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esse, quod deo sat est. Quo colitur, et amat; non potest amor cum timore misceri. Rectissime ergo facere te iudico, quod timeri a servis tuis non vis, quod verborum castigatione uteris; verberibus muta\textsuperscript{1} admonentur.

Non quicquid nos offendit, et laedit. Sed ad rabiem nos\textsuperscript{2} cogunt pervenire deliciae, ut quicquid non ex voluntate respondit, iram evocet. Regum nobis induimus animos. Nam illi quoque oblieti et suarum virium et inbecillitatis alienae sic excandescunt, sic saeviunt, quasi iniuriam acceperint, a cuius rei periculo illos fortunae suae magnitudo tutissimos praestat. Nec hoc ignorant, sed occasionem nocendi captant querendo; acceperunt iniuriam ut facerent.

\textbf{XX} Diutius te morari nolo; non est enim tibi exhortatione opus. Hoc habent inter cetera boni mores: placent sibi, permanent. Levis est malitia, saepe mutatur, non in melius, sed in aliud. \textit{V\textsc{ale}.}

\textbf{XLVIII.}

\textsc{Seneca} \textsc{Lucilio} \textsc{svo} \textsc{salvem}

1 Ad epistulam, quam mihi ex itinere misisti, tam longam quam ipsum iter fuit, postea rescribam. Seducere me debeto et quid suadeam circumspectae. Nam tu quoque, qui consulis, diu an consuleres cogitasti; quanto magis hoc mihi faciendum est,

\textsuperscript{1} muta Picianus; multa and admoventur or admonentur MSS.
\textsuperscript{2} cogunt pL; some later MSS. and Macrobius add nos.

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for a master. Respect means love, and love and fear cannot be mingled. So I hold that you are entirely right in not wishing to be feared by your slaves, and in lashing them merely with the tongue; only dumb animals need the thong.

That which annoys us does not necessarily injure us; but we are driven into wild rage by our luxurious lives, so that whatever does not answer our whims arouses our anger. We don the temper of kings. For they, too, forgetful alike of their own strength and of other men's weakness, grow white-hot with rage, as if they had received an injury, when they are entirely protected from danger of such injury by their exalted station. They are not unaware that this is true, but by finding fault they seize upon opportunities to do harm; they insist that they have received injuries, in order that they may inflict them.

I do not wish to delay you longer; for you need no exhortation. This, among other things, is a mark of good character: it forms its own judgments and abides by them; but badness is fickle and frequently changing, not for the better, but for something different. Farewell.

XLVIII. ON QUIBBLING AS UNWORTHY OF THE PHILOSOPHER

In answer to the letter which you wrote me while travelling,—a letter as long as the journey itself,—I shall reply later. I ought to go into retirement, and consider what sort of advice I should give you. For you yourself, who consult me, also reflected for a long time whether to do so; how much more, then, should I myself reflect, since more
cum longiore mora opus sit, ut solvas quaestionem quam ut proponas? Utique cum aliud tibi expedit, aliud mihi. Iterum ego tamquam Epicureus loquor?

2 Mihi vero idem expedit, quod tibi; aut non sum amicus, nisi quicquid agitur ad te pertinentis, meum est. Consortium rerum omnium inter nos facit amicitia. Nec secundi quicquam singulis est nec adversi; in commune vivitur. Nec potest quisquam beate degere, qui se tantum intuetur, qui omnia ad utilitates suas convertit; alteri vivas oportet, si vis tibi vivere. Haec societas diligenter et sancte observata, quae nos homines hominibus\(^1\) miscet et indicat aliquid esse commune ius generis humani, plurimum ad illam quoque, de qua loquebar, interiorem societatem amicitiae colendam proicit. Omnia enim cum amico communia habebit, qui multa cum homine.

4 Hoc, Lucili virorum optime, mihi ab ipsis subtilibus praecipi malo, quid amico praestare debeat, quid homini, quam quot modis amicus dicatur, et homo quam multa significet. In diversum ecce sapientia et stultitia discendunt; cui accedo? In utram ire partem iubes? Illi homo pro amico est, huic amicus non est pro homine. Ille amicum sibi parat, hic se

\(^1\) homines hominibus later MSS.; omnes hominibus pLp; omnes omnibus Muretus.

\(^a\) The Epicureans, who reduced all goods to "utilities," could not regard a friend's advantage as identical with one's own advantage. And yet they laid great stress upon friendship as one of the chief sources of pleasure. For an attempt to reconcile these two positions see Cicero, De Finibus, i. 65 ff. Seneca has inadvertently used a phrase that implies a difference between a friend's interests and one's own. This leads him to reassert the Stoic view of friendship, which adopted as its motto καὐτὰ τὰ τῆς φίλων.
deliberation is necessary in settling than in propounding a problem! And this is particularly true when one thing is advantageous to you and another to me. Am I speaking again in the guise of an Epicurean? But the fact is, the same thing is advantageous to me which is advantageous to you; for I am not your friend unless whatever is at issue concerning you is my concern also. Friendship produces between us a partnership in all our interests. There is no such thing as good or bad fortune for the individual; we live in common. And no one can live happily who has regard to himself alone and transforms everything into a question of his own utility; you must live for your neighbour, if you would live for yourself. This fellowship, maintained with scrupulous care, which makes us mingle as men with our fellow-men and holds that the human race have certain rights in common, is also of great help in cherishing the more intimate fellowship which is based on friendship, concerning which I began to speak above. For he that has much in common with a fellow-man will have all things in common with a friend.

And on this point, my excellent Lucilius, I should like to have those subtle dialecticians of yours advise me how I ought to help a friend, or how a fellow-man, rather than tell me in how many ways the word "friend" is used, and how many meanings the word "man" possesses. Lo, Wisdom and Folly are taking opposite sides. Which shall I join? Which party would you have me follow? On that side, "man" is the equivalent of "friend"; on the other side, "friend" is not the equivalent of "man." The one wants a friend for his own advantage; the other wants to make himself an advantage to his
amico. Tu mihi verba distorques et syllabas digeris.
5 Scilicet nisi interrogationes vaferimas struxero et conclu-
sione falsa a vero nascens mendacium adstrinxero, non potero a fugiendis petenda secernere. Pudet me;
in re tam seria senes ludimus.1
6 "Mus syllaba est. Mus autem caseum rodit;
syllaba ergo caseum rodit." Puta nunc me istuc
non posse solveere. Quod mihi ex ista inscientia² peric-
culum iniminet? Quod incommodum? Sine dubio
verendum est, ne quando in muscipulo syllabas
capiam aut ne quando, si neglegentior fuero, caseum
liber comedat. Nisi forte illa acutior est collectio:
"Mus syllaba est. Syllaba autem caseum non rodit;
7 mus ergo caseum non rodit." O puere ineptias!
In hoc superficia subduximus? In hoc barbam de-
misimus? Hoc est, quod tristes docemus et pallidi?
Vis scire, quid philosophia promittat generi
humano? Consilium. Alium mors vocat, alium
paupertas urit, alium divitiae vel alienae torquent vel
suae. Ille malam fortunam horret, hic se felicitati
suae subducere cupit. Hunc homines male habent,
8 illum di. Quid mihi lusoria ista conponis? Non
est iocandi locus; ad miserios advocatus es. Opem
laturum te naufragis, captis, aegris, egentibus, in-

1 After ludimus most MSS. give Valè. Seneca Lucilio
mo Salutem: Hense brackets.
2 inscientia P² and Lipsius: scientia pLPb.

a The sides are given in reverse order in the two clauses:
to the Stoic the terms "friend" and "man" are co-extensive;
his is the friend of everybody, and his motive in friendship
is to be of service; the Epicurean, however, narrows the
definition of "friend" and regards him merely as an instru-
ment to his own happiness.

b In this paragraph Seneca exposes the folly of trying to
prove a truth by means of logical tricks, and offers a curica-
ture of those which were current among the philosophers
whom he derides.
friend. What you have to offer me is nothing but distortion of words and splitting of syllables. It is clear that unless I can devise some very tricky premisses and by false deductions tack on to them a fallacy which springs from the truth, I shall not be able to distinguish between what is desirable and what is to be avoided! I am ashamed! Old men as we are, dealing with a problem so serious, we make play of it!

"'Mouse' is a syllable." Now a mouse eats cheese; therefore, a syllable eats cheese." Suppose now that I cannot solve this problem; see what peril hangs over my head as a result of such ignorance! What a scrape I shall be in! Without doubt I must beware, or some day I shall be catching syllables in a mousetrap, or, if I grow careless, a book may devour my cheese! Unless, perhaps, the following syllogism is shrewder still: "'Mouse' is a syllable. Now a syllable does not eat cheese. Therefore a mouse does not eat cheese." What childish nonsense! Do we knit our brows over this sort of problem? Do we let our beards grow long for this reason? Is this the matter which we teach with sour and pale faces?

Would you really know what philosophy offers to humanity? Philosophy offers counsel. Death calls away one man, and poverty chafes another; a third is worried either by his neighbour's wealth or by his own. So-and-so is afraid of bad luck; another desires to get away from his own good fortune. Some are ill-treated by men, others by the gods. Why, then, do you frame for me such games as these? It is no occasion for jest; you are retained as counsel for unhappy mankind. You have promised to help those in peril by sea, those in captivity, the
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tentae securi subiectum praestantibus caput pollicitus es. Quo divertis? Quid agis?

Hic, cum quo ludis, timet; succurre, quidquid laque ti res pendentium penis.† Omnes undique ad te manus tendunt, perditae vitae perituraeque auxilium aliquod inplorant, in te spes opesque sunt. Rogant, ut ex tanta illos volutatione extrahas, ut disiectis et errantibus clarum veritatis lumen ostendas.

9 Die, quid natura necessarium fecerit, quid supernum, quam faciles leges posuerit, quam incunda sit vita, quam expedita illas sequentibus, quam acerba et implicita eorum, qui opinioni plus quam naturae crediderunt.


† The passage is corrupt, but the general sense is given in the translation. Buecheler suggests sucurre, quidquid laqueis timore pendenti rumpens.
‡ faciles leges later MSS.; faciles LPb; felices p.
§ ad horum . . . . crediderim added by Hense as supplying the required connexion.
†† philosophia Page; philosophiae MSS.

* Literally, “or if or if not,” words constantly employed by the logicians and in legal instruments. For the latter cf. Cicero, Pro Caelina, 23. 65 tum illud, quod dicitur, “sive nives” irradient, tum auctia verborum et litterarum tendiculas in invidiam vocant.
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