

BOOK XLIX

Τάδε ἐνεστὶν ἐν τῷ τετταρακοστῷ ἐνάτῳ τῶν Δίωνος Ῥωμαϊκῶν

- α. Ὡς Καῖσαρ Σέξτον¹ ἐνίκησε καὶ Ἀέπιδον καθεῖλεν.
 β. Ὡς Οὐεντίδιος Πάκορον νίκησας ἀπέκτεινεν καὶ τοὺς Πάρθους ὑπὲρ τὸν Εὐφράτην ἐξήλασεν.
 γ. Ὡς Ἀντώνιος ὑπὸ Πάρθων ἠττήθη.
 δ. Ὡς Καῖσαρ Παννονίους κατεστρέψατο.
 ε. Ὡς Ἀντώνιος Ἀρταουάσδην τὸν Ἀρμενίων βασιλέα ἀπατήσας εἶλεν.
 ζ. Ὡς ἡ Παύλου στοὰ καθιερώθη.
 η. Ὡς Μαυριτανία ἡ περὶ Καισάρειαν Ῥωμαίων ἐγένετο.

Χρόνου πλήθος ἔτη τέτταρα ἐν οἷς ἄρχοντες οἱ ἀριθμοῦμενοι οἷδε ἐγένοντο

- Α. Γέλλιος Α. νί. Ποπλικόλας² ὕπ.
 Μ. Κοκκήσιος³ . . . νί.⁴ Νέρουας⁵ ὕπ.
 Α. Κορνούφιχιος Α. νί.
 Σέξτος¹ Πομπήσιος⁶ Σέξτου¹ νί. ὕπ.⁷
 Μ. Ἀντώνιος Μ. νί. τὸ β' ὕπ.
 Α. Σκριβώνιος Α. νί. Λίβων ὕπ.
 Καῖσαρ τὸ β'
 Α.⁸ Οὐολκάκιος Α. νί. Τοῦλλος ὕπ.⁷

Ἐν μὲν οὖν τῷ χειμῶνι ἐν ᾧ Λουκίος τε Γέλλιος καὶ Κοκκήσιος Νέρουας ὑπάτευσαν, ταυθ' οὕτως ἐγένετο. Καῖσαρ δέ, ὡς τό τε ναυτικὸν ἠτοίμαστο καὶ τὸ ἔαρ ἐνέστη, ἠρέ τε ἐκ τῶν Βαιῶν καὶ παρὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν ἐκομίζετο, ἐλπίδα οὐκ ἐλαχίστην ἔχων ἀπανταχόθεν πέριξ τὴν

¹ Σέξτον, Σέξτος, Σέξτου Dind., σέξστον, σέξστος, σέξστου LM (as usual).

² Ποπλικόλας R. Steph., ποπλικόλλας LM.

³ Κοκκήσιος Leuncl., κόκκιος LM (and so below).

BOOK XLIX

The following is contained in the Forty-ninth of Dio's Rome:—

- How Caesar conquered Sextus and overthrew Lepidus (chaps. 1-18).
 How Ventidius conquered and slew Pacorus and drove the Parthians across the Euphrates (chaps. 19-21).
 How Antony was defeated by the Parthians (chaps. 22-33).
 How Caesar subjugated the Pannonians (chaps. 34-38).
 How Antony by guile captured Artavasdes, the king of Armenia (chaps. 39-41).
 How the Portico of Paulus was consecrated (chap. 42).
 How Mauretania Caesariensis fell to the Romans (chap. 43).

Duration of time, four years, in which there were the magistrates (consuls) here enumerated:—

- B.C.
 36 L. Gellius L. F. Publicola, M. Cocceius . . . Nerva.
 35 L. Cornificius L. F. Sextus Pompeius Sex. F.
 34 M. Antonius M. F. (II), L. Scribonius L. F. Libo.
 33 Caesar (II), L. Volcacius L. F. Tullus.

ALL this happened in the winter in which Lucius B.C. 36
 Gellius and Cocceius Nerva became consuls. When the fleet had been made ready and spring had set in, Caesar set out from Baiæ and coasted along Italy with great hopes of encompassing Sicily on all sides.

⁴ . . . νί. added by Bs.

⁵ Νέρουας R. Steph., νέρβας LM.

⁶ Πομπήσιος Xyl., πόππιος LM.

⁷ ὕπ. added by Bs.

⁸ Α. L, om. M.

Σικελίαν περισχίσειν. αὐτός τε γὰρ πολλαῖς ναυσὶν ἐπέπλει, καὶ αἱ τοῦ Ἀντωνίου ἐς τὸν πορθμὸν ἤδη παρήσαν· ὃ τε Λέπιδος ἄκων μὲν, 2 ὑπέσχητο δ' οὖν αὐτῷ βοηθήσειν. μέγιστον δὲ τῷ τε ὕψει τῶν σκαφῶν καὶ τῇ παχύτητι τῶν ξύλων ἐθάρσει· ὑπερπαχῆ τε γὰρ καὶ ὑπερμεγέθη κατεσκευάσθη, ὥστε ἐπιβάτας τε πλείστους ὅσους ἄγειν (καὶ γὰρ πύργους ἔφερον, ὅπως ὥσπερ ἀπὸ τείχους ἐξ ὑπερδεξίων ἀγωνίζονται) καὶ αὐτὰ πρὸς τε τὰς ἐμβολὰς τῶν ἐναντίων ἀντέχειν, καὶ τοὺς ἐμβόλους αὐτῶν, ἅτε καὶ βραιοτέραν τὴν σύγκρουσιν ποιουμένων, ἀπο- 3 στρέφειν. τοιούτοις μὲν λογισμοῖς ὁ Καῖσαρ ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν ἠπέιγετο. καὶ αὐτῷ τὸ ἀκρωτήριον τὸ Παλίνουρον ὀνομαζόμενον ὑπερβάλλοντι χειμῶν μέγας ἐπέπεσε· καὶ οὗτός τε πολλὰς ναῦς ἐφθειρε, καὶ ὁ Μηνᾶς ταραττομέναις ταῖς λοιπαῖς ἐπιγενό- 4 μενος συχνὰς τὰς μὲν ἔκαυσε τὰς δ' ἀνεδήσατο. εἰ δὲ μὴ αὐθις ἐπὶ τε τῇ ἀδείᾳ καὶ ἐπ' ἄλλαις τισὶν ἐλπίσι μετέστη, καὶ τριήρεις ψευδαντομόλους δεξάμενος πᾶν τὸ ναυτικὸν οὐ ἤρχε προέδωκε, διὰ κενῆς ἂν καὶ τότε ὁ ἐπίπλους τῷ Καίσαρι ἐγένετο. τοῦτο δὲ ἔπραξεν, ὅτι οὔτε¹ τῷ Λεπίδῳ πολεμήσαι ὑπὸ τοῦ Σέξτου ἐπετράπη καὶ πρὸς 5 πάντα τᾶλλα ὑπωπτεύετο. Καῖσαρ δὲ προσήκατο μὲν αὐτὸν καὶ τότε ἀσμενέστατα, οὐ μέντοι καὶ ἐπίστευσέ τι ἔτ' αὐτῷ. ὡς δ' οὖν τὰς τε πεπονηκυίας ναῦς ἐπεσκευάσατο, καὶ τοὺς δούλους τοὺς τριηρίτας ἠλευθέρωσε, τοὺς τε περίνεως (πολλοὶ γὰρ φθειρομέναν ἐν τῇ ναυαγίᾳ τῶν σκαφῶν ἀπεκολύμβησαν) ἐς τὸ τοῦ Ἀντωνίου ναυ-

¹ οὔτε Bk., οὐδὲ LM.

For he was sailing thither with many ships himself and those of Antony were already in the strait; also Lepidus had reluctantly promised to assist him. But his chief ground of confidence lay in the height of his vessels and the thickness of their timbers; they had been built unusually stout and unusually high, in order not only to carry the largest possible number of marines (in fact they had towers on them, in order that the men might fight from higher ground, as if from a wall), but also to withstand the attacks of the opposing vessels and at the same time bend back their beaks, since the violence of their collision would be increased thereby. With such plans Caesar was hastening to Sicily. As he was passing the promontory named Palinurus a great storm fell upon him; this destroyed many ships, and Menas, coming upon the rest while they were in confusion, burned or towed away many of them. And had he not again changed sides, on the promise of immunity and because of some other hopes, and betrayed the whole fleet that he commanded by receiving some triremes that simulated desertion, Caesar's voyage to Sicily on this occasion also would have proved fruitless. Menas acted as he did because he was not allowed by Sextus to fight against Lepidus and was under suspicion in all other ways. Caesar received him very gladly on this occasion also, but trusted him no longer. And when he had repaired the damaged ships, freed the slaves that were serving on the triremes, and assigned the reserves (many of whom had escaped by leaping overboard when their vessels were destroyed in the wreck) to Antony's fleet, which was short of men, he

- 6 τικὸν ὀλιγαυδροῦν κατέταξεν, ἕς τε Λιπάραν ἦλθε, κἀνταῦθα τὸν τε Ἀγρίππαν καὶ τὰς ναῦς καταλιπὼν εἰς τὴν ἠπειρον ἐκομίσθη, ἵνα καὶ τὸν πεζὸν εἰς τὴν Σικελίαν, ὅταν καιρὸς γένηται, περαιώσῃ.
- 2 Μαθὼν δὲ ταῦτα ὁ Σέξτος αὐτὸς μὲν ἐν Μεσσήνῃ ὑφώρμει, τὸν διάπλουν αὐτοῦ τηρῶν, τῷ δ' Ἀγρίππα Δημοχάρην ἀνθορμεῖν ἐν Μύλαις ἐκέλευσεν. οὗτοι οὖν τὸ μὲν πλείστον τοῦ χρόνου ἀποπειρώμενοι μὲν ἀλλήλων κατὰ τὸ παρῆικον, οὐ μέντοι καὶ ἐναποκινδυνεύσαι παντὶ τῷ στόλῳ πολμῶντες, κατανόησαν. οὔτε γὰρ τὰς δυνάμεις ἀλλήλων ἤδεσαν, καὶ πάντα πρὸς τε τὸ μείζον καὶ πρὸς τὸ φοβερώτερον παρ' ἀμφοτέροις περὶ τῶν ἐτέρων ἐλογοποιεῖτο. τέλος δὲ ὁ Ἀγρίππας συνείδῃ ὅτι οὐ συμφέρεῖ οἱ διατρίβειν (οἱ γὰρ τοῦ Σέξτου, ἅτε ἐν τῇ οἰκείᾳ ναυλοχοῦντες, οὐδὲν ἐδέοντο σπεύδειν) τὰς τε ἀρίστας τῶν νεῶν ἔλαβε, καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς Μύλας πρὸς κατασκοπὴν τοῦ τῶν ἐναντίων πλήθους ὤρμησε. καὶ ἐπειδὴ μήτε πάντας αὐτοὺς ἰδεῖν ἠδυνήθη¹ μήτ' ἀναχθῆναι τις αὐτῶν ἠθέλησε, κατεφρόνησεν αὐτῶν, καὶ ἐπανελθὼν παρεσκευάζετο ὡς καὶ πάσαις ταῖς ναυσὶ τῆς ὑστεραίας ἐπὶ τὰς Μύλας ἐπιπλευσούμενος. τὸ δ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ ὁ Δημοχάρης ἔπαθε· μόνας τε γὰρ τὰς ἀφικόμενας ναῦς ὑποτοπήσας εἶναι, καὶ βραδυτάτα αὐτὰς ὑπὸ τοῦ μεγέθους πλεούσας ἰδῶν, τὸν τε Σέξτον τῆς νυκτὸς μετεπέμψατο, καὶ ἠτοιμάζετο ὡς καὶ αὐτῇ τῇ Λιπάρᾳ προσμίξων. ἡμέρα τε ὑπέφηνε,² καὶ ἀμφοτέροι ἄμα ὡς καὶ ἐπ' ἐλάττους σφῶν ἀλλήλους ὄντας ἔπλευον.

¹ ἠδυνήθη St., ἐδυνήθη LM. ² ὑπέφηνε M, ἀπέφηνε L.

came to Lipara; and leaving there Agrippa and the ships, he returned to the mainland, in order to transport the infantry also to Sicily, when an opportunity should arise. B.C. 36

On learning of this Sextus himself remained at anchor off Messana, waiting for Caesar to cross, but he ordered Demochares to anchor opposite Agrippa at Mylae. These two men spent most of the time in testing each other's strength as opportunity offered, but they did not dare to risk an engagement with their entire armaments; for they were not acquainted with each other's forces and on both sides the reports that circulated about the opposing fleet were exaggerated and made more fear-inspiring than the reality. But finally Agrippa realized that it was not advantageous for him to delay,—for the forces of Sextus, lying as they did in home waters, had no need of haste,—and so, taking the best of his ships, he set out for Mylae to spy out the numbers of the enemy. And when he found that he could not see them all and that none of them wished to come out into the open sea, he came to despise them, and on his return made preparations to sail against Mylae on the following day with all his ships. And Demochares came to much the same conclusion; for he had the idea that the ships which had approached him were all alone, and seeing that they sailed very slowly by reason of their size, he sent for Sextus by night and proceeded to make preparations to attack Lipara itself. When day broke, they were sailing against each other, both sides expecting to meet

3 ἐγγύς δὲ δὴ γενόμενοι, καὶ παρὰ δόξαν πολλῶν πλείους τοὺς ἐναντίους ἐκάτεροι ὧν ᾤοντο εἶναι ἰδόντες, τὰ μὲν πρῶτα ἐταράχθησαν ὁμοίως ἀμφοτέροι, καὶ τινες καὶ πρῦμναν ἐκρούσαντο· ἔπειτα δὲ τὴν φυγὴν τῆς μάχης μᾶλλον φοβηθέντες, καὶ ἐν μὲν ταύτῃ καὶ κρατῆσαι ἂν ἐλπίσαντες,¹ ἐν δὲ ἐκείνῃ πασσυδι² ἀπολείσθαι προσδοκῆσαντες, ἀντεξώρμησαν καὶ συμμίξαντες ἐνανμάχησαν.

2 ἦσαν δὲ οἱ μὲν τῷ πλήθει τῶν νεῶν, οἱ δὲ ταῖς ἐμπειρίαις τῶν ναυτικῶν προφέροντες, καὶ τοῖς μὲν τό τε ὕψος τῶν σκαφῶν καὶ τὸ πάχος τῶν ἐπωτίδων οἳ τε πύργοι συνήρουντο, τοὺς δ' ἑτέρους οἳ τε διέκπλοι ἀνέφερον, πρὸς τε τὴν ῥώμην τῶν τοῦ Καίσαρος ἐπιβατῶν ἢ τόλμα αὐτῶν ἀντήρκει· αὐτόμολοι γὰρ οἱ πλείους ἐκ τῆς Ἰταλίας

3 ὄντες ἀπονοία πολλῇ ἐχρῶντο. καὶκ τούτου πλεονεκτοῦντές τε ἅμα ἀλλήλων καὶ ἐλαττούμενοι οἷς εἶπον, ἴσην τὴν ἰσχὺν ἐκ τοῦ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων σφίσις ἀντιπάλου εἶχον· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο χρόνῳ καὶ ἀγχώμαλα ἐπὶ πλείστον ἠγωνίσαντο.

4 οἳ τε γὰρ Σέξτειοι τοὺς μὲν ἄνδρας τοὺς ἐναντίους τῷ ῥοθίῳ ἐξέπλησσαν, καὶ τινὰς ναῦς, ῥύμη τέ σφισι προσπίπτοντες καὶ τὰς παρεξαιρεσίας αὐτῶν ἀναρρηγνύντες, ἐτίτρωσκον, ἀπὸ δὲ δὴ τῶν πύργων ἐν τῇ προσμίξει βαλλόμενοι καὶ χειρῶν ἐπιβολαῖς σιδηρῶν προσ-

5 ἀρτώμενοι οὐδὲν ἔλαττον ὧν ἔδρων ἔπασχον· καὶ

inferior numbers. But when now they drew near together and each force contrary to its expectation saw that its opponents were much more numerous than they had supposed, both alike were at first thrown into confusion, and some even backed water. Then, fearing flight more than battle, because in the one case they hoped they should prevail, whereas in the other they expected to be utterly destroyed, they sailed out to meet each other and when they came to close quarters joined in battle. The one side surpassed in the number of its ships, the other in the experience of its sailors; one side was helped by the height of the vessels and the thickness of the cat-heads and also the towers, but these advantages were counterbalanced by the manoeuvring of the other side, and the superior strength of Caesar's marines was matched by the daring of those of Sextus, the majority of whom fought with great desperation inasmuch as they were deserters from Italy. Consequently, since each side had the points of superiority and likewise of inferiority that I have named with respect to the other, they found their total strength equal as the result of the even balance of their resources; and on this account they at last fought on even terms for a long time. The followers of Sextus alarmed their opponents by the way they dashed up the waves, and they also damaged some of their ships by assailing them with a rush and ripping open the parts that were beyond the banks of oars,¹ but since they were assailed with missiles from the towers at the moment of attack and were brought alongside by grappling irons, they suffered no less harm than they inflicted. And Caesar's forces,

B.C. 36

¹ κρατῆσαι ἂν ἐλπίσαντες Bk., κρατῆσειν ἀνθελπίσαντες LM.

² πασσυδι R. Steph., πασσυδεῖ LM (so in chap. 7, 3).

¹ The prows and stems.

οἱ Καισάρειοι ἐς χεῖρας μὲν σφισιν ἰόντες καὶ ἐς τὰς ναῦς σφῶν μετεκβαίνοντες κρείττους ἐγίγνοντο, ἐκπηδώντων δὲ αὐτῶν ἐς τὴν θάλασσαν ὁπότε βαπτίζονται, καὶ ἐτέρων σκαφῶν ῥαδίως ἕκ τε τοῦ καλῶς νεῖν καὶ ἕκ τοῦ κούφως ἐσκευάσθαι ἐπιβαινόντων, ἀντιρρόπως ἤλαττοῦντο. κἄν τούτῳ καὶ τῶν νεῶν ἢ τε τῆς ναυτιλίας τῶν ἐτέρων ὀξύτης ἰσοπαλῆς τῇ τῶν ἐναντίων βεβαιότητι καὶ ἢ τούτων βαρύτης ἰσοστασία τῇ ἐκείνων λεπτότητι ἐγίγμετο.

4 Ὅψὲ δ' οὖν ποτε καὶ πρὸς νύκτα ἤδη οἱ τοῦ Καίσαρος ἐκράτησαν, οὐ μέντοι καὶ ἐπεδιώξαντινα, ὡς μὲν ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ καὶ τὸ εἶκός συμβάλλεται, ὅτι μήτε καταλαβεῖν αὐτοὺς ἐδύνατο, καὶ ἐς τὴν γῆν, βράχῃ ὧν ἄπειροι ἦσαν ἔχουσαν, ἐφοβήθησαν ἐξοκεῖλαι· ὡς δὲ τινες λέγουσιν, ὁ Ἀγρίππας, ἅτε καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ Καίσαρος ἄλλ' οὐχ ὑπὲρ ἑαυτοῦ μαχόμενος, ἐξαρκεῖν οἱ τὸ τρέψαι τοὺς ἀντιπάλους ἠγάθειτο. καὶ γὰρ εἰώθει λέγειν πρὸς τοὺς πάνυ ἐταίρους ὅτι οἱ πλείους τῶν ἐν ταῖς δυναστείαις ὄντων οὐδένα ἐθέλουσι κρείττω¹ σφῶν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν πλείω, ὅσα γε καὶ πρόχειρον τὴν νίκην ἔχει, αὐτοὶ δι' ἑαυτῶν ποιοῦνται, τὰ δὲ δὴ χεῖρω καὶ ἀποπώτερα ἄλλοις προστάττουσι. κἄν ἄρα ποτὲ τῶν ἀμεινόνων τι ἀναγκασθῶσι σφισιν ἐπιτρέψαι, βαρύνονται τε καὶ ἄχθονται τῇ εὐδοξίᾳ αὐτῶν· ἠττάσθαι μὲν γάρ σφας καὶ κακῶς πράττειν οὐκ εὐχονται, οὐ μέντοι καὶ παντελῶς τι καταπράξαντας τὴν δόξαν αὐτοὺς λαβεῖν αἰροῦνται. δεῖν οὖν παρῆναι τὸν ἄνδρα τὸν σωθησόμενον τῆς μὲν δυσχε-

¹ κρείττω Xiph., κρείττων LM.

when they came into close conflict and crossed over to the hostile ships, proved superior; but as the enemy leaped overboard into the sea whenever their vessels sank, and because of their good swimming and light equipment succeeded easily in climbing aboard others, the attackers were at a corresponding disadvantage. Meanwhile, in the case of the ships also, the rapidity of movement of those on the one side counterbalanced the steadiness of those on the other side, and the weight of the latter made up for the lightness of the former.

Late in the day, however, toward nightfall, Caesar's forces were at last victorious, but they did not give chase. The reason, as it appears to me and as may with probability be conjectured, was that they could not overtake the fleeing ships and were afraid of running ashore, since the coast abounded in shoals with which they were unacquainted; but some assert that Agrippa thought it sufficient merely to rout his adversaries, since he was fighting for Caesar and not for himself. For he was wont to say to his intimate friends that most men in positions of power wish no one to be superior to themselves, but attend personally without the use of agents to most matters—to all, in fact, that afford them an easy victory—and assign the more difficult and extraordinary tasks to others. And if they ever do find themselves obliged to entrust an enterprise of the better sort to their assistants, they are irritated and displeased at the fame these subordinates win, and although they do not pray that they may be defeated and fare badly, yet they do not choose to have them win a complete success and secure glory from it. His advice, therefore, was that the man who expected to come out

ρείας αὐτοῦς¹ τῶν πραγμάτων ἀπαλλάττειν, τὴν δὲ δὴ κατόρθωσίν σφωον ἐκείνοις φυλάττειν. ἐγὼ δὲ ὅτι μὲν ταῦθ' οὕτω πέφυκε καὶ ὅτι καὶ ὁ Ἀγρίππας ἐπεμελεῖτο αὐτῶν οἶδα, οὐ μὴν ἐν γὰρ τῷ τότε παρόντι τοῦτ' αἴτιον τῆς οὐ διώξεως αὐτοῦ γράφω· οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδ' εἰ πάνυ ἐβούλετο, οἷός τε ἦν ἐπισπένθαι σφίσιν.

- 5 Ἐν ᾧ δ' οὖν ἡ ναυμαχία ἐγίγνετο, ὁ Καῖσαρ ὡς τάχιστα τὸν τε Σέξτον ἐκ τῆς Μεσσηνίας ἀπεληλυθότα καὶ τὸν πορθμὸν φυλακῆς ἔρημον ὄντα ἤσθητο, τὸ μὲν καινὸν τοῦ πολέμου οὐ παρέλπευε, ἀλλ' εὐθὺς ἐπιβάς τῶν Ἀντωνιέων νεῶν πρὸς Ταυρομένιον ἐπεραιώθη, οὐ μὴν καὶ ἐν τύχῃ αὐτῷ
2 ἐχρήσατο. πλείοντα μὲν γὰρ οὐδ' ἀποβαίνοντα αὐτὸν οὐδεὶς ἐκώλυσε, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάνυ καθ' ἡσυχίαν τά τε ἄλλα καὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον ἐποίησατο· ἐπεὶ δὲ ἦ τε ναυμαχία ἐγένετο, καὶ ὁ Σέξτος ἔς τε τὴν Μεσσηνίην σπουδῆ ἀφίκετο, καὶ μαθὼν παρόντα αὐτὸν ἄλλους τε διὰ ταχέων
3 ἀκραιφνεῖς ἐς τὰς ναῦς ἀντενεβίβασε καὶ ἐκείναις τε αὐτῷ ἅμα καὶ τοῖς ὀπλίταις κατὰ γῆν προσέμμεξε, τοῦτοις μὲν οὐδ' ἐπεξήλθεν, ἀνταναρχθεὶς δὲ καταφρονήσει τῆς τε ὀλιγότητος τῶν ἐναντίων νεῶν καὶ ὅτι καὶ προήττηντο, τοῦ τε ναυτικοῦ τὸ πλεῖον ἀπέβαλε καὶ αὐτὸς ὀλίγου προσδιεφθάρη.
4 οὐκ οὖν οὐδ' ἠδυνήθη πρὸς τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ τοὺς ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ ὄντας διαφυγεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀγαπητῶς ἔς τὴν ἠπειρὸν ἀπεσώθη. καὶ αὐτὸς μὲν ἐν ἀσφαλεῖ ἦν, ὁρῶν δὲ τὸ στράτευμα ἐν τῇ νήσῳ ἀπειλημμένον
5 δεινῶς ἤχθητο. καὶ οὐ πρότερον ἀνεθάρσθησε πρὶν

¹ αὐτοῦς Polak, αὐτὸν LM.

alive should relieve his masters of undertakings which involve great difficulty and reserve for them the successes. As for me, I know that all this is naturally so and that Agrippa paid heed to these principles, but I am not saying that on that particular occasion this was the reason for his failure to pursue; for he would not have been able to catch up with the foe no matter how much he might have desired it.

While the naval battle was in progress, Caesar, as soon as he perceived that Sextus had departed from Messana and that the strait was destitute of a garrison, did not let slip this "chance of war,"¹ but immediately embarked on Antony's vessels and crossed over to Tauromenium; however, he enjoyed no good fortune in doing so. No one, to be sure, interfered with his sailing or his disembarking, and he was quite undisturbed in general and also when he made his camp; but when the naval battle was over, Sextus came with all speed to Messana, and learning of Caesar's presence he quickly filled his ships with fresh troops and attacked him at one and the same time with this fleet and with his heavy-armed troops on land. Caesar did not even come out to fight the infantry, but sailing out against Sextus, because he despised the enemy's fleet with its small number of vessels and because they had been previously defeated, he lost the greater part of his fleet and barely avoided destruction himself. Indeed, he could not even escape to his own men in Sicily, but was glad to reach the mainland in safety. And though he himself was then in security, yet when he saw his army cut off on the island, he was terribly distressed. His confidence was not restored until a

¹ An expression borrowed from Thucydides (iii. 30).

ἰχθύν τινα ἐκ τῆς θαλάσσης αὐτόματον ἀναθορόν-
τα πρὸς τοὺς πόδας αὐτοῦ προσπεσεῖν ἐκ γὰρ
τούτου πιστεύσας τοῖς μάντεσιν, εἰποῦσίν οἱ ὅτι
δουλώσεται αὐτήν, ἀνερώσθη.

- 6 Καὶ ὁ μὲν τὸν Ἀγρίππαν σπουδῇ πρὸς τὴν
ἐπικουρίαν αὐτῶν μετεπέμπετο, ἐκείνοι δὲ ἐπο-
λιοκούντο. καὶ ἐπειδὴ τὰ τε ἐπιτήδεια ἐπιλεί-
πειν σφᾶς ἤρχετο καὶ βοήθεια οὐδεμία πω ἐφαί-
νετο, φοβηθεὶς ὁ Κορνούφικιος (οὗτος γὰρ αὐτῶν
ἤρχε) μὴ καὶ ὑπὸ λιμοῦ τῷ χρόνῳ κατὰ χώραν
2 μένων ἐκπολιορκηθῆ, καὶ νομίσας διατρίβοντι μὲν
οἱ αὐτοῦ ταύτη μηδένα τῶν πολεμίων ἐς χεῖρας,
ἅτε καὶ κρείττονι τοῖς ὀπλίταις ὄντι, ἤξειν, ἂν δέ
πη προχωρῆ, δυοῖν θάτερον, ἢ προσμίξαντάς
σφισιν αὐτοὺς κρατήσῃν, ἢ μὴ βουλευθέντων αὐ-
τῶν τοῦτο ποιῆσαι πρὸς τε τὸ ἀσφαλὲς ἀποχω-
ρήσῃν καὶ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων εὐπορήσῃν καὶ τινα
καὶ ὠφελίαν παρὰ τοῦ Καίσαρος ἢ καὶ τοῦ
3 Ἀγρίππου σχήσῃν, τὰ τε σκάφη ὅσα ἐκ τε
τῆς ναυμαχίας ὑπελέλειπτο καὶ πρὸς τὸ τά-
φρευμα ἐξεπεπτώκει κατέκαυσε, καὶ αὐτὸς ἄρας
ὡς πρὸς τὰς Μύλας ἐπορεύετο. καὶ αὐτῷ προσ-
βαλόντες καὶ ἰππῆς καὶ ψιλοὶ πόρρωθεν (οὐ γὰρ
δὴ καὶ ὁμόσε χωρησαὶ ἐτόλμων) ἄποροι δεινῶς
4 ἐγίγνοντο. αὐτοὶ μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐπήσαν ὅποτε
καιρὸς εἶη, καὶ ἀνέστρεφον διὰ βραχέος· οἱ δέ,
ὡς γε ὀπλίται, οὐτ' ἄλλως ἐπιδιώκειν σφᾶς ὑπὸ
τοῦ βάρους ἐδύναντο, καὶ τοὺς ἀόπλους τοὺς ἐκ
τοῦ ναυτικοῦ σωθέντας περιστέλλον. καὶ τού-

fish of its own accord leaped out of the sea and fell
at his feet; this incident gave him courage once
more, for he believed the soothsayers who told him
that he should make the sea his slave.

Caesar, now, was sending urgent messages to
Agrippa to come to the aid of his soldiers in Sicily,
and these troops meanwhile were being besieged.
And when their provisions began to fail them and
no rescuing force appeared, Cornificius, their leader,
became afraid that if he stayed where he was he
should in the course of time be compelled by hunger
to yield to his besiegers; and he reflected that
while he tarried there in that same spot none of
the enemy would join issue with him, because he
was superior in heavy-armed troops, but if he should
leave his camp in any direction one of two things
would happen—either he would overpower the
enemy, if they joined battle with him, or, if they
declined battle, he would retire to a place of safety,
get a supply of provisions, and obtain some help from
Caesar or from Agrippa. Therefore he burned all the
vessels that had been left over from the sea-fight and
had been cast up beside the entrenchments, and set
out as if to proceed to Mylae. Both cavalry and
light-armed troops attacked him from a distance, not
daring to come to close quarters, and proved exceed-
ingly troublesome to him; for they would not only
attack whenever opportunity offered but would also
quickly retreat again, whereas his men, being heavy-
armed, could not pursue them in any case owing to
the weight of their armour, and moreover were
endeavouring to protect the unarmed men who had
been saved from the fleet. Consequently they were

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