discussing terms of peace, before he was beset both by land and sea. There was some rising ground over against Elea, and he selected this for the site of his camp. Leaving all his infantry there, and his cavalry, of which he had 6000, he went down into the plain which extended to the walls of Elea, and sent a herald to Aemilius to inform him that he wished to open up negotiations for peace with him.

Aemilius invited Eumenes over from Pergamum and held a council, at which both Eumenes and the Rhodians were present. The Rhodians were not disinclined for peace, but Eumenes said that no peace proposals could be honourably entertained at that moment, nor could any final settlements be made. "How," he asked, "shall we, beleaguered and shut within our walls, listen with honour to any terms of peace? Or who will regard any peace settlement as valid if made without the consent of the consul, the authority of the senate and the order of the people of Rome? I put this question to you-If peace be made through you, are you going to return at once to Italy and carry away your army and your fleet, or will you wait to learn what the consul thinks, what decision the senate comes to, what order the people make? It remains, then, that you must stay in Asia and, all active operations suspended, your troops must be sent into winter quarters to drain the resources of your allies by the requisitions of your commissariat. And then, if the supreme powers so decide, we must begin the war all over again, whereas, if our strong offensive were in no way slackened or hampered by delay, we could have brought it to a close, if the gods so willed it, before winter sets in." This argument prevailed, and Antiochus was told that, till the consul arrived, there could be no discussion of the terms of peace. Finding his efforts to procure peace fruitless, Antiochus proceeded to devastate the lands of the people of Elea and then those belonging to Pergamum. Here he left Seleucus and continued his march with the intention of attacking Adramytteum, till he reached the rich district known as the "Plain of Thebe," celebrated in the poem of Homer. In no other locality in Asia was a greater amount of plunder secured by the king's troops. Aemilius and Eumenes, sailing round with their fleet, also appeared before Adramytteum as a protection to the city.

At this juncture a force despatched from Achaia, numbering 1000 infantry and 100 cavalry, approached Elea. On their landing they were met by a party sent by Attalus to conduct them to Pergamum. They were all veteran troops with war experience, and under the command of Diophanes, a pupil of Philopoemen, the foremost Greek general of his day. Two days were devoted to resting the men and horses, and also to keeping the enemy's advanced posts under observation and ascertaining at what points and at what hours they came on and went off duty. The king's troops made it a practice to advance up to the foot of the hill on which the city stands. In this way they acted as a screen, and the plundering parties behind them were not interfered with, as none came out of the city, not even to attack the advanced posts with missiles at long range. After the citizens had been once cowed by defeat they shut themselves within their wall, and the king's troops looked upon them with contempt and became careless. A great many did not keep their horses either saddled or bridled; a few were left standing to arms, while the rest were dispersed all over the plain, some betaking themselves to games and sports, others feeding under the shade of the trees, some even stretched in slumber.

Diophanes observed all this from Pergamum on the hill, and ordered his men to arm themselves and be in readiness at the gate. He then went to Attalus and told him that he had made up his mind to attack the enemy. With very great reluctance Attalus gave his consent, for he saw that he would have to fight with 100 cavalry against 600 and 1000 infantry against 4000. Diophanes went out from the gate and took up a position not far from the enemy's advanced posts and waited his opportunity. The people of Pergamum looked upon it as madness rather than courage, and the enemy, after keeping them under observation for some time, and seeing no movement of any kind, became careless as usual, and even ridiculed the smallness of their opponents' force. Diophanes made his men keep quiet for a while, then, when he saw that the enemy had broken up their ranks, he gave the infantry orders to follow as rapidly as possible, and putting himself at the head of his troop of cavalry, charged the enemy's detachment at full speed, infantry and cavalry alike shouting their battle-cry. The enemy were thrown into a state of panic, even the horses were terrified and broke their halters, creating confusion and alarm amongst their own men. A few were not scared, and stayed where they were tethered, but even these the riders did not find it an easy task to saddle and bridle and mount, for the Achaean troopers were creating an alarm and terror out of all proportion to their numbers. The infantry, coming up in their ordered ranks, prepared for battle, attacked a foe carelessly scattered and almost half asleep. The whole plain was covered with the bodies of the slain, and men were everywhere fleeing for their lives. Diophanes kept up the pursuit as long as it was safe, and then retired to the shelter of the city walls, after winning great glory for the Achaeans, for the women as well as the men had watched the action from the walls of Pergamum.

The next day the king's advanced posts, in better order and more careful formation, entrenched themselves half a mile further from the city, and the Achaeans went out about the same time and to the same place as on the previous day. For several hours the two sides were on the alert, as though in expectation of an immediate attack. When the hour for returning to camp came, just before sunset, the king's troops massed their standards and withdrew in order of march rather than of battle. As long as they could see him Diophanes kept quiet, then he charged the rear of the column as furiously as he did the day before, and again created such confusion and panic that, though they were being cut down from behind, no attempt was made to halt and face the enemy. They were driven to their camp in great disorder, with their ranks almost completely broken up. This dashing exploit of the Achaeans compelled Seleucus to remove his camp from Pergamene soil. On learning that the Romans had gone to protect Adramytteum, Antiochus left that city alone, and after ravaging the lands of Peraea, a colony from Mitylene, he carried the city itself by assault. Cotton, Corylenus, Aphrodisias and Prinne were taken at the first attempt. He then returned by way of Thyatira to Sardis. Seleucus remained on the coast, a terror to some and a protection to others. The Roman fleet in company with Eumenes and the Rhodians sailed to Mitylene, and from there to their base at Elea. They left that place for Phocaea and brought up at an island called Bacchium, opposite the city, which was rich in works of art. On a former occasion they had spared the numerous temples and statues, but now they treated them as enemy property and plundered them. Then they sailed across to the city and after distributing the troops at different points of attack they commenced the assault. It seemed possible that it might be taken by escalade without the usual siege machinery, but after a contingent of 3000 men which Antiochus had sent for its defence had entered the city, the attack was at once abandoned and the fleet withdrawn to the island without accomplishing anything beyond the devastation of the country round the city.

It was now decided that Eumenes should go home and make the nece