Cassius Dio
Roman History
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Book XXXVIII
The following is contained in the Thirty-eighth of Dio's Rome:—
1. How Caesar and Bibulus quarrelled (chaps. 1-8).
2. How Cicero was exiled (chaps. 9-17).
3. How Philiscus consoled Cicero in the matter of his exile (chaps.
18-30).
4. How Caesar fought the Helvetii and Ariovistus (chaps. 31-50).
Duration of time, two years, in which there were the following
magistrates (consuls) here enumerated:—
B.C.
59
C. Julius C. F. Caesar, M. Calpurnius C. F. Bibulus.
58
L. Calpurnius L. F. Piso, A. Gabinius A. F.
The following year Caesar wished to gain the favour of the whole
multitude, that he might make them his own to an even greater degree.
But since he was anxious to seem to be advancing the interests also of
the optimates, in order to avoid incurring their enmity, he often told
them that he would propose no measure which should not also be to their
advantage. And, indeed, he so framed a certain measure concerning the
land, which he wished to assign to the whole populace, as not to incur
the least censure for it; yet he pretended he would not introduce even
this measure, unless it should be according to their wishes. So far as
this law went, therefore, no one could find any fault with him. The
swollen population of the city, which was chiefly responsible for the
frequent rioting, would thus be turned toward labour and agriculture;
and the great part of Italy, now desolate, would be colonized afresh,
so the not only those who had toiled in the campaigns, but all the rest
as well, would have ample subsistence. And this would be accomplished
without any expense on the part of the city itself or any loss to the
optimates; on the contrary, many of them would gain both rank and
office. He not only wished to distribute all the public land except
Campania (which he advised them to keep distinct as the property of the
state, because of its excellence), but he also bade them purchase the
remainder from no one who was unwilling to sell nor yet for whatever
price the land commissioners might wish, the, in the first place, from
people who were willing to sell, and secondly, for the same price at
which it had been assessed in the tax-lists. For they had a great deal
of surplus money, he asserted, as a result of the booty which Pompey
had captured, as well as from the new tributes and taxes just
established, and they ought, inasmuch as it had been provided by the
dangers that citizens had incurred, to expend it upon those same
persons. Furthermore, he proposed that the land commission should not
consist of a few members only, so as to seem like an oligarchy, or of
men who were under indictment, lest somebody might be displeased, but
that there should be, in the first place, twenty of them, so that many
might share the honour, and secondly, that they should be the most
suitable men. But he excepted himself from consideration, a point on
which he strenuously insisted at the outset, in order that he might not
be thought to be proposing a measure in his own interest. As for
himself, he was satisfied with originating and proposing the matter; at
least he said so, but clearly he was doing a favour to Pompey and
Crassus and the rest.
So far as his measure went, then, he could not be censured, and,
indeed, no one ventured to open his mouth in opposition; for he had
read it beforehand in the senate, and calling upon each one of the
senators by name, had inquired whether he had any criticism to offer;
and he promised to alter or even to strike out entirely any clause
which might displease anybody. Nevertheless, practically all the
optimates who were outside the league were greatly irritated; and they
were grieved especially by the very fact that Caesar had drawn up such
a measure as would admit of no censure, even while it embarrassed them
all. For they suspected that by this measure he would attach the
multitude to him and gain fame and power over all men; and this was, in
fact, his very purpose. For this reason, even though no one spoke
against him, no one expressed approval either. This sufficed for the
majority, and while they kept promising him that they would pass the
decree, they did nothing; on the contrary, fruitless delays and
postponements kept arising. Marcus Cato, however, even though he had no
fault to find with the measure, nevertheless urged them on general
principles to abide by the existing system and to take no steps beyond
it. He was thoroughly upright man and disapproved of any innovation;
yet he had no influence either as the result of natural gift or
training. At this Caesar was on the point of dragging Cato out of the
very senate-house and casting him into prison. But the other offered
himself with the greatest readiness to be led away, and not a few of
the rest followed him; and one of them, Marcus Petreius, upon being
rebuked by Caesar because he was taking his departure before the senate
was yet dismissed, replied: "I prefer to be with Cato in prison rather
than here with you." Abashed at this reply, Caesar let Cato go and
adjourned the senate, merely remarking: "I have made you judges and
masters of this law, so that if anything did not suit you, it should
not be brought before the people; but since you are not willing to pass
a preliminary decree, they shall decide for themselves."
After that he communicated nothing further to the senate during his
year of office, but brought directly before the people whatever he
desired. However, as he wished even under these circumstances to secure
some of the foremost men as supporters in the assembly, hoping that
they had now changed their minds and would have some fear of the plebs,
he made a beginning with his colleague and asked him if he disapproved
of the provisions of the law. When the other gave him no answer beyond
saying that he would tolerate no innovations during his year of office,
Caesar proceeded to entreat him and persuaded the multitude to join him
in his request, saying: "You shall have the law, if only he wishes it."
Bibulus in a loud voice replied: "You shall not have this law this
year, not even if you all wish it." And having spoken thus he took his
departure.
Caesar did not address his inquiries to any other magistrates, fearing
that some one of them also might oppose him; but he brought forward
Pompey and Crassus, though they were private citizens, and bade them
express their views concerning the measure. This was not because he was
not acquainted with their view, for all their undertakings were in
common; but he purposed both to honour these men, by calling them in as
advisers about the law although they were holding no office, and also
to frighten the others by securing the adherence of men who were
admittedly the foremost in the city at that time and had the greatest
influence with all. By this very move, also, he would please the
populace, by giving proof that they were not striving for any unnatural
or unjust end, but for objects which those leaders were willing both to
approve and to praise.
Pompey, accordingly, very gladly addressed them as follows: "It is not
I alone, Quirites, who approve this measure, but the whole senate as
well, inasmuch as it has voted for land to be given not only to my
soldiers but to those also who once fought with Metellus. On the former
occasion, to be sure, since the treasury had no great means, the
granting of the land was naturally postponed; but at present, since it
has become exceedingly rich through my efforts, it is but right that
the promise made to the soldiers be fulfilled and that the rest also
reap the fruit of the common toils." After this preamble he went over
in detail every feature of the measure and approved them all, so that
the crowd was mightily pleased. Seeing this, Caesar asked him if he
would willingly assist him against those who were working in
opposition, and he also urged the populace to join in asking his aid
for this purpose. When they had done so, Pompey felt elated over the
fact that both the consul and the multitude had desired his help,
although he was holding no position of command, and so, with an added
opinion of his own worth, and assuming much dignity, he spoke at some
length: "If any one dares to raise a sword, I also will snatch up my
shield." These words of Pompey were approved by Crassus too.
Consequently, even if some of the rest were not pleased, they
nevertheless favoured the passage of the law when these men, who were
not only accounted good citizens in general but were also, as they
supposed, hostile to Caesar, (for their reconciliation was not yet
manifest,) joined in approving his measure.
Bibulus, however, would not yield, but having gained the support of
three tribunes, hindered the enactment of the law. Finally, when no
other excuse for delay was any longer left him, he proclaimed a sacred
period for all the remaining days of the year alike, during which the
people could not legally even meet in their assembly. Caesar paid but
slight attention to him and appointed a fixed day for the passage of
the law. And when the populace had already occupied the Forum by night,
Bibulus came up with the following he had got together and succeeded in
forcing his way through to the temple of Castor, from which Caesar was
delivering his speech. The men fell back before him, partly out of
respect and partly because they thought he would not actually oppose
them. But when he appeared above and attempted to speak in opposition
to Caesar he was thrust down the steps, his fasces were broken to
pieces, and the tribunes as well as others received blows and wounds.
Thus the law was passed. Bibulus was for the moment satisfied to escape
with his life, but on the next day tried in the senate to annul the
act; nevertheless, he accomplished nothing, since all were under the
spell of the multitude's enthusiasm and would do nothing. Accordingly
he retired to his home and did not appear in public again at all up to
the last day of the year. Instead, he remained in his house, and
whenever Caesar proposed any innovation, he sent formal notice to him
through his attendants that it was a sacred period and that by the laws
he could rightfully take no action during it. Publius Vatinius, a
tribune, undertook to place Bibulus in prison for this, but was
prevented from doing so by the opposition of his colleagues. Bibulus,
however, held aloof from all business of state in the manner related,
and the tribunes belonging to his party likewise no longer performed
any public duty.
Now Metellus Celer and Cato, and through him one Marcus Favonius, who
imitated him in everything, for a time did not take the oath of
obedience to the law (a custom which began, as I have stated, on an
earlier occasion, and was then continued in the case of other
preposterous measures) and stoutly refused to approve it, Metellus, for
instance, referring to Numidicus as an example. When, however, the day
came on which they were to incur the established penalties, they took
the oath, perhaps because it is but human nature for many persons to
utter promises and threats more easily than they actually carry them
out, or else because they were going to be punished to no purpose,
without helping the state at all by their obstinacy. So the law was
passed, and in addition the land of Campania was given to those having
three or more children. For this reason Capua was then for the first
time considered a Roman colony.
By this means Caesar attached the plebs to his cause; and he won over
the knights by releasing them from a third part of the taxes for which
they had contracted. For all collecting of taxes was done by them, and
though they had often asked the senate for some satisfaction, they had
not obtained it, because Cato, among others, had opposed it. When,
then, he had conciliated this class also without any one's protest, he
first ratified all the acts of Pompey, meeting with no opposition
either from Lucullus or any one else, and later he put through many
other measures without encountering any resistance. Even Cato did not
object, although during his praetorship a little later, he would never
mention the title of the other's laws, since they were called Julian
laws; for although he followed their provisions in allotting the
courts, he most absurdly suppressed their name.
As these laws, now, are very numerous and contribute nothing to this
history, I will omit them; but one other I will mention. Quintus Fufius
Calenus, finding that the votes of all were hopelessly confused, at
least in party contests, since each of the orders attributed the good
measures to itself and referred the preposterous ones to the others,
proposed a law while praetor that each order should cast its vote
separately. His purpose was that even if their individual opinions
could not be revealed, by reason of their taking this vote secretly,
yet it might become clear how the orders, at least, felt.
In most matters Caesar himself proposed, advised, and arranged
everything in the city once for all as if he were its sole rule; hence
some facetious persons totally suppressed the name of Bibulus, and in
speaking or writing would name Caesar twice, stating that the consuls
were Gaius Caesar and Julius Caesar. But matters that concerned himself
he managed through others, for he was extremely careful to offer
nothing to himself; and thus he the more easily accomplished everything
that he desired. On his own part, he would declare that he needed
nothing more, and claimed to be thoroughly satisfied with what he had;
but others, believing him a necessary and useful factor in affairs,
proposed whatever he wished and had it passed, not only by the populace
but by the senate itself. Thus it was that the multitude granted him
the government of Illyricum and of Cisalpine Gaul with three legions
for five years, while the senate entrusted him in addition with
Transalpine Gaul and another legion.
But fearing even then that Pompey might make some change during his
absence, inasmuch as Aulus Gabinus was to be consul, he attached to
himself both Pompey and the other consul, Lucius Piso, by ties of
kinship: upon the former he bestowed his daughter, in spite of having
betrothed her to another man, while he himself married Piso's daughter.
Thus he strengthened himself on all sides. Cicero and Lucullus,
however, little pleased at this, undertook to kill both Caesar and
Pompey through the help of a certain Lucius Vettius; but they failed of
their attempt and all but lost their own lives as well. For Vettius,
upon being exposed and arrested before he had accomplished anything,
denounced them; and had he not charged Bibulus also with being in the
plot against the two, it would certainly have gone hard with them. But
as it was, owing to the fact that in his defence he accused this man
who had revealed the plan to Pompey, it was suspected that he was not
speaking the truth in the case of the others either, but had been
prompted in the matter as a result of a plot of the other side to
calumniate their opponents. Concerning these matters various reports
were current, since nothing was definitely proven. Vettius was brought
before the populace, and after naming only those whom I have mentioned,
was thrown into prison, where he was treacherously murdered a little
later. In consequence of this affair, Cicero became suspected by Caesar
and Pompey, and he confirmed their suspicion in his defence of Antonius.
The latter, while governor of Macedonia, had inflicted many injuries
upon the subject territory as well as upon that which was in alliance
with Rome, and had suffered many disasters in return. For after
ravaging the possessions of the Dardanians and their neighbours, he did
not dare to await their attack, but pretending to retire with his
cavalry for some other purpose, took to flight; in this way the enemy
surrounded his infantry and forcibly drove them out of the country,
even taking away their plunder from them. When he tried the same
tactics on the allies in Moesia, he was defeated near the city of the
Istrians by the Bastarnian Scythians who came to their aid; and
thereupon he ran away. It was not for this conduct, however, that he
was accused, but he was indicted for complicity in Catiline's
conspiracy; yet he was convicted on the former charge, so that it was
his fate to be found not guilty of the crime for which he was being
tried, but to be punished for something of which he was not accused.
That was the way he came off. But Cicero, who defended him at this time
because Antonius had been his colleague, made a most bitter attack upon
Caesar, whom he held responsible for the suit against him, and even
went so far as to heap abuse upon him.
Caesar was naturally indignant at this, but, although consul, refused
to be the author of any insolent speech or act against him. He said
that the multitude often purposely cast many idle slurs upon their
superiors, in the effort to draw them into strife, so that they might
seem to be their equals and of like importance with them, in case they
should get anything similar said of themselves; and he did not see fit
to make anybody his rival in this manner. This, then, was his attitude
toward others who insulted him in any way, and so now, when he saw that
Cicero was not so anxious to abuse him as to receive similar abuse in
return, he paid little heed to his traducer, ignoring all he said;
indeed, he allowed him to indulge in abuse without stint, as if it were
so much praise showered upon him. Still, he did not disregard him
entirely. For, although Caesar possessed in reality a rather mild
nature, and was not at all easily moved to anger, he nevertheless
punished many, since his interests were so numerous, yet in such wise
that it was not done in anger nor always immediately. He did not
indulge in wrath at all, but watched for his opportunity, and his
vengeance pursued the majority of his foes without their knowing it.
For he did not act in such a way as to seem to be defending himself
against anybody, but so as to arrange everything to his own advantage
while arousing the least hatred. Therefore he visited his retribution
secretly and in places where one would least have expected it, both for
the sake of his reputation, in order to avoid seeming to be of a
wrathful disposition, and also to the end that no one should learn of
it beforehand and so be on his guard, or try to inflict some serious
injury upon him before being injured. For he was not so much concerned
about what had already occurred as he was to prevent future attacks. As
a result he would pardon many of those, even, who had vexed him
greatly, or pursue them only to a limited extent, because he believed
they would do no further injury; whereas upon many others he took
vengeance, even beyond what was fitting, with an eye to his own safety.
What was once done, he said, he could never make undone by any penalty,
but because of the severity of the punishment he would for the future
at least suffer no harm.
In view of these considerations he was inclined to do nothing on this
occasion also; but when he ascertained that Clodius was willing to do
him a favour in return for the fact that he had not accused him of
adultery, he set this man secretly against Cicero. In the first place,
in order that he might be lawfully excluded from the patricians, he
transferred him with Pompey's coöperation to the plebeian status
once more, and than immediately had him appointed tribune. This
Clodius, then, silenced Bibulus, when at the expiration of his office
he entered the Forum and intended on connexion with taking the oath to
deliver a speech about the existing state of affairs; and he attacked
Cicero also. But since he decided that it was not easy to overthrow a
man who had very great influence in the state by reason of his skill in
speaking, he proceeded to conciliate not only the populace, but also
the knights and the senate, by whom Cicero was held in the highest
regard. His hope was that if he could make these men his own, he might
easily cause the downfall of the orator, whose strength lay rather in
the fear than in the good-will which he inspired. For Cicero annoyed
great numbers by his speeches, and those whom he aided were not so
thoroughly won to his side as those whom he injured were alienated; for
most men are more ready to reel irritation at what displeases them than
to feel grateful to any one for kindnesses, and they think that they
have paid their advocates in full with their fee, while their chief
concern is to get even with their opponents in some way or other.
Cicero, moreover, made for himself very bitter enemies by always
striving to get the better of even the most powerful men and by always
employing an unbridled and excessive frankness of speech toward all
alike; for he was in pursuit of a reputation for sagacity and eloquence
such as no one else possessed, even in preference to being thought a
good citizen. As a result of this and because he was the greatest
boaster alive and regarded no one as equal to himself, but in his words
and life alike looked down upon everybody and would not live as any one
else did, he was wearisome and burdensome, and was consequently both
disliked and hated even by those very persons whom he otherwise pleased.
Clodius, therefore, hoped on this account that if he should first win
over the senate and the knights and the populace he could quickly crush
him. So he straightway went to distributing free corn; for when
Gabinius and Piso had now become consuls, he had introduced his motion
that it should be doled out to the needy; and he revived the
associations called collegia in the native language, which had existed
of old but had been abolished for some time. He also forbade the
censors to remove anybody from any order or to censure any one, except
as he should be tried and convicted before them both.
After offering them this lure he proposed another law, concerning which
it is necessary to speak at some length, so that it may become clearer
to the general public. Public divination was obtained from the sky and
from certain other sources, as I have said, but that of the sky had the
greatest authority — so much so, in fact, that while the other auguries
were many in number and were taken for each action, this one was taken
but once and for the whole day. This was the most peculiar feature
about it; but there was the further difference that whereas in
reference to all other matters sky-divination either allowed things to
be done, in which case they were carried out without consulting any
individual augury further, or else would prevent and hinder something,
yet it stopped the voting of the people altogether, serving always as a
portent to check them, whether it was of a favourable or unfavourable
nature. The cause of this custom I am unable to state, but I set down
the common report. Accordingly, many persons who wished to obstruct the
appointment of magistrates that came before the popular assembly were
in the habit of announcing that they would look for omens from the sky
that day, so that during it the people would have no power to pass any
measure. Clodius, now, was afraid that if he indicted Cicero some might
adopt this means to secure the postponement or delay of the trial; and
so he introduced a measure that none of the magistrates should observe
the signs from heaven on the days when it was necessary for the people
to vote on anything.
Such were the measures which he then drew up with reference to Cicero.
The latter understood what was afoot and induced Lucius Ninnius
Quadratus, a tribune, to oppose every move; so Clodius, fearing that
some disturbance and delay might arise as a result, outwitted him by
deceit. He first made an agreement with Cicero to bring no indictment
against him, if the other would not interfere with any of the measures
he proposed; thereupon, while Cicero and Ninnius remained quiet, he
secured the passage of the laws, and then made his attack upon the
orator. And thus the latter, who thought himself extremely shrewd, was
deceived on that occasion by Clodius — if, indeed, it is proper to
speak here of Clodius and not rather of Caesar and the others who were
in league with the two. Now the law that Clodius next proposed was not
on its face enacted against Cicero, since it did not contain his name,
but was directed against all, without exception, who should put to
death or even had put to death any citizens without the condemnation of
the people; yet in reality it was drawn up with especial reference to
the orator. It brought within its scope, indeed, the entire senate,
because that body had charged the consuls with the protection of the
city, by which act it was permitted them to take such steps, and
afterwards had condemned Lentulus and the others who were put to death
at that time. Nevertheless, Cicero received the whole blame, or at
least the greater part of it, since he had laid information against the
men and had on each occasion made the motion and put the vote and
finally had exacted the penalty of them through those entrusted with
such business. For this reason he vigorously opposed Clodius' measure
in every way; in particular, he discarded his senatorial dress and went
about in the garb of the knights, paying court meanwhile, as he went
the rounds, day and night alike, to all who had any influence, not only
of his friends but also of his opponents, and especially to Pompey and
even Caesar, inasmuch as the latter concealed his enmity toward him.
Now these men, indeed, did not wish to appear to have instigated
Clodius themselves, or even to be pleased with his measures, and so
they devised the following plan, involving no discredit to themselves
but obscure to Cicero, for deceiving him. Caesar, for his part, advised
him to yield, for fear he might lose his life if he remained in the
city; and in order to have it believed the more readily that he was
doing this through good-will, he promised to employ him as his
lieutenant, so that he might retire out of Clodius' way, not in
disgrace, as if under investigation, but in a position of command and
with honour. Pompey, however, tried to turn him aside from this course,
calling the act outright desertion, and uttering insinuations against
Caesar to the effect that through enmity he was not giving sound
advice; as for himself, he advised him to remain and boldly defend both
himself and the senate and thus avenge himself at once upon Clodius.
The latter, he declared, would not be able to accomplish anything with
Cicero present and confronting him, and would furthermore meet his
deserts, since he, Pompey, would also coöperate to this end. Now
when these two expressed themselves thus, not because their views were
opposed, but for the purpose of deceiving their victim without arousing
his suspicion, Cicero attached himself to Pompey. Of him he had no
previous suspicion and was absolutely confident of being saved by his
assistance. For in the first place, many respected and honoured him as
one who saved numerous persons in grave peril, some from the judges and
others from their very accusers; and Clodius, in particular, had
formerly been a relative of Pompey's and had long served under him, so
that it seemed likely that he would do nothing that failed to accord
with his wishes. As for Gabinius, Cicero supposed he could count on him
absolutely as an adherent, since he was a good friend of his, and
equally on Piso, because of his amiability as well as his kinship with
Caesar. On the basis of these calculations, then, he hoped to win,
since he was now unreasonably confident, even as he had before been
unduly terrified; and fearing that his withdrawal from the city would
seem to have been occasioned by a bad conscience, he listened to
Pompey, though he said that he was considerably obliged to Caesar.
And thus Cicero, deceived in this wise, was preparing as if for a great
victory over his enemies. For, in addition to the grounds for hope
already mentioned, the knights assembled on the Capitol and sent envoys
in his behalf to the consuls and senate, some from their own number,
and also the senators Quintus Hortensius and Gaius Curio. Ninnius, too,
in addition to his assistance in other ways urged the populace to
change their apparel, as if for a general calamity. And many of the
senators also did this, and would not change back until the consuls
rebuked them by an edict.
The forces of his adversaries were more powerful, however. Clodius
would not allow Ninnius to take any action on his behalf, and Gabinius
would not grant the knights access to the senate; on the contrary, he
drove one of them, who was very insistent, out of the city, and rebuked
Hortensius and Curio for having been present in the assembly of the
knights and for having undertaken the mission. Moreover, Clodius
brought them before the populace, where they were soundly belaboured
for their mission by some appointed agents. After this Piso, though he
seemed well-disposed towards Cicero and had advised him, on seeing that
it was impossible for him to attain safety by any other means, to slip
away in time, nevertheless, when the other took offence at this
counsel, came before the assembly at the first opportunity (he was too
ill most of the time) and to the question of Clodius as to what opinion
he held regarding the proposed measure said: "No deed of cruelty or
sadness pleases me." Gabinius, too, on being asked the same question,
not only failed to praise Cicero but even accused both the knights and
the senate.
Caesar, however, who had already taken the field, and whom Clodius
could therefore make arbiter of the measure only by assembling the
populace outside the walls, condemned the illegality of the action
taken in regard to Lentulus, but still did not approve the punishment
proposed for it. Every one knew, he said, all that had been in his mind
concerning the events of that time, as he had cast his vote in favour
of sparing their lives, but it was not fitting for any such law to be
drawn up with regard to events now past. This was Caesar's advice.
Crassus showed some favour to Cicero through his son, but himself took
the side of the multitude. Pompey kept promising him assistance, but by
making various excuses at different times and purposely arranging many
journeys out of town, failed to defend him.
Cicero, perceiving this, became afraid and again undertook to resort to
arms, among other things even abusing Pompey openly; but he was stopped
by Cato and Hortensius, for fear a civil war might result. Then at last
he departed, against his will, and with the shame and ill-repute of
having gone into exile voluntarily, as if conscience-stricken. But
before leaving he ascended the Capitol and dedicated a little image of
Minerva, whom he styled "Protectress." And he set out secretly for
Sicily; for he had once been governor there, and entertained a lively
hope that he should be honoured among its towns and private citizens
and by their governor. On his departure the law took effect; so far
from meeting with any opposition, it was supported, as soon as he was
once out of the way, by those very persons, among others, who had
seemed to be the most active workers in Cicero's behalf. His property
was confiscated, his house was razed to the ground, as though it had
been an enemy's, and its site was dedicated for a temple of Liberty.
Against Cicero himself a decree of exile was passed, and he was
forbidden to tarry in Sicily; for he was banished five hundred miles
from Rome, and it was further proclaimed that if he should ever appear
within those limits, both he and those who harboured him might be slain
with impunity.
He accordingly went over to Macedonia and spent his time there in
lamentations. But there met him a man named Philiscus, who had made his
acquaintance in Athens and now by chance fell in with him again. "Are
you not ashamed, Cicero," he said, "to be weeping and behaving like a
woman? Really, I should never have expected that you, who have enjoyed
such an excellent and varied education, and who have acted as advocate
to many, would grow so faint-hearted."
"But," replied the other, "it is not at all the same thing, Philiscus,
to speak for others as to advise one's self. The words spoken in
others' behalf, proceeding from a mind that is firm and unshaken, are
most opportune; but when some affliction overwhelms the spirit, it
becomes turbid and darkened and cannot reason out anything that is
opportune. For this reason, I suppose, it has been very well said that
it is easier to counsel others than to be strong oneself under
suffering."
"That is but human nature," rejoined Philiscus. "I did not think,
however, that you, who are gifted with so much sound sense and have
practised so much wisdom, had failed to prepare yourself for all human
possibilities, so that even if some unexpected accident should befall
you, it would not find you unfortified at any point. But since, now,
you are in this plight,... for I might be of some little assistance to
you by rehearsing a few appropriate arguments. And thus, just as men
who put a hand to others'burdens relieve them, so I might lighten this
misfortune of yours, and the more easily than they, inasmuch as I shall
not take upon myself even the smallest part of it. Surely you will not
deem it unbecoming, I trust, to receive some encouragement from
another, since if you were sufficient for yourself, we should have no
need of these words. As it is, you are in a like case to Hippocrates or
Democedes or any of the other great physicians, if one of them had
fallen ill of a disease hard to cure and had need of another's aid to
bring about his own recovery."
"Indeed," said Cicero, "if you have any arguments that will dispel this
mist from my soul and restore me to the light of old, I am most ready
to listen. For words, as drugs, are of many varieties, and divers
potencies, so that it will not be surprising if you should be able to
steep in some mixture of philosophy even me, for all my brilliant feats
in the senate, the assemblies, and the law-courts."
"Come then," continued Philiscus, "since you are ready to listen, let
us consider first whether these conditions that surround you are
actually bad, and next in what way we may cure them. First of all, now,
I see you are in excellent physical health and strength, which is
surely man's chief natural blessing; and, next, that you have the
necessities of life in sufficiency so as not to hunger or thirst or
suffer cold or endure any other hardship through lack of means — which
may appropriately be set down as the second natural blessing for man.
For when one's physical condition is good and one can live without
anxiety, all the factors essential to happiness are enjoyed."
To this Cicero replied: "But not one of these things is of use when
some grief is preying upon one's mind; for mental cares cause one far
more distress than bodily comforts cause pleasure. Even so, I also at
present set no value on my physical health, because I am suffering in
mind, nor yet on the abundance of necessaries; for my loss is great
indeed."
"And does this grieve you?" replied the other. "Now if you were going
to be in want of things needful, there would be some reason for your
being annoyed at your loss. But since you have all necessaries in full
measure, why do you distress yourself because you do not possess more?
For all that one has beyond one's needs is superfluous, and amounts to
the same thing whether present or absent; since surely you did not make
use formerly of what was not necessarily. Consider, therefore, either
that than what you did not need you did not have, or else that you now
have what you do not need. Most of these things, indeed, were not yours
by inheritance, that you should be particularly exercised about them,
but were acquired by your own tongue and by your own words — the very
things which caused you to lose them. You should not, therefore, be
vexed if things have been lost in the same manner in which they were
won. Ship-masters, for example, do not take it greatly to heart when
they suffer great losses; for they understand, I suspect, how to take
the sensible view of it, namely, that the sea which gives them wealth
takes it away again.
"So much for the present point; for I think it should be enough for a
man's happiness to have a sufficiency and to lack nothing that the body
requires, and I hold that everything in excess involves anxiety,
trouble, and jealousy. As for your saying, now, that there is no
enjoyment of physical blessings unless those of the spirit are also
present, that is indeed true, since it is impossible, if the spirit is
in a poor state, that the body should fail to share in its ailment;
nevertheless, I think it much easier therefore one to look after his
mental health than his physical. For the body, being of flesh, contains
in itself many dangers and requires much assistance from the divine
power; whereas the spirit, of a nature more divine, can easily be
trained and prompted. Let us see here also, then, what spiritual
blessing has abandoned you and what evil had come upon you that we may
not shake off.
"First, then, I see that you are a man of the greatest sagacity. The
proof is that you so often persuaded both the senate and the people in
cases where you gave them advice, and so often helped private citizens
in cases where you acted as their advocate. And secondly, I see that
you are a most just man. Certainly you have always been found
contending for your country and for your friends against those who
plotted their ruin. Indeed, this very misfortune which you have now
suffered has befallen you for no other reason than that you continued
to say and do everything in behalf of the laws and of the constitution.
Again, that you have attained the highest degree of self-mastery is
shown by your very course of life, since it is not possible for a man
who is a slave to sensual pleasures to appear constantly in public and
to go to and fresco in the Forum, making his deeds by day witnesses of
those by night. This being the case, I, for my part, supposed you were
also very brave, enjoying, as you did, such force of intellect and such
power of oratory. But it seems that, startled out of yourself through
having failed contrary to your hopes and deserts, you have fallen a
little short of true courage. But you will regain this immediately, and
as you are thus equipped as I have pointed out, with a good physical
endowment as well as mental, I cannot see what it is that is
distressing you."
At the end of this speech of his Cicero replied: "There seems to you,
then, to be no great evil in disfranchisement and exile and in not
living at home or being with your friends, but, instead, living in a
foreign land, and wandering about with the name of exile, causing
laughter to your enemies and disgrace to your friends?"
"Not in the least, so far as I can see," declared Philiscus. "There are
two elements of which we are constituted, soul and body, and definite
blessings and evils are given to each of the two by Nature herself. Now
if there should be any defect in these two, it would properly be
considered injurious and disgraceful; but if all should be right with
them, it would be useful instead. This is your condition at the present
moment. Those things which you mentioned, banishment and
disfranchisement, and anything else of the sort, are disgraceful and
evil only by convention and a certain popular opinion, and work no
injury on either body or soul. What body could you cite that has fallen
ill or perished and what spirit that has grow more unjust or even more
ignorant through disfranchisement or exile or anything of that sort? I
see none. And the reason is that no one of these things is by nature
evil, just as neither citizenship nor residence in one's country is
itself excellent, but whatever opinion each one of us holds about them,
such they seem to be. For instance, men do not universally apply the
penalty of disfranchisement to the same acts, but certain deeds which
are reprehensible in some places are praised in others, and various
actions honoured by one people are punished by another. Indeed, some do
not so much as know the name, nor the thing which it implies. And
naturally enough; for whatever does not touch that which belong to
man's nature is thought to have no bearing upon him. Precisely in the
same way, therefore, as it would be most ridiculous, surely, if some
judgment or decree were to be rendered that So-and-so is sick or
So-and-so is base, so does the case stand regarding disfranchisement.
"The same thing I find to be true in regard to exile. It is a sojourn
abroad involving disfranchisement; so that if disfranchisement in and
of itself contains no evil, surely no evil can be attached to exile
either. In fact, many live abroad anyway for very long periods, some
unwillingly, but others willingly; and some even spend their whole life
travelling about, just as if they were expelled from every place in
turn; and yet they do not regard themselves as being injured in doing
so. Nor does it make any difference whether a man does it voluntarily
or not; the man who trains his body unwillingly is no less strong than
he who does it willingly, and one who goes on a voyage unwillingly
obtains no less benefit than another. And as regards this unwillingness
itself, I do not see how it can exist with a man of sense. Accordingly,
if the difference between being well and badly off is that we do some
things readily and voluntarily, while we perform others unwillingly and
grudgingly, the trouble can easily be remedied. For it we willingly
endure all necessary things and allow none of them to conquer us, all
those matters in which one might assume unwillingness have been done
away with at a single stroke. There is, indeed, an old saying and a
very good one, to the effect that we ought not to demand that whatever
we wish should come to pass, but to wish for whatever does come to pass
as the result of any necessity. For we neither have free choice in our
manner of life nor are we our own masters; but according as it may suit
chance, and according to the character of the fortune granted each one
of us for the fulfillment of what is ordained, we must also shape our
life.
"Such is the nature of the case whether we like it or not. If, now, it
is not disfranchisement in itself or exile in itself that troubles you,
but the fact that you have not only done your country no injury but
have actually benefited her greatly, and yet you have been
disenfranchised and expelled, look at it in this way — that, when once
it was destined for you to have such an experience, it has surely been
the noblest and the best fortune that could befall you to be
despitefully used without having committed any wrong. For you advised
and carried out all that was proper for the citizens, not as an
individual but as consul, not meddling officiously in a private
capacity but obeying the decrees of the senate, which were not passed
as party measures but for the best ends. This and that person, on the
contrary, out of their superior power and insolence devised everything
against you; hence they ought to have trouble and sorrow for their
injustice, but for you it is noble as well as necessary to bear bravely
what Heaven has determined. Surely you would not prefer to have joined
with Catiline and conspired with Lentulus, to have given your country
the exact opposite of useful counsel, to have performed none of the
duties laid upon you by her, and thus remain at home as the reward of
wickedness, instead of saving your country and being exiled.
Accordingly, if you care at all about your reputation, it is far
preferable, I am sure, for you to have been driven out, after doing no
wrong, than to have remained at home by performing some base act; for,
apart from other considerations, the shame attaches to those who have
unjustly cast a man forth, rather than to the man who has been wantonly
expelled.
"Moreover, the story, as I heard it, was that you did not depart
unwillingly, near after conviction, but of your own accord; that you
hated to live with them, seeing that you could not make them better and
would not endure to perish with them, and that you fled, not from your
country, but from those who were plotting against her. Consequently it
would be they who are dishonoured and banished, having cast out all
that is good from their souls, and it would be you who are honoured and
fortunate, as being nobody's slave in unseemly fashion but possessing
all that is needful, whether you choose to live in Sicily, or in
Macedonia, or anywhere else in the world. For surely it is not places
that give either success or misfortune of any sort, but each man
creates his own country and his own happiness always and everywhere.
This was the feeling of Camillus when he was fain to dwell in Ardea;
this was the way Scipio reasoned when he spent his last days in
Liternum without grieving. But why mention Aristides or Themistocles,
men whom exile rendered more famous, or . . . or Solon, who of his own
accord left home for ten years?
"Therefore, do you likewise cease to consider irksome any such thing as
pertains neither to our physical nor to our spiritual nature, and do
not vex yourself at what has happened. For to us belongs no choice, as
I told you, of living as we please, but it is absolutely necessary for
us to endure what Heaven determines. If we do this voluntarily, we
shall not be grieved; but if involuntarily, we shall not escape at all
what is fated, and we shall at the same time acquire the greatest of
ills — the distressing of our hearts to no purpose. The proof of this
is that men who bear good-naturedly the most outrageous fortunes do not
regard themselves as being in any very dreadful plight, while those who
are disturbed at the lightest disappointments imagine that all human
ills are theirs. And people in general, both those who manage
unfavourable conditions well, make their good or ill fortune appear to
others to be just what they make it for themselves. Bear this in mind,
then, and be not cast down by your present state, nor grieve if you
learn that the men who exiled you are flourishing. For the successes of
men are vain and ephemeral at best, and the higher a man climbs as a
result of them, the more easily, like a breath, does he fall,
especially in partisan strife. Borne along in the midst of troubled and
unstable conditions they differ little, if at all, from sailors in a
storm, but are tossed up and down, now hither, now thither; and if they
make the slightest mistake, they are sure to sink. Not to mention
Drusus, or Scipio, or the Gracchi, or certain others, remember how
Camillus, the exile, later came off better than Capitolinus, and
remember how greatly Aristides afterwards surpassed Themistocles.
"Do you also, then, hope, first and foremost, for your restoration; for
you have not been expelled on account of wrong-doing, and the very ones
who drove you forth will, as I learn, seek for you, while all will miss
you. But even if you continue in your present state, do not distress
yourself at all about it. For if you will take my advice, you will be
quite satisfied to pick out a little estate in some retired spot on the
coast and there carry on at the same time farming and some historical
writing, like Xenophon and like Thucydides. This form of learning is
most enduring and best adapted to every man and to every state; and
exile brings with it a kind of leisure that is more fruitful. If, then,
you wish to become really immortal, like those historians, emulate
them. You have the necessary means in sufficiency and you lack no
distinction. For it there is any virtue in such honours, you have been
consul; nothing more belongs to those who have held office a second, a
third, or a fourth time, except an array of idle letters which benefit
no man, living or dead. Hence you would not choose to be Corvinus, or
Marius, the man seven times consul, rather than Cicero. Nor, again, are
you anxious for any position of command, seeing that you withdrew from
the one bestowed upon you, because you scorned the gains to be had from
it, scorned a brief authority that was object to the scrutiny of all
who chose to practise blackmail. These matters I have mentioned, not
because any one of them is requisite for happiness, but because, since
it was necessary, you have occupied yourself sufficiently with public
affairs to learn therefrom the difference in lives and to choose the
one course and reject the other, to pursue the one and avoid the other.
Our life is but short, and you ought not to I've all yours for others,
but by this time to grant a little to yourself. Consider how much
better quiet is than turmoil, and tranquillity than tumults, freedom
than slavery, and safety than dangers, that you may feel a desire to
live as I am urging you to do. In this way you will be happy, and your
name shall be great because of it — and that for evermore, whether you
are living or dead.
"If, however, you are eager for your restoration and aim at a brilliant
political career, I do not wish to say anything unpleasant, but I fear,
as I cast my eyes over the situation and call to mind your frankness of
speech, and behold the power and numbers of your adversaries, that you
may meet defeat once more. If then you should encounter exile, you will
have merely to experience a change of heart; but if you should incur
some fatal punishment, you will not be able even to repent. And yet is
it not a dreadful and disgraceful thing to have one's head cut off and
set up in the Forum, for any man or woman, it may be, to insult? Do not
hate me as one who prophesies evil to you, but pay heed to me as to one
announcing a warning from Heaven. Do not let the fact that you have
certain friends among the powerful deceive you. You will get no help
against those who hate you from the men who seem to love you, as,
indeed, you have learned by experience. For those who have a passion
for power regard everything else as nothing in comparison with
obtaining what they desire, and often give up their dearest friends and
closest kin in exchange for their bitterest foes."
On hearing this Cicero grew somewhat easier in mind. His exile,
however, did not last long, but he was recalled by Pompey himself, who
had been chiefly responsible for his expulsion. The reason was this.
Clodius had taken a bribe to deliver Tigranes the younger, who was
still at that time in confinement at the house of Lucius Flavius, and
had let him go; and when Pompey and Gabinius became indignant at this,
he wantonly insulted them, inflicted blows and wounds upon their
followers, broke to pieces the consul's fasces, and devoted his
property to the gods. Pompey, enraged at this, particularly because the
authority which he himself had restored to the tribunes had been used
against him by Clodius, desired to recall Cicero, and immediately began
through Ninnius to work for his restoration. The latter waited for
Clodius to be absent, and then introduced in the senate the motion in
Cicero's behalf. When another one of the tribunes opposed him, he not
only posted up his measure, indicating that he would communicate it
also to the people, but he furthermore set himself in unqualified
opposition to Clodius at every point. From this there arose contentions
and many wounds in consequence for both sides. But before matters
reached that point Clodius wished to get Cato out of the way, so that
he might more easily succeed with his schemes, and likewise to avenge
himself upon Ptolemy, who then held Cyprus, because the latter had
failed to ransom him from the pirates. Hence he declared the island the
property of the state and despatched Cato, very much against the
latter's will, to attend to its administration.
While this was going on in the city, Caesar found no hostility in Gaul,
but everything was absolutely quiet. The state of peace, however, did
not continue, but first one war broke out against him of its own
accord, and then another was added, so that his greatest wish was
fulfilled of waging war and winning success for the whole period of his
command (?). The Helvetii, who were strong in numbers and had not
sufficient land for their large population, were unwilling to send out
a part to form a colony for fear that if separated they might be more
exposed to plots on the part of the tribes whom they had once injured;
instead, they decided to migrate all together, with the intention of
settling in some larger and better country, and they burned all their
villages and cities, so that none should regret the migration. After
adding to their numbers some others who felt the same needs, they set
out with Orgetorix as their leader, intending to cross the Rhone and
settle somewhere near the Alps. When Caesar destroyed the bridge and
made other preparations to hinder them from crossing, they sent to him
asking permission to cross and also promising to do no injury to the
Roman territory. And though he had the greatest distrust of them and
had not the slightest idea of allowing them to proceed, nevertheless,
because he was not yet well prepared he answered that he wished to
consult his lieutenants about their requests and would give them their
reply on a stated day; in fact he held out some little hope that he
would grant them the passage. Meanwhile he dug ditches and erected
walls in the most commanding positions, so as to make the road
impassable for them.
Accordingly the barbarians waited for a time, and then, when they heard
nothing as agreed, they set out and proceeded first through the country
of the Allobroges, as they had begun. Then, encountering the obstacles,
they turned aside into the territory of the Sequani and passed through
their land as well as that of the Aedui, who gave them a free passage
on condition that they should do no harm; but instead of abiding by the
agreement, they went to plundering their country. Then the Sequani and
Aedui sent to Caesar asking for assistance and begging him not to let
them be ruined. Although their statements did not correspond at all
with their past deeds, they nevertheless obtained their request. For
Caesar was afraid the Helvetii might turn also against Tolosa, and
chose to drive them back with the help of the other tribes, rather than
to fight them all after they had come to an understanding, which it was
clear they would otherwise do. Consequently he fell upon the Helvetii
as they were crossing the Arar, annihilating at the very ford those who
were bringing up the rear, and so alarming those who had gone ahead by
the suddenness and swiftness of his pursuit and the report of their
losses, that they desired to come to terms, on condition of receiving
some land. They did not, however, reach any agreement; for when they
were asked for hostages, they became offended, not because they were
distrusted, but because they thought it unworthy of them to give
hostages to anyone. So they disdained a truce and went forward again.
When Caesar's cavalry galloped far ahead of the infantry and proceeded
to harass their rear-guard, the enemy withstood them with their own
cavalry and conquered them. Filled with pride in consequence, and
thinking that he, too, had fled, both because of the defeat and
because, owing to lack of provisions, he turned aside to a city that
was off the road, they abandoned further progress and pursued after
him. Caesar, seeing this and fearing the violence of their attack as
well as their numbers, hurried with his infantry to some higher ground,
but first threw forward his horsemen to bear the brunt of the fighting
until he could marshal his forces in a suitable place. The barbarians
routed them a second time and were making a spirited charge straight up
the hill, when Caesar with his forces in battle-array dashed down upon
them suddenly from his superior position, while they were scattered,
and so repulsed them without difficulty. After these had been routed,
some others who had not joined in the conflict — for owing to their
multitude and their haste not all had arrived at the same time —
attacked the pursuers in the rear and threw them into some confusion,
but gained no advantage. For Caesar, leaving the fugitives to his
cavalry, and turning himself with his heavy-armed troops to the others,
defeated them and followed both bodies as they fled together to the
waggons; and there, though from these vehicles they made a vigorous
defence, he vanquished them again. After this reverse the barbarians
divided into two parties. The one came to terms with him, and going
back again to their native land, whence they had set out, they rebuilt
and occupied their cities there. The others refused to surrender their
arms, and, with the idea that they could get back again to their old
home, set out for the Rhine; but being few in numbers and labouring
under a defeat, they were easily annihilated by the allies of the
Romans through whose territory they passed.
Such was the first war that Caesar fought, and he did not remain quiet
after this beginning; instead, he at the same time satisfied his own
desire and did the allies a favour. For the Sequani and Aedui, who had
marked his desire and had noticed that his deeds corresponded with his
hopes, were willing at one stroke to bestow a benefit upon him and to
take vengeance upon the Germans, who were their neighbours. The latter
had at some time in the remote past crossed the Rhine, cut off portions
of their territory, and rendered them tributaries, taking hostages from
them. And because they happened to be asking what Caesar was anxious
for, they easily persuaded him to assist them.
Now Ariovistus was the ruler of those Germans; his authority had been
confirmed by the Romans and he had been enrolled among their friends
and allies by Caesar himself during his consulship. In comparison,
however, with the glory to be derived from the war and the power which
that glory would bring, the Roman general heeded none of these
considerations, except in so far as he wished to get some excuse for
the quarrel from the barbarian, so that he should not appear to be in
any way the aggressor against Ariovistus. Therefore he sent for him,
pretending that he wished to have a conference with him. Ariovistus,
instead of obeying, replied: "If Caesar wishes to say anything to me,
let him come to me himself. I am not inferior to him, anyway, and the
man who has need of another should himself go to that person."
Thereupon Caesar became angry on the ground that he had thereby
insulted all the Romans, and he immediately demanded of him the
hostages of the allies and forbade him either to set foot on their land
or to bring any reinforcements from home. This he did, not with the
idea of scaring him, but because he hoped to enrage him and by that
means to gain a good and plausible pretext for the war. And this was
what happened. The barbarian, angered by these demands, made a long and
harsh reply, so that Caesar no longer bandied words with him, but
straightway, before any one was aware of his intentions, seized on
Vesontio, the city of the Sequani.
Meanwhile reports reached the soldiers that Ariovistus was making
vigorous preparations, and also that many other Germans had either
already crossed the Rhine to assist him or had collected on the very
bank of the river to attack the Romans suddenly; hence they fell into
deep dejection. Alarmed by the stature of their enemies, by their
numbers, their boldness, and consequent ready threats, they were in
such a mood as to feel that they were going to contend not against men,
the against uncanny ferocious wild beasts. And the talk was that they
were undertaking a war which was none of their business and had not
been decreed, merely on account of Caesar's personal ambition; and they
threatened also to desert him if he did not change his course. So he,
when he hear of it, did not make any address to the common soldiers,
since he thought it was not a good plan to discuss such matters before
a crowd, and that if he did, these things would get out and reach the
enemy, and since he feared his soldiers might perchance refuse
obedience, raise a tumult, and do some harm, but he assembled his
lieutenants and subalterns and spoke before them as follows:
"My friends, we ought not, I think, to deliberate about public
interests in the same way as about private. In fact, I do not see that
the same goal is set for each men privately as for all together
publicly. For though we may for ourselves take the course that is most
expedient and safe, yet for the people we should both adopt and carry
out only the measures that are best. Even in private matters it is
necessary to be energetic; so only can a respectable position be
maintained. Still, a man who is least occupied with affairs is thought
to be also safest. But a state, especially if it holds sway over
others, would be very quickly overthrown by such a course. These laws,
not drawn up by man but exacted by Nature herself, always have existed,
do exist, and will exist so long as the race of mortals endures.
"This being the case, no one of you at this juncture should have an eye
to what is privately agreeable and safe so much as to what is
creditable and advantageous to all the Romans. For, apart from the
other considerations that may naturally arise, reflect in particular
that we who are so many and of such rank — members of the senate and
knights — have come here accompanied by a great multitude of soldiers
and with money in abundance, not that we may take our ease or neglect
our duties, but for the purpose of managing rightly the affairs of our
subjects, preserving in safety the property of those bound to us by
treaty, repelling any who undertake to do them wrong, and increasing
our own possessions. For if it was not in this spirit that we came, why
in the world did we take the field at all instead of contriving in some
manner or other to stay at home attending to our own affairs? Surely it
were better not to have undertaken the campaign than to give it up
after being assigned to it. If, however, some of use are here because
compelled by the laws to do what our country ordains, and the majority
of us voluntarily, on account of the honours and rewards that come from
the wars we wage, how could we either honourably or rightly cheat not
only the hopes of the men who sent us forth but also our own? For no
one can fare so well individually as not to be ruined with the
republic, if it should fall; but if the state prospers, it sustains all
the misfortunes of each individual citizen.
"I do not say this with reference to you who are here, my comrades and
friends; for you are not ignorant of these things, that you need to be
instructed in them, nor are you indifferent toward them, that you
require exhortation. I say it because I have ascertained that some of
the soldiers are themselves noisily talking to the effect that this war
we have undertaken is none of our business, and are stirring up the
rest to sedition. My purpose is that you yourselves may as a result of
my words make more unswerving the zeal you have for your country and
may also teach the others their whole duty. For they will be benefited
more by hearing it from you individually and repeatedly than they would
from learning it but once from my lips. Tell them, then, that it was
not by staying at home or shirking their campaigns or avoiding their
wars or pursuing their ease that our ancestors made the city so great,
but it was by bringing their minds to venture readily all that they
ought to do and their bodies to work out eagerly all the plans they had
determined upon; by risking their own possessions as if they belonged
to others, but acquiring readily the possessions of their neighbours as
their own, while they thought that happiness was nothing else than
doing their duty, and held that misfortune was nothing else than
resting inactive.
"It was in consequence of these principles, therefore, that those men,
who were in the beginning very few and dwelt in a city as small as any
at first, conquered the Latins, subdued the Sabines, mastered the
Etruscans, Volscians, Oscans, Lucanians and Samnites, in a word,
subjugated the whole land south of the Alps, and repulsed all the
foreign tribes that came against them. The later Romans, likewise, and
our own fathers imitated them, not being satisfied with what they had
inherited, but regarding sloth as their sure destruction and hardship
as their certain safety. They feared that if their treasures remained
unaugmented they would waste away of themselves and wear out with age,
and were ashamed after receiving so rich a heritage to add nothing to
it; accordingly they effected much greater and more numerous conquests.
But why mention individually Sardinia, Sicily, Macedonia, Illyria,
Greece, Ionian Asia, Bithynia, Spain, and Africa? And yet the
Carthaginians would have given them much money not to extend their
voyages thither, and much would Philip and Perseus have given to keep
them from making campaigns against them; Antiochus would have given
much, his sons and grandsons would have given much, to have them remain
in Europe. But those men in view of the glory and the greatness of the
empire did not choose to be ignobly idle or to enjoy their wealth in
security, nor did the older men of our generation who even now are
still alive; nay, as men who well knew that advantages are preserved by
the same methods by which they are acquired, they made sure of many of
their original possessions and also acquired many new ones. But here
again, why catalogue in detail Crete, Pontus, Cyprus, Asiatic Iberia,
Farther Albania, both Syrias, the two Armenias, Arabia, and Palestine?
Countries whose very names we did not know precisely in former times we
now rule, lording it over some ourselves and having bestowed others
upon various persons, so that we have gained from them revenues and
troops and honour and alliances.
"With such examples before you, now, do not bring shame upon the deeds
of the fathers nor let slip the empire which is already the greatest.
We cannot even deliberate in like manner with the rest of mankind who
have no possessions like ours. For them it suffices to live in ease
and, with safety guaranteed, to be subject to others, but for us it is
necessary to toil, to make campaigns, and to incur danger in guarding
our existing property. Against this prosperity many are plotting, since
everything that lifts people above their fellows arouses both emulation
and jealousy; and consequently an eternal warfare is waged by all
inferiors against those who excel them in any way. Hence either we
ought not in the first place to have grown powerful beyond other men,
or else, since we have become so great and have gained so many
possessions, it is fated for us either to rule our subjects firmly or
to perish utterly ourselves. For it is impossible for men who have
advanced to such distinction and to power so vast to live to themselves
without danger. Let us therefore obey Fortune and not repel her, seeing
that she voluntarily and at her own behest was present with our fathers
and now abides with us. But this result will not be attained if we cast
away our arms or desert or sit idly at home or even wander about
visiting our allies; it will be attained if we keep our arms constantly
in hand (this is the only way to preserve peace), practise the deeds of
war by actual fighting (this is the only way we shall not forever
having war), aid unhesitatingly those of our allies who ask for aid (in
this way we shall get many more), and do not indulge those of our
enemies who are always turbulent (in this way no one will any longer
care to wrong us).
"What though some god had become our surety that even if we should fail
to do all this, no one would plot against us and we should forever
enjoy in safety all that we have won, it would still be disgraceful to
say that we ought to keep quiet; yet those who are willing to do
nothing that is requisite would then have some show of excuse. But if,
as a matter of fact, it is inevitable that men who possess anything
should be plotted against by many, and if it behooves them to
anticipate their attacks; if those who hold quietly to their own
possessions risk losing even these, while those who without any
compulsion employ war to acquire the possessions also of others are
protecting their own as well,— for no one who fears for his own goods
covets those of his neighbour, since his fear concerning what he
already has effectually deters him from meddling in what does not
belong to him,— if all this be true, why, then, does any one say that
we ought not always to be acquiring something more?
"Do you not recall, partly from hearsay and partly from observation,
that none of the Italian races stopped plotting against our country
until our ancestors carried the wars into their territory, nor yet the
Epirots until our fathers crossed over into Greece? Nor Philip, who
intended to make a campaign even against Italy, until they harried his
land first; nor Perseus, or Antiochus, or Mithridates, until they
treated them in the same way? And why mention the other instances? But
take the Carthaginians; so long as they suffered no disaster at our
hands in Africa, they kept crossing into Italy, overrunning the
country, sacking the towns, and almost captured the city itself; but
when they began to have war made upon them, they fled altogether from
our land. One might instance the same results in the case of the Gauls
and Germans. For these peoples, while we remained on our side of the
Alps, often crossed them and ravaged a large part of Italy; but when we
ventured at last to make a campaign beyond our own borders and to bring
the war home to them, and also took away a part of their territory, we
never again saw any war begun by them in Italy, except once. When,
accordingly, in the face of these facts, anybody declares that we ought
not to make war, he simply says that we ought not to be rich, ought not
to rule others, ought not to be free, ought not to be Romans.
Therefore, just as you would not endure it if a man should say any of
these things, but would kill him even as he stood before you, so now
also, comrades, you must feel the same way toward those who make these
other statements, judging their disposition not by their words but by
their deeds.
"Therefore none of you will contend, I think, that this is not the
right point of view to take. If, however, any one thinks that because
no investigation has been made of this war in the senate and no vote
has been passed in the assembly we need be less eager, let him reflect
that while some, to be sure, of the many wars which have fallen to our
lot, have come about as a result of preparation and previous
announcement, yet others have occurred on the spur of the moment. For
this reason all uprisings that are made while we are staying at home
and keeping quiet, in which the beginning of the complaints arises from
some embassy, both call for and demand an inquiry into their nature and
the taking of a vote, after which the consuls and praetors must be
assigned to them and the forces sent out; but all that come to light
after commanders have already gone forth and taken the field are no
longer to be brought up for decision, but to be taken in hand promptly,
before they increase, as matters decreed ratified by the very urgency
of the crisis.
"Else for what reason did the people send you hither, for what reason
did they send me immediately after my consulship? Why did they, on the
one hand, elect me to hold command for five years at one time, as had
never been done before, and on the other hand equip me with four
legions, unless they believed that we should certainly be required to
fight? Surely it was not that we might be supported in idleness, or
that making visits to the allied cities and our subject territory, we
should prove a worse bane to them even than their enemies. Nobody would
make this assertion. It was rather that we might protect our own land,
ravage that of the enemy, and accomplish something worthy both of our
numbers and our expenditures. With this understanding, therefore, both
this war and every other whatsoever have been assigned and entrusted to
us. They acted very sensibly in leaving in our hands the decision as to
whom we should fight, instead of voting for the war themselves. For
they would not have been able to understand thoroughly the affairs of
our allies, being at such a distance from them, and would not have
taken measures with equal opportuneness against enemies who were
already informed and prepared. So we, on whom has devolved at once the
decision and the carrying out of the war, and who are turning our
weapons promptly against foes actually in the field, shall not be
waging the war without investigation or unjustly or incautiously.
"But suppose, now, some one of you should answer me with this
objection: 'What wrong has Ariovistus done so great that he should have
become an enemy of ours in place of a friend and ally?' Let any such
man consider the fact that one has to defend one's self against those
who are undertaking to do a wrong not merely on the basis of what they
do, but also on the basis of what they intend, and has to check their
growth promptly, before suffering any injury, instead of waiting until
the wrong is actually done and then taking vengeance. Now how could it
better be proved that he is hostile, nay, most hostile toward us than
by what he has done? I sent to him in a friendly way to bid him come to
us and consult with us about present conditions, and he neither came
nor promised that he would appear. And yet what did I do that was
unfair or unseemly or arrogant in summoning him as a friend or ally?
What insolence and wantonness, on the other hand, has he failed to show
in refusing to come! Is it not inevitable that he did this for one of
two reasons — either that he suspected he should suffer some harm or
that he felt contempt for us? Now if he felt any suspicion, he convicts
himself most clearly of conspiring against us; for no one, when he has
suffered no injury, is suspicious towards us, nor does one become so
with an upright and guileless mind; rather, it is those who have
prepared themselves to wrong others because of their own conscience
that harbour suspicion against them. If, on the other hand, nothing of
this sort was at the bottom of his action, but he merely looked down on
us and insulted us with overweening words, what must we expect him to
do when he lays hold of some real project? For when a man has shown
such disdain in matters where he was not going to gain anything, does
he not stand convicted from afar off of utter injustice both in thought
and in deed?
"Not content, now, with this, he further bade me come to him, if I
wanted anything of him. Do not, I beg of you, regard this addition as
any light matter; for it is weighty as an indication of his
disposition. As for his refusing to come to us, one speaking in his
defence might ascribe this to hesitation, or infirmity, or fear; but
his summoning me admits of no excuse, and furthermore proves that he
acted in the first instance from no other motive than a determination
in nothing and furthermore to make corresponding demands in every case.
And yet with what insolence and contumely does this very course of his
teem! The proconsul of the Romans summons a man and he does not come;
then some one summons the proconsul of the Romans — an Allobrogian! Do
not regard it as a slight matter and of little moment that he failed to
obey me, Caesar, or that he summoned me, Caesar. For it was not I who
summoned him, the Roman, the proconsul, the fasces, the authority,
legions; it was not I who was summoned by him, but all these. Privately
I have no relations with him, but in common we have all spoken and
acted, received his retort and suffered his scorn.
"Therefore the more anybody asserts that he has been enrolled among our
friends and among our allies, the more he will prove him to deserve our
hatred. Why? Because deeds such as not even any of those who are
avowedly our bitterest foes has ever ventured to do have been committed
by Ariovistus under the names of friendship and of alliance, as if he
had secured these for the very purpose of having a chance to wrong us
with impunity. But it was not to be insulted and plotted against that
we made our treaty with him at the time, nor will it be ourselves who
now break the truce. For we sent envoys to him as to one who was still
a friend and ally, but as to him — see how he has treated us!
Accordingly, just as when he chose to benefit us and desired to be well
treated in return, he justly obtained his wishes, so now, likewise,
when he pursues the opposite course in everything, he would most justly
be regarded in the light of a foe. Do not be surprised that I, who
myself once looked after some of his interests both in the senate and
in the assembly, now speak in this way. So far as I am concerned, I am
of the same mind now as then, and am not changing. And what is that? To
honour and reward the good and faithful, but to dishonour and punish
the evil and unfaithful. It is he that is changing front, in that he
does not make a fair and proper use of the privileges bestowed by us.
"Therefore, that we should go to war with him most justly, no one I
think will dispute. And that he is neither invincible nor even a
difficult adversary, you can see both from the other members of his
race, whom we have often conquered before and have recently conquered
very easily, and you can reason further from what we learn about the
man himself. For he has no force of his own at any time that is united
and welded together, and at present, since he is looking for nothing
serious, he is utterly unprepared. Hence, no one of his countrymen even
would readily aid him, not even if he makes most tempting offers; for
who would choose to be his ally and fight against us, if he had not
received any injury at our hands? Would they not all, rather
coöperate with us, instead of with him, in the desire of
overthrowing his despotic rule on their very borders, and of obtaining
from us some share of his territory? And even if some should band
together, they would not prove superior to us in any way. For, to omit
other considerations,— our numbers, our age, our experience, our
deeds,— who does not know that we have armour over all our body alike,
whereas they are for the most part unprotected, and that we employ both
reason and organization, whereas they are unorganized and rush at
everything impulsively? Do not, then, fear their violence nor yet the
magnitude either of their bodies or their shouting. For voice never yet
killed any man, and their bodies, having the same hands as ours, can
accomplish no more, but will be capable of much greater injury through
being both large and unprotected. And though their charge is tremendous
and headlong at first, it easily exhausts itself and is effective for
but a short while. To you who have of course experienced what I mention
and have conquered men like them I make these suggestions, so that you
may not seem to have been misled by my words, but may really feel a
most steadfast hope of victory as a result of your former exploits.
However, a great many of the very Gauls who are like them will be our
allies, so that even if these nations did have anything terrible about
them, we shall possess that advantage in common with them.
"Do you, then, look at matters in this light yourselves, and also
instruct the rest. For that matter, even if some of you do feel
differently, I, for my part, will fight just the same and will never
abandon the post to which I have been assigned by my country. The tenth
legion will be enough for me; I am sure that, if there should be any
need of it, they would readily go through fire naked. The rest of you
be off, the quicker the better, and let me not see you wearing
yourselves out here to no purpose, recklessly spending the public
money, laying claim to other men's labours, and appropriating the
plunder gathered by others."
At the end of this speech of Caesar's not only did no one raise an
objection, even if some thought altogether the opposite, but they all
agreed, especially those who were suspected by him, to spread the ideas
they had heard. They had no difficulty in persuading the soldiers to
yield obedience; some were eager to do so as a result of having been
chosen in preference to others, and the rest were led to do the same
through emulation of these. He had specially singled out the tenth
legion because for some reason he always felt kindly toward it. This
was the way the legions of the republic were named, according to the
order of their enrolment; whence those of the present day have similar
titles.
When their enthusiasm had been thus aroused, Caesar, in order that they
might not grow indifferent again through delay, no long remained
stationary, but immediately set out and marched against Ariovistus. By
the suddenness of his approach he so alarmed the latter that he forced
him to hold a conference with him regarding peace. They did not come to
terms, however, since Caesar wished to make all the demands and
Ariovistus refused to obey any of them. The war consequently broke out;
and not only were the two sides themselves in anxious suspense, but
likewise all the allies and enemies of both sides in that region, since
they felt sure that the battle between them would take place in the
shortest possible time and that all would have to serve those who once
conquered. The barbarians were superior in numbers and in physical
size, the Romans in experience and in armour. To some extent also
Caesar's prudence was found to counterbalance the fiery spirit of the
Germans and their reckless and impetuous attack. As a result, then, of
their being evenly matched in these respects, their hopes and their
zeal based on these hopes were likewise in perfect balance.
While they were encamped opposite each other, the women of the
barbarians as the result of their divinations, forbade the men to
engage in any battle before the new moon. For this reason Ariovistus,
who always paid great heed to them whenever they took any such action,
did not immediately join in conflict with his entire force, although
the Romans were challenging them to battle. Instead, he sent out the
cavalry alone, with only the foot-soldiers assigned to them, and did
the other side severe injury. Then, becoming contemptuous of them, he
undertook to occupy a position above the Romans' entrenchments; this he
seized, and his opponents occupied another in their turn. Then,
although Caesar kept his army drawn up outside until noon, Ariovistus
would not proceed to battle, but when, toward evening, the Romans
retired, he suddenly attacked them and all but captured their rampart.
Therefore, since affairs were turning out so well for him he paid
little heed any longer to the women; and on the following day, when the
Romans had been drawn up in battle array, according to their daily
custom, he led out his forces against them.
The Romans on seeing them advancing from their tents did not remain
quiet, but rushing forward, gave them no chance to form strictly in
line, and by attacking with a charge and shout prevented them from
hurling their javelins, in which they had especial confidence; in fact,
they came to so close quarters with them that the enemy could not
employ either their pikes or long swords. So the barbarians pushed and
shoved, fighting more with their bodies than with their weapons, and
struggled to overturn whomever they encountered and to knock down
whoever withstood them. Many, deprived even of the use of their short
swords, fought with hands and teeth instead, dragging down their
opponents, and biting and tearing them, since they had a great
advantage in the size of their bodies. The Romans, however, did not
suffer any great injuries in consequence of this; they closed with
their foes, and thanks to their armour and skill, somehow proved a
match for them. At length, after carrying on that sort of battle for a
very long time, they prevailed late in the day. For their daggers,
which were smaller than the Gallic daggers and had steel points, proved
most serviceable to them; moreover, the men themselves, accustomed to
hold out for a long time with the same sustained effort lasted better
than the barbarians, because the endurance of the latter was not of
like quality with the vehemence of their attacks. The Germans were
accordingly defeated, though they did not turn to flight — not that
they lacked the wish, but simply because they were unable to flee
through helplessness and exhaustion. Gathering, therefore, in groups of
three hundred, more or less, they would hold their shields before them
on all sides, and standing erect, they proved unassailable by reason of
their solid front and difficult to dislodge on account of their
denseness; thus they neither inflicted nor suffered any harm.
The Romans, when their foes neither advanced against them nor yet fled,
but stood immovable in the same spot, as if in towers, had likewise put
aside their spears at the very outset, since these were of no use; and
as they could not with their swords either fight in close combat or
reach the others' heads, where alone they were vulnerable, since they
fought with their heads unprotected, they threw aside their shields and
rushed upon the foe. Some by taking a running start and others from
close at hand leaped up as it were upon the tower-like groups and
rained blows upon them. Thereupon many fell immediately, victims of a
single blow, and many died even before they fell; for they were kept
upright even when dead by the closeness of their formation. In this way
most of the infantry perished either there or near the waggons, back to
which some had been driven; and with them perished their wives and
children. Ariovistus with a few horsemen straightway left the country
and set out for the Rhine. He was pursued, but not overtaken, and
escaped on a boat ahead of his followers; of the rest some were killed
by the Romans who advanced into the river, while others were seized and
borne away by the river itself.
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